Russian tanks suck?

[Michael Emrys]

To me, what this thread shows is the uselessness of small samples as a way of determining average behavior in CM.

Michael

[sburke]

I just played another scenario and i have to say the T-34/85s were way better at spotting than those damn 76s, but they are still lacking compared to the german tanks imo

While testing RT I was convinced the T34 85 had uber spotting capability. It took a lot of playing to convince me otherwise. They do spot far better than a T34 76.

[Duckman]

Divisions? I thought that since there were so few Tigers and Panthers (at that point in time) that they were not assigned to divisions but held in independent battalions that were assigned to corps. Is that not so?

At Kursk the Panthers were all in independent tank brigades (two of them I think). Tigers were both in independent Abteilungen (i.e. corps assets) and in divisions, since the SS panzer divisions and Grossdeutschland all had organic Tiger battalions.

I'm pretty sure the only panzer divison ever to have only Panthers was Panzer Lehr, which was a demonstration unit before being sent to Normandy. The rest had a mix of Panthers and Panzer IVs (and sometimes exotica like Jagdpanzers) in their tank regiments, usually on a 1:1 basis.

[MikeyD]

A lot of Eastern Front battles have the Germans on the defensive. That means they're sitting in defilade waiting while the Ruskies roll forward. Moving tanks have a disadvantage in CM, the faster they're moving the worse they're able to spot. And in the best of conditions that Russian 2 man turret has its spotting problems. The few times that I've been able to let my Russian tanks sit and await the oncoming enemy they've fared much better.

I don't have objections to T-34-76 spotting difficulties, I do object to Hetzer being an efficient spotter, though. The commander literally has no forward optics with the exception of a little hatch to poke his scissors binocs through. There was no way to observe to his right at all!

[slysniper]

As was mentioned, this thread is useless. Without some real testing it means nothing.

I am playing a battle right now that I would agree with the comment totally that the T34/85's are at a disadvantage. Except for the fact that I have played three other battles where they outperformed and spotted better than the russian foes, including Panthers, Tigers, King Tiger and Mk IV's.

So, you are seeing nothing more than the way the spotting, terrain, situation and all the other facets are able to have a effect on a battle.

So until some major testing is done, you have no clue how that tank is doing compared to any other tank and speculation is not the way to get the answer.

[Bastables]

At Kursk the Panthers were all in independent tank brigades (two of them I think). Tigers were both in independent Abteilungen (i.e. corps assets) and in divisions, since the SS panzer divisions and Grossdeutschland all had organic Tiger battalions.

I'm pretty sure the only panzer divison ever to have only Panthers was Panzer Lehr, which was a demonstration unit before being sent to Normandy. The rest had a mix of Panthers and Panzer IVs (and sometimes exotica like Jagdpanzers) in their tank regiments, usually on a 1:1 basis.

Post Normandy Hitler decided that fresh Panther's should be placed in independent Panzer Brigades in battalions of 36, the immolation of Panzer Divisions and their rebuilding post normandy was thought to take too long to face off vs Anglo-American overrunning France. Although initially the idea was to imbed Bake's "Panzer Brigade/kampfgruppe" success in a formation . . . wishful thinking as it ignored the kampagruppe coming from the training and experience of being in a pz division and all subsequent pz brigades lacked Bake leading them.

About 10 (and another 10 later comprising a Panzer regt as opposed to a single panther battalion) of them were formed (based around a Panther regt) with small infantry and no artillery or engineer support. Model complained to C&C west Von Rundstedt september 1944 "The formation and use of Independent Panzer brigades outside the framework of the Panzer Divisions has not been successful in previous fighting."

http://books.google.co.nz/books?id=n86Ww8zePvIC&pg=PT237&lpg=PT237&dq=independent+panzer+brigades&source=bl&ots=Nf6vXg1O1i&sig=0ieZ-Yu-mPazM8Lm6jpVnKOLRNY&hl=en&sa=X&ei=NXMgVOGwHtDY8gXLwoGoCg&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=independent%20panzer%20brigades&f=false

The loss of Panther's and PIV especially in their employment in Panzer Brigades directly led to the replacement in panzer divisions of PIV/70 in 44/45 in the Panzer divisions 2nd battalions. It also adversely affected the replacement and training of crews being fed back into the panzer divisions.

Panzer Lehr on the 6th of June had an authorised strength of:

99 Pz IV

89 Pz V

31 Jgpz IV

10 StuG III

8 Tigers (5 Tiger II)

36 Fkl

The 5 Tiger II's were preproduction models and left at Chateaudun when the Division was deployed to Normandy, they were destroyed in place to prevent capture and never saw action. Normandy saw Panzer Lehr at it's highest panzer strength, it never had 2 battalions of Panthers.

[JasonC]

At Kursk the divisions with Tigers only had 1 company of them apiece. That was the 1 2 and 3 SS, and GD. AD Kempf had a full battalion, and so did Model up in AG Center on the north face, both as army level assets. (The AD Kempf one lost 2/3rds of its strength to a minefield on the first day, incidentally). The Panthers were all in one formation with 200 tanks, attached to GD. They had only about a quarter of those running by the end of the 2nd day, many having failed mechanically from the outset, and others hitting water and mine obstacles.

The other heavy armor were the Elephants on the north face, and a similar formation of Brummbars up there. Overall, the heavy armor was split between 3 categories - Tigers, Panthers, and assault guns. The Tigers were the most effective; the overall effectiveness of the whole group of them should be considered together, however, including the less successful formations (including Kempf's Tigers) etc.

[Vanir Ausf B]

I don't have objections to T-34-76 spotting difficulties, I do object to Hetzer being an efficient spotter, though. The commander literally has no forward optics with the exception of a little hatch to poke his scissors binocs through. There was no way to observe to his right at all!

I have never tested it, but I would be surprised if the Hetzer spots any better than the Jagdpanther in-game since they are the same vehicle type. And the Jagd is half blind.

[H1nd]

I have never tested it, but I would be surprised if the Hetzer spots any better than the Jagdpanther in-game since they are the same vehicle type. And the Jagd is half blind.

[Vanir Ausf B]

Rather cramped, no?

[Duckman]

Overall, the heavy armor at Kursk was split between 3 categories - Tigers, Panthers, and assault guns. The Tigers were the most effective; the overall effectiveness of the whole group of them should be considered together, however, including the less successful formations (including Kempf's Tigers) etc.

I guess it comes down mostly to experience. The majority of Tiger units were veterans, while the Ferdinands and Panthers were in newly raised units that hadn't had time to work out tactics or procedures.

It's about the men and not just the machines, to use a cliché.

Post Normandy Hitler decided that fresh Panther's should be placed in independent Panzer Brigades in battalions of 36, the immolation of Panzer Divisions and their rebuilding post normandy was thought to take too long to face off vs Anglo-American overrunning France. Although initially the idea was to imbed Bake's "Panzer Brigade/kampfgruppe" success in a formation . . . wishful thinking as it ignored the kampagruppe coming from the training and experience of being in a pz division and all subsequent pz brigades lacked Bake leading them.

The Panther brigades were mauled by Patton's 75 mm-gunned Shermans at Arracourt, which again lends support to the above cliché. Hitler gets blamed for everything, but he seems to have been the driving force behind making the Panther overweight and constantly raising new units that worked better on the parade ground than in combat.

Thanks for the info about Panzer Lehr, I was wrong about their Panthers.

[sburke]

Rather cramped, no?

Not at all, if you happen to crew it with the Keebler elves.

[Michael Emrys]

It's about the men and not just the machines, to use a cliché.

Usually true to one extent or another. But at Kursk the Panthers' and Ferdinands' mechanical liabilities added another layer of "not ready for prime time". It was Hitler's naïve and foolish faith in "wonder weapons" that led to their being tasked with roles that they could not fulfill.

Michael

[George MC]

Decker was heavily criticised by Graf von Strachwitz for his handling of the Panther brigade in the opening stages of Kursk. In fact Decker was relieved of his command (if I recall) and replace by Strachwitz. It caused a real controversy at the time.

"Kursk: The German View" Stephen H. Newton gives a brief description on pages 387-8 of the dispute between Strachwitz and Decker concerning the command and control of the armoured units operating within the Grossdeutschland Division at the start of Citadel

http://axistanksworldwarii.devhub.com/blog/656324-panther-debut-at-kursk-july-1943/

This from the CMBB scenario Charlie Meconis and I did:

"At the last minute prior to the start of the July 5 assault, an entire regiment of the new Panther tanks, nearly 200 in all, had been attached to Großdeutschland. The tanks were powerful but beset by teething problems, and their crews had had little time to train together or even test their radios.

To make matters worse, at the insistence of General Guderian, at the very last minute Oberst Karl Decker was appointed overall commander of both Grossdeutschland's panzer regiments in a new Panzer Brigade 10, shunting the brilliant and proud Strachwitz into a subordinate role.

Decker, a good commander under normal circumstances, badly bungled the first day of the assault as the nearly 350 tanks under his command became hopelessly tangled in swampy terrain and Soviet minefields, and then were then badly shot up by Soviet defences, with the Panthers taking severe losses.

Furious at this travesty, Strachwitz had gone over the head of his division commander General Hornlein straight to the Korps Commander, General von Knoblesdorff, and demanded that Decker be sidelined and command returned to him. Knoblesdorff acquiesced and as of July 6 Strachwitz regained command of Großdeutschland's panzer forces including the few remaining Panthers, and got the division moving toward Kursk."

[Hellas]

Usually true to one extent or another. But at Kursk the Panthers' and Ferdinands' mechanical liabilities added another layer of "not ready for prime time". It was Hitler's naïve and foolish faith in "wonder weapons" that led to their being tasked with roles that they could not fulfill.

Sources for that claim?

Strangely it has not been mentioned yet that the Soviets knew every detail about the planned German attack already on July 2nd and were digged in accordingly.

[sburke]

Sources for that claim?

Strangely it has not been mentioned yet that the Soviets knew every detail about the planned German attack already on July 2nd and were digged in accordingly.

I am almost afraid to ask based on how the question is phrased, but strangely? In what sense?

[Hellas]

I am almost afraid to ask based on how the question is phrased, but strangely? In what sense?

On the German side what was the most important factor for success of this operation?

[sburke]

On the German side what was the most important factor for success of this operation?

Nope that doesn't help. What are you suggesting? I am not gonna guess, you need to spell this one out. Sorry. This is straying into one of those odd areas from a historical/political perspective. I don't want to risk assuming anything or putting words in your mouth.

[Hellas]

Pardon? I asked not to put something into my mouth, I am the one who asked a simple question.

I think it's fair to assume, if people are talking about a military operation, that they have basic knowledge about the plan and the most important factor the plan of the operation was based upon. Otherwise such a discussion would be moot.

So I ask again: what was the most important factor operation Citadel was based upon?

[cool breeze]

It seems you might be fishing for a Monty Python joke about the spanish inquisition. Am I right?

Anyway that response it too obvious. I'll go with one more to the point.

The most important factor most important factor for the germans to have a successful operation was....

Not to have all their tanks blown up and men shot and or starved?

[JasonC]

"the nearly 350 tanks under his command became hopelessly tangled in swampy terrain and Soviet minefields, and then were then badly shot up by Soviet defences"

First point to notice - there is a direct connection between trying to use 350 tanks on a single divisions frontage and becoming "hopelessly tangled".

Second point to notice - the supposedly "swampy terrain" is not swamp on any map. It just happened to have rained the night before the attack. *All* low lying areas were muddy, as a direct result. *Every* ditch became a mud and sometimes a water obstacle.

Third point to notice - the Russians had in fact constructed an intelligent anti tank defense. That is why there were substantial water obstacles, and anti tank ditches between the water obstacles (which themselves filled with water in the rainstorm, had muddy sides etc), and why every route that wasn't blocked by such obstacles was mined.

Fourth point to notice - higher local odds don't do diddly squat against mines and terrain obstacles. Local firepower doesn't remove a mine, or allow a 45 ton tank to cross a ditch with weak, muddy sides without it caving in under the tank.

Fifth point to notice - while the bypassed commander blames it all on his rival, that rival was a perfectly capable armor commander in all other circumstances. In addition, the Tiger battalion spearheading AD Kempf's attack in an entirely different sector *also* lost 2/3rds of its entire strength on the first day, by getting stuck in another minefield.

Sixth point to notice - in addition to all of the obstacle based problems, the Russians had an AT network of capable ATGs firing from widely separated position. They had layer after layer of them. They had T-34 formations backing them up. And when all those were penetrated successfully anyway - which by the way they always were, everywhere - the Russians had new layers of rifle divisions and anti tank regiments to create new layers of ATG network as fast as the old ones were penetrated. They also had reserve formations of tanks larger than the entire attacking force available to slide in front of each heavy point.

Seventh point to notice - at the climax of the battle days later, no appreciable portion of the vaunted heavies were still running. And the Russians still had 25 rifle divisions in theater reserve behind all of the threatened sectors. They were not running out, and there was no prospect of their running out.

Eighth point to notice - within a week, a massive Russian counteroffensive as big as the entire Citadel operation was launched by the Russians against the entirely parallel Orel salient north of their own Kursk salient. That counteroffensive forced the abandonment of the northern prong of the planned pincer in less than 24 hours. And the southern prong on its own never had the slightest operational point. With no one to meet up with to cut off anything, it was a drive into space and a straight ahead brawl with the Russian reserves, as dumb as any other frontal attack in military history.

Ninth point to notice - unlike either prong of the German's own Citadel, the Russian Orel offensive achieved an operational breakthrough on its northern face drive within 48 hours, and pushed an entire tank corps into the German operational depth, destroying 2 German infantry divisions in the process, to make the hole. Despite rapidly arriving German mobile reinforcements, pulled from the northern Citadel drive, the Germans never stopped the Russian 11th Guards Army that first achieved that breakthrough. They slowed it, but it relentlessly oozed south until it cut the roads and railroads out of the salient, forcing its evacuation.

Tenth point to notice - none of the German side narratives of the actual course of the fighting or the reasons for the failure of the operation focus on its true cause, the superior Russian performance in their own similar attack a week later. They talk of Sicily or the Muis river area or failures of will or blame Model for not breaking through in the north more rapidly or local mishandling of armor, or --- anything, really, except the clear reality that the Russian Orel offensive was better conceived, planned and executed than Citadel was.

And the reason is clear. To admit that Kutuzov outright trumped Citadel was to admit that the Russian generals were superior commanders to the German ones, and that is the only thing that must never be admitted or even hinted at, under any conceivable circumstance.

But reality is not mocked.

[c3k]

Eleventh point to notice - but it was a GLOOORIOUS attack, despite its failure, nonetheless!

[Michael Emrys]

On the German side what was the most important factor for success of this operation?

This sounds to me like a rhetorical question, so why don't you go ahead and tell us what *you* think the answer is.

Michael

[YankeeDog]

On the German side what was the most important factor for success of this operation?

OK; I'll bite:

The most important factor for the success of any German offensive in the Summer of 1943 on the East Front was a realistic master strategic and operational vision based upon objective assessments of enemy and own force capabilities.

Needless to say, Gefreiter with the funny mustache in overall charge failed miserably in this regard.

[Sgt Joch]

well of course the fact that the Germans were outnumbered in tanks, men, artillery and aircraft and were attacking a larger enemy force with deep prepared defences and with no element of surprise probably had something to do with it as well.

A few hundred "Uber" tanks were not going to make a difference.