Why were the Paras at Arnhem so lightly equipped?

[Sailor Malan2]

TrailApe,

When compared to the combat load US Airborne jumped with on D-Day, the British, in terms of what the individual paratrooper had on his person, did indeed go in light, and the pertinent equipment lists and individual loadouts have been presented as evidence. My question was why the paratroopers of 1st Airborne were that way, not whether they were light. Two different matters. I could've said that, compared to the American paratroopers, their British and Polish confreres seemed light, which presumably would have been more to your taste. I didn't. If you read something which came across as meaning the British and Poles were stupid, that's on you.

I was looking at it not from a perspective of their being stupid, which I neither thought nor said, but of my not understanding why they did something so apparently at odds with the historical airborne experience, which is that enemy resistance is often much worse than expected (see Crete for the FJ), leading to the need for more weapons and ammo than theoretically required, and relief seldom arrives as or when planned, which also affects water requirements, rations, medical supplies and things like radio batteries and radio parts. Before it was all said and done at Arnhem, the British pretty much ran out of water and were also hungry, therefore weakened by both, and had also gone through their medical supplies, to the point where sheets were being torn up to make bandages, there was no morphine and certainly no plasma. All these things, I maintain, directly and materially affected the combat effectiveness and staying power of the parachutists and glider landed forces, which also took substantial losses from enemy fire and various landing crackups, losses which greatly hurt 1st Airborne in such important categories as ATGs. The British lost, for example, 4 x 17-pdr of 8 in the first wave. Half. In the second wave, the British effectively received only 3 guns of the 8 planned.

http://arnhemjim.blogspot.com/2012/10/the-17-pounder-anti-tank-guns-at.html

In turn, this put much greater than expected demands on the infantry's man-portable AT weapons, leading to rapid depletion of now-vital PIAT stocks. The unexpected escalating scale and ferocity of German resistance also put paid to the small arms rifled weapon ammo consumption estimates, ultimately leaving the British with no means to defend themselves.

What you said derisively about pockets in Denison smocks and their uselessness for carrying cannon rounds tells me a) you fundamentally don't/won't/can't get my overall point and/or you wish to demean and insult me.

Regards,

John Kettler

1st AB held out for 9 days, having (as you pointed out) had some key non-arrivals in the first wave, and almost no resupply. Of course they ran out of stuff! Please indicate examples of a division sized units that were not short of stuff after being isolated (or at least partially out of supply) for 9 days. The only way I could think this would possible is if they happened to have an all round defense of a major supply dump when cut off!

[altipueri]

I'm losing track of this but I am reading a biography of General Hackett who was commander of 4th Parachute Brigade. But if you are American try and get a copy of "Those Devils In Baggy Pants" by Ross S. Carter for a first hand view of the 82nd Airborne.

[John Kettler]

Before this gets more serious, I have to note for the record an amusing bit of military trivia. 1st Airborne at Arnhem went in with a 15-man PR team! Last item in a very detailed look at each chunk of the division in terms of how many went in and how many came back.

http://www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/order_1st.htm

Regards,

John Kettler

[John Kettler]

Returning to the main topic, I think we need to better define the parameters of this discussion. Are we talking the overall duration of the op, which was nine days, or the duration of the "to the last" defense of Arnhem bridge, which was four? In turn, that drastically narrows the scope of the discussion if confined to the latter. My argument, if I haven't sufficiently elucidated the point, is that the 600 men defending the Arnhem bridge had very little in overall resources relative to what an equivalent sized American formation would've had. This had cascading impacts on the indisputably staunch defenders who, in my estimation, simply didn't have that much to start with, considering that only one battalion, together with Brigade HQ, got there, fortunately without significant German interference, else the overall situation would've been far worse and sooner. There's a lot to investigate here, as my research is finding.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Ultradave]

The US army had a tendency to really load the men down with all they could carry. Just last night I was viewing some films of the paratroopers boarding up before the D-Day drops, and it looked like they must have had 100 lbs of various gear including their reserve 'chute. They were so burdened that they were having trouble climbing aboard the planes without a shove from beneath.

....

And I can tell you things haven't changed much since then in that regard. I always felt like a pack mule. Of course when I was in, my radio still weighed 25lbs, so that didn't help things.

[JonS]

My argument, if I haven't sufficiently elucidated the point, is that the 600 men defending the Arnhem bridge had very little in overall resources relative to what an equivalent sized American formation would've had.

Well, that's certainly an "interesting" interpretation of the first post in this thread. And you "deduced" this relative balance of forces based on ... two photos, one posed some 15-months before Op MARKET-GARDEN and the other not from the bridge. Oh, and a movie

If Leaps of Logic were an event at the Olympics, you'd certainly be a medalist.

(and that's quite aside from all the many flaws in your understanding)

[TrailApe]

Airborne Operations are all about compromise.

What can be lifted for the initial drop and what resources are available for the follow on drops. In the case of the Arnhem jump, the first lift couldn’t take all of the resources so the initial drop was spread over two days.

I’m sure if the Airborne lads had the resources they wanted they would have sent in a platoon of baristas supplied with three weeks’ worth of really good beans, or in the Brits case some of the better teas and a good supply of earthenware teapots and some fine bone china crockery to use in the consumption of the amber nectar.

However given the fact that unlimited lift resources were not available they had to decide what to take and what to leave.

Do you take a divisions worth of men and have two days’ worth of logistics or Brigade and a week’s worth of logistics? Will there be enough transport aircraft left to resupply? Will the weather effect the resupply (remember the great storms following D-Day and the subsequent shortages). Will there be anything left to resupply? – go in with too many stores and not enough boots and you won’t have any body left to use the ammo or accept the resupply.

Now on one hand we have a bunch of soldiers who have been living and breathing airborne ops since 1942. They had absorbed the lessons learned from Crete in ’41 and started small with raids like Bruneval in early ’42. The dropped two battalions into Tunisia and funnily enough 2PARA (Lt Col John Frost – name ring a bell?) found itself cut off at Oudna, 50 miles behind enemy lines and had to fight its way back without resupply – no doubt a few lessons were learned there.

Then there was Sicily, a Brigade size force this time. Then Operation Slapstick – a Division dropped at Taranto. Then Normandy, once again a Division dropped in. Operation Dragoon saw a Brigade going into Southern France to coincide with the Cobra breakout in Normandy.

Then Arnhem.

Now this is not an exhaustive list of all of the Airborne operations that the Brits were involved in, but just the major ones, just to indicate that this was not a new concept, they knew what they were about.

So on one hand we have Mr Kettler and his extensive google skills (or whatever browser he prefers) and on the other we have a cell of highly experienced solders steeped in the lore of Airborne Operations.

Every ounce, every pound, would have been sweated over and questioned. For example – the 17lbers – very effective a/t’s but very very heavy. Could you risk taking just 6lbers – still effective against almost all German armour and you can take more? The 17lbers are not really portable and need a universal carrier to drag them about, however 6lbers are much more portable and can get about using muscle power. They compromised and took some of each.

Don’t tell me that this was a decision made lightly.

Here’s an extract from the after action report from the 1st Battalion the Border Regiment, who were part of the air assault into the area. My bolds.

Operation “MARKET” was a justifiable gamble, as every airborne operation must be to a certain extent, but it was a gamble that failed. As a defensive battle however, it was, without doubt, a success. A force which was expected and was equipped for an operation of 28 hours duration which might extend to five days, fought continuously for nine days, and successfully and consistently violated almost every accepted principle of defensive warfare

Further into the report is a mention of the supply situation.

During the remainder of the day the battalion area remained quiet, and it was not until 07:00 hours on the 18th that conditions began to get lively – it was ‘B’ Company who opened the batting. The succeeded in destroying a number of enemy patrols, but in return were heavily mortared, and had all their vehicles destroyed, including my jeep containing my gin supply.

Dastardly Huns!

And Mr Kettler, 70 years after the event, is questioning the judgment of these men based on two wiki pictures and a film. Thank god he didn’t use Mr Attenborough’s cinematic interpretation of Mr Ryan’s book ‘A Bridge Too Far’ as no doubt he would have been asking whether the Brit Para’s really needed containers of berets being dropped in.

If I was dropping tomorrow and had the choice of who would plan the jump I know who gets my vote.

One last thought

Their field packs look like something more suited to a picnic than war

Bearing in mind they would have had PARACHUTES on their back to get there, where do you think they picked up the haversacks for their ‘picnic’ rations?

Possibly from the tons of stores that were brought in with the gliders and the caches of small arms ammo dropped in alongside all of the transport and anti-tank guns? And these packs were probably NOT carrying any picnicking material but containing bullets and gin.

[Sailor Malan2]

My argument, if I haven't sufficiently elucidated the point, is that the 600 men defending the Arnhem bridge had very little in overall resources relative to what an equivalent sized American formation would've had. This had cascading impacts on the indisputably staunch defenders who, in my estimation, simply didn't have that much to start with, considering that only one battalion, together with Brigade HQ, got there, fortunately without significant German interference, else the overall situation would've been far worse and sooner. There's a lot to investigate here, as my research is finding.

Regards,

John Kettler

Ah, just looking at 2 Para- why didn't you say? So a battalion, mostly on foot and having to cover 8 miles, ran out of supply. And a US para Btn wouldn't. Right, as I don't have the info, please could you provide comparative ammo and other kit for US and UK para btns, Compensating (of course) for the actual loads of 2 Para vs intent.

[Sailor Malan2]

Oh, and Market Garden has been investigated rather well over the years. Take a brilliantly innovating and surprising idea, and then ensure you make every possible error in the planning process, throw in a Panzer Korps (I'll let you have a knackered one!), and then have bad weather and various operational issues.

Due to the above, MG was a 'unlikely to be worse than' result. If a few things had gone better (even with II PzK) it could have been different.

[Pak40]

Ah, just looking at 2 Para- why didn't you say? So a battalion, mostly on foot and having to cover 8 miles, ran out of supply. And a US para Btn wouldn't. Right, as I don't have the info, please could you provide comparative ammo and other kit for US and UK para btns, Compensating (of course) for the actual loads of 2 Para vs intent.

I think real difference between the 2nd Btn at Arnhem and a typical US para btn is the resupply issue. They never were able to properly resupply Arnhem bridge but your typical US para btn in Market Garden was typically well resupplied. Maybe the 101 more than the 82nd.

I think if you reverse the roles and put a U.S. para btn at Arnhem you'll see them run out of ammo just as quickly. It could even be worse with semi-auto heavy units.

[John Kettler]

JonS,

Having just reviewed my original post, it's quite apparent that I was talking about things at the individual man level. It was you and others who expanded the discussion to the divisional level. And while your post is snide and arch, it's an improvement over your many ad hominem attacks against me!

TrailApe,

You raise some good points, and I am by no means (massive understatement) as familiar with the Paras as you are. The Airborne 17-pdr was towed by the tractor I understood was a stripped Morris Quad, not a UC, a matter I previously discussed. The latter was to tow the 6-pdr. It's perfectly okay to address me by name. The weight differential between the two is enormous, nearly 3x. And that's just for the guns. The problem burgeons thereafter because of another 3x projectile weight, some unknown number for propellant and case, not to mention the volumetric differentials. To me, the 17-pdr really only seems justifiable if the fields of fire needed to permit long range engagement are there OR one's expecting King Tigers to drop by. Else, it's better to take the smaller gun and in greater quantity and ammo supply. Numbers tell and make for a more robust, resilient defense. The qua Quad (see link) carried 30 rounds of ammo--10 x APDS + 20 x APCBC. It, the Airborne 17 Pdr, the gun tractor and the crew all fit into one Hamilcar. Info is from the excellent, overflowing with MG and other Para goodies, ParaData site.

http://www.paradata.org.uk/content/morris-commercial-c8at-mark-3-artillery-tractor

War diary of the 2nd (Oban) Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery, Royal Artillery.

http://www.paradata.org.uk/articles/2nd-oban-airlanding-anti-tank-battery-royal-artillery-war-diary-lt-e-h-ellis

I believe the British, who obviously made tough judgment calls on scads of things prior to MG, would've likely been better off with a pure 6 pdr AT battery or better yet, two, given the lift and cube were available. Alternatively, the pure unit could go in armed with a much greater ammo stock than usual, providing what the Russians called combat stability. Certainly, the War Diary shows the 6-pdr got quite a few kills and early on. It makes no direct mention of 17-pdr kills, but the link below addresses what little is known of the matter. Note also the difficulties of maneuvering the 17-pdr.

http://arnhemjim.blogspot.com/2012/10/the-17-pounder-anti-tank-guns-at.html

I'll have to address the issues you and others here raised later. Am going to try to get some work done.

Regards,

John Kettler

[TrailApe]

John,

I’m certainly not an expert in the Airborne side of the house, I’ve never been a Para and never wanted to be one – the only time I will exit from a perfectly useable aircraft is when it’s stationary on the ground. I only became interessted in this thread as I knew Gunners were at Arnhem and that did not seem to mesh with your view of lightly equipped.

Airborne forces are in effect Light Infantry (with attitude) and operate in that envelope. In the approach to the area of operations you would expect your Light Infantryman or Tom to be laden with kit. That picture you show with the Para with the ‘picnic’ kit is one version of ’37 Pattern webbing. He is wearing the smallpack, they were also equipped with a much larger ‘haversack’ which they would wear in marching order. So you march (or fly) to your area of interest carrying everything you need (plus squad supplies) then dump it at a secure point and reconfigure your kit. You cannot patrol or fight with 50-65lbs of kit on your back – well you can, but if the **** hits the fan you are in deep trouble.

This process will be mirrored from a small patrol to a Division. The small patrol would leave a couple of men to guard the stores and act as a quick reaction force, the Airborne at Arnhem used the 1st Battalion of the Border Regiment who were brought in via Gliders with the rest of the heavy stuff. (There are a lot of ‘what if’ scenarios around the consequences of taking the Borderers along to the Bridge instead of guarding the Drop Zones.)

So go in heavy, fight light. This is as old as the Romans and is still used today. If the powers that be ignore this rule and send troops straight into the assault laden down with kit it usually ends badly, a notable example being the Somme in 1916.

As already mentioned further upstream in this thread, you could replace any of the Airborne units with those of the Arnhem Bridge defenders and you would have the same result – nobody was scaled to fight for longer than 5 days. It’s interesting in the last link you posted re the US Airborne that the following is mentioned (my bolds)

I transcribed the following list of equipment which was worn by Sgt John Urbank, 3d platoon Co.'G' 501 PIR into Normandy. This is from a handwritten list he made on a blank V Mail form. Many troopers who survived Normandy travelled much lighter on the next combat jump into Holland.

Additionally in that article, while the troops are carrying ammo it’s obvious that most of their load is dropped separately in carts – which was standard practice by then for all of the Allied Airborne troops.

So in my opinion, the British element of ‘MARKET’ were no less well provisioned than any other element, however they were the furthest flung and had to hold out for longer than anyone else, you can only get a pint into a pint pot (and if I wanted to be nationalistic here, I’ll note* that the British – Imperial – pint is bigger than the US version) and once it’s gone – it’s gone, no refills for Para’s.

*I’ll also note that the litre is bigger than both – the Germans used litres.

[arnhemjim]

Have to tread very lightly as I'm totally new to this forum. However the principal subject; Operation Market Garden-Battle of Arnhem, has been of considerable personal interest for over 4 decades. Fortunately I've already seen my name "taken in vain" on this forum. More accurately, reference to several pages in the blog page that I have maintained since 2011. I was alerted to Combat Mission:Battle for Normandy and Beyond website by one of the members of this forum who left a comment on my blog page.

In way of an introduction may I please refer those members who may be interested to the following URL; http://arnhemjim.blogspot.com/p/operation-market-garden.html.

I'm obviously going to be very interested in all the ongoing discussions on the forum, and hope to gain further knowledge from its membership. In-turn hope that I can make a continuing small, but positive, contribution to the forum.

Arnhem Jim

Arizona Territory

[sburke]

Welcome aboard, looking forward to reading your blog.

[John Kettler]

arnhemjim,

Welcome aboard!

We can always use another grog here, and you seem to be a new breed, an Arnhem grog. You write well, and your site is, frankly, a military history buff treasure trove. While I have no doubt you'll make a positive contribution here in the Forums, will you also be playing CMBN MG v3.11?

Regards,

John Kettler

[arnhemjim]

Gentlemen,

Sincere tanks for the welcome aboard. During the course of time I've played various wargames on Operation Market Garden (Battle of Arnhem), but never in a competitive environment. At the moment, I would please like to remain an active spectator in order to "get the form", and grow into the action. To the limited extent of my knowledge, hope to contribute to research surrounding the battle. Best Happy Thanksgiving wishes to all.

Arnhem Jim

Arizona Territory

[Pete Wenman]

Just for Jim

P

[Wodin]

I feel JK is harmless. Yes he waffles alot and loves posting endless web links (I tend to skim his posts to be honest, just to many links and dense text)..but he isn't a bad person.

[Wodin]

Hello and enjoy your stay.

I play solo only using turn based mode ( so I can watch the action in all it's glory from all angles).

Honestly the game is still tough (for me anyway) against the AI.

Love the campaigns.

I suggest you buy as many games and modules and engine upgrades as you can afford because each module and upgrade expands the gameplay no end.

Plus though I'm usually WW2 only Black Sea is going to blow your socks off:)

Gentlemen,

Sincere tanks for the welcome aboard. During the course of time I've played various wargames on Operation Market Garden (Battle of Arnhem), but never in a competitive environment. At the moment, I would please like to remain an active spectator in order to "get the form", and grow into the action. To the limited extent of my knowledge, hope to contribute to research surrounding the battle. Best Happy Thanksgiving wishes to all.

Arnhem Jim

Arizona Territory

[Warts 'n' all]

I used to knock the stuffing out of the AI playing Beyond Overlord. But, this generation of CM is a whole lot tougher. But, getting beat, especially in the campaigns means that it is going to take a whole lot longer to master the game. So there is as "arnhemjim" says, plenty of time to "grow into the action".

[John Kettler]

Pete,

What a wonderful thing to do for our new arrival! Which AFV has/had Grabner?

Warts 'n' all,

How'd you do playing 18 Platoon in CW? I got pretty much wiped out vs AI in what I believe was v1.11.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Warts 'n' all]

Warts 'n' all,

How'd you do playing 18 Platoon in CW? I got pretty much wiped out vs AI in what I believe was v1.11.

QUOTE]

I have to admit to not having played any of the "Loamshires" battles. Going back to when I first bought "Beyond Overlord", however many years ago that was, I've always preferred Historical or semi- Historical scenarios. I know that fictional scenarios and quick battles are very popular with a lot of CMers, but I have always enjoyed trying to tackle the Historical scenarios. Even if it means taking a beating.

[TrailApe]

Warts’n’All,

18 platoon is based on an episode in Sydney Jary’s excellent book ’18 Platoon’. He was a platoon officer in the Somerset Light Infantry and fought in the bloody infantry battles of Normandy and beyond.

It’s really well worth reading although it’s hard to get a hold of a copy.

So 18 platoon is very much based on what actually happened.

If you still under the impression that the Commonwealth troops were ‘sticky’ during the big Normandy battles, this one might revise your opinions.

This books been out for ages but has been overlooked by many of the more ‘important’ authors who have moulded our current ‘truth’ about Normandy and WW2 in general.

Sydney’s book has been revived a bit as the new generation of authors that have started publishing about Normandy are dipping into personal accounts from the ranks and are not just regurgitating secondary sources that are often taken from the higher ranks autobiographies.

Makes you wonder why the likes of Hastings, D’Estes, Ryan et al didn’t do the same, as the word from the coal face is conspicuous by its absence in a lot of the older publications, although given that the average grunt in Normandy stood a good chance of getting killed and even if he didn’t, not many had the chance to keep a diary that would survive the extreme weather and enemy actions during 1944 and 1945, it’s perhaps understandable.

[Warts 'n' all]

I will certainly bear it in mind. Although having bought the "Big Bundle" and been working my way chronologically through the Historical/semi-historical battles it will certainly be a long time before I take on any of the fictional battles.