New Book: "Battlegroup!: The Lessons of the Unfought Battles of the Cold War" (Jim Storr)

[John Kettler]

Simcoe,

What I recall from decades ago is that there simply isn't enough space into which to cram the Soviet forces the planners expected to swarm across the IGB and into the storied Fulda Gap. Finding something on this isn't proving at all easy, though, and the sidebar comment in JDR was only a sentence or two, not an article. Would note, though, that the shocking discovery in a Post-Berlin Wall downing recovered Soviet war plan envisioned 200 tac nukes used by the Soviets to get to the Channel in a matter of weeks rated only a few sentences.

Regards,

John Kettler

Edited January 6, 2022 by John Kettler

[Grey_Fox]

Fulda wasn't meant to be a Soviet main effort though, just diversionary. The plains to the north, where the West Germans and Brits were stationed, was where the Soviet main effort was going to fall.

Edited January 6, 2022 by Grey_Fox

[John Kettler]

Gray_Fox,

Fair point, but since this was highest profile gap in. the US sector, it became the defining goal for the US. Had a brother with the 2/11 ACR, and he was in the low PR profile Meiningen Gap. By the time the Berlin Wall game down, he was a Platoon Sergeant in the famous Blackhorse 2/11 ACR Scouts on Bradley M3 CFVs. Used to send me sketches of East German guard towers, their patrols' guard dogs (terrifyingly drawn and labeled Fangorous Gigantus) and many other things. It wasn't at all comforting to have a SECRET level Army study of expected US casualties in the CFB (Covering Force Battle) of 50% and my brother sitting practically on the IGB. That said, having him there and a family friend who was an F-16 pilot lent my work as a Soviet Threat Analyst who worked on programs to kill tanks, deep interdict Soviet follow-on forces and other things a kind of urgency and attention to detail that might otherwise have been lacking. Nothing like a personal stake! Had war broken out, the F-16s would've had Hughes AIM-120 AMRAAMs, my brother would've had wartime use only TOW 2s, and the A-10s supporting him would've been armed with various versions of the Maverick, all Hughes Missile Systems Group products, and all of which I'd done analyses concerning.

Regards,

John Kettler

[MikeyD]

US writing is fixated on Fulda region for the simple reason that that was where they were stationed. If the US had instead been stationed along the Baltic coast, Pentagon military writing would have pegged the defense of Hamburg as the absolute most important sector of the war. 

[Simcoe]

1 hour ago, MikeyD said:

US writing is fixated on Fulda region for the simple reason that that was where they were stationed. If the US had instead been stationed along the Baltic coast, Pentagon military writing would have pegged the defense of Hamburg as the absolute most important sector of the war. 

That was the most interesting part of the book for me. As an American I was really surprised to hear that Fulda would be a backwater. I didn't know how integral the German army was to the defense.

(Tinfoil hat time) Makes you wonder how much that influenced the American whitewashing of the Wehrmacht and to a lesser extent the Nazi's after WW2.

[arkhangelsk2021]

If one can spare about US$2.99, people might want to get a "feel" of what this book is likely to say by picking up Storr's

Hall of Mirrors: War and Warfare in the Twentieth Century (Emerging Civil War Series)

as an Ebook, in particular Chapter 10 discusses the Cold War.

[Aragorn2002]

Pity there's no kindle version of this book.

[BeondTheGrave]

10 hours ago, Simcoe said:

(Tinfoil hat time) Makes you wonder how much that influenced the American whitewashing of the Wehrmacht and to a lesser extent the Nazi's after WW2.

This is something I am a bit interested in for the later Cold War era, the relationship between German Generals, Nazis, and the US Army has always been....... weird. After all we forced many of them to write us histories while they were in prison camps, histories which were pretty influential in how the civilian community has gone on to remember WWII and especially the Eastern Front. From what I've read of both documents and of writing on the subject, the US Army was pretty uncritical when it came to the Nazis. There is even an infamous Military Review article which is very flattering to Joachim Piper and has, as I recall, one line in it about all the bad stuff he did. The interviews with Hermann Balck I linked in that other thread are also interesting, I've always gotten the vibe from reading the interview transcripts that what theyre really saying is that the Russians are incapable of being good soldiers, Germans are inherently good soldiers, etc. Balck also definitely takes the line in his memoir that Berlin and the rear area troops were responsible for the brutality not the troops on the line. Thats not really true (see the work of Omar Bartov who takes down that specific myth). Yet the US Army took those lessons seemingly uncritical and really adopted the German lessons from fighting the Soviets without any comment on all the nasty parts of WWII on the Eastern front. Also no comment on the fact that the Germans lost(!!!) and why that may have been the case. Its interesting stuff.

Back on schedule @marais the Amazon page suggests he has some SHOCKING revelation about the Bundeswehr. Is that just selling fluff or does he seem to have something to say there? Is it just 'the Germans were really good?' Also for those who have read it, where do you think this falls on the memoir to scholarship spectrum? Sometimes you get these guys who do this annoying thing where they want to contribute to bigger questions about a subject, but are too lazy to do more research so they just take their own direct experience and apply it writ large to the whole Army or the whole system. Or just ignore everything they didn't directly engage with. It makes me wary of these kinds of books sometimes. Do you think he does a good job of striking a balance? 

If his big revelation re: the Germans is that 'they had learned lessons from WWII and that made their doctrine good' I hate to break it too him, but the US also did that, both AD & AirLand Battle were directly based off WWII experiences generally, German experiences specifically, and were written in combination with German doctrine. The 1980s HDV 100/100 and FM 100-5 were very similar, and DePuy was PROUD that he had gotten the Germans to rewrite the 1970s version of HDV 100/100 to make it like Active Defense. I wonder how much of 'German doctrine is good!' stems from biases developed during WWII and the 1950s, applied to the 1970s & 80s. My own work looks to conclusively show that German and American doctrine werent all that different in theory, and were written jointly together at multiple levels. So why would someone like Storr rate the US and Germany differently, as often happens? (I dont want this to sound rotely nationalistic, but rather why the Germans get elevated so highly) Is it that their WWII experiences look good and carried their reputation through the Cold War? Or that they were still doing something nobody else was? If there were I havn't figured it out. 

[holoween]

2 hours ago, BeondTheGrave said:

 My own work looks to conclusively show that German and American doctrine werent all that different in theory

If we strip away WW2 credit id say this is what you end up with making the difference (if there actually is any).

Just because the doctrine is the same in theory doesnt mean its the same in practice. Because if you give 3 people the same doctrine to solve a problem you end up with 4 different ways to fight. So if you wanted to find an apreciable difference youd have to look at how they each ended up working in exercises.

Another difference could come from different training standards for the units.

[marais]

2 hours ago, BeondTheGrave said:

This is something I am a bit interested in for the later Cold War era, the relationship between German Generals, Nazis, and the US Army has always been....... weird. After all we forced many of them to write us histories while they were in prison camps, histories which were pretty influential in how the civilian community has gone on to remember WWII and especially the Eastern Front. From what I've read of both documents and of writing on the subject, the US Army was pretty uncritical when it came to the Nazis. There is even an infamous Military Review article which is very flattering to Joachim Piper and has, as I recall, one line in it about all the bad stuff he did. The interviews with Hermann Balck I linked in that other thread are also interesting, I've always gotten the vibe from reading the interview transcripts that what theyre really saying is that the Russians are incapable of being good soldiers, Germans are inherently good soldiers, etc. Balck also definitely takes the line in his memoir that Berlin and the rear area troops were responsible for the brutality not the troops on the line. Thats not really true (see the work of Omar Bartov who takes down that specific myth). Yet the US Army took those lessons seemingly uncritical and really adopted the German lessons from fighting the Soviets without any comment on all the nasty parts of WWII on the Eastern front. Also no comment on the fact that the Germans lost(!!!) and why that may have been the case. Its interesting stuff.

Back on schedule @marais the Amazon page suggests he has some SHOCKING revelation about the Bundeswehr. Is that just selling fluff or does he seem to have something to say there? Is it just 'the Germans were really good?' Also for those who have read it, where do you think this falls on the memoir to scholarship spectrum? Sometimes you get these guys who do this annoying thing where they want to contribute to bigger questions about a subject, but are too lazy to do more research so they just take their own direct experience and apply it writ large to the whole Army or the whole system. Or just ignore everything they didn't directly engage with. It makes me wary of these kinds of books sometimes. Do you think he does a good job of striking a balance? 

If his big revelation re: the Germans is that 'they had learned lessons from WWII and that made their doctrine good' I hate to break it too him, but the US also did that, both AD & AirLand Battle were directly based off WWII experiences generally, German experiences specifically, and were written in combination with German doctrine. The 1980s HDV 100/100 and FM 100-5 were very similar, and DePuy was PROUD that he had gotten the Germans to rewrite the 1970s version of HDV 100/100 to make it like Active Defense. I wonder how much of 'German doctrine is good!' stems from biases developed during WWII and the 1950s, applied to the 1970s & 80s. My own work looks to conclusively show that German and American doctrine werent all that different in theory, and were written jointly together at multiple levels. So why would someone like Storr rate the US and Germany differently, as often happens? (I dont want this to sound rotely nationalistic, but rather why the Germans get elevated so highly) Is it that their WWII experiences look good and carried their reputation through the Cold War? Or that they were still doing something nobody else was? If there were I havn't figured it out. 

Sources in the book are cited as a mix of inline references to 15 frequently-cited works, and then as footnotes. Those 15 dominant sources are:

• the reader for a 2009 NATO staff ride
• Team Yankee (?!)
• John English's The Mechanized Battlefield, 1985
• US Army field manuals (mostly FM 100-5, 1976)
• British training and doctrinal publications (notably, The Infantry Battalion, 1975, Land Operations, 1971, and the 1942 battle drill instructor's handbook)
• Isby, Weapons and Tactics, 1981
• First Clash (again, eh?)
• McGarth, Scouts Out (which I have problems with, above)
• Middendorf's The Russian Campaign, 1957, and Handbook of Tactics, 1957. I think that these are the little-known source, maybe? They're noted as "author's translation."
• US Army Report of Army Field Forces Advisory Panel on Armor, 1949
• British Army Staff Officers' Handbook, 1999

Here's what the author has to say about sourcing: "The sources used in this study include a few books (particularly Middeldorf's), British and US Army doctrine, some first-hand knowledge, a little OR and some gaming. All have shortcomings. Written doctrine is not the same as actual practice. Middeldorf does not etll us much about what the Bundeswehr was actually doing in the 1980s (although my Bundeswehr colleagues' first-hand knowledge has helped to correct that." (Storr 284)

Not a memoir. The text is speckled with personal remarks, just a few sentences at a time, a mix of Storr's own experience and conversations with other NATO veterans, who remain mostly unnamed. They provide context but not substance. I wish they came more to the foreground.

Yes, this book is driving at the idea that the West German forces were good because they followed on lessons from WWII. From the chapter summing up the various armies: "Bundeswehr officers trained in the 1970s and 1980s were explicitly aware that their tactics were based in the Wehrmacht's tactics of the Second World War. They were not generally aware of the Middeldorf books, but their language and context were familiar." (Storr 56)

 

Edited January 7, 2022 by marais
Fixed typo. It's" ideas from WWII," not WWI, which would be quite the claim.

[BeondTheGrave]

2 hours ago, marais said:

Sources in the book are cited as a mix of inline references to 15 frequently-cited works, and then as footnotes. Those 15 dominant sources are:

• the reader for a 2009 NATO staff ride
• Team Yankee (?!)
• John English's The Mechanized Battlefield, 1985
• US Army field manuals (mostly FM 100-5, 1976)
• British training and doctrinal publications (notably, The Infantry Battalion, 1975, Land Operations, 1971, and the 1942 battle drill instructor's handbook)
• Isby, Weapons and Tactics, 1981
• First Clash (again, eh?)
• McGarth, Scouts Out (which I have problems with, above)
• Middendorf's The Russian Campaign, 1957, and Handbook of Tactics, 1957. I think that these are the little-known source, maybe? They're noted as "author's translation."
• US Army Report of Army Field Forces Advisory Panel on Armor, 1949
• British Army Staff Officers' Handbook, 1999

Here's what the author has to say about sourcing: "The sources used in this study include a few books (particularly Middeldorf's), British and US Army doctrine, some first-hand knowledge, a little OR and some gaming. All have shortcomings. Written doctrine is not the same as actual practice. Middeldorf does not etll us much about what the Bundeswehr was actually doing in the 1980s (although my Bundeswehr colleagues' first-hand knowledge has helped to correct that." (Storr 284)

Not a memoir. The text is speckled with personal remarks, just a few sentences at a time, a mix of Storr's own experience and conversations with other NATO veterans, who remain mostly unnamed. They provide context but not substance. I wish they came more to the foreground.

Yes, this book is driving at the idea that the West German forces were good because they followed on lessons from WWII. From the chapter summing up the various armies: "Bundeswehr officers trained in the 1970s and 1980s were explicitly aware that their tactics were based in the Wehrmacht's tactics of the Second World War. They were not generally aware of the Middeldorf books, but their language and context were familiar." (Storr 56)

 

Thanks for this extended writeup, I appreciate it and you've sold me on picking up a copy (or procuring one by other means). Seems like something worth reading, though to be honest not everything inspires me with confidence. Thanks for taking the time out. 

@holoweenI would certainly agree with you there, though interestingly I myself have found some evidence to suggest that the Bundeswehr adopted American training practices such as MILES/Simulated fire systems, certain Israeli inspired gunnery courses, and the NTC concept which was applied to revamp Graffenwoehr and camps. I would suspect that the Germans were trying to 'buy' ala carte many of the ideas that the US Army was trying to implement, some of which were ironically inspired by ideas that the Army had already bought from German history. There is an interesting dynamic there. 

[arkhangelsk2021]

10 hours ago, marais said:

• Isby, Weapons and Tactics, 1981

Really? The Soviets are half of this book, and he has only ONE major source on them?

But then reading through Hall of Mirrors, his bibliography on the Soviets is ridiculously thin or at least some stuff I'll expect to be there is not. He has read Christopher Bellamy, but not Red God of War Soviet Artillery and Rocket Forces, only a text called Evolution of Modern Land Warfare. He has Glantz, but while he has read Zhukov's Greatest Defeat and When Titans Clash, he hasn't read any of the three-set on Tactics, Operational Art, Strategy. No Grau though Afghanistan was the war the Soviets actually fought in. I don't see Richard Simpkins and his Red Armour there either. And if Team Yankee is a source, why not Ralph Peters' Red Army? And while Military Review has had many papers on the Soviets over the years ... if he has read them it's well hidden.

Is that the same for Battlegroup?

[Jim Storr]

I'm delighted to see that Battlegroup! is being discussed on this forum.  

I would ask that people actually take the time to read the book before commenting. It took me over a year to write.  Is it too much to ask that people take a couple of days to read and consider it before rushing on line with a critique?  

It is astonishing to see books criticized largely on the bibliography.  Regarding (for example) Soviet military art and theory.  I was taught it extensively through four levels of professional military education.  A glance at my bookshelves shows 7 related books that aren't in the bibliography.  Is this really a justified criticism?  Would you want me to list every book that I've ever read?   

Similarly for the suggestion that I haven't written many books (and that therefore 'Battlegroup!' may not be very good).  Is that mistaking quantity for quality? 

There are some really substantive and novel issues in 'Battlegroup!'.  I am saddened to see that they have not yet been addressed here.  But exactly the same happened for 'The Hall of Mirrors', and even 'King Arthur's Wars'.  

Yours sincerely 

Jim Storr

[Jim Storr]

On 1/8/2022 at 1:48 AM, arkhangelsk2021 said:

Really? The Soviets are half of this book, and he has only ONE major source on them?

But then reading through Hall of Mirrors, his bibliography on the Soviets is ridiculously thin or at least some stuff I'll expect to be there is not. He has read Christopher Bellamy, but not Red God of War Soviet Artillery and Rocket Forces, only a text called Evolution of Modern Land Warfare. He has Glantz, but while he has read Zhukov's Greatest Defeat and When Titans Clash, he hasn't read any of the three-set on Tactics, Operational Art, Strategy. No Grau though Afghanistan was the war the Soviets actually fought in. I don't see Richard Simpkins and his Red Armour there either. And if Team Yankee is a source, why not Ralph Peters' Red Army? And while Military Review has had many papers on the Soviets over the years ... if he has read them it's well hidden.

Is that the same for Battlegroup?

That is not true.  

The Soviets are not half of this book.  The bottom of page 16 and the top of page 17 explain why.  That passage also refers to two further references (Vigor and Suvorov).  To repeat my earlier comment, 'I would ask that people actually take the time to read the book before commenting. It took me over a year to write.  Is it too much to ask that people take a couple of days to read and consider it before rushing on line with a critique?'  

[Jim Storr]

To quote two earlier posts:  

'I just got the book and read through around 40 pages'; and   

'Just received my copy and skimmed the whole thing.' (But then goes on to make a number of substantive  comments, including an observation about my conclusions).  

To repeat:  'I would ask that people actually take the time to read the book before commenting. It took me over a year to write.  Is it too much to ask that people take a couple of days to read and consider it before rushing on line with a critique?'  

On the specific issue of the use of wargaming:  Page 74 says 'I have used the insights from wargaming cautiously in researching for this book.  Where I use them directly, I use the expression ''gaming suggests that', or similar'.  That is because the Cold War was not fought, so a researcher or analyst has very little direct evidence to work from.  That is the point of much of Chapter 3 ('The Approach').  And I would reiterate the point on Page 75:  'The reader may be sceptical as to whether wargaming is of any value.  Scepticism is valuable ...' 

then 

'Sceptics are asked to keep an open mind ...'   

The issue is then revisited in the observations and conclusions, from page 286.   Finally, the wargaming itself was not the main source of insight: it was the research (Page 72 refers).  

Yours sincerely 

Jim Storr

Edited January 10, 2022 by Jim Storr

[Simcoe]

8 hours ago, Jim Storr said:

I'm delighted to see that Battlegroup! is being discussed on this forum.  

I would ask that people actually take the time to read the book before commenting. It took me over a year to write.  Is it too much to ask that people take a couple of days to read and consider it before rushing on line with a critique?  

It is astonishing to see books criticized largely on the bibliography.  Regarding (for example) Soviet military art and theory.  I was taught it extensively through four levels of professional military education.  A glance at my bookshelves shows 7 related books that aren't in the bibliography.  Is this really a justified criticism?  Would you want me to list every book that I've ever read?   

Similarly for the suggestion that I haven't written many books (and that therefore 'Battlegroup!' may not be very good).  Is that mistaking quantity for quality? 

There are some really substantive and novel issues in 'Battlegroup!'.  I am saddened to see that they have not yet been addressed here.  But exactly the same happened for 'The Hall of Mirrors', and even 'King Arthur's Wars'.  

Yours sincerely 

Jim Storr

Hi Jim,

I read through the book and I greatly enjoyed it. For a Cold War newbie like me, it was a great introduction to the setting. 

My favorite chapter was the discussion on mechanized infantry and especially the pros and cons of fighting mounted vs dismounted and each countries preference. Can you recommend any other books etc that covers this topic in greater detail? I know you had a ton of ground to cover so I understand that you weren't able to devote more pages to it.

[Grey_Fox]

10 hours ago, Jim Storr said:

I'm delighted to see that Battlegroup! is being discussed on this forum.  

I would ask that people actually take the time to read the book before commenting. It took me over a year to write.  Is it too much to ask that people take a couple of days to read and consider it before rushing on line with a critique?  

It is astonishing to see books criticized largely on the bibliography.  Regarding (for example) Soviet military art and theory.  I was taught it extensively through four levels of professional military education.  A glance at my bookshelves shows 7 related books that aren't in the bibliography.  Is this really a justified criticism?  Would you want me to list every book that I've ever read?   

Similarly for the suggestion that I haven't written many books (and that therefore 'Battlegroup!' may not be very good).  Is that mistaking quantity for quality? 

There are some really substantive and novel issues in 'Battlegroup!'.  I am saddened to see that they have not yet been addressed here.  But exactly the same happened for 'The Hall of Mirrors', and even 'King Arthur's Wars'.  

Yours sincerely 

Jim Storr

Not often you get to interact with the writer, good to see you.

How'd you happen to show up here?

Do you have any intention of releasing the book in an electronic format?

Edited January 10, 2022 by Grey_Fox

[dbsapp]

4 hours ago, Jim Storr said:

Suvorov

Oh, no...

And welcome! 

[Jim Storr]

5 hours ago, Simcoe said:

Hi Jim,

I read through the book and I greatly enjoyed it. For a Cold War newbie like me, it was a great introduction to the setting. 

My favorite chapter was the discussion on mechanized infantry and especially the pros and cons of fighting mounted vs dismounted and each countries preference. Can you recommend any other books etc that covers this topic in greater detail? I know you had a ton of ground to cover so I understand that you weren't able to devote more pages to it.

Thank you.  Regrettably I can't.  This goes back to the point that the battles of the Cold War weren't fought; so nobody wrote about them; so there are few relevant written sources for researchers or analysts to work from. 

You might want to look at the problem this way.  Middeldorf and his colleagues observed that you were unlikely to locate well dug-in infantry at beyond 150m or so.  Yet by the 1980s those dug-in infantry could easily have shoulder-fired antitank weapons with ranges of 200m or more.  And such weapons had become commonplace.  So fighting mounted might have been practical up to the 1970s, when Marder entered service and Bradley was designed.  

In the 1980s the US and Bundeswehr stopped advocating fighting mounted and plated over the firing ports of their IFVs.  Enough said.  

Thank you particularly for taking the time to read the whole book.  

Your sincerely 

Jim Storr

[Jim Storr]

3 hours ago, Grey_Fox said:

Not often you get to interact with the writer, good to see you.

How'd you happen to show up here?

Do you have any intention of releasing the book in an electronic format?

Thank you.  

The publisher, Helion, has control over what formats get published.  I have no say in that. 

Best wishes 

Jim Storr 

[Simcoe]

10 minutes ago, Jim Storr said:

Thank you.  Regrettably I can't.  This goes back to the point that the battles of the Cold War weren't fought; so nobody wrote about them; so there are few relevant written sources for researchers or analysts to work from. 

You might want to look at the problem this way.  Middeldorf and his colleagues observed that you were unlikely to locate well dug-in infantry at beyond 150m or so.  Yet by the 1980s those dug-in infantry could easily have shoulder-fired antitank weapons with ranges of 200m or more.  And such weapons had become commonplace.  So fighting mounted might have been practical up to the 1970s, when Marder entered service and Bradley was designed.  

In the 1980s the US and Bundeswehr stopped advocating fighting mounted and plated over the firing ports of their IFVs.  Enough said.  

Thank you particularly for taking the time to read the whole book.  

Your sincerely 

Jim Storr

Thank you! I really appreciate your response. I'll be on the look out for your next book.

[Thewood1]

Its always neat watching internet and anonymous critics get all fired up until the actual author/designer shows up to respond.

[Jim Storr]

15 minutes ago, Thewood1 said:

Its always neat watching internet and anonymous critics get all fired up until the actual author/designer shows up to respond.

Thank you.  I couldn't possibly comment ... 

Best wishes 

Jim Storr

[Grey_Fox]

36 minutes ago, Jim Storr said:

Thank you.  

The publisher, Helion, has control over what formats get published.  I have no say in that. 

Best wishes 

Jim Storr 

That's unfortunate, currently my only purchase option is ~€35 including delivery from amazon.

[Jim Storr]

7 hours ago, Grey_Fox said:

That's unfortunate, currently my only purchase option is ~€35 including delivery from amazon.

35 Euros is a bit over 29 pounds.  That's not much more than the list price in Britain (£25) .  

Best wishes 

Jim Storr