New Book: "Battlegroup!: The Lessons of the Unfought Battles of the Cold War" (Jim Storr)

[holoween]

Jim Storr ive gotten the book a few weeks ago and have read through it a few times now. Generally i found it easy to read though somewhat heavy on opinions rather than analysis.

You might have found a quite critical audience here as i  as several before me take issue with a certain aspect of the book. In my case ill focus on the chapter Infantry and Antitank Forces specifically your discussion of IFVs.

 

I think wargaming is a valuable source if information but always needs to be cross referenced with rl data.

However the IFV section is entirely at odds with the vast majority of modern armies and from reading it seemed inherently at odds with what was being said. It is also at odds with my personal experience so i was trying to wrap my head around it until i started collecting quotes from it to make a rebuttal ten i realized where the issue comes from.

"Ground-mounted cannon, such as the French and German 20mm, would have beenhighly effectivea gainst enemy APCs." p.116

"Cannon and ATGMs could be very effective [...] Once dismounted in cover, they could be very difficult to locate" p.123

So the Weapons the IFVs carried were effective so why not the IFV itself? Lets see the defense:

"IFVs located in a defensive position [...] tended to be knocked out by artillery fire, or neutralized and then easy prey to the attackers, be it tanks or shoulder-fired antitank weapons." p.124

"If IFVs were sited outside defensive positions [...] being quite large vehicles, they attrackted fire from the attackers Tanks and ATGMs." p.124

This implies that either a dismounted 20mm cannon is more resistant to artillery bombardement or its position wont be spotted and so not bombarded. That is strange in two ways. The IFV should be more resistant to artillery and given its mobility should be sitting outside of view only to move into its firing position when targets are called my the infantry and so actually harder to spot. Or dug in and just have its turret exposed in which case it should be equally difficult to spot but still be more resistant to artillery fire.

Now looking at the offense

"vehicle-mounted cannon and MGs did not help. [...] difficulty in locating the defenders, who were invariably concealed and often dug in." p.123

"Conversely they made the [...] IFVs obvious and high-priority targets for the defender´s fire." p.123

This is strange in two ways. First for supressing defenders and assisting the own infantry exact locations of the defenders need not be known. Simply supressing areas that could be dangerous to the own infantry if occupied by enemy infantry will do the majority of work since 20mm cannons firing he at 1000rpm cyclic into the defenders general area is going to keep their heads down. Even more if there is a full platoon doing this.

Second is that in the game even with their aparently ineffective fire they were still the priority target and not the supporting tanks (and if there werent any why?)

But what about using their ATGMs?

"Where IFVs used  [...] ATGMs [...] they were highly vulnerable to enemy ATGM fire, from either dismounted launchers or specialist antitank vehicles. In both cases the enemy were much harder to locate" p.123

This is again somewhat strange. An IFVs turret is certainly larger than an atgm launcher alone but for the ATGM vehicle that is only the case if it can go hulldown in which case an IFVs turret still wouldnt be much bigger and far more importantly the main way an ATGM will get located is dust and smoke kicked up from the weapons launch which will be the same in either case.

These contradictions between observed results and expected results indicate to me that:

1. There is a spotting mechanic in the ruleset used and IFVs are at a higher disadvantedge as a result

2. Improper defensive doctrine at least for western vehicles who should have several fighting positions and frequently switch. Possibly combined with the ruleset not giving the bonus for a defensive position when employing such a strategy

3. Strange targeting priorities or improper support. A defending unit should prioritize supporting tanks when employing anti tank weapons as they are the biggest threat to the individual unit. In wargaming its easy to always target the unit that will result in the greatest chance of overall success but for the actual troops individual survival is key. A tank will given the choice between an IFV or a tank first shoot the tank because that is the bigger threat. If Tanks simply werent involved the quewstion becomes why not? IFVs are combined arms weapons and suffer when left alone just like any other weapon.

[holoween]

Now the Next interesting topic is how you chose to validate your results namely with the one exception among major armies that doesnt use IFVs Israel.

"The only army to have much experience of APC operations in regular war did not adopt IFVs." p.122

Historically its actually exactly the opposite. The army with the most experience using APCs being the wehrmacht with the SdKfz 251 literally starting ww2 with an APC. And as soon as the Bundeswehr formed they went for getting an IFV with the HS 30 8 years ahead of the BMP1.

Out of all major militaries Israel is actually the exception in not having an IFV.

So lets examine what could have lead to this and what they are using instead.

The area Israel has to fight in has generally quite rough terrain and a fairly high number of highly build up areas. This generally puts a higher emphasis on the dismounts. It also decreases the value of the added speed of advance IFVs can give formations. Israel also had a fairly long history of Insurgency fighting where IFVs also tend to not excel (compare Iraq occupation) though htats straying away from the regular war narative.

Interestingly as much as the Arab Israeli wars were studied by Soviets and Nato alike neither abandoned their IFVs. The biggest influence being the development of BMP2. Curiously with 1 fewer dismounts compared to BMP1 so lack of dismounted infantry wasnt the takeaway.

What seems to be far more influential is that Israel maintains an army of a size it can only afford due to extensive military aid and during the cold war the same was true of its oponents. Its main aid contributor was the US which for the time of Israels major wars simply didnt own IFVs and so couldnt sell them but istead sold APCs. At that point Israel also had very limited AFV production capability so the combination of essentially free APCs and production of IFVs eating into the tank numbers its obviously the better choice to not produce IFVs.

To feed into this the heavy APCs build were primarily captured or outdaatet tank chassis repurposed and only with the Namer did they produce them from the ground up resulting in far lower numbers than they would like. These heavy APCs also face primarily Insurgents not a regular army so are in purpose closer to the modern US MRAP.

IFVs have also been used in several regular wars (2nd and 3rd gulf war, 2008 Georgian war and 2014 in Ukraine). So far they all seem to have accounted quite well for themselves seeing as no unser advocated to stop using them.

[arkhangelsk2021]

I'll contribute to the above by providing some context from Storr's previous works. Storr probably got the idea to go anti-IFV after one of his contributors, William Owen, wrote an article and Storr replied to it. I'm supposed to cite these as:

• Owen, William F., “Wrong Technology for the Wrong Tactics: The Infantry Fighting Vehicle”,
  Military Operations, Volume 1, Issue No. 3, Winter 2012, pages 17-20.
• Storr, Jim, “Three Short Pieces”, Military Operations, Volume 1, Issue No. 4, Spring 2013, pages 23-26.

In it, an IFV is defined as:

Quote

• An IFV has a 3-man crew of which 2 are in the turret and dismounts 6-7 men.
• The APC has a 2-man crew and dismounts 8-10 men.
• The APC version is lighter by virtue of not having a turret, and so will have the same or better levels of protection.

and the BMP-1 is called:

Quote

The BMP-1 was an APC with a 1-man turret that mounted an ATGM launcher and a 73mm anti-tank gun with a co-axial MG. The intent was for an APC to protect itself against tanks.

By that standard, the Schutzenpanzer HS30 is not an IFV. An IFV in this context might be defined as an infantry-carrying vehicle that has more weapons capability than can be fitted without massive tradeoffs in infantry complement, protection and/or cost (both procurement and training).

Also, the concern, either in Owen's article or Storr's reply the objection is not with the effectiveness of the on-board weapons, but the vulnerability of the vehicles and the attendant crippling of the formation's mobility due to the loss of infantry carrying capability.

Thus, for example in this context:

Quote

This implies that either a dismounted 20mm cannon is more resistant to artillery bombardement or its position wont be spotted and so not bombarded. That is strange in two ways. The IFV should be more resistant to artillery and given its mobility should be sitting outside of view only to move into its firing position when targets are called my the infantry and so actually harder to spot. Or dug in and just have its turret exposed in which case it should be equally difficult to spot but still be more resistant to artillery fire.

I'm going to guess what he meant to say is not that a dismounted 20mm or manpack ATGM launcher is "more resistant" than an IFV turret, or even much less visible as it commits to action, but that when you lose them at least you don't lose an infantry carrier (and consequent mobility) with it. 50% losses in dismounted heavy weapons means a proportionate lowering of firepower. Even 20% losses in IFVs means a disproportionate lowering of mobility unless you just cut off anybody who can't cram onto a surviving vehicle.

Quote

This is strange in two ways. First for supressing defenders and assisting the own infantry exact locations of the defenders need not be known. Simply supressing areas that could be dangerous to the own infantry if occupied by enemy infantry will do the majority of work since 20mm cannons firing he at 1000rpm cyclic into the defenders general area is going to keep their heads down. Even more if there is a full platoon doing this.

Re the point of suppression, if he's doing it in a wargame a significant difference will be how the wargame models this psychological factor. In previous works, Storr is of the opinion that the suppressive effect will be minimal unless it is very close to the target:

Quote

 

In general, small arms fire has to pass within roughly a metre from the outline of the target to be effective. A small number of rounds passing through that area in a few seconds (perhaps 3 to 5 rounds in as many seconds) will suppress the target, or re-suppress him if required; whilst just one round every three seconds will keep him suppressed. That seems quite achievable.

 

• Storr, Jim, “The Real Role of Small Arms in Combat”, Rusi Defence Systems, June 2009, pages 44-46.

If we assume that Storr believes autocannon fire works in similar fashion and works it into his wargame rules, then such area suppressive fires will be much less effective than in wargames assuming a larger acceptable miss radius for suppressive fire.

I agree, however, that the target priorities seem a clear point of suspicion in the conclusions. Who got to decide what gets shot at first in that wargame? My sense is that weapons on an IFV exploit the "shadow" created by the tanks. Certainly, if the infantry carriers are armed and they are shooting, they will move up in priority, but in theory they will be safe as long as they are not the most interesting choice - the theoretical optimum is that they make themselves as interesting as possible (by putting effective weapons fire on the enemy) without being more interesting than the tanks.

[Jim Storr]

On 2/5/2022 at 9:24 PM, Begemot said:

Some questions for Jim Storr.

Starting with something non-contentious. You indicated that you and your brother developed a method in your gaming that reduced the "God's Eye View" factor and it seems allowed for actual surprise to occur on the game board. Would you care to tell us what you did to achieve this?

In your footnotes you reference particular games you and your brother played (e,g. "Battle 164, 12 January 2003." - pg. 231). Are these games referred to in the footnotes available somewhere to examine? If so, where? If not, why the footnote?

More contentious:

On page 149 you state: "Soviet artillery fire would probably be very heavy but inaccurate, and its fire planning crude." I don't feel you properly justified this comment in the preceding text and to be frank I find it doubtful for two reasons. First the importance that artillery has played in Russian and Soviet military tactics. And second, your assessment suggests a low standard of training. I know that the Soviets had artillery academies devoted to producing artillery officers. These were academies with four year programs that produced company/battery grade officers with engineering degrees. I can't imagine that such an education would produce incompetents. My wife's deceased father was a colonel in the Soviet artillery and was on the faculty of such an institution. He was a university mathematics student when he was recruited into the Soviet Army. Perhaps I am wrong, so can you explain why an army that prized artillery, seems to have placed it high in their tactical system and seems to have invested quite a bit in the education of its artillery officers would produce and be satisfied with such dismal results as "... heavy but inaccurate [fire], and its fire planning crude"?

Regards.

Thank you for your enquiry.  

The 'God's Eye View': it was largely a matter of trust coupled to the convention that a commander at any level couldn't change his plan unless he, or someone communicating to him, had detected something that would prompt him to do so.  It seemed to work.  

Games or battles:  if you're in England sometime you're welcome to drop buy and I'll show you the references.  The reason for citing them is to provide evidence that something real prompted the observation, remark or whatever.  Consider the alternative:  without such reference, the general perception would be less convincing.  No more than that.  

Artillery:  There are several reasons, many of them taken from the literature.  Regrettably, knowing somebody who was a maths student and served in the artillery school doesn't make the whole of the Soviet artillery accurate; and I didn't say that their officers were incompetent.  Their guns were crude; their sensors and computation roughly a generation behind the west's, their standards of training generally poor. Soviet artillery fire in the Great Patriotic War was often heavy but inaccurate and its fire planning crude; Arab artillery fire in those wars where they had been taught by the Soviets equally so.  

In simple terms, any artillery fire can be accurate if you can observe the target directly and correct the fall of shot.  Western armies could do that quite well in 1916.  But in practically every other case we can reasonably expect Soviet artillery fire to have been as described.  

Best wishes 

Jim Storr 

Edited February 7, 2022 by Jim Storr
Word missing

[Jim Storr]

10 hours ago, arkhangelsk2021 said:

I'll contribute to the above by providing some context from Storr's previous works. Storr probably got the idea to go anti-IFV after one of his contributors, William Owen, wrote an article and Storr replied to it. I'm supposed to cite these as:

• Owen, William F., “Wrong Technology for the Wrong Tactics: The Infantry Fighting Vehicle”,
  Military Operations, Volume 1, Issue No. 3, Winter 2012, pages 17-20.
• Storr, Jim, “Three Short Pieces”, Military Operations, Volume 1, Issue No. 4, Spring 2013, pages 23-26.

In it, an IFV is defined as:

and the BMP-1 is called:

By that standard, the Schutzenpanzer HS30 is not an IFV. An IFV in this context might be defined as an infantry-carrying vehicle that has more weapons capability than can be fitted without massive tradeoffs in infantry complement, protection and/or cost (both procurement and training).

Also, the concern, either in Owen's article or Storr's reply the objection is not with the effectiveness of the on-board weapons, but the vulnerability of the vehicles and the attendant crippling of the formation's mobility due to the loss of infantry carrying capability.

Thus, for example in this context:

I'm going to guess what he meant to say is not that a dismounted 20mm or manpack ATGM launcher is "more resistant" than an IFV turret, or even much less visible as it commits to action, but that when you lose them at least you don't lose an infantry carrier (and consequent mobility) with it. 50% losses in dismounted heavy weapons means a proportionate lowering of firepower. Even 20% losses in IFVs means a disproportionate lowering of mobility unless you just cut off anybody who can't cram onto a surviving vehicle.

Re the point of suppression, if he's doing it in a wargame a significant difference will be how the wargame models this psychological factor. In previous works, Storr is of the opinion that the suppressive effect will be minimal unless it is very close to the target:

• Storr, Jim, “The Real Role of Small Arms in Combat”, Rusi Defence Systems, June 2009, pages 44-46.

If we assume that Storr believes autocannon fire works in similar fashion and works it into his wargame rules, then such area suppressive fires will be much less effective than in wargames assuming a larger acceptable miss radius for suppressive fire.

I agree, however, that the target priorities seem a clear point of suspicion in the conclusions. Who got to decide what gets shot at first in that wargame? My sense is that weapons on an IFV exploit the "shadow" created by the tanks. Certainly, if the infantry carriers are armed and they are shooting, they will move up in priority, but in theory they will be safe as long as they are not the most interesting choice - the theoretical optimum is that they make themselves as interesting as possible (by putting effective weapons fire on the enemy) without being more interesting than the tanks.

I'm grateful for this submission but I feel it's mistaken.  I have know William Owen for many years and our discussions pre-date 2012 probably by 7 years or more.  My thinking probably hasn't changed very much since the 1980s; but (more widely) the contributor is making assumptions that don't seem valid ('if we assume that Storr ...')  

As for the contention 'Storr probably got the idea to go anti-IFV after one of his contributors, William Owen, wrote an article ...':  sorry, that's just wrong.  

I'm sometimes amused by people's projections.  I'm not 'anti-IFV' and I didn't 'get an idea to go anti-IFV ... '.   I just did some gaming and found that IFVs didn't work.  That is, I followed the evidence.  

I hope that helps.  Best wishes 

Jim Storr

[Jim Storr]

16 hours ago, holoween said:

Now the Next interesting topic is how you chose to validate your results namely with the one exception among major armies that doesnt use IFVs Israel.

"The only army to have much experience of APC operations in regular war did not adopt IFVs." p.122

Historically its actually exactly the opposite. The army with the most experience using APCs being the wehrmacht with the SdKfz 251 literally starting ww2 with an APC. And as soon as the Bundeswehr formed they went for getting an IFV with the HS 30 8 years ahead of the BMP1.

Out of all major militaries Israel is actually the exception in not having an IFV.

So lets examine what could have lead to this and what they are using instead.

The area Israel has to fight in has generally quite rough terrain and a fairly high number of highly build up areas. This generally puts a higher emphasis on the dismounts. It also decreases the value of the added speed of advance IFVs can give formations. Israel also had a fairly long history of Insurgency fighting where IFVs also tend to not excel (compare Iraq occupation) though htats straying away from the regular war narative.

Interestingly as much as the Arab Israeli wars were studied by Soviets and Nato alike neither abandoned their IFVs. The biggest influence being the development of BMP2. Curiously with 1 fewer dismounts compared to BMP1 so lack of dismounted infantry wasnt the takeaway.

What seems to be far more influential is that Israel maintains an army of a size it can only afford due to extensive military aid and during the cold war the same was true of its oponents. Its main aid contributor was the US which for the time of Israels major wars simply didnt own IFVs and so couldnt sell them but istead sold APCs. At that point Israel also had very limited AFV production capability so the combination of essentially free APCs and production of IFVs eating into the tank numbers its obviously the better choice to not produce IFVs.

To feed into this the heavy APCs build were primarily captured or outdaatet tank chassis repurposed and only with the Namer did they produce them from the ground up resulting in far lower numbers than they would like. These heavy APCs also face primarily Insurgents not a regular army so are in purpose closer to the modern US MRAP.

IFVs have also been used in several regular wars (2nd and 3rd gulf war, 2008 Georgian war and 2014 in Ukraine). So far they all seem to have accounted quite well for themselves seeing as no unser advocated to stop using them.

Thank you. I'm not going to reply to every point.   

The Wehrmacht had extensive experience of APCs in WW2; they specified what became the Marder; but they did not foresee the rise in shoulder-fired weapons.  People go on and on about the HS30 but overlook the fact that it was a Swiss stopgap design which was clearly substandard.  Only  2,176 were built of the 10,680 planned.   When they got to design the vehicle they wanted, they designed the Marder.  Middeldorf's books point to the Marder, not the HS30.  

'Interestingly as much as the Arab Israeli wars were studied by Soviets and Nato alike neither abandoned their IFVs.'.  The Arab-Israeli wars took place in 1956, 1967 and in 1973.  In 1973 both the AMX 10P and the Marder were just entering service; the Bradley and the Warrior didn't enter service until later.  So, arguably no NATO country had IFVs to abandon.  But the wider point about analysis of the Arab-Israeli wars is addressed as Page 67-69.  In brief:  'Overall, western nations did examine Middle-Eastern wars and made some important adjustments.  But that did not change the way they fought very much'.  (P68)  If western analysts had looked more closely they would have noticed, for example, that in 1973 not a single BMP penetrated beyond the Israeli strongpoints on the Golan; whereas Syrian tanks penetrated several kilometers.  Enough said?  

I have not found  a single example of IFVs fighting their way onto well-prepared, well defended positions in the Second or 3rd Gulf Wars.  I am less familiar with the 2008 Georgian War and the 2014 war in the Ukraine but believe that the same applies.  

I am astonished by Holoween's analysis of the choices which the Israelis made.  Heavy APCs like Namer face insurgents, so they are closer in purpose to MRAPs?  Really?  Purpose? The IDF designed Namer in order to 'face insurgents'?  I don't think so.  

The real issue at stake here is the one that I identified on Pages 124, 125, 287 and 288:  evidence.  I analysed such evidence as I could find.  The real-world, high quality evidence is patchy and inconclusive.  If anything it suggests the use of heavy APCs.  Gaming suggests that IFVs are a bad idea. So, quoting from page 287:  

'We may have been wrong.  ...  So:  should we continue to accept the apparent value of IFVs based on belief, faith and superstition?  Should we choose something else, on the basis of actual operational experience, as the Israelis did?  Or should we try to discover, as objectively as we can, whether there is a better way to employ the relevant manpower and investment?'  

Yes, I think we should.  

Best wishes 

Jim Storr 

Edited February 7, 2022 by Jim Storr
Grammar; clarification

[civdiv]

Jim,

I recently received your book unfortunately I am reading a couple (or more) books right now. I will get into it in a week or more. I doubt I can receive you the detailed feedback above.

Cheers!

[holoween]

2 hours ago, Jim Storr said:

The Wehrmacht had extensive experience of APCs in WW2; they specified what became the Marder; but they did not foresee the rise in shoulder-fired weapons. 

Are we talking about the same Wehrmacht and Bundeswehr? Because the Wehrmacht i know was quite enthusiastically giving out panzerfaust and panzerschreck to its units. The Bundeswehr following it did the same with the Carl Gustav and Pzf44 so them not expecting it would require some incredible institutional blindness.

2 hours ago, Jim Storr said:

People go on and on about the HS30 but overlook the fact that it was a Swiss stopgap design which was clearly substandard.  Only  2,176 were built of the 10,680 planned.   When they got to design the vehicle they wanted, they designed the Marder.  Middeldorf's books point to the Marder, not the HS30.  

Being a stopgap and not as good as wanted doesnt prevent it from being seen and employed as an IFV and drawing conclusions from its use. The wehrmacht proved quite capable of invading Poland and France with stopgap tanks.

2 hours ago, Jim Storr said:

'Interestingly as much as the Arab Israeli wars were studied by Soviets and Nato alike neither abandoned their IFVs.'.  The Arab-Israeli wars took place in 1956, 1967 and in 1973.  In 1973 both the AMX 10P and the Marder were just entering service; the Bradley and the Warrior didn't enter service until later.  So, arguably no NATO country had IFVs to abandon.

In 1956 te Bundeswehr had barely started to exist, in 1967 it had IFVs in use for 7 years and in 1973 it was on its second generation IFV.

2 hours ago, Jim Storr said:

  But the wider point about analysis of the Arab-Israeli wars is addressed as Page 67-69.  In brief:  'Overall, western nations did examine Middle-Eastern wars and made some important adjustments.  But that did not change the way they fought very much'.  (P68)  If western analysts had looked more closely they would have noticed, for example, that in 1973 not a single BMP penetrated beyond the Israeli strongpoints; whereas Syrian tanks penetrated several kilometers.  Enough said? 

That BMPs werent following the tanks says more about the combined arms coordination than the vehicle used. It actually shows a quite bleak picture for Syrian officers competence and therefore calls taking the lessons lerned by Israel at face value into question.

2 hours ago, Jim Storr said:

 

I have not found  a single example of IFVs fighting their way onto well-prepared, well defended positions in the Second or 3rd Gulf Wars.  I am less familiar with the 2008 Georgian War and the 2014 war in the Ukraine but believe that the same applies.  

During the second gulf war the initial Iraqi positions were well prepared but mostly destroyed by artillery. The 2008 and 2014 wars saw russian troops mostly counterattacking units on the offensive.

I find the assertion that fighting into a well-prepared and well-defended position is a flawed metric for judging an IFVs value. They enable highly mobile operations which are far more effective in winning fights. No matter how well prepared and defended your positions are they can be broken as evidenced during WW2.

 

Also some interesting loss statistics from those middle eastern wars:

Second gulf war 1,487 tanks, 1,384 infantry fighting vehicles Employed by US troops resulting in 31 tanks destroyed/disabled and 28 Bradley IFVs destroyed/damaged indicating an equal chance of being knocked out.

For the 1982 Lebanon war For Israel its 1,240 tanks and 1,500 armoured personnel carriers employed 130 tanks destroyed/damaged and 175 APCs destroyed/damaged.

This suggests that on a large scale tanks arent much more survivable than IFVs.

2 hours ago, Jim Storr said:

I am astonished by Holoween's analysis of the choices which the Israelis made.  Heavy APCs like Namer face insurgents, so they are closer in purpose to MRAPs?  Really?  Purpose? The IDF designed Namer in order to 'face insurgents'?  I don't think so.  

Primary threat are IEDs, light anti tank weapons, far heavier and less mobile than their immediate laternative, used primarily in very rough ground or cities against oponents that reach at best western light infantry standards.

Biggest difference is that the Namer weighs 60tons and is supposed to also be usable in conventional war.

Also my initial statement was somewhat exagerated so this isnt the hill ill die on.

 

2 hours ago, Jim Storr said:

The real issue at stake here is the one that I identified on Pages 124, 125, 287 and 288:  evidence.  I analysed such evidence as I could find.  The real-world, high quality evidence is patchy and inconclusive.  If anything it suggests the use of heavy APCs.  Gaming suggests that IFVs are a bad idea.

Here is my main problem though and where i wonder why you didnt adress my first post at all.

I pointed out issues i have with your method of reaching your conclusion specifically possible weaknesses in the ruleset you used based on your description of what happened. I dont know the ruleset but when my irl experience clashes with my wargaming experience i first question if my wargaming experience has any possible flaws causing the results. You take the results as is without examining the ruleset for possible issues.

Your conclusion might very well be correct but it contradicts practically all modern armies with all their combined experience so the burden of proof is on your end to show youre right and everyone else is wrong and you present very little hard evidence. What you present is wargaming under one specific ruleset modified by yourself against the same oponent and to validate you use one military not using IFVs where there might be other reasons involved as i pointed out. At least for me that is not enough so id be quite happy if you could actually clarify.

Thank you for the replies so far. Its highly unusual to be able to discuss a book like this with its author so its much apreciated.

[Rooks And Kings]

On 1/10/2022 at 3:17 AM, Jim Storr said:

I'm delighted to see that Battlegroup! is being discussed on this forum.  

I would ask that people actually take the time to read the book before commenting. It took me over a year to write.  Is it too much to ask that people take a couple of days to read and consider it before rushing on line with a critique?  

It is astonishing to see books criticized largely on the bibliography.  Regarding (for example) Soviet military art and theory.  I was taught it extensively through four levels of professional military education.  A glance at my bookshelves shows 7 related books that aren't in the bibliography.  Is this really a justified criticism?  Would you want me to list every book that I've ever read?   

Similarly for the suggestion that I haven't written many books (and that therefore 'Battlegroup!' may not be very good).  Is that mistaking quantity for quality? 

There are some really substantive and novel issues in 'Battlegroup!'.  I am saddened to see that they have not yet been addressed here.  But exactly the same happened for 'The Hall of Mirrors', and even 'King Arthur's Wars'.  

Yours sincerely 

Jim Storr

What did you teach and what were your responsibilities? Genuinely curious. 

[Rooks And Kings]

also @John Kettler was a Soviet Threat Analyst and might be a good springboard for your next book!

[Jim Storr]

12 hours ago, Rooks And Kings said:

also @John Kettler was a Soviet Threat Analyst and might be a good springboard for your next book!

That's kind, but the book is on an entirely different subject.  

Best wishes 

Jim Storr

[BAOR]

Good Morning All,

I recently found this forum while keeping track of Jim Storr's books. I have read the book (more than once) and will read it again as the conclusions and methodology fascinate me. I will not criticize anyone for their opinions but I would like to point out that Jim does state (its in the title and he reiterates here) that the book focuses on unfought battles of the Cold War , that is his conclusions are based upon his playing out hundreds of wargame scenarios and the relevant tactics of the period espoused by different armies (it does help that he was a Pongoe in one...) that never put them into practice in a real blood, guts, and Murphy's Law war (IMHO the Gulf War was an anomaly in some ways, I digress). In a similar vein to "Achtung Panzer!" and "Infanterie greift an!", "Battlegroup!" shows us the theories, tactics, equipment, and thought process of a period of time. The only difference is the two other books had a Great War before and a  real war after their publication. I enjoyed the book and I know of other Gents who were also on the the ground, so to speak, at the time who have rated it highly. 

Lastly, full transparency, before reading the book I had come to the conclusion that current IFVs and their tactics were possibly a dead end, a coffin for ten or at the very least not fit for role....that is protecting the TANKS from other Infantry so they could deal death and destruction. (now Infantry accompanying Tanks seizing an objective, that is fine but a secondary role, the consolidation and defence of that objective should be the role of follow on Infantry formations...again, I digress). I even went so far as to state in another forum that the current British Army should be looking at something similar to Merkava/Namer combination (BTW the previous pic in this thread is not Namer, that is a Nagamachon APC based on the Centurion which IS supposed to operate in urban/COIN enviroments. Namer is based upon Merkava and has similar speed and maneuverability).

Getting back to Jim and Battlegroup! I'll give it 4.9 out of 5 Stars...the only reason for that is I want more!

[Jim Storr]

13 hours ago, Rooks And Kings said:

What did you teach and what were your responsibilities? Genuinely curious. 

Thank you for your enquiry, but I'm a bit confused.  The quote you refer to says that I was taught at 4 levels of professional military education.  But your question seems to be about what I taught. I'm happy to answer, but which did you mean?  

Best wishes 

Jim Storr

[Jim Storr]

16 hours ago, holoween said:

Are we talking about the same Wehrmacht and Bundeswehr? Because the Wehrmacht i know was quite enthusiastically giving out panzerfaust and panzerschreck to its units. The Bundeswehr following it did the same with the Carl Gustav and Pzf44 so them not expecting it would require some incredible institutional blindness.

Being a stopgap and not as good as wanted doesnt prevent it from being seen and employed as an IFV and drawing conclusions from its use. The wehrmacht proved quite capable of invading Poland and France with stopgap tanks.

In 1956 te Bundeswehr had barely started to exist, in 1967 it had IFVs in use for 7 years and in 1973 it was on its second generation IFV.

That BMPs werent following the tanks says more about the combined arms coordination than the vehicle used. It actually shows a quite bleak picture for Syrian officers competence and therefore calls taking the lessons lerned by Israel at face value into question.

During the second gulf war the initial Iraqi positions were well prepared but mostly destroyed by artillery. The 2008 and 2014 wars saw russian troops mostly counterattacking units on the offensive.

I find the assertion that fighting into a well-prepared and well-defended position is a flawed metric for judging an IFVs value. They enable highly mobile operations which are far more effective in winning fights. No matter how well prepared and defended your positions are they can be broken as evidenced during WW2.

 

Also some interesting loss statistics from those middle eastern wars:

Second gulf war 1,487 tanks, 1,384 infantry fighting vehicles Employed by US troops resulting in 31 tanks destroyed/disabled and 28 Bradley IFVs destroyed/damaged indicating an equal chance of being knocked out.

For the 1982 Lebanon war For Israel its 1,240 tanks and 1,500 armoured personnel carriers employed 130 tanks destroyed/damaged and 175 APCs destroyed/damaged.

This suggests that on a large scale tanks arent much more survivable than IFVs.

Primary threat are IEDs, light anti tank weapons, far heavier and less mobile than their immediate laternative, used primarily in very rough ground or cities against oponents that reach at best western light infantry standards.

Biggest difference is that the Namer weighs 60tons and is supposed to also be usable in conventional war.

Also my initial statement was somewhat exagerated so this isnt the hill ill die on.

 

Here is my main problem though and where i wonder why you didnt adress my first post at all.

I pointed out issues i have with your method of reaching your conclusion specifically possible weaknesses in the ruleset you used based on your description of what happened. I dont know the ruleset but when my irl experience clashes with my wargaming experience i first question if my wargaming experience has any possible flaws causing the results. You take the results as is without examining the ruleset for possible issues.

Your conclusion might very well be correct but it contradicts practically all modern armies with all their combined experience so the burden of proof is on your end to show youre right and everyone else is wrong and you present very little hard evidence. What you present is wargaming under one specific ruleset modified by yourself against the same oponent and to validate you use one military not using IFVs where there might be other reasons involved as i pointed out. At least for me that is not enough so id be quite happy if you could actually clarify.

Thank you for the replies so far. Its highly unusual to be able to discuss a book like this with its author so its much apreciated.

We could go on forever.  

Please justify the assertion that BMPs did not follow the tanks due to poor combined-arms coordination.  What evidence is there?  What evidence is there of incompetence of Syrian officers in that particular?  Which visit to the Golan Heights gave you that impression? I formed an entirely different opinion during my visits.  

HS 30 was not 'a first generation IFV' in any realistic sense:  it was 'a massive procurement failure'.  The Federal German government cancelled the contract in the year it entered service (1959).  It was an atrociously bad vehicle.  So let's discount any suggestion of the Bundeswehr having 'seven years of IFV experience' by 1967.  

Marder entered service in 1971.  Production continued until 1976.  So in 1973 the Bundeswehr had very little experience with working, practical IFVs.   

The 'stop gaps' you allude to in the early stages of WW2 were accepted into service.  Conversely HS 30 was cancelled as soon as the political will to do so emerged.  The Bundeswehr then had a simple choice: keep the early production run in service, or scrap them.  If they scrapped them, they would have nothing.   

Gross vehicle casualty statistics are simplistic without some understanding of damage mechanism.  To  say that, therefore,  tanks 'aren't much more survivable than IFVs' is dangerously misleading.  Objectively, it's ridiculous.  

Your picture was not a Namer.  Namer, and the stopgaps introduced before it, was developed primarily because M113s were found to be too vulnerable during the 1982 invasion of Lebanon.  Any use in irregular warfare is secondary.  

We could go on forever.   

If IFVs cannot be used to assault a defensive position then they are of very little use.  Hence the value of that as a metric.  (Like most metrics, it has its limitations, but at least we could actually measure something.)  Yes, IFVs' mobility is highly useful and, as I said in the book, the real value of in-service IFVs may well be that they are highly mobile in comparison with the APCs which they replaced (eg, Bradley for M113; Warrior for FV432; Marder for M113).  But If you try to use them as general-purpose AFVs, they achieve relatively little and the real cost is that their dismounts are either killed in the process or lose their mobility.  

That's what our gaming suggested.  You say that my conclusion may well be right: thank you.  But no, there is no burden of proof on me.  This is neither a court of law nor a high school debating society.  I have presented my evidence and my conclusions.  I am well aware that many modern armies think  differently, and discuss that in my book (for example, page 124).  You may, for whatever reason, want to believe that IFVs are a good thing.  You may want more evidence.  Well, I don't have any; please look elsewhere.  If you find some, please publish the results.  I did.  

With best wishes 

Jim Storr

[Jim Storr]

4 hours ago, BAOR said:

Good Morning All,

I recently found this forum while keeping track of Jim Storr's books. I have read the book (more than once) and will read it again as the conclusions and methodology fascinate me. I will not criticize anyone for their opinions but I would like to point out that Jim does state (its in the title and he reiterates here) that the book focuses on unfought battles of the Cold War , that is his conclusions are based upon his playing out hundreds of wargame scenarios and the relevant tactics of the period espoused by different armies (it does help that he was a Pongoe in one...) that never put them into practice in a real blood, guts, and Murphy's Law war (IMHO the Gulf War was an anomaly in some ways, I digress). In a similar vein to "Achtung Panzer!" and "Infanterie greift an!", "Battlegroup!" shows us the theories, tactics, equipment, and thought process of a period of time. The only difference is the two other books had a Great War before and a  real war after their publication. I enjoyed the book and I know of other Gents who were also on the the ground, so to speak, at the time who have rated it highly. 

Lastly, full transparency, before reading the book I had come to the conclusion that current IFVs and their tactics were possibly a dead end, a coffin for ten or at the very least not fit for role....that is protecting the TANKS from other Infantry so they could deal death and destruction. (now Infantry accompanying Tanks seizing an objective, that is fine but a secondary role, the consolidation and defence of that objective should be the role of follow on Infantry formations...again, I digress). I even went so far as to state in another forum that the current British Army should be looking at something similar to Merkava/Namer combination (BTW the previous pic in this thread is not Namer, that is a Nagamachon APC based on the Centurion which IS supposed to operate in urban/COIN enviroments. Namer is based upon Merkava and has similar speed and maneuverability).

Getting back to Jim and Battlegroup! I'll give it 4.9 out of 5 Stars...the only reason for that is I want more!

Thank you.  

Best wishes 

Jim Storr

[Begemot]

On 2/7/2022 at 7:55 AM, Jim Storr said:

Artillery:  There are several reasons, many of them taken from the literature.  Regrettably, knowing somebody who was a maths student and served in the artillery school doesn't make the whole of the Soviet artillery accurate; and I didn't say that their officers were incompetent.  Their guns were crude; their sensors and computation roughly a generation behind the west's, their standards of training generally poor. Soviet artillery fire in the Great Patriotic War was often heavy but inaccurate and its fire planning crude; Arab artillery fire in those wars where they had been taught by the Soviets equally so.  

In simple terms, any artillery fire can be accurate if you can observe the target directly and correct the fall of shot.  Western armies could do that quite well in 1916.  But in practically every other case we can reasonably expect Soviet artillery fire to have been as described. 

Jim Storr,

Thank you for taking the time to respond to my query about your characterization of Soviet artillery in a Cold War goes hot scenario as as "... heavy but inaccurate [fire], and its fire planning crude".  Regrettably, I thought your reply was disappointing.

First, the reference to my wife's father, a colonel of Soviet artillery and an instructor in an academy devoted to producing junior grade artillery officers in a four year program was intended to show that I had personal knowledge that such institutions existed (there were more than one such academy for artillery) and to show that the Soviets evidently took such an investment in training seriously. Your response was to say that while you didn't say that Soviet artillery officers were incompetent (true) the Soviet standards of training  were "generally poor", thus, along with technical backwardness, the best to be expected was "... heavy but inaccurate [fire], and its fire planning crude". If artillery officers can't hit a target then how competent can they be?

Referring to the Great Patriotic War ("Soviet artillery fire in the Great Patriotic War was often heavy but inaccurate and its fire planning crude") is relevant to the Cold War period in what way? Are you suggesting that the Soviets did not improve their artillery and practice and doctrine in any way from 1945 to the 1980's? Am I on firm ground here in thinking that the Soviets did improve their game in this area? If so, wouldn't accuracy be one of those things improved upon (that being the ultimate point of artillery) or are we to think that these guys are just too primitive and unsophisticated to "get it"?

You also offer the example of the Arabs trained by the Soviets and the Arabs sad and failed efforts as an indicator of the quality of Soviet artillery. If we can accurately judge the teaching nation's military by how well its students have done, then how do we evaluate the US military and the students its has taught: South Vietnamese Army (collapsed 1975), Georgian Army (collapsed 2008), and Afghan Army (collapsed 2021)?

I find it incredible that a nation that could build a nuclear arsenal and carry out a manned space program, even if not up to the technical level of sophistication of the United States, couldn't solve the problem of getting accurate artillery fire, which was solved back in WW1. It beggars belief.

Enough. I suspect that we are firmly lodged in our positions and not likely to yield, so I propose a "Christmas Truce" and there's and end to it.

Good luck with your next book (is the topic a secret?).

Regards

 

[arkhangelsk2021]

21 minutes ago, Begemot said:

Thank you for taking the time to respond to my query about your characterization of Soviet artillery in a Cold War goes hot scenario as as "... heavy but inaccurate [fire], and its fire planning crude".  Regrettably, I thought your reply was disappointing.

Considering the circumstances, I applaud you for staying so calm.

On the subject, I'll only point out that if Arabs indeed have poor technical and/or tactical fire control, the British cannot escape their share of responsibility, because most Arab militaries were British trained before the Soviets ever touched them. So either the Arabs were untrainable (and indeed, that's the conclusion of Kenneth Pollack's Armies of Sand), or the British have to admit their tactics and techniques don't work as well.

The Soviets probably don't mind the Arabs using British tactics or techniques. What they care about is the Arabs taking their equipment and killing Israelis, so they can brag about it. It's great if they did it with Soviet tactics, but doing it with British tactics is a very close second compared to losing.

[Jim Storr]

5 hours ago, Begemot said:

Jim Storr,

Thank you for taking the time to respond to my query about your characterization of Soviet artillery in a Cold War goes hot scenario as as "... heavy but inaccurate [fire], and its fire planning crude".  Regrettably, I thought your reply was disappointing.

First, the reference to my wife's father, a colonel of Soviet artillery and an instructor in an academy devoted to producing junior grade artillery officers in a four year program was intended to show that I had personal knowledge that such institutions existed (there were more than one such academy for artillery) and to show that the Soviets evidently took such an investment in training seriously. Your response was to say that while you didn't say that Soviet artillery officers were incompetent (true) the Soviet standards of training  were "generally poor", thus, along with technical backwardness, the best to be expected was "... heavy but inaccurate [fire], and its fire planning crude". If artillery officers can't hit a target then how competent can they be?

Referring to the Great Patriotic War ("Soviet artillery fire in the Great Patriotic War was often heavy but inaccurate and its fire planning crude") is relevant to the Cold War period in what way? Are you suggesting that the Soviets did not improve their artillery and practice and doctrine in any way from 1945 to the 1980's? Am I on firm ground here in thinking that the Soviets did improve their game in this area? If so, wouldn't accuracy be one of those things improved upon (that being the ultimate point of artillery) or are we to think that these guys are just too primitive and unsophisticated to "get it"?

You also offer the example of the Arabs trained by the Soviets and the Arabs sad and failed efforts as an indicator of the quality of Soviet artillery. If we can accurately judge the teaching nation's military by how well its students have done, then how do we evaluate the US military and the students its has taught: South Vietnamese Army (collapsed 1975), Georgian Army (collapsed 2008), and Afghan Army (collapsed 2021)?

I find it incredible that a nation that could build a nuclear arsenal and carry out a manned space program, even if not up to the technical level of sophistication of the United States, couldn't solve the problem of getting accurate artillery fire, which was solved back in WW1. It beggars belief.

Enough. I suspect that we are firmly lodged in our positions and not likely to yield, so I propose a "Christmas Truce" and there's and end to it.

Good luck with your next book (is the topic a secret?).

Regards

 

Thank you.

To clarify:  hitting a target where the fall of shot can be seen and correct is easy.  However:  In many circumstances fire will be predicted, rather than observed.  That is where I would expect Soviet artillery fire to be heavy and inaccurate.  And if the target is also not observed, then fire planning is led by intelligence, which might be poor and out of date. This is not primarily an issue of 'competence'.  It's more a reflection on the whole Soviet way of war.  

But, more broadly, I agree.  In the absence of any better evidence, I'll keep myside of the Christmas Truce.  

Best wishes 

Jim Storr

Edited February 9, 2022 by Jim Storr
Grammar

[Jim Storr]

Sorry, should read 'corrected'.  

Jim Storr

[renown1916]

So I just finished this book and it was excellent hopefully the author will still respond. First off I want to mention I haven't read very much about cold war armies either organizationally or about their tactics. Most of my questions will be about organization. 

The first thing I want to ask is that during the reorganization in the 1980's when British FEBA brigades lost their reserve battlegroups why was this allowed to occur. Having immediate reserves at the lowest levels to prevent a breakthrough seems like common sense if even if high HQ's have few reserves. And why did units have to ask the next higher commander if they could use their own reserves. For example a division wanting to commit their reserve brigade asking the corps commander. This seems inflexible, time consuming, and taking the initiative away from subordinates. 

One argument in favor of IFV's could be that the  APC and fire support roles in one vehicle should decrease the number of vehicles in each battlegroups and require less fuel and spare parts compared to two vehicles. Of course this doesn't address the tactical use of IFV's

According to sources, Patrick Delaforce being one, British armoured divisions during WW2 used their armoured recce regiments as a fourth tank battalion teamed. So shouldn't the total number of maneuver companies for Britain on table 9-1 be 27 not 24 as mentioned in the book? On page 163 I feel that you also contradict yourself when you say that the 24 companies of the British armoured divisions is too many but then 2 paragraphs later mention that 20-24 companies is about right. Is it because of the ratio 15 infantry and 9 tank companies or something else? Besides that I wished you had included a chart breaking down your proposed Byfleet division. 

 Regarding the Pentomic organization used by the U.S and similarly used by the British in the 1970's why was 5 battlegroups to much in terms of span of control while a bundesheer brigade could control 4 battlegroups plus other units? And what seems to be the best number of Combat Commands/Brigade headquarters between divisions and their battlegroups? 2 or 3 intermediate HQ's? 

I'm trying to find Grundsatzliche zu dem organizationplan heer and Soldat im 20. Jahrhundert  that you mention as being translated by Ghislaine Fluck but I can't seem to find them in English. Is this personally translated for you like Middeldorf's books? Finally is there any chance that Middeldorf's being translated and sold anytime soon? 

Thanks in advance and I know this post is long winded.

[Acorn]

Gosh, this is fun! - I found it Googling "wrg tanks infantry" as I occasionally do.  I've got Jim's book, and I've got the copy of British Army Review in which his brother (who was a TA - reserve - infantry officer, as was I at the time) had an article on "mini-APCs" based on wargaming.  That the rules used were WRG 1950-85 seemed likely because smaller vehicles are harder to spot - something which the successor 1950-2000 rules did away with.  It's a brilliant book and my former CO is eagerly awaiting his copy.  It's easy enough to quibble with, but what would be the point of a book that didnt provoke such a lively and interesting debate?  The thing that jarred most with me is that the definitions of "interlocking" and "overlapping" aren't the ones I was taught.  Which is basically irrelevant to the book's utility.  I'm putting together a Bundeswehr force from 1968 (for WRG), so I look forward to trialling my SPz-12s - and maybe comparing them to AMX VTT/VCI when I get round to Belgians.  And I have played CM, but only the older versions.

[Rice]

sus...

[Combatintman]

17 hours ago, Acorn said:

something which the successor 1950-2000 rules did away with.  It's a brilliant book and my former CO is eagerly awaiting his copy.  

He's been waiting 22 years for a book ... Christ on a bike, Royal Mail has gone downhill of late - where does he live, the Falklands?

[Grey_Fox]

On 4/23/2022 at 1:21 AM, Acorn said:

Gosh, this is fun! - I found it Googling "wrg tanks infantry" as I occasionally do.  I've got Jim's book, and I've got the copy of British Army Review in which his brother (who was a TA - reserve - infantry officer, as was I at the time) had an article on "mini-APCs" based on wargaming.  That the rules used were WRG 1950-85 seemed likely because smaller vehicles are harder to spot - something which the successor 1950-2000 rules did away with.  It's a brilliant book and my former CO is eagerly awaiting his copy.  It's easy enough to quibble with, but what would be the point of a book that didnt provoke such a lively and interesting debate?  The thing that jarred most with me is that the definitions of "interlocking" and "overlapping" aren't the ones I was taught.  Which is basically irrelevant to the book's utility.  I'm putting together a Bundeswehr force from 1968 (for WRG), so I look forward to trialling my SPz-12s - and maybe comparing them to AMX VTT/VCI when I get round to Belgians.  And I have played CM, but only the older versions.

Hi Jim, do you feel criticism of your book is unwarranted?

Do you mind providing the modified rulesets, and the results of games using those modified rulesets, used as a basis for your book? A number of us have been curious about it.

Edited April 24, 2022 by Grey_Fox

[jirik]

Hi @Jim Storr,

I read your  book twice and I believe it is really valueable piece of work. I learnt a lot from it and it is definitely thought provoking material. 

I served couple of years in nineties in a former Eastern army and I had opportunity to speak to quite a lot of Cold War officers and I'd say that a lot (even if not all) your opinions and ideas about Soviet and Eastern armies is correct.

I loved the discussion about IFVs. What is interesting that I (as a gamer) progressively moved from IFV based infantry to prefer APC based one. The reason is that I feel that larger squad (usually +2) is more resilient and usually for the same amount of resource points you can obtain larger infantry force. For forest and urban work it seems to be indispensable.

From my side it was mostly subconcious process but it seems that it fits well to your analysis.

I'd like to ask you for one thing. As you mentioned you translated Middeldorf's books. Is there a chance you'd be able to publish the translations? It seems to me that they are really valuable source.

I was able to find them online in Russian in which I am very weak. At the same time publishing them in English would improve the English-language discourse as well.

Thanks a lot for your answer and I wish you luck in your future publication efforts!

J.