Hi Forum,
Hi Jim,
I was looking for reviews about the book and found this thread. I have read it as well. I just registered for posting here and hope that's okay, haven't played CM in years but I might get back into it.
I was reading the info on the "Bundeswehr" with great interest, in particular after I wondered for some time what the "untapped" sources would be. I was thinking about two claims for a while now:
1.)
I am not quite sure how well the book is served by explaining Bundeswehr tactics from the 80s by overrelying on two books by Middeldorf from the 50s. That's 30 years of tactical development in between. I don't say Middeldorf is irrelevant, but I felt that overall it would have been more appropriate to work with sources from the 80s or late 70s, simply for the sake of being closer to the scope of the book, especially since Middeldorf is cupiously quoted for relatively banal things (the faster the persuit, the greater the success" p. 201).
So when you say "Unsurprisningly, the best discription of the tactics of the delay come from the Middeldorf books." (p. 178) What do you compare that with? Middeldorf himself keeps developing his thoughts on the delay for example until, at least, the 60s when he is trying to take into account the changed environment of the 60s in his later publication "Führung und Gefecht" (1968).
Middeldorf is very important, but I personally feel that he would have required more contextualization to tranasfer his books into the 1980s.
2.)
Similar things go for the size discussion of the divisions. You write that "Both v. Manstein and Speidel wrote divisions over 12 or 13.000 men were unwieldy" (p. 161) and quote v. manstein from 55. That pre-dates the development of the brigade structure in Germany, that is then adopted by most of NATO, hence the shift from the division as the smalles operational element to the brigade. Hence, when Speidel and v. Manstein complain about division size, they still assume the division as the smalles building block. They came up with the brigades after that. The very intense discussion from 55-58 is basically missing.
When you say "West german Planners really should have payed more heed to Speidel and von Manstein" (p. 173)....that's literally what they did. Speidel and gang came up with the solution further down the road (smalles combined arms element "brigade") to the problem they identified (too large divisions).
There are a few more oddities here and there, like claims that would have needed some source to back them up, mistranslations/misinterpretations of German language/tactical thinking, some quotes that don't seem to add up at times (p. 162, fn 21: The source does not claim this?) , a lot of anecdotes, strong relying on world war II wisdom to explain the 80s, some odd claims about the role of Middeldorf, occasional snarky comments (accepatble style devices though) a la "agilty has been overlooked" (p. 173, and no, it wasn't). Maybe your thoughts on the German perspective should have been subject to a seperate publication, since I feel at times it is overly simplified/shortened. So I am empathatic to your quote from p. 58. "German doctrine is often poorly understood by English-speaking readers." after which you continoue on to give an incorrect explanation of Fingerspitzengefühl. (I have the u with the funny points, so my authenticity is hereby proven )
I really enjoyed the read though! Great to see someone take on this topic and express his thoughts on divisional structure and hypothetical WWIII Combat. And taking on Middeldorf is certainly something! I really appreciated that and learned a few things about BAOR as well. A great non-academic addition from an experienced officers perspective.
I know in these kind of blogs discussions can turn into bilateral "back and forths", so I would like to reserve the right to reply once if thats okay and leave it at that. If you (Jim) or anybody else like to exchange more thoughts, I am happy to exchange contact details (facebook or similar).
All the best to everyone,
LD
