F-35 deployment to Ukraine?

[A Canadian Cat]

Ah yeah, I don't know about that. While it is possible that a rocket engine expert could spend time talking to himself about flying spaghetti monsters and still have sensible stuff to say about rocket engines. It is far more likely that anyone talking about flying spaghetti monsters is not really making a lot of sense on any topic. Or at the very least is not equipped to tell what is good information and what is not when reading other sources.

Edited to add: Hah ninja'ed by @sburke. What he said. I long ago put John on ignore because after wading through his posts there was very little of significance in the reams and reams of words and then it was clear that the vast majority of it was just tosh. I decided that I wanted that time back but since I cannot get that time back I decided to not spend any more of my time reading it.

Edited March 2, 2017 by IanL

[HerrTom]

I don't think I was talking about warisboring, which I agree is far from technically accurate. If I was sburke et al, I apologize for the controversy.

WRT specifically the F35 I don't really understand the whole row about it's capabilities. It may be falling short of its goalposts, but those are pretty damn lofty ones at that. What it can already do is pretty impressive.

Budget over run is a different matter and probably should be the real focus on what is "wrong" with the aircraft, in giving out why the contracts went so far over, and that is more of a "Bradley" problem than a technical one.

[A Canadian Cat]

2 minutes ago, HerrTom said:

Budget over run is a different matter and probably should be the real focus on what is "wrong" with the aircraft, in giving out why the contracts went so far over, and that is more of a "Bradley" problem than a technical one.

Yep. As a Canadian the debate has been about the $. That and the sole source contact for them in the first place - although no irony is lost on me that our current government cancelled the F35 purchase due to cost (as promised during the election) and then was "forced" to sole source a contact for new F18s because they felt the time line for replacing the current F18s was to tight for a full competition. Gotta love politics. Note: if the previous government had had conducted a competitive bid process this could have been avoided and if the F35 was still too expensive they would at least have had a second place bit to look at as a starting point.

[Codename Duchess]

The TL;DR of the F-35 as it stands in 2017 is that the program was horribly managed/run/whatever from the beginning, but the aircraft itself is pretty damn awesome.  You'll find that analogous to many other big programs throughout US military history (and other countries).  The difference is simply the amount of money involved at this point was unheard of up to this point.

As for the CAS debate, which I've gone through many times before (don't make me get the Bingo square out...), there simply won't be fixed wing CAS for anywhere from the first day to the first week, depending on how committed Russia (in this example) is.  The exception would be Marine F-18s and F-35s because that's their focus, but I imagine even they would be committed to the Air Superiority role.  The first air to ground strikes you would see would be SEAD/DEAD and the destruction of enemy airfields and strategic nodes.  SEAD is to help gain air superiority and the airfield and strategic (fuel dumps, truck farms, HQs, etc) strikes don't require long term air superiority, merely a simple bubble that can collapse after the strike has passed.  Conversely, CAS requires long term (in aviation terms) control of the local airspace in order to allow the best chances of success.  The higher the threat, the greater this area needs to be.  Note that rotary assets would likely still operate in a CAS role even without air superiority because they are much better at hiding, and I'm less willing to use a missile on something down low when there are Sukhois around.  The Russian Air Force would be essentially unable to perform any CAS roles in the face of NATO airpower (this is why SHORAD isn't a big deal for the US) and at best could hope for the kind of "bubble strikes" I mentioned above, likely at great cost.  As the situation started to allow CAS, you'd see F-35s followed by 4th gen fighters and the A-10 start to appear in that role.

Seriously though, don't make me get the bingo square out.

Edited March 2, 2017 by Codename Duchess

[HerrTom]

Duchess, what about escort roles in SEAD? Do they stay with the SEAD aircraft or loiter out of the SAM envelope?

[Codename Duchess]

32 minutes ago, HerrTom said:

Duchess, what about escort roles in SEAD? Do they stay with the SEAD aircraft or loiter out of the SAM envelope?

Super Hornets can self escort, or they'd stay with them.  The newest version of the HARM go really far, as do any other number of standoff weapons that can be used in a SEAD/DEAD role.  The Cold War low CBU pass thing isn't really the current trend when we are talking about modern SAM systems with crazy range.  The escort doesn't need to be right on top of the SEAD flight to still do it's job.

[Vanir Ausf B]

It would be fascinating to see the F-35 against a neer-peer opponent. The US has bet most of it's marbles on the dominance of BVR but that is mostly theoretical.

Quote

Claim that USAFs combat record proves maturity of BVR combat or even missiles in general is misleading, however. Targets that were fired at were in vast majority of cases unaware they were being fired at and thus did not take any evasive action; no targets had electronic countermeasures, support from stand-off jammers, nor comparable BVR weapon (be it radar-guided, IR or anti-radiation BVR missile). When targets were aware they were targeted and thus did take evasive action – such as when two Iraqi MiG-25s illuminated two F-15Cs with BVR radar in 1999 – BVR shots were ineffective (in example cited, US fighters made 6 BVR shots to no effect).

For end, I will adress an argument that is obviously invalid but very often does come up anyway: one of exercises in which F-22 “dominates” against “legacy” fighters, with kill ratios between 10:1 and 30:1. But these exercises are bogus, as they depend on incorrect assumptions about air combat to produce results. In them, most kills are achieved at BVR as BVR missiles are assigned Pk of 90%, despite never achieving such performance

https://defenseissues.net/2013/04/27/usefulness-of-bvr-combat/

 

 

Quote

Analyses done elsewhere have shown that the history of the AIM-120 in BVR engagements has been 6 kills from 13 shots, a kill probability of 46%.  However, the targets were ‘straight and level,’ un-alerted aircraft, not fitted with electronic counter measures.  One was a helicopter.   So, for modern warfare when the enemy is network enabled, fully cognisant of the tactical situation, and takes every opportunity to break the kill-chain, a sub-20% kill probability for BVR missiles is likely to be the new reality.

In future air combat, those with the most BVR rounds, the ability to egress a fight before a merge, and flying tough, multi-engine aircraft that can take a WVR missile hit and still get home, will be the winners.

http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-NOTAM-270109-1.html

 

Edited March 2, 2017 by Vanir Ausf B

[John Kettler]

shift8,

Pray let me give you some calibration points on my last post. I cited War Is Boring Because a fair number of people here read it. Thus, it has name recognition. Equally, it's clear the site has insider sources who know all manner of useful things. The deluge of negative material on the F-35 was on professional defense sites, heavily featured in such periodicals and the MSM. By "professional," I mean people in the military, defense industry, as well as academics who delve into such things. I lacked the time and energy, both of which I expended on an enormous scale to generate my last post, to go root up the piles and piles of evidence supporting my claim. In fact, given my state when I was wrapping up my post, I barely was able to do that kill breakdown I provided. If you really want to dig into this who got whom with what issue, the RED BARON reports have been declassified, so are available for meticulous analysis. The ones we saw when I was at Hughes made harrowing reading. Talking haggard looking boss after he read who knows how many.

IanL can talk about spaghetti monsters with reference to me all he wants, but in no way can he make any of my following direct involvements in air-to-air missile matters go away.

*Data extraction and presentation from 6-DOF AMRAAM flyout model, from which all manner of things the engineers needed to know were determined.

*Running RAID Air Battle Model (Force on Force)

*AMRAAM  Battery Life Study

*AMRAAM Seeker Gimbal Limits Study

*AMRAAM G Limits Study

*AMRAAM F-Pole Analysis

*AMRAAM ER vs AA-7 Threat

*AMRAAM Proposal

*AMRAAM SDR (Solid Ducted Rocket)

SAMRAAM (SAM version)

*Global Assessment of Total AMRAAM compatible launch rails in both friendly and gray countries.

The above were in addition to a very extensive amount of work on threat definition.

I also put in a lot of work on FAD in threat characterization, AWG-9 and AIM-54 vulnerabilities to high power RF, both Blue and Red (one I found caused a firestorm with both Hughes and the Navy), SOJ, escort jammers, BACKFIRE, submarine and ship launched ASCMs, together with associated doctrine and tactics. Participated in  evaluations of various Red scenarios to penetrate FAD (from F-14s, through SM-2 ER and SM-2 down to RAM and Phalanx) for both conventional and nuclear cases (RAM and Phalanx obviously irrelevant in latter case) and was directly involved in various CAP Remanning Studies. Most of this was done with that guy who had a conduit from the Office of Scientific & Weapons Research at the CIA, so he had the latest intel. Sad to say, the far term threat projections we had to threat as threat excursions in our analyses.were already fielded.

Recall that Hughes Missile Systems Group built the two longest legged AAMs (Phoenix and AMRAAM, both command- inertial, so could be launched and then go active, allowing the plane to break off and avoid incoming missiles; Sparrow was pretty pathetic then and its SAH required flying into the teeth of the inbound Russian missile) and Radar Systems Group built the FCS for the F-14, F-15, and the F-18. The only fighter whose radar we didn't build was for the F-16, and it was risible in terms of range and performance. AMRAAM could also be used as a highly capable WVR fired active right off the rails like a Sidewinder. It would fit any Sidewinder rail, which is why I had to do an exhaustive platform count and assess potential configurations by aircraft type. 

Was also involved on the Anti-SUAWACS missile, which was designed to kill their Il-76 MAINSTAY.

All in all, you could say I was smack in the middle of air-to-air stuff. I could do exactly the same drill for strike and ground warfare, including the IAD of the period. When I talk about what the thinking was during the Cold War, what we were doing, what the Russians were doing, what doctrine was, our capabilities vs theirs, etc., I'm speaking from the perspective of someone who made his living in the missile business and whose acumen was so valued I was called in to consult with Dr. Hans Mauer, our CTO. Though not senior enough to rate an office, I soon had one, with 10 classified three-drawer file cabinets taking up the space of an office mate.  You could say I had a practically all-embracing Threat Library in my office, from which I supported all the various sections.

Though things have obviously changed considerably since, I knew my stuff then, and it probably wouldn't take an enormous effort (provided I could read and retain it) now to fill in the gaps. Our desperately needed ASRAAM is today's AIM-9X, for example. Phoenix is gone, and AMRAAM now is far better, and much longer-legged, than the one I was directly involved in bringing to fruition.

To be clear, I fervently hope the F-35 does not only everything it was intended to do, but much beyond that as the years go forward. But the aggregate of what I was seeing when I last looked into the matter was the F-35 was a Grade One disaster in which many critical systems either didn't work, performed poorly or were only partially ready and might not be for years--with the aircraft coming into IOC. Fun has been poked over the Bradley, but the truth of the matter is that the Army rigged the survivability tests.

http://articles.latimes.com/1986-01-29/news/mn-1162_1_weapons-testing

http://www.upi.com/Archives/1986/01/28/The-Pentagon-rigged-tests-of-the-113-billion-Bradley/5110507272400/

Extensive detail on the specifics of the cheating 

http://www.nytimes.com/1985/12/18/opinion/another-test-of-truth-for-the-army.html

Am I glad they ultimately got the Bradley sorted out? Absolutely. It's not amphibious (was supposed to be as originally designed), but it's a tremendous weapon system. Brother George spent much of his Army career in Scouts in Bradley CFVs armed, might I add, with the Hughes Bushmaster Chain Gun, Hughes FCS,  optics and thermals, Hughes TOWs (which I also worked on) and a Hughes near instant Halon fire suppression system which could stop an RPG penetration from wiping out the crew.  Smothered it. Saw the CONFIDENTIAL film from our SBRC (Santa Barbara Research Center) which designed and built it.

While I generally agree that were Russia to overtly invade the Ukraine, the Air Force's priorites would be to rupture the Russian AD bubble, smash the SAMs in the combat area and  clear the skies, it's equally true that there's precious little time in which to stop the surging Russian spearheads from reaching operational-strategic and strategic objectives before then. Consequently, I anticipate there will have to be an air effort, however bloody, by Army and Air Force air assets alike, against the spearhead units, else the Air Force may well wind up winning from its perspective yet lose the war! Sometimes you have to go fight when and where you'd prefer not to. See, for example, Jaguar ultra low level strikes, with laydown weapons requiring overflight of the runways, against heavily defended Iraqi air bases in GW I. Casualties were the worst of the entire war, but the airfields were put out of business, which was the whole point. Loss rates were shocking to NATO, whose war plans envisioned doing exactly the same to Russian air bases in East Germany.

Happily, these days CAS doesn't have to rely exclusively on strafing, rockets and laydown bombs, so real pain can be inflicted from outside the envelope of at least part of the defenses, and the organic defenses can be dealt with fairly quickly by a variety of means. Tunguska, for example, wouldn't fare well under artillery fire. Knock out a few of those, and it creates the opportunities to get in there and go to work with everything the A-10, a flying dump truck of ordnance and with great combat persistence, has. From an aircraft survival perspective, Ukraine is far from ideal, but neither is it flat. If anything can exploit every nook and cranny of the terrain for self-protection it's the highly maneuverable A-10. 

Regards,

John Kettler

 

Edited March 3, 2017 by John Kettler

[John Kettler]

What I wrote previously about early insertion of CAS into the fight wasn't based on any direct recollection of the invasion timings, but what I do know is that those Russian armored spearheads will have fuel sufficient to travel some 550 kilometers by road (for the T-90) without refueling (and probably not counting auxiliary fuel drums). Coming from the closest point of Belarus to Kiev, for example, is about a fifth of that, In turn, this means that interdicting fuel and ammo won't stop Russia from taking Kiev and winning the war. Therefore, fixed wing CAS, in conjunction with Army's helos,  has to preferentially target and kill SAMs, tanks, IFVs, APCs, MRLS, SPA, C3I, ISTR,EW, bridging gear. CAS and whatever's supporting it have to fundamentally blunt the spearhead by disrupting its cohesion and physically destroying its combat power. BAI and deep interdiction won't mean much if the Red Army already occupies Kiev. If the front of the steamroller can be stalled, then other things can be hit hard. You've seen those Russian invasion columns on videos. Those vehicles are so tightly strung together they'd be meat on the table for air attack. Think Highway of Death redux, And we know, from the Czechoslovakian invasion, for one, how the Red Army operates in urgent mode. Everything is sacrificed, including artillery and commo vans with intact radios and crypto gear if need be, for the sake of speed. In the minds of the Red Army commanders only two things matter: putting tanks and motorized rifle infantry on the objective in the shortest possible time. Do that, own the ground, be prepared for a NATO counterattack, then let the politicians sort out the rest. This is exactly why I believe CAS should be focused on killing the sources of combat power first, for it is that which will decide all in an invasion in which every minute is priceless for Russia. 

Regards,

John Kettler

Edited March 3, 2017 by John Kettler

[c3k]

The F22 can "control" the fight.

The F35 has more advanced designs/sensors than the F22, but is not optimized for the air-to-air fight. (Not saying it is bad at it, just that it is not an optimized for air-to-air.)

Comms (without losing stealth) with earlier generation aircraft is the biggest bugaboo.

The F35 really is a game changer...as is/was the F22. (The minor gun issue: probably solvable with a software fix to use automatic flight control inputs to counter the asymmetric drag. Testing yet to be done. Door commanded to open? Rudder input counters it. Recoil would be the next issue.  )

The relative lack of internal stowage is the biggest limit. The back-of-the-envelope solution is to us "missile trucks" in comms with the F35/F22. They can be loitering UAVs or earlier generation fighters. That creates two issues: missile range/engagement energy, and comms to coordinate/target the missiles against the enemy. Solid rocket boosters strapped to the ass-end of the missiles solves the range/energy issue. Comms (stealthy) is the biggest hurdle. The F22 is more limited in this regard.

The internal stowage limitation is most critical when the stealth level is a requirement. If/when air superiority is achieved, external stowage can be used. (Not sure how realistic that assumption is. E.g., when does the warfighter decide it's okay to go less stealthy.)

Wingtip ordnance vibration is, as far as I know, limited to the F35C (carrier version with the big wing with folding tips). It -may- be present on the A and B, but I haven't heard of it yet. Structural beefing up is needed. That's an "oops", but it can be readily implemented in production once the design is finalized.

These aircraft are VERY good at what they do.

[Ivanov]

Regarding the "expensive" F-35.

http://aviationweek.com/avalon-airshow/f-35a-could-cost-80-million-multi-year-orders-lockheed-says?platform=hootsuite

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

All:

Re: F-35 vs F-22

I am aware of the different mission sets. The early F-35 back when it was pitched as the JSF was billed being part of a new wave of faster, better, cheaper procurement that would deliver a lot of the F-22s strengths oriented more towards a strike mission. 

The faster and cheaper procurement process really did not occur and that's something worth wagging fingers over. 

Re: F-35 performance in general

20% p/k sounds bad until you look at it from the perspective that 1:5 of your formation is dead with others damaged or evasive to the degree to be mission kill, and you have no idea where the attackers even are. 

We in the war game community are used to suicide brave pilots or being able to rebuild things on the fly, but there isn't a force out there that could sustain 20% losses on a regular basis, especially if you're stupid levels of outnumbered AND flying mostly planes from two generations ago. 

The F-35 is part of a wider weapons system that is frankly pretty scary if you have to look at it as a foe. No one really has a good reliable or reasonable answer to it yet, posturing aside. 

[John Kettler]

Ivanov,

After reading the article, I must say that the comments are are great, especially the ones about what the F-35 can and can't do, and how those in the fighter community with F-35 experience rate it. 

Regards,

John Kettler

[Codename Duchess]

52 minutes ago, John Kettler said:

Ivanov,

After reading the article, I must say that the comments are are great, especially the ones about what the F-35 can and can't do, and how those in the fighter community with F-35 experience rate it. 

Regards,

John Kettler

Speaking from firsthand experience the jet is so much more than Pierre Sprey and defense bloggers will have you believe.

[Sgt.Squarehead]

IS that 'Is' or 'Will Be'?

How many F-16s or F-18s could one purchase for the same total cost as the F-35 project, just out of interest.....Quite a few I'd warrant! 

BTW is ALIS working properly yet? 

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

3 hours ago, Sgt.Squarehead said:

IS that 'Is' or 'Will Be'?

How many F-16s or F-18s could one purchase for the same total cost as the F-35 project, just out of interest.....Quite a few I'd warrant! 

BTW is ALIS working properly yet? 

How many T-34s can you buy for the price of a single T-80?  Quite a few I'd warrant!

[John Kettler]

Codename Duchess,

You've flown it?! What was it like to fly relative to your usual Super Hornet? How do you feel about potentially going to war with only one engine, rather than two? I'd be rather nervous having but one engine after being long accustomed to two. Please share everything you can that's not under the rubric of the UCMJ.

I think if the US puts the F-35 in Ukraine Putin's going to come unstuck on a scope and scale which will make his reaction to the little parade through the Baltics last year of US AFVs seem like a model of restraint. For now, there'd something nearby which theoretically, at least, can nip across the border at any time, fly through his super expensive much vaunted AD bubble, knock out his long range SAMs which form its core and his Iskander Ms (favorite intimidation toys) to pave the way for NATO into Russia in either a first strike or, in a time of crisis, do what the Russians do, preemptively hit before the correlation of forces becomes too imbalanced. That may sound crazy to us, but I can tell you, from over a decade of classified analysis experience, that's exactly how this would be viewed in a Kremlin which ever dreads a sudden attack, especially one it can't defend against, such as the Pershing 2 and GLCM in the early 1980s. 

If things ever get bad, the Iskander Ms can't be left functional, but under Russian declaratory strategic doctrine, an attack on them is considered as falling under the rubric of events which justify nuclear war. Believe there's a Russian video( with English subtitles) on this, and it explicitly defines what constitutes a nuclear weapon release  trigger, but for now, an impressive French analysis, "Russia's Evolving Strategic Doctrine and Its Implications," by the Foundation pour la Recherche Strategique, will serve.

Regards,

John Kettler

 

Edited March 4, 2017 by John Kettler

[Michael Emrys]

On March 2, 2017 at 10:20 AM, HerrTom said:

...wasn't one of the major lessons of WWII that you can't win a war from the air, no matter how hard LeMay tried?

Well...mostly true. The two A-bombs that got dropped on Japan arguably ended that war. Japan was already on the ropes because the home islands were under an air-naval siege that would have starved them all eventually. But they needed some extra arm twisting to convince them that they were beaten.

Michael

[Rinaldi]

This just in: 5th Gen fighters may cost more than a 4th Gen fighter. World shocked. In other news, the sky is blue.

[HerrTom]

49 minutes ago, Rinaldi said:

This just in: 5th Gen fighters may cost more than a 4th Gen fighter. World shocked. In other news, the sky is blue.

It's not that it costs more or is expensive in its own right.  It's that it cost so much more than contracted.  Admittedly, I work on a different type of government contract, but there is a ton of accountability even in the plan put forth in the contract. It's just surprising to me how badly the pooch got screwed here.  As far as I know, pretty much every project on F-35 is way over budget and behind schedule.  This may be a trend for big military contracts for shiny new toys, but doesn't that say that there's something wrong with the contract and procurement process?

[Codename Duchess]

10 hours ago, John Kettler said:

You've flown it?! What was it like to fly relative to your usual Super Hornet? How do you feel about potentially going to war with only one engine, rather than two? I'd be rather nervous having but one engine after being long accustomed to two. Please share everything you can that's not under the rubric of the UCMJ.

Multiple hops in the full mission simulator.  No stick time, yet.  It's a highly capable aircraft.  The amount of information available is staggering.  I won't go into specifics but like I said, unless you've been exposed  to the full capabilities of the aircraft all you're left with are the program details.  Like I've said before, the jet is magnificent, the procurement program for it was truly terrible.  Credit to the various folks who made it work. 

As for the engine issue only time will tell.  It's supposed to be a highly reliable engine, so if it's as good as they say then more power to it (literally, heh).  I've personally never encountered a situation in the Rhino where I was down to one engine but I know folks who have.  I would wager though that the next Naval jet won't be single engine, and won't be co-developed again either.

[Sgt.Squarehead]

Amen to that! 

Has it faced off with Typhoon or Rafale yet?  Be interested to know if all its hi-tech gubbins can handle a truly agile opponent with high off boresight capability and half decent long missiles.

[Vanir Ausf B]

22 hours ago, John Kettler said:

I think if the US puts the F-35 in Ukraine Putin's going to come unstuck on a scope and scale which will make his reaction to the little parade through the Baltics last year of US AFVs seem like a model of restraint. 

I think we're getting ahead of ourselves here. Even if the US were considering the deployment of fighter aircraft to Ukraine -- which I very much doubt -- the F-35 is not ready for prime time yet and likely will not be for a few years. From the DOT&E FY2016 Annual Report:

Quote

Finally, rigorous operational testing, which provides the sole means to evaluate actual combat performance, will not complete until at best the end of 2019—and more likely later. 

 

Edited March 5, 2017 by Vanir Ausf B

[John Kettler]

Vanir Ausf B,

The F-35 has already attained IOC. While it would be desirable to have OPTEVAL complete, do you really believe, if the perceived need was great enough, the US would let that stand in the way? I think not.  Of related interest, and doubtless to the fury of the PRC, Japan has already received at least one F-35A. I used "at least" because the article is from September of last year.  The Marines, as of February 8, 2016 reporting, are doing F-35B training at two bases on Okinawa. 

Regards,

John Kettler

[Vanir Ausf B]

2 hours ago, John Kettler said:

 While it would be desirable to have OPTEVAL complete, do you really believe, if the perceived need was great enough, the US would let that stand in the way? I think not. 

What is the great perceived need in Ukraine? Note that the good general said they were looking at non-combat zone deployments.

Edited March 5, 2017 by Vanir Ausf B