Centurian52

So, based on what I'm seeing, this is my prediction.
Limited objective Ukrainian counterattacks across the entire frontline will continue over the next few weeks, increasing in scale and tempo. This will force the Russians to think short-term, disperse whatever they have left in reserve, and increase panic among Russian soldiers. Shortly before the main offensive kicks off we are going to see smoking accidents in Russian ammo dumps and command centers all over Ukraine, throughout the entire depth of the Russian occupied territory (probably not limited to the intended area of the main offensive, unless Ukraine needs to closely husband a limited supply of Storm Shadows). I'm thinking the offensive itself could be on a broader front than I had previously imagined, possibly stretching from Melitopol to Mariupol. Once Ukrainian forces have cleared out the Russian air defenses between them and the coast (Storm Shadow is not immune to interception), the Kerch bridge has a series of smoking accidents until a sizeable section of it drops. As the Russians scramble to respond to the main offensive the pace of opportunistic attacks in Luhansk and Donetsk increase, carving out more and more territory, with the objectives becoming less and less limited. As the Russian frontline in Zaporizhia collapses, the Ukrainians get more aggressive with their bridgehead in Kherson, possibly pushing to beat as many Russian units as possible to the neck of Crimea. The offensive may temporarily stall at the neck of the Crimean peninsula. But without any reinforcements, and with Ukrainian pressure forcing the Russians to expend ammo faster than it can be sealifted in, resistance in Crimea collapses within another month. Another wave of emergency mobilization, the limited scale of the attacks in the region, and the fact that it will take time for Ukraine to reorient their main offensive forces, may allow the Russians to stabilize the situation in Luhansk and Donetsk. A follow up offensive later this year or early next year is needed to finish the Russians off.

Ok, this rude, but... 
I shall shortly delete... 

Another 3rd Assault Brigade clip:
 

Sevastopol is fair game. Ukrainian territory is being defined by the 1991 borders. So strikes into Crimea are not considered cross border strikes.

I'm pretty sure these things have triple layers of ERA on the side hull

There surely are some tougher Russian units. Some of them are bound to have a higher concentration of experienced prewar personnel and higher quality equipment. It might be a problem if the Ukrainians run into one of them during one of these limited attacks. But when it comes to the main offensive, the tougher Russian units will either have to run away with the weaker units, or they will find themselves isolated and vulnerable to easy destruction.

Well, well right on time.
 

I was hoping to see more activity today. This is enough to convince me that the activity of the last three days was not just a few opportunistic bites. Something bigger and more sustained is happening. I don't think it's the main offensive yet. But if it pulls in Russian reinforcements, maybe even convinces the Russians that it is the main offensive, then it's significant. At the very least, I'm loving the panic it seems to be causing in the Russian information space.

Looks like with the things starting to move again, we are back to Rybar maps being interesting. Latest ones shows UA gains near the water reservoir that was mentioned in latest RU MoD announcement. Overall, the Bakhmut salient is looking less and less salienty by the hour.
 

I gather this is good news. AFAIK training takes about 10-12weeks. Lets see where we stand then.
 
 

This made me smile, but is also perhaps a little cautionary.
 
Comments are worth a read as well
 

The postwar Russian army is going to be a ****show. I don't see them rebuilding in a hurry. Even if they can build enough tanks to replace the equipment losses in this war, rebuilding something resembling effective standards of leadership and training will be nearly impossible. They just won't have enough skilled officers to rebuild the necessary institutions around.

I occasionally post updates on the war to Facebook, to keep my friends and family in the loop. I'm still trying to piece together what happened in this attack near Bakhmut based on ISW's report and what people have posted here. So before I actually post this, and potentially mislead my friends and family, I submit the following for comments, criticisms, additions, and revisions:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
From what I can piece together, the Ukrainians conducted two limited counterattacks on May 9th and 10th. One to the northwest of Bakhmut, the other to the southwest of Bakhmut (neither were in the city itself). The one that I mentioned yesterday, pending details, seems to have been the one to the southwest, occurring on May 9th. The area was apparently held by the Russian 72nd motorized rifle brigade. There are a few competing narratives about what happened. The most likely version is that the brigade's 6th and 8th companies suffered heavy losses, but the brigade itself was not destroyed. It is the most specific version of the story, and other versions could be consistent with it with some interpretation. The story that "the brigade was destroyed" could easily be an exaggeration of "its 6th and 8th companies suffered heavy losses". And that it broke and ran is completely consistent with two of its companies suffering heavy losses. At least one Ukrainian spokesman has claimed that the brigade suffered serious losses, but was still intact, which is also consistent. The Ukrainians reportedly advanced 2.6 kilometers along a 3km front as a result of this attack, though none of my usual sources are able to independently verify this.
That would be a good result on its own for a limited counterattack. But a Wagner assault group reportedly also moved into the area shortly after the attack in order to stop the Ukrainian advance and re-establish the frontline. The Ukrainian 3rd Assault Brigade (the unit that conducted the attack) had already stopped and entrenched itself, and the Wagner assault group blundered straight into their positions.
There are already some estimates of the Russian casualties, although they should be taken with the usual grain of salt. Prigozhin, the owner of Wagner PMC, claims they lost 500 men. I'm not sure if that number applies to 72nd's losses, Wagner's losses, or both, or whether they refer to just killed or total casualties. I don't normally put a lot of stock in what Prigozhin says. He views the regular Russian military as a rival, not a partner, so he likes to play up their failures in order to make Wagner look better. Ironically, he also likes to play up the difficulties faced by Wagner forces in order to squeeze more resources out of the regular Russian military, which he is dependent on for supplies. But in this case his claim seems to be corroborated by a statement from the Ukrainian 3rd Separate Assault Brigade, to the effect that his claim was accurate (although they may also be biased). The confirmed Russian losses are somewhere from 69-92 (either 64 or 87 Russian bodies were collected, and 5 prisoners taken). Based on the confirmed body count I'd say that 250-500 total casualties is plausible, closer to 500 if there are uncounted Russian dead (there have generally been at least 3 or 4 WIA for every KIA in this war so far). Even if the brigade was at full strength, 500 casualties would be a serious blow, representing a loss of about 25% of the brigade in a single action. But the brigade has been in action for some time, and was probably nowhere near its full strength. So this may have represented an even heavier blow to its remaining strength.
By itself, this action is not significant. But it may be significant as an indicator of what is happening in the larger picture. This attack, and the attack to the northwest of Bakhmut, together indicate that the Russians have well and truly run out of steam in Bakhmut (mere inches from the finish-line at that (the last report I heard was that the Ukrainians only hold 2.35 square kilometers in the westernmost corner of the city)). It was looking like the Russian attack had culminated about a week ago, but I didn't want to say anything yet in case it was just a lull. At that point the Ukrainians held 2.5 square kilometers. At a pace of 0.15 square kilometers a week, it would take the Russians another 4 months to secure the remaining 2.35 square kilometers of the city. That's almost the amount of time it took them to secure the first 39.1 square kilometers of the city. So to say that the Russian advance has noticeably slowed down is an understatement.
More importantly, this is only the latest in a series of small, limited counterattacks that have been occurring along the entire frontline in Ukraine. I don't know whether these attacks are occurring on an ad-hoc basis on the initiative of local commanders, or as part of a larger plan to shape the battlefield in preparation for the main offensive. If the former, it means that local commanders are seeing more and more openings to conduct limited attacks, which bodes very poorly for Russia's chances of resisting the big offensive (keep in mind that none of the units conducting these counterattacks so far are the 9-12 fresh brigades that are still being held back, and have been specifically trained and equipped, for the upcoming offensive). If the latter, then it means we are already seeing the opening phase of the big offensive. Whether they are part of a larger plan or not, the combined effect of these attacks will be to dilute whatever reinforcements the Russians have available by forcing them to respond to local emergencies, cause confusion about where the main offensive will land, and possibly even create cracks in the Russian line ahead of the main offensive. 
I still don't know when the main offensive will begin. My gut says it will be any day now, but my gut is biased by impatience. I think it will most likely start in June. That is based on current weather forecasts and an assumption that the Ukrainians will want more than two weeks without rain. That is supported by statements by Zelensky to the effect that they need more time for more of the promised equipment to arrive. There are plausible options for offensive actions along pretty much the entire frontline. But my guess is still that it will land in Zaporizhia Oblast, aimed at reaching the coast and cutting off Russian forces in Crimea and southern Kherson Oblast. The latest news I've heard is that Britain has now provided Ukraine with Storm Shadow missiles, which have enough range to reach the Kerch bridge from anywhere along the coast of Zaporizhia Oblast, meaning that trapping Russian forces in Crimea is now a realistic option.

I occasionally post updates on the war to Facebook, to keep my friends and family in the loop. I'm still trying to piece together what happened in this attack near Bakhmut based on ISW's report and what people have posted here. So before I actually post this, and potentially mislead my friends and family, I submit the following for comments, criticisms, additions, and revisions:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
From what I can piece together, the Ukrainians conducted two limited counterattacks on May 9th and 10th. One to the northwest of Bakhmut, the other to the southwest of Bakhmut (neither were in the city itself). The one that I mentioned yesterday, pending details, seems to have been the one to the southwest, occurring on May 9th. The area was apparently held by the Russian 72nd motorized rifle brigade. There are a few competing narratives about what happened. The most likely version is that the brigade's 6th and 8th companies suffered heavy losses, but the brigade itself was not destroyed. It is the most specific version of the story, and other versions could be consistent with it with some interpretation. The story that "the brigade was destroyed" could easily be an exaggeration of "its 6th and 8th companies suffered heavy losses". And that it broke and ran is completely consistent with two of its companies suffering heavy losses. At least one Ukrainian spokesman has claimed that the brigade suffered serious losses, but was still intact, which is also consistent. The Ukrainians reportedly advanced 2.6 kilometers along a 3km front as a result of this attack, though none of my usual sources are able to independently verify this.
That would be a good result on its own for a limited counterattack. But a Wagner assault group reportedly also moved into the area shortly after the attack in order to stop the Ukrainian advance and re-establish the frontline. The Ukrainian 3rd Assault Brigade (the unit that conducted the attack) had already stopped and entrenched itself, and the Wagner assault group blundered straight into their positions.
There are already some estimates of the Russian casualties, although they should be taken with the usual grain of salt. Prigozhin, the owner of Wagner PMC, claims they lost 500 men. I'm not sure if that number applies to 72nd's losses, Wagner's losses, or both, or whether they refer to just killed or total casualties. I don't normally put a lot of stock in what Prigozhin says. He views the regular Russian military as a rival, not a partner, so he likes to play up their failures in order to make Wagner look better. Ironically, he also likes to play up the difficulties faced by Wagner forces in order to squeeze more resources out of the regular Russian military, which he is dependent on for supplies. But in this case his claim seems to be corroborated by a statement from the Ukrainian 3rd Separate Assault Brigade, to the effect that his claim was accurate (although they may also be biased). The confirmed Russian losses are somewhere from 69-92 (either 64 or 87 Russian bodies were collected, and 5 prisoners taken). Based on the confirmed body count I'd say that 250-500 total casualties is plausible, closer to 500 if there are uncounted Russian dead (there have generally been at least 3 or 4 WIA for every KIA in this war so far). Even if the brigade was at full strength, 500 casualties would be a serious blow, representing a loss of about 25% of the brigade in a single action. But the brigade has been in action for some time, and was probably nowhere near its full strength. So this may have represented an even heavier blow to its remaining strength.
By itself, this action is not significant. But it may be significant as an indicator of what is happening in the larger picture. This attack, and the attack to the northwest of Bakhmut, together indicate that the Russians have well and truly run out of steam in Bakhmut (mere inches from the finish-line at that (the last report I heard was that the Ukrainians only hold 2.35 square kilometers in the westernmost corner of the city)). It was looking like the Russian attack had culminated about a week ago, but I didn't want to say anything yet in case it was just a lull. At that point the Ukrainians held 2.5 square kilometers. At a pace of 0.15 square kilometers a week, it would take the Russians another 4 months to secure the remaining 2.35 square kilometers of the city. That's almost the amount of time it took them to secure the first 39.1 square kilometers of the city. So to say that the Russian advance has noticeably slowed down is an understatement.
More importantly, this is only the latest in a series of small, limited counterattacks that have been occurring along the entire frontline in Ukraine. I don't know whether these attacks are occurring on an ad-hoc basis on the initiative of local commanders, or as part of a larger plan to shape the battlefield in preparation for the main offensive. If the former, it means that local commanders are seeing more and more openings to conduct limited attacks, which bodes very poorly for Russia's chances of resisting the big offensive (keep in mind that none of the units conducting these counterattacks so far are the 9-12 fresh brigades that are still being held back, and have been specifically trained and equipped, for the upcoming offensive). If the latter, then it means we are already seeing the opening phase of the big offensive. Whether they are part of a larger plan or not, the combined effect of these attacks will be to dilute whatever reinforcements the Russians have available by forcing them to respond to local emergencies, cause confusion about where the main offensive will land, and possibly even create cracks in the Russian line ahead of the main offensive. 
I still don't know when the main offensive will begin. My gut says it will be any day now, but my gut is biased by impatience. I think it will most likely start in June. That is based on current weather forecasts and an assumption that the Ukrainians will want more than two weeks without rain. That is supported by statements by Zelensky to the effect that they need more time for more of the promised equipment to arrive. There are plausible options for offensive actions along pretty much the entire frontline. But my guess is still that it will land in Zaporizhia Oblast, aimed at reaching the coast and cutting off Russian forces in Crimea and southern Kherson Oblast. The latest news I've heard is that Britain has now provided Ukraine with Storm Shadow missiles, which have enough range to reach the Kerch bridge from anywhere along the coast of Zaporizhia Oblast, meaning that trapping Russian forces in Crimea is now a realistic option.

Another reason why Battlefront needs to make CMSU. I really need these Ukrainian style Challenger 2s.

The isolation of the mobik probably starts in their training period, if they have one. Given the "training methods" traditional to the RA, and the, ahem, "accelerated timescale", there's probably little or no cultivation of the attitudes that lead to the development, once deployed to unit, of the "bond between squadmates" that remains the primary motivation to fight of an infantryman. And there's no leadership at the low level with the competence to compensate.
This might contribute to the execrable treatment of casualties, fatal and otherwise: there just isn't any motivation to waste any effort on the guys around you, since you barely know them from Adam.
Both sides have been using tanks for indirect fire, so the Russians digging deeper into their reserves to find (temporarily) mobile HE chuckers that don't need new barrel linings isn't really a surprise. Putting artillery guys in the vehicle might be a good way of getting more effect out of the platform, or it might be an indication that they haven't anything better to serve.
If the UK is sending 10 score Storm Shadow, the US commitment of ATACMS can't be far behind. What temperature is the frog-water at now?
 

Here's TheDrive article about it, probably as good an analysis as we can get at this time:
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraines-storm-shadow-missiles-are-a-big-problem-for-russia

Really gives you a good sense of just how big these things are. 
Theoretical range 

So nowhere in the AO is safe.  Strikes across the border are verboten. 

Another reason why Battlefront needs to make CMSU. I really need these Ukrainian style Challenger 2s.

I occasionally post updates on the war to Facebook, to keep my friends and family in the loop. I'm still trying to piece together what happened in this attack near Bakhmut based on ISW's report and what people have posted here. So before I actually post this, and potentially mislead my friends and family, I submit the following for comments, criticisms, additions, and revisions:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
From what I can piece together, the Ukrainians conducted two limited counterattacks on May 9th and 10th. One to the northwest of Bakhmut, the other to the southwest of Bakhmut (neither were in the city itself). The one that I mentioned yesterday, pending details, seems to have been the one to the southwest, occurring on May 9th. The area was apparently held by the Russian 72nd motorized rifle brigade. There are a few competing narratives about what happened. The most likely version is that the brigade's 6th and 8th companies suffered heavy losses, but the brigade itself was not destroyed. It is the most specific version of the story, and other versions could be consistent with it with some interpretation. The story that "the brigade was destroyed" could easily be an exaggeration of "its 6th and 8th companies suffered heavy losses". And that it broke and ran is completely consistent with two of its companies suffering heavy losses. At least one Ukrainian spokesman has claimed that the brigade suffered serious losses, but was still intact, which is also consistent. The Ukrainians reportedly advanced 2.6 kilometers along a 3km front as a result of this attack, though none of my usual sources are able to independently verify this.
That would be a good result on its own for a limited counterattack. But a Wagner assault group reportedly also moved into the area shortly after the attack in order to stop the Ukrainian advance and re-establish the frontline. The Ukrainian 3rd Assault Brigade (the unit that conducted the attack) had already stopped and entrenched itself, and the Wagner assault group blundered straight into their positions.
There are already some estimates of the Russian casualties, although they should be taken with the usual grain of salt. Prigozhin, the owner of Wagner PMC, claims they lost 500 men. I'm not sure if that number applies to 72nd's losses, Wagner's losses, or both, or whether they refer to just killed or total casualties. I don't normally put a lot of stock in what Prigozhin says. He views the regular Russian military as a rival, not a partner, so he likes to play up their failures in order to make Wagner look better. Ironically, he also likes to play up the difficulties faced by Wagner forces in order to squeeze more resources out of the regular Russian military, which he is dependent on for supplies. But in this case his claim seems to be corroborated by a statement from the Ukrainian 3rd Separate Assault Brigade, to the effect that his claim was accurate (although they may also be biased). The confirmed Russian losses are somewhere from 69-92 (either 64 or 87 Russian bodies were collected, and 5 prisoners taken). Based on the confirmed body count I'd say that 250-500 total casualties is plausible, closer to 500 if there are uncounted Russian dead (there have generally been at least 3 or 4 WIA for every KIA in this war so far). Even if the brigade was at full strength, 500 casualties would be a serious blow, representing a loss of about 25% of the brigade in a single action. But the brigade has been in action for some time, and was probably nowhere near its full strength. So this may have represented an even heavier blow to its remaining strength.
By itself, this action is not significant. But it may be significant as an indicator of what is happening in the larger picture. This attack, and the attack to the northwest of Bakhmut, together indicate that the Russians have well and truly run out of steam in Bakhmut (mere inches from the finish-line at that (the last report I heard was that the Ukrainians only hold 2.35 square kilometers in the westernmost corner of the city)). It was looking like the Russian attack had culminated about a week ago, but I didn't want to say anything yet in case it was just a lull. At that point the Ukrainians held 2.5 square kilometers. At a pace of 0.15 square kilometers a week, it would take the Russians another 4 months to secure the remaining 2.35 square kilometers of the city. That's almost the amount of time it took them to secure the first 39.1 square kilometers of the city. So to say that the Russian advance has noticeably slowed down is an understatement.
More importantly, this is only the latest in a series of small, limited counterattacks that have been occurring along the entire frontline in Ukraine. I don't know whether these attacks are occurring on an ad-hoc basis on the initiative of local commanders, or as part of a larger plan to shape the battlefield in preparation for the main offensive. If the former, it means that local commanders are seeing more and more openings to conduct limited attacks, which bodes very poorly for Russia's chances of resisting the big offensive (keep in mind that none of the units conducting these counterattacks so far are the 9-12 fresh brigades that are still being held back, and have been specifically trained and equipped, for the upcoming offensive). If the latter, then it means we are already seeing the opening phase of the big offensive. Whether they are part of a larger plan or not, the combined effect of these attacks will be to dilute whatever reinforcements the Russians have available by forcing them to respond to local emergencies, cause confusion about where the main offensive will land, and possibly even create cracks in the Russian line ahead of the main offensive. 
I still don't know when the main offensive will begin. My gut says it will be any day now, but my gut is biased by impatience. I think it will most likely start in June. That is based on current weather forecasts and an assumption that the Ukrainians will want more than two weeks without rain. That is supported by statements by Zelensky to the effect that they need more time for more of the promised equipment to arrive. There are plausible options for offensive actions along pretty much the entire frontline. But my guess is still that it will land in Zaporizhia Oblast, aimed at reaching the coast and cutting off Russian forces in Crimea and southern Kherson Oblast. The latest news I've heard is that Britain has now provided Ukraine with Storm Shadow missiles, which have enough range to reach the Kerch bridge from anywhere along the coast of Zaporizhia Oblast, meaning that trapping Russian forces in Crimea is now a realistic option.

Russian milbloggers today is alarming:
This is part of long post of Kots, where he guesses what can mean transporting of UKR tanks on trailers toward Russian border - demonstrative maneuver to distract troops or preparation to attack, but where - Svatove? Belgorod? Or cut Svarove group logistic, bypassing line of defense through Russian territory?
 
Local bereakthrough of UKR troops on Soledar direction, "situation is hard"

Troops of Russian 9th motor-rifle regiment (lykely new formed unit of 18th motor-rifle division of 11th  Army Corps, coastal troops, Baltic Feet) abandoned positions near Khromove and Bohdanivka (blue marked zones), losing areas about 650 x 600 m

Mid of day. NW from Klishchiivka units of 4 motor-rifle brigade (LPR? ) and 374th separate motor-rifle battalion (I don't know what is it) abandoned positions after atatck of UKR troops. But positoins were returned with Wagner counter-attack.  

 
Local successful attack of UKR forces near Mayorske, Horlivka area. Russians counter-attacking, in attempt to take posiotions bvack

I occasionally post updates on the war to Facebook, to keep my friends and family in the loop. I'm still trying to piece together what happened in this attack near Bakhmut based on ISW's report and what people have posted here. So before I actually post this, and potentially mislead my friends and family, I submit the following for comments, criticisms, additions, and revisions:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
From what I can piece together, the Ukrainians conducted two limited counterattacks on May 9th and 10th. One to the northwest of Bakhmut, the other to the southwest of Bakhmut (neither were in the city itself). The one that I mentioned yesterday, pending details, seems to have been the one to the southwest, occurring on May 9th. The area was apparently held by the Russian 72nd motorized rifle brigade. There are a few competing narratives about what happened. The most likely version is that the brigade's 6th and 8th companies suffered heavy losses, but the brigade itself was not destroyed. It is the most specific version of the story, and other versions could be consistent with it with some interpretation. The story that "the brigade was destroyed" could easily be an exaggeration of "its 6th and 8th companies suffered heavy losses". And that it broke and ran is completely consistent with two of its companies suffering heavy losses. At least one Ukrainian spokesman has claimed that the brigade suffered serious losses, but was still intact, which is also consistent. The Ukrainians reportedly advanced 2.6 kilometers along a 3km front as a result of this attack, though none of my usual sources are able to independently verify this.
That would be a good result on its own for a limited counterattack. But a Wagner assault group reportedly also moved into the area shortly after the attack in order to stop the Ukrainian advance and re-establish the frontline. The Ukrainian 3rd Assault Brigade (the unit that conducted the attack) had already stopped and entrenched itself, and the Wagner assault group blundered straight into their positions.
There are already some estimates of the Russian casualties, although they should be taken with the usual grain of salt. Prigozhin, the owner of Wagner PMC, claims they lost 500 men. I'm not sure if that number applies to 72nd's losses, Wagner's losses, or both, or whether they refer to just killed or total casualties. I don't normally put a lot of stock in what Prigozhin says. He views the regular Russian military as a rival, not a partner, so he likes to play up their failures in order to make Wagner look better. Ironically, he also likes to play up the difficulties faced by Wagner forces in order to squeeze more resources out of the regular Russian military, which he is dependent on for supplies. But in this case his claim seems to be corroborated by a statement from the Ukrainian 3rd Separate Assault Brigade, to the effect that his claim was accurate (although they may also be biased). The confirmed Russian losses are somewhere from 69-92 (either 64 or 87 Russian bodies were collected, and 5 prisoners taken). Based on the confirmed body count I'd say that 250-500 total casualties is plausible, closer to 500 if there are uncounted Russian dead (there have generally been at least 3 or 4 WIA for every KIA in this war so far). Even if the brigade was at full strength, 500 casualties would be a serious blow, representing a loss of about 25% of the brigade in a single action. But the brigade has been in action for some time, and was probably nowhere near its full strength. So this may have represented an even heavier blow to its remaining strength.
By itself, this action is not significant. But it may be significant as an indicator of what is happening in the larger picture. This attack, and the attack to the northwest of Bakhmut, together indicate that the Russians have well and truly run out of steam in Bakhmut (mere inches from the finish-line at that (the last report I heard was that the Ukrainians only hold 2.35 square kilometers in the westernmost corner of the city)). It was looking like the Russian attack had culminated about a week ago, but I didn't want to say anything yet in case it was just a lull. At that point the Ukrainians held 2.5 square kilometers. At a pace of 0.15 square kilometers a week, it would take the Russians another 4 months to secure the remaining 2.35 square kilometers of the city. That's almost the amount of time it took them to secure the first 39.1 square kilometers of the city. So to say that the Russian advance has noticeably slowed down is an understatement.
More importantly, this is only the latest in a series of small, limited counterattacks that have been occurring along the entire frontline in Ukraine. I don't know whether these attacks are occurring on an ad-hoc basis on the initiative of local commanders, or as part of a larger plan to shape the battlefield in preparation for the main offensive. If the former, it means that local commanders are seeing more and more openings to conduct limited attacks, which bodes very poorly for Russia's chances of resisting the big offensive (keep in mind that none of the units conducting these counterattacks so far are the 9-12 fresh brigades that are still being held back, and have been specifically trained and equipped, for the upcoming offensive). If the latter, then it means we are already seeing the opening phase of the big offensive. Whether they are part of a larger plan or not, the combined effect of these attacks will be to dilute whatever reinforcements the Russians have available by forcing them to respond to local emergencies, cause confusion about where the main offensive will land, and possibly even create cracks in the Russian line ahead of the main offensive. 
I still don't know when the main offensive will begin. My gut says it will be any day now, but my gut is biased by impatience. I think it will most likely start in June. That is based on current weather forecasts and an assumption that the Ukrainians will want more than two weeks without rain. That is supported by statements by Zelensky to the effect that they need more time for more of the promised equipment to arrive. There are plausible options for offensive actions along pretty much the entire frontline. But my guess is still that it will land in Zaporizhia Oblast, aimed at reaching the coast and cutting off Russian forces in Crimea and southern Kherson Oblast. The latest news I've heard is that Britain has now provided Ukraine with Storm Shadow missiles, which have enough range to reach the Kerch bridge from anywhere along the coast of Zaporizhia Oblast, meaning that trapping Russian forces in Crimea is now a realistic option.

I think the plan is to let one drive onto the Kerch bridge and watch it collapse from the weight.

I think that's a pretty good point to be made about crowd sourced information in general. Crowd sourcing is definitely a very effective way to get good information on a subject (depending on the number of people participating (the worst Wikipedia articles are the ones that have the fewest people contributing to them)). But that comes with the caveat that it requires good interpretation and sorting of the information that has been contributed in order to get the best results.

They are. They are trying to piece together what is happening using only open-source information, like the rest of us. But they are very professional in interpreting what information comes through that keyhole.