Machor

First, an explanation of what the Long Peace is (I assume there are at least as many people who aren't familiar with the concept as there are people who are). The Long Peace is the massive statistical reduction in warfare and violence since the end of WW2 (not all at once, the decades closer to WW2 being more violent than the decades further from WW2, so it's more of a downward trend than a sudden drop). Following WW2 we see fewer wars on average, each of which are smaller and less deadly on average, compared to any period in history prior to WW2 (even compared to the interwar period between the world wars, and the relative period of peace enjoyed in Europe between the Franco-Prussian war and WW1). While there is a lot of attention paid to the horror of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war, I find it telling that this is the first high intensity peer vs peer war of the 21st century (which is saying something considering that we are a couple decades into the 21st century by now). In a similar 20 years timespan, between WW1 and WW2 (15 year timespan actually, since I'll ignore wars in the first 5 years of the 1920s as continued reverberations of WW1 (such as the Russian Civil War), and I'm also ignoring the 2nd Sino-Japanese war as the "eastern half" of WW2, and any war with less than 10,000 casualties, and any war that I can't find enough information on in a google search) we have the Cristero War, the first phase of the Chinese Civil War, the Soviet-Japanese border conflicts, the Second Italo-Ethiopian War, and the Spanish Civil War.
Since the long peace is an overall statistical trend towards less warfare, not a straight line at the zero mark, I don't think one spike in the data is enough to declare the long peace over. This could be the end of the long peace, but we will only know in retrospect if/when this war is followed up by another high intensity war, and another, and another, until a statistical pattern of warfare is set that is on par with pre-WW2 human history. The 2020s may start to look like that, as I'm betting that there is a fair to decent chance of this war being followed up in a few years by a Chinese invasion of Taiwan (my guess is 2027 +/- 2 years, and if it doesn't happen by 2030 it will never happen*). If that happens then two high intensity wars in the same decade (the second probably being more brutal than the first) will sure as hell feel like an end to the long peace. But I think Taiwan is the last flashpoint in the modern world (one which may yet be averted). Assuming Ukraine and Taiwan aren't replaced by new flashpoints (or that war over Taiwan may even be averted), my bet is that the 2020s will represent nothing more than a statistical spike in an overall pattern of warfare that will continue to trend towards peace. I'd take it a step further and say that the Russo-Ukrainian war is even the exception that proves the rule. We are shocked by the level of violence of the Russo-Ukrainian war because these sort of high intensity wars just don't happen anymore, and the crushing economic sanctions, universal condemnation, and tarnished reputation Russia is facing perfectly demonstrate why these sort of wars just don't happen anymore. At least that's my view.
I suppose one mechanism that comes to mind which might produce new flashpoints is if the war in Ukraine and possible war over Taiwan go so badly for Russia and/or China that they actually fracture into smaller states which, not being members of the global systems that are often credited with incentivizing peace (EU, UN, NATO), could squabble with each other as frequently as pre-WW2 Europe (China has a long history of breaking up into smaller parts, and Russia apparently still has a number of subordinate republics and regions with distinct identities (it would be a shocking and unlikely turn of events, but how many people saw the breakup of the Soviet Union coming?)). That's the only mechanism I can think of by which the war(s) of the 2020s could trigger a return to pre-WW2 levels of warfare. But I don't think it's particularly likely. Of course there could be other mechanisms that I just haven't thought of. After all, just because I haven't thought of it doesn't mean it won't happen.
But what do you think? Do you think we are merely witnessing a brief interruption in the Long Peace? Or do you think we are seeing a return to "normal" levels of warfare after an 80 year statistical anomaly? Or do you dispute that the Long Peace was ever a thing? Do you think everything I've written here is complete BS? Please, tell me your thoughts?
*<my reasoning for the timing of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, if it happens, and why it won't happen after 2030 if it doesn't happen before 2030> Chinese strength will continue growing for few years, peaking sometime this decade, and then decline as demographics catch up with them (barring a black swan technology, such as AI advanced enough to completely replace all human labor (demographics would become pretty irrelevant to economic growth in that case)). So this decade is a bit of a now or never moment for them. If war doesn't come by 2030 then we can breath easy, because it means they elected "never" (caveat: I could just be wrong about all of this because I actually know far less than I think I do).

Hello,
Easily the most painstaking work to date, I have totally designed a typical Russian MRB in the MTLB flavor. If you want to switch it up you could swap the main battalions, but everything else included in this TOE should be particular to the MTLB brigade.
I have placed what feels like thousands of vehicles. Many are signals vehicles, logistics trucks, kitchen trucks, tanker trucks ETC. The Toe is complete. I had to substitute for vehicles nonstop for this project. So the vehicles are named what they should be, if they are different. Some of the small truck differences were omitted. I used the MTLB Artillery Observation vehicle to imitate certain command vehicles, and heavy engineering vehicles. I used the SA-12 MTLB launcher in place of various radars that the Russians employ. So it takes some imagination.
Please add more diverse vehicles Battlefront! A tanker truck model would go a long way. Or trailers. Or any enclosed version of the URALs. 
My biggest source and inspiration are the PHENOMENAL Shipbucket.com TOE drawings. They had legit everything diagrammed and labelled out for me. Some things I had to translate from Cyrillic, so now I know bits of that.
Download link: https://www.dropbox.com/s/4tfql4td043k80u/MASTERTOE Russian MRB.btt?dl=0
Preview Images:



Sources:
http://shipbucket.com/vehicles?category=real&type=orgchart&country=9&page=1
The Russian Way Of War
The Military Balance 2021
And some double checking on Wikipedia

Intelligently contrarian article by David Johnson on WOTR - I will underline some parts for the sake of promoting discussion with TLDR folks:
"WOULD WE DO BETTER? HUBRIS AND VALIDATION IN UKRAINE"
https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/would-we-do-better-hubris-and-validation-in-ukraine/
First, a warning about Ukraine's control of the information sphere in the West:
"The Russians have, however, conducted several successful river crossings of the Siverskyi Donets River to position forces for offensive operations against Izyum. These crossings enabled the Russians to posture forces for offensive operations in the region south of the river.
These crossings, as well as other successful Russian operations, receive scant media attention. Nor do Ukrainian failures figure prominently in reporting from the war. This is likely the result of a sophisticated all-media Ukrainian information campaign, reinforced by positive stories from journalists whose access is carefully managed by the Ukrainian government. This control of information is reinforced by their military’s excellent operational security. Indeed, it was the Ukrainian government that distributed the video of the botched Siverskyi Donets River crossing."
Sizzling take on how Western militaries' prioritization of force protection [See all the folks bragging about protecting their pixeltruppen above 🙂 ] may well be counter-productive in a near-peer conflict like the war in Ukraine:
"Western militaries are also conditioned by what Jeffrey Record calls “casualty phobia.” He traces this phenomenon to the Vietnam War, but notes that its modern implications were manifested in Operation Allied Force in Kosovo. His thesis is that U.S. policymakers and senior military officers believe that the “use of force in situations of optional intervention should be prepared to sacrifice even operational effectiveness for the sake of casualty avoidance” and that in the war against Serbia, “force protection was accorded priority over mission accomplishment.” To support this conclusion, Record cites then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Hugh Shelton to support this conclusion: “The paramount lesson learned from Operation Allied Force is that the well-being of our people must remain our first priority.”
Consequently, Western militaries have focused heavily on force protection. This was possible because of the discretionary nature of most operations—the types of operations most serving military members have experienced almost exclusively during their careers. There also is an ever-present concern behind most operational decisions that the perceived public aversion to casualties could unhinge policy. This is not to say that the irregular wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were not brutal and deadly. They certainly were at the soldier, squad, platoon, and company levels. That said, operations rarely involved the employment of battalion or larger formations in combined arms operations.
In over 20 years of war in Afghanistan, not a single platoon position was lost in combat. Casualty levels were extraordinarily low by even Vietnam War standards and medical attention was prompt and comprehensive. Finally, combat was deadly only at the ground level; aircraft largely operated with impunity outside the range of limited adversary air defenses. Aviation losses were in low-altitude operations and almost exclusively helicopters.
The war in Ukraine has starkly demonstrated the high human costs of large-scale, high-intensity warfare. Russian casualties at the Siverskyi Donets River and in other battles show that these are wars where company, battalion, and even larger formations can be annihilated in the blink of an eye, resulting in large numbers of soldiers killed in action and wounded, as well as significant materiel losses.
Consequently, in Ukraine, we are seeing the return of the imperative for force preservation, rather than force protection. This is currently beyond the consciousness of Western militaries and current combat casualty care capacity.
Changing the mindset from “force protection” to “force preservation” borders on heresy in current Western military culture. In Ukraine, Russia is learning the necessity of force preservation the hard way — in the unforgiving crucible of combat. A reasonable question is whether or not Western governments have prepared themselves, much less their citizens, for a conflict that could result in thousands of deaths and many more casualties in just a few weeks. Would this butcher’s bill awaken the passion of the people described in Carl von Clausewitz’s On War trinity, even in countries with volunteer militaries? Could this level of casualties challenge, if not unhinge, policy?
The fact that the Russians are reconstituting units from fresh troops and remnants of units decimated in combat is the reality of protracted, high-intensity combat. Our own history from World War II shows the potential cost of peer warfare. The 1st Infantry Division, in 443 days of total combat in North Africa, Sicily, and Europe, suffered 20,659 casualties. This figure is greater than the authorized strength of 15,000 for a World War II U.S. infantry division.
Importantly, these levels of casualties in the Ukraine war also call into question the ability of Western armies to maintain adequate fighting strength in other than short wars with modest casualties. Much is being made of the Russians relying on hastily mobilized reserves to replace losses. Ironically, as has been demonstrated since the Napoleonic Wars, the levée en masse is a requirement for protracted state warfare at this level. The Russians and Ukrainians both have systems in place to conscript their citizens; the practice has been abandoned, along with its supporting infrastructure, in most Western countries. Perhaps this is a case of prudent preparation, rather than an act of desperation?"
He's with @The_Capt in arguing that there's nowhere to hide with modern ISR:
"While many aspects of the Ukraine war echo past major wars, such as World War II and, to a lesser degree, the Korean War, there are several new dimensions. One in particular, likely explains the Siverskyi Donets River crossing debacle: ubiquitous surveillance of the battlefield. The Ukrainians reported that they had discovered the Russian crossing operation via aerial reconnaissance. The potential sources of this information are much more diverse and numerous now than in even the most recent conflicts. They include a wide variety of drones, commercially available satellite imagery, intelligence from Western sources, and other means.
This new reality essentially means that there is nowhere for a relatively large formation to hide. Surprise, particularly at a limited number of potential crossing points on a river, may not be possible. Thus, these types of physical deception operations may also be pointless. Finally, given the sophistication of many sensors, smoke screens may be less useful than in the past.
This new reality renders those criticizing the Russians not only wrong but dangerous. They are clinging to a doctrine that may be completely outdated in the current operational environment. That they persist in the view that Russian incompetence is mostly due to untrained and poorly motivated soldiers, led by corrupt and incompetent leaders, gives them a comfortable answer that does not invalidate their expertise or current practices."
And he follows up with a knock-out punch:
"The U.S. Army in the 1970s and 1980s looked to the World War II Wehrmacht for lessons about how to fight the Soviets outnumbered and win. After all, the Germans had actually fought the Red Army. Former Nazi officers, such as Gen. Hermann Balck and Gen. Friedrich von Mellenthin, explained their system and its importance during conferences and meetings with U.S. officers and officials. Americanized versions of German professional military education practices, officer professionalism, and encouraging subordinate initiative through Auftragstactik, which became U.S. mission command, were adopted in the U.S. Army as best practices. But we should well remember that the same type of Red Army destroyed the vaunted Nazi Wehrmacht during World War II in a long, grinding war of attrition supposedly suffered from the similar centralized leadership and hastily trained soldier maladies as today.
Furthermore, a revisionist history, not unlike that of the Lost Cause narrative about the Confederate defeat in the U.S. Civil War, was peddled by the Germans. Robert Cittino wrote that they
described the Soviet army as a faceless and mindless horde, with the officers terrorizing their men into obedience and dictator Josef Stalin terrorizing the officers. It had no finesse. Its idea of the military art was to smash everything in its path through numbers, brute force, and sheer size.
Thus, just like the Union Army, “‘quantity had triumphed over quality.’ The better army lost, in other words, and the elite force vanished beneath the superior numbers of the herd.”
These perceptions shaped U.S. views about Russian forces during the Cold War and, despite being disproven in the 1990s, are echoed in assessments today. As retired Army colonel and diplomat Joel Rayburn said in an interview with the New Yorker, “A bad army was ordered to do something stupid.” While officers are now promoted based on patronage, this is not all that dissimilar from the requirement for political reliability in the Russian military in World War II. What should have been considered then and now is why the German forces were crushed by such an inferior adversary? Perhaps enough people, materiel, and an indomitable will to fight despite privations and setbacks are exactly what are really necessary to endure and win in peer warfare."
In his conclusion, he questions the widespread notion that the Ukrainian military is doing well because it had been 'Westernized':
"These views are dangerous in Western assessments of the Ukrainian military. Currently, the prevailing narrative is that the Ukrainian edge is that they have evolved into a modern Western military, trained for over a decade in Western methods. They are professionals. Therefore, they will prevail. Just as we would. Again, nothing to learn here.
However, the actual evidence is unclear; the assessments of the prowess of Ukraine’s military may be wishful thinking and hubris. The title of a Wall Street Journal article epitomizes this view, saying it all came down to “years of NATO training.”
One should recall that Western initiatives to reform the Ukrainian military did not even begin until after the 2014 Russian invasion. Although they have progressed, many of the senior officers were raised in the Soviet system. When I visited the National Defense University in Kyiv in 1996 on an exchange visit as the director of academic affairs at our National University, all of the senior leaders were former Soviet officers. Some were also Russian citizens who chose to stay in Ukraine because there was nothing in Russia to go home to after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Consequently, a deeply entrenched Soviet-style bureaucracy and training model permeated the Ukrainian military. Thus, their rehabilitation is fundamentally a bottom-to-top institution rebuilding and culture-changing endeavor that will take time. In particular, initiatives to create a merit-based and proficient officer and noncommissioned officer corps are decades-long efforts that are just taking root at the lower- and mid-levels of the Ukrainian military. Consequently, many of the tactics above the small unit look more Russian than American, as does most of the equipment.
An indication that there is some way to go beyond the NATO training is that there is little evidence that the Ukrainians are executing joint and combined arms offensive operations. This capability will be important if the transition from the defense and attempt offensive operations to restore territory lost to Russia. Furthermore, Ukraine also appears to be ceding ground in the Donbas to a slow, grinding Russian advance.
Consequently, the analysis of the Ukraine war needs to address another unasked question: What if this view that quality people and leaders are the most important ingredient in modern warfare is wrong? What if Stalin was correct that quantity has a quality all of its own? If that is the case, then the Ukrainians may need much greater assistance if they are to survive a Russian-style grinding war of attrition.
Additionally, as the United States plans for how it will compete and potentially fight China and Russia in the future, the approach should be characterized by humility and an intense desire to challenge existing assumptions, concepts, and capabilities, rather than to validate current approaches.
As it did for Russia, it could happen to us, and we need to fully understand what “it” is."

Welcome aboard, Twisk! Always good to have someone new in the conversation.
I think it's partially a matter of definitions. The casualty-aversity discussion usually seems to be framed in terms of "modern" starting between the World Wars, if not later.
As for the "modern decadence" issue, I think most of us probably see the emphasis on limiting casualties as a feature, not a bug, of modernity... certainly on balance. Aversion to casualties is not inherently the same thing as a lack of resolve.

By the fourth month of the war, the boots had worn out...
....the Made In China boots? Maybe this is a new Trent Telenko area
2.  22 minute Ukrainian doco in link (mostly in English) with Foreign Legion fighters. The interview with the unit CO early on has the most military substance, including some remarks that a number of Americans bailed because they couldn't adjust to being on the outgunned side. It's mainly human interest after that.
 

More artillery:
A thread from Dmitry, guy who gives us all those interesting translations. He subjectively remarks about general trends he noticed in materials he has been reading/ listening to lately:
And something really bleeping scary:
 

Yes, but with caveats. It's a random chance that can vary by unit type, e.g. M1 Abrams has about a 70% chance but T-90 about 50%. This applies to all vehicles, even trucks. If the unit makes it's "saving throw" it knows an ATGM has been launched and the direction from which it was launched but not the exact location.

Agreed.  I really wish CM had an operational layer to plug this into.

This cartoon from 1982 aged like fine wine. 😀

Was playing this last week. Is John's semi-rigid Kriegspiel of the first couple of weeks of Ukraine, discussed here:

http://wargamingco.blogspot.com/2022/03/ukraine-2022-why-are-our-wargames-wrong.html

Brigade level, but I think it did a pretty decent job of modelling some of the fundamental problems with this, notably in how easy it was to stymie the Russian advance by using depth (and how ridiculously big Ukraine is).

Xi must be fuming at Putin.
Kishida looks to be first Japanese leader to attend NATO summit
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/06/04/national/fumio-kishida-nato-summit/
"Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is planning to attend a NATO summit slated for late June in Spain, a development that would make him the first Japanese leader to take part in a gathering of the Western alliance, a government source said Saturday.
Kishida’s attendance at the June 29-30 event in Madrid is dependent on the domestic political situation leading up to an Upper House election likely to be held July 10, the source said.
Through Kishida’s participation in the NATO summit, officials hope Japan will strengthen coordination with the United States and European countries in response to Russia’s war in Ukraine and possible contingencies over the Taiwan Strait."

We need to wargame this out Warren.
There is some real cutting edge stuff happening in Ukraine right now, but offensive success, on both sides, is not where it is happening. 
I agree 100% that striking the enemy throughout its depth, but mainly in the rear and along the MSRs is the most effective and quickest way to break up an enemy offensive... it has worked for the Ukrainians over and over again in this war.
I think there needs to be more work on how tactical (CM size) formations of Brigade-Battalion and below operate while on the offense... because frankly its at that level that both sides have had poor and underwhelming results so far... that is a missing ingredient that I think we can wargame and come up with a few possible concepts of employment... using distributed infantry forces, UAVs, artillery, rocket artillery, tanks (massed at key points and times), and information warfare. Those make up what I think of as the new-combined arms force and working out how they operate together would be an interesting experiment.

The average load of grain we ship/recieve here at work, in Canada, is in the 40 metric tonnes range. In order to meet the 6,000,000 metric tonnes a month it works out to 5,000 truckloads of grain to be moved every single day. 
The new and modern rail cars here hold 100 metric tonnes. The new modern grain handling facilities are being setup to accommodate trains of 134 cars in length with load/unload times of 12 hours per train. This means with the most modern equipment and facilities, 15 trains need to be loaded and leave Ukraine every day. If they are using systems designed 30 years ago, it becomes 20 trains a day. If facilities are any older, the three "modern" elevators around me were all built in the sixties, then it will be closer to 40 trains. Of course this all assumes everything is going to work perfectly without any maintenance issues. 
If you are lucky enough to live in a location with a lawn, it is not too late to rip up some grass and plant some vegetables. 

Thank you for the input and kind wishes! I looked up War over the Steppes by Hooton (2016) to see what he had to say, and he pretty much corroborates, particularly underlining the shortage of aviation fuel for the Luftwaffe. I also found out about a gallant effort to supply the Warsaw Uprising from air, which forced the Luftwaffe to reallocate resources. Relevant to this thread - since there has been much discussion of how little intel and planning time Russian officers appear to have received before the invasion - here's how much heads-up the VVS had before Bagration (p. 210):
"No wire communications were permitted during planning, with corps and division commanders briefed five to seven days before the attack while regimental commanders had only a few hours notice. The physical strain was so severe that shortly before Bagration Golovanov collapsed with nervous exhaustion, and while he followed Stalin’s advice to rest at home and drink vodka, Skripko bore the brunt of ADD planning."

Ah, thanks. I just assumed it was blocked. Since the Baltics also run on broad gauge going through Belarus would at least seem possible.
Overview of rail gauges used in the world:

Is Ukraine still attacked from/through Belarus?
IIRC Ukraine plans(!) to switch to standard gauge. Starting with Lviv - Kiev, Lviv - Odessa and a 3rd line I've forgotten. But this will take years to complete.
 

I am not sure if it has been mentioned before, but this channel does regular interviews, mostly with Muscovite(?) zoomers and millenials, but I thought it gave some valuable insights into a certain subsection of Russian society, i.e. young urbanites, so definitely not representative of the whole country.
What these videos show particularly well is the utterly destitute state of Russian civic culture, with standard answers like "I'm apolitical", "these things are decided at the top", "we have no say in it", etc and a general disconnect from reality ("the rest of the world is envious of Russia's wealth and resources").
Some other interesting videos are the somewhat regularly posted (every few weeks or so) "are you affected by sanctions yet?" videos, which most people tend to answer with no, even if all acknowledge issues such as severe price increases.
This one answer I found particularly funny:
 

I had to skip ahead (The Thread has been taking up most of my reading time since early March) to see what he has to say about Bagration. He does indeed make a strong case that the defeat of the Luftwaffe (not in a definitive sense of course, but a tipping point was reached) in the west earlier that year was the key factor: Luftflotte 6 had 100 single-engine fighters to cover Army Group Center, of which 40 were mission-capable and even they did not have adequate fuel. There were 600 Luftwaffe fighters (single- and twin-engine) on the entire Eastern Front when Bagration began, and against this the V-VS were able to deploy 5,417 aircraft, 2,528 of which were fighters, along the fronts taking part in the offensive. German commanders interviewed by the Allies after the war generally considered this to be the point where Soviet tactical airpower went from being a nuisance to a decisive factor.
Hope time and health do permit that for you soon, CMRT does look very interesting to get into.

I saw this this Russian propaganda performance first via the Canadian Ukraine Volunteer account, but here is the original. Wow!
Seems to be the song:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Sacred_War

Bolded. The rust appears almost instantly after a high-temp vehicle fire. Rust is, after all, just oxidized metal. The fires will burn off all the paint and other protections, leaving the bare metal exposed and also more reactive (due to high temp) to the atmosphere...that is 20% oxygen.
 

A good start point.  I also have been mulling over a lot of these issues; however, I come to different conclusions.  My primary induction is that we are looking at this too narrowly; quality vs quantity is a one dimensional set of competitive metrics and we are clearly moving past it in this war.  To start these are somewhat vague as what do we mean by "quality"?  Is that training and equipment?  The amount of money invested prior to war?  Quantity, is that mass on the battlefield or broader strategic capacity?  Is it both?  These definitions muddle more than they really explain.
I think there are at least three more dimensions that need to be explored (and I say "at least" deliberately): "smartness" and "distribution", and "capacity". 
Smartness could just as easily be described as intelligence in the broader sense but the term is already in use.  By this I define smartness as: the ability of a force to competitively create usable knowledge in the prosecution of war.  This is effectively competitive theory building at all levels of warfare (i.e. the warfare enterprise) - [aside: I did have graphics but the "eeewww PowerPoint crowd" might get ruffled again].  So one can have a very well trained and equipped force but is it competitively smart?  Further, can you have a smart low-quality but high quantitative force?  Theorists say yes, they call it a swarm.  Smartness could easily be called C4ISR; however, I personally think that term gets boxed up as "HQ stuff" which does a disservice to the idea of the overall cognitive ability of a force as a sentient system in itself.   
In the opening phase of this war the Russian attacked on 5 main axis where they concentrated over 190k troops well armed and just coming off moths of exercises (how effective those were are in doubt), they had the local mass advantage as Ukrainian defence was 1) still mobilizing, 2)  in a state of shock at the first punch and 3) was spread out across a very long frontage as no one knew if Belarus was going to jump in or there were more axis the Russians were going to open up. So in the opening phase of this war we have seen a very smart Ukrainian force meet what I call a "dim" mass-based Russian one, and it appears the meeting was decisive in the opening phase of this war.
Distribution and capacity speak to mass but how one employs it.  Distribution is how we spread that mass around and capacity is how much depth we invest into it.  In this war, again in the opening phase, we saw the Ukrainian defence as very highly distributed mass, yet also highly connected and very intelligent.  It met a very high density mass, yet also "dim" of the Russian forces...and we saw what happened.  The Ukrainian defence created friction and attrition along the entirely of the Russian operational system leading to the collapse of that system on at least 2 operational axis, one of them the main effort of the whole war.   So now we can have high quality - smart - distributed/lower capacity mass meeting low quality - dim - concentrated/higher capacity mass, and we all saw what happened.  Western militaries will wring their hands over this one for at least a decade because we tend to put out high quality - smart - concentrated/low capacity mass and no matter what the military visionaries, revisionist or conservatives may say, we have no idea what happens when these types of forces all meet - Steve, has nearly shouted himself raw pointing out how wrong the pre-war modeling was, and still can be.  Particularly when we have seen what low quality - smart - distributed/high capacity (nearing endless) mass can do to our forces over time, in insurgencies over the last 20 years .
This brings me to my last point, which no one really seems to be talking much about either: speed of victory/loss matters.  Hypothetically Russia could win this thing if it manages to drag out this war for a century - I am talking Taliban style of constant low level cuts and bites across the spectrum that it somehow manages to sustain.  However, by then it may no longer matter.  Putin will be dead, the political landscape will have changed to the point that what ever mattered in this war, in this moment has become a complete sideshow.  Further, Russia may "win" but the victory completely breaks the nation, to the point that the victor is not even Russia anymore.  We know this because this is what happened in Afghanistan.  In Oct of '01 it was "a critical blow to terrorism", in Aug of '20 - "*sigh* let's just get this over with".  The USA of '01 is gone and the one in '20 was built upon it but did not have anywhere near the same level of investment as fundamental conditions had changed.  
Back to my main point, western militaries are built for either a quick victory or long loss.  We do not know what to do with a quick loss or long victory.  Further, the public that send us are not wired for the latter either.  Problem is that these could be the wars offered to us and this is a major strategic blind spot.  I think this was one of the authors main points, that is particularly insightful as it relates directly to what sorts of forces we have been building.
And finally, as if all that was not enough, I am still on the fence as to what is happening between defence and offence.  Is this conditions based or are we looking at something more fundamental?  Offence in the form the Russians are offering is clearly in trouble.  It has become incredibly difficult and costly with the type of force they have employing to prosecute it.  We have all been getting "scope eye" on a 2500 sq km postage stamp of terrain - in a country of roughly 604k sq kms - down in the south; however, the rest of the country is also pretty static.  The UA has made a couple successful offensives around Kharkiv and now north of Kherson, but these have been modest.  This could be, as the author suggests, due to the Ukrainian force and how it is being employed (not western enough?).  Or has technology driven us into a different warfare paradigm?  Frankly, I do not know and I am sure people have plenty opinions but let me be the first to break it, you don't know either...no one does.  We likely won't know until something breaks and one side in this war figures it out.  Or maybe they won't and it will take the next war for a side to come up with the answer. The only thing I can say definitively is that the question is in the air right now and the real experts are all watching and waiting.

Modern suppressors don't negatively affect bullet velocity. With a really good chronometer you will actually see a very slight increase in velocity. The "hitting power" of the bullet is a direct result of the velocity at which it is traveling, so there is no reduction in energy as there is no reduction in velocity. They generally reduce recoil and give a more stable weapon platform. The downside is the extra weight on the end of the barrel but is doesn't take long to become accustomed to it.
They do help with concealment as the reduction in noise and reduction of flash make it harder to locate the shooter, however my opinion is the more important part is the better ability to communicate. Gunfights are very loud. Gunfights in enclosed environments are stupid loud. I think most of us would agree the most important factor tying everything else together is communication and suppressors make that immensely easier, especially in an environment where not every shooter is connected with bone mics and ear pieces. 

I'm not so sure. Honestly looking back at the numbers at the start of the war, between the regular army, territorial defense units, and other forces contributing to Ukraine's ground strength, Ukraine had over 200,000 fighters to the 190,000 Russian troops that massed for the initial invasion. So I'm not so sure that Russia ever had a numerical advantage. Their numerical hardware edge was never that great to begin with (in terms of active forces, obviously some of the higher estimates of their reserve and stored equipment looked pretty intimidating) with ~3,000 active tanks to Ukraine's ~2,000 active tanks at the start of the war (albeit Ukraine had very few in reserve or storage). And when you consider that Russia couldn't have massed all of their active tanks at once for the invasion they may actually have been at a slight numerical hardware disadvantage. If at the start of the war you thought that all Ukrainian tanks were T64BVs and all Russian tanks were T72B3s then you could be forgiven for thinking that the Russians had a huge qualitative hardware edge. But of course the reality is that a lot of the Ukrainian T64BVs were T64BV model 2017s. And a lot of the Russian tanks were older T72Bs, T80BVs, and T80Us. So overall Russia may have only had a slight qualitative hardware edge. About the only area where the Russians had a clear edge was in the air, which is important but has never been decisive by itself.
Honestly, if we hadn't been so enamored by the myth of Russian military might, and just looked at the actual numbers on the ground and applied our pre-war rules of thumb (and add in the fact that the Russians were attacking at literally the worst possible time of year), we really should have predicted that the Russian advance would bog down. Perhaps it wasn't unreasonable to predict (assuming that both sides fully mobilized to an equal degree, and that the west didn't send weapons to Ukraine, and that Russian wouldn't be heavily sanctioned) that Russia would eventually win. But it should have been obvious from the start that their initial invasion forces wouldn't be up to the task. Honestly I had guessed that the Russians would have a hard time of it early on, but then I kept revising up the Russian capabilities because I kept assuming that they knew what they were doing. "They wouldn't launch an invasion if they don't know it will succeed" I kept telling myself. "Their generals must know something I don't" I kept telling myself. As we started seeing an early thaw in mid February I started telling my family "historically, this is a bad time of year to invade", and "mud can really bog down an advance". But then I started telling myself "The Russians aren't stupid, they must be aware of the impact of mud, it must not be as important as I thought" and "Bagration was a huge success despite the marshy terrain, mud must be less important than I'd assumed". When I saw the estimate of 190,000 troops on the Ukrainian border I thought "is that all? To invade such a large country?". But then I thought "it must be enough, they aren't stupid after all". But no, they were just inept. The whole "no one could have predicted this" refrain is total BS. All the evidence was there and clear as day. We should have given Russia less credit, and Ukraine more credit, from the very beginning. That is on us. There is no excuse. We let the myth of Russian strength distract us from the actual numbers and conditions.
My key takeaway from this war is this: When predicting the course of a war, do not let the perception of the aggressor's strength or competence make you second guess the actual numbers on the ground and historically tested rules of thumb. Yes, in training and wargames you should assume that your enemy is competent. But, when it comes to the real world, remember that just because it's a stupid idea doesn't mean they won't do it. And just because they are doing it doesn't mean that it isn't a stupid idea.

Harmon Rabb already posted this, but undersold it - CB is a bitch:
 

Harmon Rabb already posted this, but undersold it - CB is a bitch: