Reassessment of Italian Combat Prowess

[dieseltaylor]

dt - I deny it. The Brits had very tank heavy armor forces in the western desert and their combined arms blew chunks because of it, and it got entire armor brigades annihilated in an afternoon, on more than one occasion. The Germans had a better tank infantry ratio and more combined arms formations, and those formations outperformed dramatically. Was tank artillery cooperation even more important than tank infantry cooperation in the desert? Sure. But they went hand in hand - lopsided tank heavy forces still were lousy at that, and balanced ones were superior. Sometimes the cooperating force was a gun front or a timely barrage indirect - the principle was the same.

Re-telling some of the history does not actually advance your case with detail but seems if anything to support mine by emphasising the German use of combined arms. Which to me suggest intrinsically that you build your force for the job in hand. Essentially you need the correct force mix but even that is no good if your tactics are rubbish.

The three German panzer divisions attacking at Medinine In March 1943 lost 53 of 150 tanks to ATG's and artillery with British losses a few ATG. Assuming they had the admired mix of infantry - which I do not know [ yet] - it would appear was not much help. Terrain adequate weapons and good generalship did for them.

[Sgt Joch]

JonS beat me to it:

100% loss rate in jan.-may 44, obviously a lot of "expertens" in there as well.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/AAF-Luftwaffe/index.html

[Michael Emrys]

I always thought the Luftwaffe was ruined during the Battle of Britain. I presumed after that it was never the same.

Aside from the points that Jason makes, the air battle over France in 1941-42 provides a definite clue as to why that was not the case. During the Battle of Britain, the RAF enjoyed several advantages as a result of playing on its home field. One was that it had, for the time, a superb GCI organization that was able to maneuver intercepting fighters to attack from angles and altitudes to obtain maximum tactical advantage from the numbers available. Also, pilots who were able to bail out of stricken aircraft either unwounded or only lightly wounded could be back in the air the next day, whereas Luftwaffe pilots and crew became POWs. As a result, the Luftwaffe was losing personnel at a 2:1 ratio.

In 1941, the RAF began flying fighter sweeps and escorting daylight bombing missions over France and the Low Countries. At that time, the RAF had only marginal radar coverage over the battlefield, and could only warn their formations after the Germans were already in the air and at altitude. The Luftwaffe, on the other hand, now had an effective GCI organization of its own and was thus able to turn the tables on the RAF. Also now, RAF personnel bailing out over the battlefield or nearby Channel waters were likely to become POWs or if concealed by the Resistance, faced a long journey via Spain before returning to their units. Now it was the RAF that was losing personnel at a ratio of 2:1.

From all that, I would deduce that after the Battle of Britain the Luftwaffe was at least the equal of the RAF in terms of aircraft and pilot quality. And this at a time when the Luftwaffe was primarily committed to the war against the USSR with excursions in the Med, and so did not have the numbers available which otherwise it might have employed against the British in Europe.

Michael

[Sgt Joch]

In terms of pilot quality. This chart on flying hours in training tells the tale. The Germans spent more time training than the RAF before sept 42, but thereafter kept shortening the programs while the CW and Americans who had a lot more pilot candidates and could afford to spend more time on their training.

In june 41, the average Luftwaffe pilot had 3-4 times as many flying hours as the average Soviet pilot.

[Sublime]

Jason can you give me a source? not because I doubt you're veracity but because I happen to be doing a 20 page paper on the Combined Bomber Offensive, and the 20th AF Operations in the Pacific. I'm largely done but would like to see any sources you have that may be new?

Same to any others..

[Michael Emrys]

I have ordered and expect to receive today a copy of The Pointblank Directive: Three Generals and the Untold Story of the Daring Plan that Saved D-Day. I hope that there will at least be something original in it.

Michael

[dieseltaylor]

Well not everyone likes as this is the sole quote on UK Amazon

I have never before felt compelled to write a book review but I purchased this book believing I would gain a new and informed insight into the air war over Europe during World War Two. Sadly, this wasn't the case.

In brief, this book merely re-tells, mainly in diary format, the story of how the American Army Air Forces (mainly the 8th and 9th Air Forces) operated in the ETO in the run up to D Day. It is suggested in the title that the author has unearthed new evidence about how the Allies (for Allies read the Americans) gained air superiority during that period, implying that "The Pointblank Directive" has previously remained untold. Read any relative, authoritative history of the subject and you will uncover exactly the same information as is presented here. Changes of commanding personnel, battle plans and target criteria, tactics, morale, co-operation between air forces, co-operation between the fighting services and the Allies, disagreement between the Americans and the British about bombing strategy etc; nothing new at all, it's all been documented before!

To say that this is written from a typically "how the Americans saved our bacon" angle would be an understatement to say the very least. Scant reference is made to the huge contribution made by Britain, the Commonwealth and other Allied countries, let alone praise and recognition for their part in achieving the overall objective. At certain stages, I even began to wonder if we actually turned up for the show!

Accounts of major air battles lack only "Zap!", "Kerpow!" and "Splat!", such is the American Superhero Comic style in which they are written. Not only are they repetitious and unnecessary padding, but you also can't help but feel they are gratuitous. Please leave out the gung-ho stuff in non fiction works! The reader also has to battle with the author's apparent fixation with certain words and expressions, frequently used out of context, throughout the course of the book. Add to this poor editing in the form of countless typos, missing words, unfinished sentences, poor punctuation and grammar, plus inaccurate geographical and historical information, and you have the formula for one of the most irritating books that I have ever read.

To the author's credit, however, he has had a book published, first and foremost. The topic he has chosen will continue to be debated for many years to come and, despite not telling us anything new or ground-breaking, he presents a sound case for the importance and necessity of Allied actions in the air as part of the overall plan for the liberation of Europe.

However the author has had published this this year:

Combined Bomber Offensive 1943-1944, The (WWII Trilogy) [Paperback]

Perhaps it is better? I see he is a co-founder of the History Channel. This may explain how he managed for three books published on Gun Camera footage. I look forward to your opinion as I am sure from your postings here it will carry more weight. : )

PS I can see how he can get up the nostril of the less jingoistic reader - particularly with the quote in here:

While the photographs are interesting, the sub-title "Photography from Allied Fighters and Bombers over Occupied Europe" is misleading because this is an entirely American viewpoint. In fact, from the text, you will get the impression that the 8th Air Force did all the fighting and the only British involvement was to be grateful!

This quote sums it up: "Nothing surprised the Luftwaffe more than to discover that American fighter pilots could actually shoot them down in a dogfight. After all, the Germans were battle-hardened and had victories over both the British and the Soviets".

[JasonC]

Sublime - US strategic bombing survey, Military Analysis Division, report number 059, "The Defeat of the German Air Force".

[Sublime]

Thanks Jason. I have the Strategic Bombing Survey. Also LeMays book, Hasting's book on Bomber Command, Arthur Harris' book as well. Also a book on Big Week by Yenne, a book on USAAF by Geoffrey Perret. Some others too, have to dig around.

[Michael Emrys]

Also a book on Big Week by Yenne...

Could you do me a favor then and check when the original copyright date is? I read a book by that name over 30 years ago, and I don't know if it was the same one or not. Amazon lists its publication date as last year, but that might be just when the latest printing was. They're pretty fuzzy about that.

Michael

[LukeFF]

A similar comment can be made about the Luftwaffe. It was stronger in late 1943 or even the beginning of 1944 than it was in the early war (in equipment, in raw numbers, in tech, in experience too, etc). It just lost the air war in the west in early 1944 anyway, because it was up against a vastly stronger set of opponents. (Not that it did so hot in the battle of Britain early, but it faced much, much weaker opponents in the early war). In the *fall* of 1944? Sure, by then the air war was already lost, the oil plants bombed, the veterans shot down, etc. Irrelevant, that part of the war was over by then.

Except that it's not irrelevant. It's the same sort of flawed argument that says the German army was a better force in the summer of 1944 simply because it had tanks like the Panther and Tiger, in contrast to 1940. The size of the Luftwaffe fighter force wasn't shrinking by the fall of 1944 but, just like with the Army, it was a much less effective force, because most of the veteran pilots were gone. Fuel problems? That wasn't really a chronic issue for the Luftwaffe until the beginning of 1945. The Luftwaffe's problem in the second half of 1944 was with the pilots they were putting in the cockpit. The aircraft certainly weren't.

[Michael Emrys]

Well, the point that Jason makes about being up against much more capable opponents during the second half of the war is completely valid. Germany got the jump on the rest of the world and was virtually unstoppable for two years. Then for two years, the matter hung in the balance. But by the middle of 1943, the Allies had started to catch up and then surpass Germany in many areas. Not because the Germans had the fight knocked out of them, that was certainly far from being the case, but because the Allies had learned some very tough lessons and were starting to apply them.

Michael

[JonS]

Yes, but that's true of any force. The enemy has a say, and rate of change matters. Eventually rate of change matters more than the start point.

Early in WWI the British Army was great at malleting wogs on the Upper Limpopo, but pants at continental warfare. So was their bomber force. And so was their close air support. About the only things they were really good at, in 1940, was home air defence, and naval warfare (but not anti-submarine warfare). However during the war they got better at all those things, and they got better faster than the Germans did (who eventually ended up going backwards, that is suffered a negative rate of change). The British (and other Allies) rate of change ended up being so fast that they exceeded German capability in almost all areas.

It's pointless saying the German army (or airforce) of 1944 was 'better' than the 1940 edition. Sure, a Panther is better than a PzII, and an FW190A6 is 'better' than a ME-109E, and tactics and doctrines had evolved too. But the enemy had improved in all those areas too, and done so much faster than the Germans.

When you take the enemy into account (and why on earth wouldn't you?), the German Army (and Air Force) of 1940 was unquestionably a more capable tool than it's 1944 sibling.

[Sublime]

Could you do me a favor then and check when the original copyright date is? I read a book by that name over 30 years ago, and I don't know if it was the same one or not. Amazon lists its publication date as last year, but that might be just when the latest printing was. They're pretty fuzzy about that.

Michael

Copyright 2012. Not too bad of a book. If you want I can mail it to you, maybe you have something I haven't read in exchange.

[Michael Emrys]

Copyright 2012. Not too bad of a book. If you want I can mail it to you, maybe you have something I haven't read in exchange.

Hmmm, let us think about that. I was thinking of ordering it from Amazon, with whom I do lots of business, but your offer sounds even better. What areas of the war are you particularly interested in? I have hundreds of books that cover most aspects of the war, but I'm not in a hurry to get rid of most of them. We might work something out though that would serve both our interests. But why don't we move this discussion to PM and not hijack the thread?

Michael

[JasonC]

"When you take the enemy into account (and why on earth wouldn't you?), the German Army (and Air Force) of 1940 was unquestionably a more capable tool"

This is a fancy way of repeating that the Allies got stronger, and it ducks the entirely independent and important point that the Germans actually also got stronger absolutely, just not as fast as the Allies did.

There is a difference between two opponents starting at 150 and 100 and going to 200 and 400, and the same going from 150-100 to 50-200. The latter picture is what is painted by the claim that the Germans got weaker, and it is not true. The former is correctly described as the early war Allies being especially weak and the Germans declining relatively rather than absolutely, and it is what happened, from the early war to early 1944. The period of actual outright decline in German capability is quite short, 12 months tops.

This matters for assessing the relative importance of combat attrition and production, quality and quantity, and lots of other such planning objectives or trade offs, so no it is not the same to claim that the Germans got weaker, when you only mean the Allies got stronger faster than the Germans did.

[Redwolf]

Except that it's not irrelevant. It's the same sort of flawed argument that says the German army was a better force in the summer of 1944 simply because it had tanks like the Panther and Tiger, in contrast to 1940. The size of the Luftwaffe fighter force wasn't shrinking by the fall of 1944 but, just like with the Army, it was a much less effective force, because most of the veteran pilots were gone. Fuel problems? That wasn't really a chronic issue for the Luftwaffe until the beginning of 1945. The Luftwaffe's problem in the second half of 1944 was with the pilots they were putting in the cockpit. The aircraft certainly weren't.

But the reason why they had so few capable pilots was lack of fuel for training.

[Erwin]

"the German Army (and Air Force) of 1940 was unquestionably a more capable tool than it's 1944 sibling."

Sounds correct so long as you add: "...more capable tool compared to Allied forces of the 1940's"..." and "...than it's 1944 sibling was compared to Allied forces of 1944."

[JonS]

Erwin; that's why I used 'tool'. Tools are for doing things with, not just hanging on the wall. The 1940 edition was a useful tool. The 1944 edition wasn't.

[Erwin]

Most discussion on these forums seem to be based on misunderstandings based on semantics or other trivia. I am merely attempting to (hopefully) clarify/confirm what I thought you were saying. (And of course I accept the possibility that I too may have misinterpreted.)

[JonS]

Erwin; I agree with your point about misunderstandings, but given that the whole point of my previous paragraphs was about comparative power, I though it was at least moderately obvious that the final paragraph was about that too. But, since you picked up on it, and Jason managed to completely miss it*, then I suppose it can't have been.

Regards

Jon

* "it ducks the entirely independent and important point that the Germans actually also got stronger absolutely, just not as fast as the Allies did." I didn't 'duck it entirely'. It was the central pillar of what I wrote

[JonS]

To move off on a related and hopefully more productive tangent, I've recently started reading Stephen Biddle's Military Power. His thesis - put simplistically - appears to be that traditional models of military power are based on either simple mass ("God is on the side of the big battalions") or simple technology ("New stuff beats old stuff"), or on whether the overal state of military power is offense- or defence-dominant. But both of these models are inadequate - they famously and very publically failed to predict the outcome of the 1991 Gulf War, and even worse they predict opposite outcomes to each other. Biddle proposes that the missing piece from these models is what he terms 'employment', which speaks to the way forces are employed, rather than just what forces are employed, and he goes further in saying that the way is more important than the what.

Anyway, I'm only part way through so far, but I have some questions for the forum:

1) has anyone else read it?

1b) what did you think of it. Is it plausible? Is it usable?

2) given that this book is almost a decade old now, has there been any related work in this area - an elaboration of Biddle's thesis, a refutation of it, anything? Or did it apparently sink without a trace.

Regards

Jon

Edit: I found a review by van Creveld. he doesn't think much of it

[JasonC]

"The German army and airforce of 1944 was unquestionable a superior tool than the German army of 1940".

This statement is true, and it directly contradicts yours, as a piece of English. So no, the central pillar of what you wrote was not that the German army of 1944 was actually stronger than that of 1940, just facing a stronger set of opponents, and by a larger margin than its own improvement.

If you want to revise your remarks to, "yes the German army of the start of 1944 was absolutely stronger and more capable than the German army of 1940, but its opponents were more numerous and experienced", feel free. As yet you haven't.

[JonS]

Is a claw hammer 'better' than a ballpeen hammer? The question as stated is meaningless. You may as well ask what is the ideal length, in inches, for a piece of string. It only makes sense when we know what task the hammer or the string is required to accomplish.

A ballpeen hammer will knock a nail into balsa wood. (German armed forces vs Allies, 1940)

A claw hammer will not knock a nail into concrete. (German armed forces vs Allies, 1944)

Therefore; no. A claw hammer is not better than a ballpeen hammer, since the ballpeen hammer will succeed while the claw hammer fails.

[Erwin]

This should clarify the issue: