Iron Mike Golf

@Jim StorrGot my copy and put a dent in it. Got me reviewing the history of doctrine development with a different azimuth of view. Thanks! Reading some earlier writings of Starry, you can definitely see the genesis of AirLand battle (looking for good pull quotes). He seemed convinced, using a target servicing rate model in the sims of the time, that the forward deployed forces could handle the entire first echelon (including second and follow-own echelon regiments of the first echelon) if the pacing of introduction of WP combat power into the FEBA could be well managed. He saw that "surveillance line" of sensors available to a Corps commander weren't up to that task (national recon assets were needed, so speedy dissemination of that info was also needed) and fires available to the Corps Commander didn't have the range to alter WP momentum. That meant using air power. So, using air power to influence the 24-72 hours in the future. As so the apparent disconnect between Active Defense and AirLand Battle, that may be a result of the pre-cursor architect for want of a better term) having been an 11 ACR and V Corps Commander. Decade too late, but Starry lived 20 minutes away from me. *sigh*. Anyway, from a V Corps perspective, the difference between Active Defense and AirLand Battle comes to the fore once the IGB Covering Force has been collapsed and the Divisions have deployed from garrison. My experience and study (thus far) don't qualify me to comment on other sectors. I was an AMF and V Corps guy in my 3 tours in Europe, As to mounted assaults, I need to dig more. Starry was a Cavalry guy first and armor guy second. Maybe something written by Depuy? I don't know. I have a gut feeling the West's (sans British, perhaps) position was a result of Wehrmacht and WP experience/thought. The fact, IMO, was WW II experience in such tactics (along with tank riders, or "armor desant") was largely invalid by the 80s (if not earlier), owing to a different battlefield lethality environment. Now, that doesn't mean that aren't times where dismounting infantry on or very near (< 1000m from) the objective doesn't make perfect sense. Grabbing a piece of terrain and having an hour or two to get ready for the inevitable counter-attack is a gem beyond price.

Thank you, @Erwin, on both counts. @Jim StorrI was hoping to receive your book today, but now it's looking like in the next day or two. I am really looking forward to reading it!

Certainly! There is a single hatch over the troop compartment and it is a cargo hatch, not a fighting hatch. The principal task for using that hatch is to reload the TOW missile launcher. And, it's an alternative for resupply if for whatever reason one can't lower the ramp. In the A2 model, the flank periscopes are basically unusable, as they are also blocked by the add-on hull armor. Additionally, when the cargo hatch is open, the turret weapons are locked out. There are a number of switches and sensors that result in the main gun elevating to 45 degrees or so (relative to the hull) to prevent the gun barrel from striking an open driver's hatch or the cargo hatch. Had a gunner knocked off the vehicle and also knocked out when the vehicle commander grabbed a palm switch in the turret with the driver's hatch open and the gun too close to it. it's quite a vigorous action. There were no gunnery table to exercise squads using these weapons. When I as a Division level Bradley Master Gunner, I did some work on seeing if some firing exercises could be fashioned. Consulted with folk at 7th Army Training Command at Graf in the early 90s and our consensus was we couldn't do it safely enough with facilities in existence at the time. I transitioned from "foot mobile" to BFV Infantryman on the A1. The doctrinal manual at the time and the subsequent one (both editions of FM 23-1) specified fire commands for the firing port weapons. They were termed "right bank", "left bank", and "rear bank". I never witnessed troops dismounting with the firing port weapons mounted in the ramp. I think the barrels were short enough to keep them out of the dirt, but I'd expect people tripping over them if dismounting in the dark. "Mounted assault" speaks not to dismounts fighting while mounted, but where they dismount relative to the objective. A mounted assault sees troops being disgorged on the objective as opposed to dismounting in a covered and hopefully concealed location hundreds of meters from said objective. Even in the basic and A1 models, using the firing ports is about self protection and not assaulting. The weapons are shortened AR-15s. Magazine fed (regular 30 round ones) and no sight system. The doctrine was to shoot all tracer and it was about suppressing very close targets (too close for the turret weapons), not attacking and objective.

I can't speak to UK or BW mechanized forces, but as to US (personal experience, here, so cast it as anecdotal if you like): The decision to assault mounted or to dismount short of the assault objective is a situational decision. The main factors are cover, concealment, and time. For the M2, the modifications brought about by the A2 variant were driven by the BMP-2's 30mm autocannon. The basic and A1 variants were designed to stop 14.5mm and 23mm. The upgrade added heavier armor skirts to the hull flanks (as well as applique plates to the front slope and turret) and the skirts are what covered up the flank firing ports. The rear firing ports remained operational and the vehicle kit retained firing port weapons for those. Mounted assault was not, in my experience, dropped from either doctrine or training when the flank firing ports were deleted. A former Bradley Master Gunner