SimpleSimon

True or not that's a pretty narrow view to take on the series' prospects. The audience for wargaming isn't huge here by any means, and probably pars rather well customers in Europe of which i'm sure UK customers are a relevant slice. In any case, I as an American have no inclination to weigh the games for purchase based on the presence of US forces in it. I doubt i'm really alone on that. 

True or not that's a pretty narrow view to take on the series' prospects. The audience for wargaming isn't huge here by any means, and probably pars rather well customers in Europe of which i'm sure UK customers are a relevant slice. In any case, I as an American have no inclination to weigh the games for purchase based on the presence of US forces in it. I doubt i'm really alone on that. 

I saw a Paratrooper in Fortress Italy arc, like legit lob a Bazooka's rocket into one of those Italian Fiat-17s from 250m away once. It was awesome, an absolutely crazy shot. 

The invasion of France was full of risks, but no single one of them could defeat the invasion by itself. Operation Overlord was full of risks, but no single setback or defeat would cause the invasion to fail. Market Garden had a crippling design flaw that risked making the entire assault moot if literally just this one thing happened that always happens which was the Germans blowing up a bridge in imminent danger of capture. How could they make this plan around the hope that this would be the one time they failed to do that? This was a plan that created far more questions than it answered and that's just what tends to emerge out of a bad plan. 
Market Garden was an unfortunate example of something that can emerge from the kind of large and complicated bureaucracy of the Allied war effort. It's not something that people limited to military experience encounter in their daily lives. If you've ever worked for a Corporation or just about any multi-level organization there has most certainly been a "Market Garden" at your place of work and if you stick around long enough there's certain to be another. An operation, directive, initiative, etc thought up at high levels (ie: management) and then passed down to subordinates fully cognizant that it was either out-of-touch with reality or foolish. The solution is good communication between the various levels of management and staff and minimal insulation between those levels so accountability for both success and failure can be distributed appropriately. Criticism makes people uncomfortable and can be painful but it is part of the process of learning and while it's also important to be fair sometimes you can't have both. Montgomery is fortunate that all he ever faced for the debacle on the Nederrijn was criticism. Men under his command faced things far worse. 

Here's what I found, and it's consistent with Syrian Army organization in SF2. Motor Infantry would use BTRs or BMPs to get around, could be either depending on availability but I think BMPs would be in the minority. 
https://www.battleorder.org/rus-ussr-squad-graphics
https://www.battleorder.org/ussr-bmp-afghansky
And the Company. That website has other formations as well. Syrian organization in SF2 is entirely consistent with these tables. It'd be hard to find anything more official, and this looks reasonable enough combined with what Battlefront assembled for the game. 

The invasion of France was full of risks, but no single one of them could defeat the invasion by itself. Operation Overlord was full of risks, but no single setback or defeat would cause the invasion to fail. Market Garden had a crippling design flaw that risked making the entire assault moot if literally just this one thing happened that always happens which was the Germans blowing up a bridge in imminent danger of capture. How could they make this plan around the hope that this would be the one time they failed to do that? This was a plan that created far more questions than it answered and that's just what tends to emerge out of a bad plan. 
Market Garden was an unfortunate example of something that can emerge from the kind of large and complicated bureaucracy of the Allied war effort. It's not something that people limited to military experience encounter in their daily lives. If you've ever worked for a Corporation or just about any multi-level organization there has most certainly been a "Market Garden" at your place of work and if you stick around long enough there's certain to be another. An operation, directive, initiative, etc thought up at high levels (ie: management) and then passed down to subordinates fully cognizant that it was either out-of-touch with reality or foolish. The solution is good communication between the various levels of management and staff and minimal insulation between those levels so accountability for both success and failure can be distributed appropriately. Criticism makes people uncomfortable and can be painful but it is part of the process of learning and while it's also important to be fair sometimes you can't have both. Montgomery is fortunate that all he ever faced for the debacle on the Nederrijn was criticism. Men under his command faced things far worse. 

The invasion of France was full of risks, but no single one of them could defeat the invasion by itself. Operation Overlord was full of risks, but no single setback or defeat would cause the invasion to fail. Market Garden had a crippling design flaw that risked making the entire assault moot if literally just this one thing happened that always happens which was the Germans blowing up a bridge in imminent danger of capture. How could they make this plan around the hope that this would be the one time they failed to do that? This was a plan that created far more questions than it answered and that's just what tends to emerge out of a bad plan. 
Market Garden was an unfortunate example of something that can emerge from the kind of large and complicated bureaucracy of the Allied war effort. It's not something that people limited to military experience encounter in their daily lives. If you've ever worked for a Corporation or just about any multi-level organization there has most certainly been a "Market Garden" at your place of work and if you stick around long enough there's certain to be another. An operation, directive, initiative, etc thought up at high levels (ie: management) and then passed down to subordinates fully cognizant that it was either out-of-touch with reality or foolish. The solution is good communication between the various levels of management and staff and minimal insulation between those levels so accountability for both success and failure can be distributed appropriately. Criticism makes people uncomfortable and can be painful but it is part of the process of learning and while it's also important to be fair sometimes you can't have both. Montgomery is fortunate that all he ever faced for the debacle on the Nederrijn was criticism. Men under his command faced things far worse. 

The Stummel was about as typical as Assault Guns got and that was a category of weapon system many Armies found extremely useful. It's just crucial that you know what you're using it for and against what. It's easy to accuse the Stummel of many things that it certainly was with its limited traversing and weak Stuk L/24 gun mounted on a vulnerable half-track chassis without so much as a machine gun. Why then did so many  vehicles like it exist nonetheless? The SU-76 was also an open top gun carrier that the Soviets built the hell out of so why build so many examples of an ostensibly inferior AFV?
It's because like MikeyD says, it wasn't a tank, it's a gun carrier. It's a way to get the infantry the StuK L/24 gun fighting right alongside them and as a bonus, the weapon's crew is even protected from basic return fire such as a mortars, rifles and machine guns. This is a job that the far superior Sturmgeshutz used to perform but unfortunately because the StuG was so superb it was frequently held at higher levels for more important tasks. 
In the Red Army the SU-76's job was originally assigned to light tanks like the T-70...but the Red Army ended up deeply unsatisfied with the performance of light tanks. They were too expensive and demanding on logistics for which the return was the unimpressive firepower of their light guns. So they got rid of the turret and duct taped a ZiS-3 to the chassis. That's just the nature of the war's economy-of-force rules lol. 
 

+ 1 Barbarossa. The world will hold its breath and make no comment...

+ 1 Barbarossa. The world will hold its breath and make no comment...

A blunder foisted on him quite a bit by London. This is what annoys me about the pop history since the effort to make Montgomery out to be the 2nd coming of Wellington is just as wrong as the efforts to depict him is a bloody moron. Market Garden came down from London, and while the details of the operation were worked out by Montgomery the operation was in fact the detritus of Churchill's administration, one the Imperial General Staff couldn't contain this time, so Monty had to work with it and unfortunately he did make things worse. It didn't really all start with him though. 
Unfortunately it seems Wavell and Auchinleck fell afoul of the Prime Minister, a surefire way to get sacked or sent to India. Yet Churchill wasn't entirely wrong here, men in Auchinleck's command like Neil Ritchie were highly questionable leaders and Churchill was tired of wondering when the next aide was going to inform him of more bad news from the Middle East. Bonus awkward if he's in the middle of lunch with Roosevelt. Auchinleck was retreating again? Victory is in the other direction! So he did what any leader would do, he took action and had Auchinleck removed. Originally he was going to send General Gott but Gott's plane was shot down so instead command went to Montgomery, a man very adept at playing to Churchill's desires and concerns but this proved a rather important talent didn't it? 
Auchinleck and Wavell didn't seem like heroes to the media which was unfortunate since they were actually good tacticians. Auchinleck came off as a stuffy British Elite while the stubborn roughneck Wavell had too many enemies in the Imperial General Staff and had taken the fall for the disaster in Greece (which he didn't want any part of to begin with). Ironically Rommel thought highly of both, but a war waged on public consent needed at least some men who could parlay with the media successfully since public opinion mattered so much. I can think of nations that were fighting the war with zero consideration of public consent, I wouldn't want to have lived in any of them much less fought for them. 
Indeed. Something these guys had to deal with was being constantly being overruled or second guessed by Washington, London, and Moscow. Sound strategies were ruined all the time by politics, but that's because the Grand Alliance was the most important strategy of them all and Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin knew it. 
 

How did he put up with Patton assaulting an American servicemen or Bradley's childish temper tantrums all the time? He was mindful of the fact he was the boss of all these men and that he had to be responsible for his staff, which meant among many things that he had to be fair. Montgomery was an arrogant egomaniac but can you find a General for me in all of history who wasn't? Compared to the equally boisterous qualities of many of his equally famous peers Montgomery was not all that much worse in either the social or professional sense. 
The Press was a major factor back in 1940 and you had to factor it in since the war effort was a taxpayer funded thing directed by civilian governments in London and Washington. Montgomery pandered shamelessly to inflate his importance to be sure but plenty of his stardom was in fact promoted by Churchill who was rather well known for demanding his Generals prioritize the British Empire's prestige over sound strategy. Montgomery was the media's poster child for British Generalship during the war but for good reason. He was reassuring, charming, and confident and that counted for quite a lot, not only to the press but also to subordinate staff looking for their boss to set an example. 
He was a star baby, no less than the other big actors trying to grab the spotlight of the war, MacArthur, Patton, Bradley, Clark, yes even the German Generals Rommel, Guderian, Manstein etc. These guys didn't become Generals for being modest that's for sure. Which is a shame because in fact the best Generals on both sides of the war are frequently the ones you didn't hear all that much about. Eisenhower could only underline the value of guys like Simpson, Patch, Gerow, Truscott in a report while the war was winding down while i'm not sure the British even thanked Auchinleck or Wavell or Leese. 
Today's pop media has done very little to deflate the drama around any of the war's biggest personalities like Patton or Montgomery, in some ways its made things worse by asking honestly silly questions like "who's strategy was better" when strategy wasn't up to them. 
EDIT: To add, probably the angriest Eisenhower ever got was over the recalcitrance of an Admiral who wasn't even under his command, French Admiral Jean Darlan and his foot dragging over surrendering Vichy North Africa. Poor Ike actually yelled that he "needed a good assassin" at one point openly to his staff while smoking whole packs of Camels from the isolation of Gibraltar while what seemed like Darlan's ego was putting the entire invasion at risk. In the end ironically Darlan was assassinated but the crisis had passed by then. This event was not a proud moment for the Supreme Allied Commander who appeared to have lost his nerve, but such was the nature of the Invasion of North Africa that the Americans were totally new at all of this and there were problems top-to-bottom. Even Eisenhower had things to learn after all...

How did he put up with Patton assaulting an American servicemen or Bradley's childish temper tantrums all the time? He was mindful of the fact he was the boss of all these men and that he had to be responsible for his staff, which meant among many things that he had to be fair. Montgomery was an arrogant egomaniac but can you find a General for me in all of history who wasn't? Compared to the equally boisterous qualities of many of his equally famous peers Montgomery was not all that much worse in either the social or professional sense. 
The Press was a major factor back in 1940 and you had to factor it in since the war effort was a taxpayer funded thing directed by civilian governments in London and Washington. Montgomery pandered shamelessly to inflate his importance to be sure but plenty of his stardom was in fact promoted by Churchill who was rather well known for demanding his Generals prioritize the British Empire's prestige over sound strategy. Montgomery was the media's poster child for British Generalship during the war but for good reason. He was reassuring, charming, and confident and that counted for quite a lot, not only to the press but also to subordinate staff looking for their boss to set an example. 
He was a star baby, no less than the other big actors trying to grab the spotlight of the war, MacArthur, Patton, Bradley, Clark, yes even the German Generals Rommel, Guderian, Manstein etc. These guys didn't become Generals for being modest that's for sure. Which is a shame because in fact the best Generals on both sides of the war are frequently the ones you didn't hear all that much about. Eisenhower could only underline the value of guys like Simpson, Patch, Gerow, Truscott in a report while the war was winding down while i'm not sure the British even thanked Auchinleck or Wavell or Leese. 
Today's pop media has done very little to deflate the drama around any of the war's biggest personalities like Patton or Montgomery, in some ways its made things worse by asking honestly silly questions like "who's strategy was better" when strategy wasn't up to them. 
EDIT: To add, probably the angriest Eisenhower ever got was over the recalcitrance of an Admiral who wasn't even under his command, French Admiral Jean Darlan and his foot dragging over surrendering Vichy North Africa. Poor Ike actually yelled that he "needed a good assassin" at one point openly to his staff while smoking whole packs of Camels from the isolation of Gibraltar while what seemed like Darlan's ego was putting the entire invasion at risk. In the end ironically Darlan was assassinated but the crisis had passed by then. This event was not a proud moment for the Supreme Allied Commander who appeared to have lost his nerve, but such was the nature of the Invasion of North Africa that the Americans were totally new at all of this and there were problems top-to-bottom. Even Eisenhower had things to learn after all...

How did he put up with Patton assaulting an American servicemen or Bradley's childish temper tantrums all the time? He was mindful of the fact he was the boss of all these men and that he had to be responsible for his staff, which meant among many things that he had to be fair. Montgomery was an arrogant egomaniac but can you find a General for me in all of history who wasn't? Compared to the equally boisterous qualities of many of his equally famous peers Montgomery was not all that much worse in either the social or professional sense. 
The Press was a major factor back in 1940 and you had to factor it in since the war effort was a taxpayer funded thing directed by civilian governments in London and Washington. Montgomery pandered shamelessly to inflate his importance to be sure but plenty of his stardom was in fact promoted by Churchill who was rather well known for demanding his Generals prioritize the British Empire's prestige over sound strategy. Montgomery was the media's poster child for British Generalship during the war but for good reason. He was reassuring, charming, and confident and that counted for quite a lot, not only to the press but also to subordinate staff looking for their boss to set an example. 
He was a star baby, no less than the other big actors trying to grab the spotlight of the war, MacArthur, Patton, Bradley, Clark, yes even the German Generals Rommel, Guderian, Manstein etc. These guys didn't become Generals for being modest that's for sure. Which is a shame because in fact the best Generals on both sides of the war are frequently the ones you didn't hear all that much about. Eisenhower could only underline the value of guys like Simpson, Patch, Gerow, Truscott in a report while the war was winding down while i'm not sure the British even thanked Auchinleck or Wavell or Leese. 
Today's pop media has done very little to deflate the drama around any of the war's biggest personalities like Patton or Montgomery, in some ways its made things worse by asking honestly silly questions like "who's strategy was better" when strategy wasn't up to them. 
EDIT: To add, probably the angriest Eisenhower ever got was over the recalcitrance of an Admiral who wasn't even under his command, French Admiral Jean Darlan and his foot dragging over surrendering Vichy North Africa. Poor Ike actually yelled that he "needed a good assassin" at one point openly to his staff while smoking whole packs of Camels from the isolation of Gibraltar while what seemed like Darlan's ego was putting the entire invasion at risk. In the end ironically Darlan was assassinated but the crisis had passed by then. This event was not a proud moment for the Supreme Allied Commander who appeared to have lost his nerve, but such was the nature of the Invasion of North Africa that the Americans were totally new at all of this and there were problems top-to-bottom. Even Eisenhower had things to learn after all...

How did he put up with Patton assaulting an American servicemen or Bradley's childish temper tantrums all the time? He was mindful of the fact he was the boss of all these men and that he had to be responsible for his staff, which meant among many things that he had to be fair. Montgomery was an arrogant egomaniac but can you find a General for me in all of history who wasn't? Compared to the equally boisterous qualities of many of his equally famous peers Montgomery was not all that much worse in either the social or professional sense. 
The Press was a major factor back in 1940 and you had to factor it in since the war effort was a taxpayer funded thing directed by civilian governments in London and Washington. Montgomery pandered shamelessly to inflate his importance to be sure but plenty of his stardom was in fact promoted by Churchill who was rather well known for demanding his Generals prioritize the British Empire's prestige over sound strategy. Montgomery was the media's poster child for British Generalship during the war but for good reason. He was reassuring, charming, and confident and that counted for quite a lot, not only to the press but also to subordinate staff looking for their boss to set an example. 
He was a star baby, no less than the other big actors trying to grab the spotlight of the war, MacArthur, Patton, Bradley, Clark, yes even the German Generals Rommel, Guderian, Manstein etc. These guys didn't become Generals for being modest that's for sure. Which is a shame because in fact the best Generals on both sides of the war are frequently the ones you didn't hear all that much about. Eisenhower could only underline the value of guys like Simpson, Patch, Gerow, Truscott in a report while the war was winding down while i'm not sure the British even thanked Auchinleck or Wavell or Leese. 
Today's pop media has done very little to deflate the drama around any of the war's biggest personalities like Patton or Montgomery, in some ways its made things worse by asking honestly silly questions like "who's strategy was better" when strategy wasn't up to them. 
EDIT: To add, probably the angriest Eisenhower ever got was over the recalcitrance of an Admiral who wasn't even under his command, French Admiral Jean Darlan and his foot dragging over surrendering Vichy North Africa. Poor Ike actually yelled that he "needed a good assassin" at one point openly to his staff while smoking whole packs of Camels from the isolation of Gibraltar while what seemed like Darlan's ego was putting the entire invasion at risk. In the end ironically Darlan was assassinated but the crisis had passed by then. This event was not a proud moment for the Supreme Allied Commander who appeared to have lost his nerve, but such was the nature of the Invasion of North Africa that the Americans were totally new at all of this and there were problems top-to-bottom. Even Eisenhower had things to learn after all...

That narrative makes it sound like the British cheated because they had more stuff so the Germans could console themselves that they never stood a chance. Rommel was warned by OKH that if he pursued the British into Egypt he would not be resupplied. There was no uncertainty about this warning, he would get nothing because there would be no way to reach him in Egypt. He literally chased the British right back into their own supply dumps on "his own initiative" when it was already very problematic to keep his Army supplied from Tripoli. By chasing the British into Egypt he signed a death warrant for the huge number of Italian troops in his command that he marooned there after leaving his umbilical cord several hundred miles to his rear. Marooning your Army behind enemy lines is not sound strategy, confronting a cautious enemy commanding superior defensive ground and supported considerably by artillery and air support was both unsound and not even doctrinal for the Wehrmacht. Rommel was showboating that's all, he wanted to convince Hitler to personally intervene on his behalf and direct supplies to the Afrika Korp over the protestations of the OKH and the meddling of the Commando Supremo and Kesselring. Incidentally Kesselring was not in fact trying to sabotage him, but he did earn Mussolini's (useless) advocacy of his priority in the supply chain. 
None of this highlights anything the British did during either battle as particularly clever, but they were rather more prudent and it was a good time to be that way since the British had just suffered a string of emotional and actual setbacks that year. First Singapore fell, then that summer the Gazala line collapsed and Tobruk was lost after its heroic defense had been the headline of the year before. Case Blau commenced in Russia and seemed as if the Soviet Union might lose the war after all. Against this Claude Auchinleck was facing major morale problems in 8th Army (some of which were by his own making), another major defeat for the British that year would be devastating so he kept the retreat going right on through Mersa Matruh.
History has obscured how unpopular a decision this was at the time, El Alamein was much closer to Cairo, and the Luftwaffe would be in range of Alexandria but Auchinleck realized that 8th Army's morale was close to breaking and suffering another major defeat would be devastating. Stabilizing the front was the most important thing and he couldn't rely on willpower for that, so he had the Qattara Depression arrange it for him. Even if catastrophe struck and Rommel somehow managed to collapse the line, he couldn't bypass the 8th Army since the force-to-space ratio was so dense. There would be fighting all the way to Alexandria no matter what. The British were thinking strategically while Rommel wasn't. 
The narrative of a successful offensive via bludgeoning is ironically one also sold by the British themselves, who wanted to make it sound as if it had been Montgomery's plan all along. Ah ha! I meant to order 7th Armored Brigade into a suicide charge against that Flak battery you see! He certainly could not claim he had been a superior leader to Auchinleck on the grounds that he had been a better tactician that's for sure. 

Studienka in Red Thunder is practically a campaign in a single mission. It's a huge confrontation but the counts are small enough and the terrain varied enough on both sides that it won't necessarily degenerate into a set-piece battle. 

Marx wasn't a 'shady foreigner' but was a correspondent for an American newspaper in London during the U.S. Civil War. A firm abolitionist, he quit his newspaper in protest when the paper began drifting toward appeasement of the South. Its no coincidence that Das Kapital was published two years after the end of the Civil War. Human slavery in America was the most egregious example imaginable of corporate power debasing and abusing the working class.

Everyone's been saying so i'll reiterate. Your firepower > his, raze the place. Ideally all your infantry should have to do is occupy smoking craters. 

+1 to adding the ability to control air strikes during the setup phase. As things stand, I generally don't use air assets in CMRT as either player or designer because you never know when they are going to show up and the risk of attacking friendlies is so high. So, the feature is essentially useless. The only scenario I managed to get them in successfully was a vs-AI-only battle where the player had lots of time before he got any armor, a big map, lots of buildings to put his troops in, and the air assets were friendly Stuka specialized AT -- so they wouldn't attack his own infantry.
I'd love to add air to my current project for CMRT, but it's simply too risky unless it can be controlled -- at least during setup.
It seems to me the only real use for the current system would be to have some kind of attrition phase for a campaign, where the player's units would have to make it across a map and exit with enemy air in the skies -- but no assets on the ground, other than a hidden FO. But even then, the air might never show up.
Seems a shame to waste the feature. Setup phase control (with a guaranteed arrival time) would make it usable.

There is a con to Germany's aufkragstaktik that is not normally brought up though. Namely, the hands-off and occasionally outright weak control field commanders exert over their subordinates led to a number of instances of German Officers and Leaders mindlessly charging much stronger Allied positions and suffering massacres as a result. It encouraged a bit of wild recklessness and that didn't always pay off. 

If it was me, I would have spent those 20 minutes using Target Briefly with two of my King Tigers on random buildings. 20 buildings in town, 20 turns worth of 15 second target briefly commands, probably about 20-30 HE rounds used, would still leave plenty left for the assault. As I recall, a King Tiger carries something like 50+ rounds of ammo?
Lever a round or two of HE into a building, and see what comes out. Next turn, send more HE into another building. Recon by Fire as it were, but if you've already used up twenty minutes, you might as well start rolling in. You're not going to spot enemy infantry in buildings unless you either bait them into opening fire, or you flush them into the open.
How much time is on the clock?

And like, don't get me wrong Freyberg, there's a lot of validity to your point and this view that it wasn't clear cut. I'm intentionally being dramatic to illustrate a point and kind of get across a certain "zeitgeist" about the era that's been lost to time I think. The Germans particularly lamented that as the war went on the Panzer Divisions seemed to have lost their ability to inflict "tank terror" on formations of troops better led and less shocked by the appearance of armour. So while enough tanks might still penetrate the line it was no longer guaranteed that the entire front might collapse in a single decisive blow as it had in 1940 or 1941. Men triumphed over machine on a number of occasions before, during, and after World War 2.
I just think that people don't realize when they're applying reasoning and thinking that has been taught to them by generations of games, movies, media, etc much of which is actually just self-referential (or mindless repetition of propaganda) and not really grounded in any kind of fact or truth. Here it's the idea, frequently implied by fiction and wielded by the propaganda of reckless, irresponsible leaders that bravery and persistence will always triumph over the superior numbers and weapons of the enemy. It bugs me enough for me to take my own stance on it, but it is not meant to invalidate yours since I also believe there's plenty of space for subjectivity on all this...
 

'Attempt to shoot the tracks' is like telling police to shoot an attacking assailant in the leg. Cops are taught to aim for the center of mass for the simple reason that handguns are notoriously inaccurate at anything beyond point blank range and you're likely to not hit anything at all. In the game we see bazooka rounds impact the ground in front of the tank and panzerfaust rounds soar over the top of the vehicle. If hitting the vehicle at all is problematic then demanding the pixeltruppen go for a trick shot against the left rear drive sprocket is an unreasonable expectation. Such advice is usually included in manuals for the morale of the troops. Telling them to aim for the tracks is better than telling them to despair and surrender. Still, in the games I've been playing recently I've suffered a fair number 'immobilized ' hits on my attacking armor. You can't say it doesn't happen, though there's no dedicated animations of specific 'heroic' acts.
 

I could just lack some context here...but the StuG only has around 25-28 rounds of HE for its main gun. It's not designed for prolonged combat and not very good at suppressive fire since it lacks a coaxial machine gun. The MG34 on the roof is really just for self-defense since the gunner has to expose himself to fire it. The Ausf D used to have more ammo....but no one liked that version since the short gun it had couldn't defeat tanks easily. The Ausf G came around because the infantry desperately needed more anti-tank capacity but the StuG suffered a commensurate loss in its usefulness as an Assault-Gun because of this due to the larger size of the StuK L/48's shells and the need to stock more AP rounds. This was a particularly acute problem in the Wehrmacht too because supply lines were so stretched most tanks probably couldn't expect ammunition for days or maybe even weeks at a time. Would a resupply mechanic for tanks in the game be nice? Sure. Is it absolutely critical for us to have? I don't think so.