Taking all bets, is the long peace over?

[Centurian52]

First, an explanation of what the Long Peace is (I assume there are at least as many people who aren't familiar with the concept as there are people who are). The Long Peace is the massive statistical reduction in warfare and violence since the end of WW2 (not all at once, the decades closer to WW2 being more violent than the decades further from WW2, so it's more of a downward trend than a sudden drop). Following WW2 we see fewer wars on average, each of which are smaller and less deadly on average, compared to any period in history prior to WW2 (even compared to the interwar period between the world wars, and the relative period of peace enjoyed in Europe between the Franco-Prussian war and WW1). While there is a lot of attention paid to the horror of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war, I find it telling that this is the first high intensity peer vs peer war of the 21st century (which is saying something considering that we are a couple decades into the 21st century by now). In a similar 20 years timespan, between WW1 and WW2 (15 year timespan actually, since I'll ignore wars in the first 5 years of the 1920s as continued reverberations of WW1 (such as the Russian Civil War), and I'm also ignoring the 2nd Sino-Japanese war as the "eastern half" of WW2, and any war with less than 10,000 casualties, and any war that I can't find enough information on in a google search) we have the Cristero War, the first phase of the Chinese Civil War, the Soviet-Japanese border conflicts, the Second Italo-Ethiopian War, and the Spanish Civil War.

Since the long peace is an overall statistical trend towards less warfare, not a straight line at the zero mark, I don't think one spike in the data is enough to declare the long peace over. This could be the end of the long peace, but we will only know in retrospect if/when this war is followed up by another high intensity war, and another, and another, until a statistical pattern of warfare is set that is on par with pre-WW2 human history. The 2020s may start to look like that, as I'm betting that there is a fair to decent chance of this war being followed up in a few years by a Chinese invasion of Taiwan (my guess is 2027 +/- 2 years, and if it doesn't happen by 2030 it will never happen*). If that happens then two high intensity wars in the same decade (the second probably being more brutal than the first) will sure as hell feel like an end to the long peace. But I think Taiwan is the last flashpoint in the modern world (one which may yet be averted). Assuming Ukraine and Taiwan aren't replaced by new flashpoints (or that war over Taiwan may even be averted), my bet is that the 2020s will represent nothing more than a statistical spike in an overall pattern of warfare that will continue to trend towards peace. I'd take it a step further and say that the Russo-Ukrainian war is even the exception that proves the rule. We are shocked by the level of violence of the Russo-Ukrainian war because these sort of high intensity wars just don't happen anymore, and the crushing economic sanctions, universal condemnation, and tarnished reputation Russia is facing perfectly demonstrate why these sort of wars just don't happen anymore. At least that's my view.

I suppose one mechanism that comes to mind which might produce new flashpoints is if the war in Ukraine and possible war over Taiwan go so badly for Russia and/or China that they actually fracture into smaller states which, not being members of the global systems that are often credited with incentivizing peace (EU, UN, NATO), could squabble with each other as frequently as pre-WW2 Europe (China has a long history of breaking up into smaller parts, and Russia apparently still has a number of subordinate republics and regions with distinct identities (it would be a shocking and unlikely turn of events, but how many people saw the breakup of the Soviet Union coming?)). That's the only mechanism I can think of by which the war(s) of the 2020s could trigger a return to pre-WW2 levels of warfare. But I don't think it's particularly likely. Of course there could be other mechanisms that I just haven't thought of. After all, just because I haven't thought of it doesn't mean it won't happen.

But what do you think? Do you think we are merely witnessing a brief interruption in the Long Peace? Or do you think we are seeing a return to "normal" levels of warfare after an 80 year statistical anomaly? Or do you dispute that the Long Peace was ever a thing? Do you think everything I've written here is complete BS? Please, tell me your thoughts?

*<my reasoning for the timing of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, if it happens, and why it won't happen after 2030 if it doesn't happen before 2030> Chinese strength will continue growing for few years, peaking sometime this decade, and then decline as demographics catch up with them (barring a black swan technology, such as AI advanced enough to completely replace all human labor (demographics would become pretty irrelevant to economic growth in that case)). So this decade is a bit of a now or never moment for them. If war doesn't come by 2030 then we can breath easy, because it means they elected "never" (caveat: I could just be wrong about all of this because I actually know far less than I think I do).

[Erwin]

Interesting analysis.  The longer the Ukraine war continues, the less it appears that Russia has lost and is simply digging in for the long haul - basically waiting out the west as we struggle with increasing economic and social problems of our own.  It's been 4 months since the invasion and Putin is still in charge and there seems no signs of his leaving or of any change in the Russian intent to grab as much of Ukraine (at least the valuable parts with grain and/or minerals) as possible.  Russia is good at resolute defense and the Russian character is used to absorbing massive casualties.  If Russia holds on until next October there will be another "winter of discontent" in the west as energy and other supplies become even more unavailable/expensive and black-outs become normal.  We can expect to see increasing fracturing of the "alliance" as populations get angry that billions are sent to Ukraine while western populations suffer increasing deprivations.  Massive pressure will grow on Ukraine to come to some sort of (unsatisfactory to Ukraine) settlement with Russia.  There will be no happy ending.

If the above comes to pass the real potential winner will of course be China.  If Russia cannot be defeated - and that means Russia is forced out of Ukraine - then we can expect more Chinese aggression.  We may see China grabbing a small undefended/unoccupied Taiwanese island and just sitting on it daring the west/US to "do something" - ie presenting us with the dilemma of risking world war over an island that is purely symbolic.

Even though the west now perceives the China threat, it will; take years for our forces to build up.  For the next few years China has a window of opportunity where it can achieve local superiority.  So any action by China is probably going to come sooner rather than later.

Your analysis that the "long peace" is coming to an end as a historical anomaly may be spot on.  

[Bulletpoint]

Russia's war in Ukraine might seem more scary to us Europeans than various conflicts in Africa and Syria, but that's just because it's closer to us and involves people who look more like we do. And of course because it involves Russia and Nato.

But for all its brutality, in the big picture, the actual losses and destruction in Ukraine are still much lower than in Syria for example.

So unless it develops into a much bigger war, I don't think the war in Ukraine is any argument against the Long Peace.

Edited June 7, 2022 by Bulletpoint

[Centurian52]

1 hour ago, Erwin said:

Interesting analysis.  The longer the Ukraine war continues, the less it appears that Russia has lost and is simply digging in for the long haul - basically waiting out the west as we struggle with increasing economic and social problems of our own.  It's been 4 months since the invasion and Putin is still in charge and there seems no signs of his leaving or of any change in the Russian intent to grab as much of Ukraine (at least the valuable parts with grain and/or minerals) as possible.  Russia is good at resolute defense and the Russian character is used to absorbing massive casualties.  If Russia holds on until next October there will be another "winter of discontent" in the west as energy and other supplies become even more unavailable/expensive and black-outs become normal.  We can expect to see increasing fracturing of the "alliance" as populations get angry that billions are sent to Ukraine while western populations suffer increasing deprivations.  Massive pressure will grow on Ukraine to come to some sort of (unsatisfactory to Ukraine) settlement with Russia.  There will be no happy ending.

Personally I don't expect that a long war scenario is favorable to Russia. The imbalance between the western economies and Russia is just too great. Any economic turmoil felt in the west will be felt tenfold in Russia. Russia had a huge initial advantage in equipment (if you count active + reserve + stored equipment), but very limited capacity to produce new equipment (basically none when compared with the rate equipment is lost in a high intensity war). Russia's material advantage will diminish as their stockpiles are gradually reduced by battlefield losses, and Ukrainian stockpiles are replenished by shipments from the west (and the quality advantage will shift towards Ukraine as Russia expends its newer equipment and draws on older equipment, while Ukraine starts transitioning towards NATO equipment). Additionally, Russia hasn't had to absorb massive casualties since WW2, almost 80 years ago (back then they were part of the Soviet Union, giving them a larger industry and population to draw on to replace losses). And Ukraine was also part of the Soviet Union back then, making them just as experienced in absorbing massive casualties as the Russians. In fact we can expect Ukraine to be far more willing to tolerate casualties than Russia, since Ukraine is fighting for its survival, while Russia is not. Of course I won't say that Russia can't win. While western aid has been significant, it hasn't been enough yet that, if it were cut tomorrow, Ukraine would be able to withstand a fully mobilized Russia. But every day that passes in which western aid continues to flow in, and Russia still hasn't mobilized, further reduces Russia's chances.

1 hour ago, Erwin said:

If the above comes to pass the real potential winner will of course be China.  If Russia cannot be defeated - and that means Russia is forced out of Ukraine - then we can expect more Chinese aggression.  We may see China grabbing a small undefended/unoccupied Taiwanese island and just sitting on it daring the west/US to "do something" - ie presenting us with the dilemma of risking world war over an island that is purely symbolic.

I think China will go all in or not at all. They will almost certainly start with the smaller islands between China and Taiwan (although I don't think any of them are undefended). But those will be stepping stones to an invasion of the main island. If they just take a small island and just sit there, daring the US to make a move, they give the US plenty of time to move assets into the region to defend Taiwan. China's greatest advantage in a war would be the several month lead-time they would enjoy on the US being able to redeploy naval assets to Taiwan from the other side of the world (the main reason that I personally give the Chinese favorable odds of winning the first battles). They wouldn't risk throwing that away, lest they lose their chance of taking the main island for good.

But I do have some hope that the west's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine may have actually reduced the probability of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan somewhat. The sanctions against Russia have done real damage to the Russian economy. Damage which may take years to become fully apparent. But, Russia can survive. Russia is a massive oil and food exporter. While it's economy will be drastically weakened, it will still be able to transport goods, and it will not face mass starvation. China, on the other hand, is a massive oil and food importer. If China gets hit with the same sanctions that we've hit Russia with then vehicles in China will stop running within six months, and mass starvation will begin within a year. Before 24 February 2022 China may have calculated that they would be strong enough (either now or in a few years) to win local military victories against the United States. After 24 February 2022 China may have calculated that, whether or not it achieves battlefield victories, it cannot survive economic isolation by a global community that is largely friendly to the US.

Of course, that assumes that rational minds prevail in China. As we now know from Russia's invasion of Ukraine, rational minds do not always prevail. And Xi may not be getting accurate information about the war, as he has surrounded himself with just as many yes-men as Putin. So while I'm hopeful that the probability of a Chinese invasion has been reduced, I am not confident that it has been reduced to the point of being unlikely (if it was 75%, maybe now it is 50%).

1 hour ago, Erwin said:

Your analysis that the "long peace" is coming to an end as a historical anomaly may be spot on.  

My personal view is that the Long Peace is not coming to an end. But I may have masked that view with caveats and an interest in ways in which I might be wrong (if I am wrong, at least I may still be right about how I was wrong (or I'll just be wrong on all counts)). I think my overall view of the world is optimistic, with the caveat that things could get worse before they get better.

[The_Capt]

Very interesting question but it needs some context:

So this graphic is interesting - it is built from some research done at Georgia tech, for the real nerds the excel sheets in detail are avail at https://brecke.inta.gatech.edu/research/conflict/.  We have had periods of "great peace" before as you can see.  What is missing from this graphic are the Mongol Conquests that occurred between 1200-1400 AD, which still ranks only second to the Three Kingdoms War (182-280 BC) as the most deadly in history as percentages of the overall human population at the time (and this does not give full credit to the Mongol Invasions contributions to the Black Death).  So before 1400 there was a major spike and then between 1400 and 1600 we basically had a lot of small wars between fiefdoms but overall deaths were kept low. (Also note that the deaths as a result of conquest of the New World are also not included, which by some estimates were obscene).

Then right about the time we had the "Peace of Westphalia" deaths by war went on a bit of a wild ride with spikes about every 50 years, right about the time the generations that fought the last major war died off.  This is pretty consistent, we get a big spike as the 3rd post-last-war generation tries to re-order things, then an exhausted peace, then another spike...and then the 20th century happened.  If we go with anything less than 10 deaths out of 100,000 globally as the "peace line", the 20th century was a Season of Mars, and this after one of the most peaceful stretches in the late 19th century, right after the US Civil War.  So for higher resolution of more recent history:

So we have the Chinese Civil war there, ending in '49.   Korea, and then things do start to drop as we enter into the time of intra-state wars and wars of intervention of the Cold War.  Still pretty active but below that 10 per 100,000 line...and then 1989 happened.  It is hard to believe, based on how busy our militaries have been but we definitely have been living a "great peace" between 1989 and about 2012 as the world enjoyed a single super power order and we basically only had small little savage wars to deal with, not unlike the much briefer period in the late 19th century.  Neither of these charts take into account the Russo-Ukraine War, which is vicious but still a smallish war by earlier standards.

So as to the original question...my guts says "yes" we are entering a new phase of something.  You can track all these charts directly to power competition, which has largely been dormant since the end of the Cold War.  We argued a lot but most of the nations who "won" the Cold War have not had a civil war, or engaged in a state-based one, we all got rich instead.  The dirty little wars on the margins continue but they were largely civil wars or nasty little regional affairs.  Russia has signaled that it is willing to pay a blood price to re-order things, and here we are today.  I am betting we will see more proxy wars and look more like the 60s and 70s and some state-on-state clashes.  Will we go back to the old model of great big wars every 50 years like we saw between 1650-1945?  Doubtful, as we will likely see the biggest spike in history in the form of an escalated thermonuclear exchange if we try that out.  My bet is some form of nasty power competition as East and West rebalance. 

Edited June 8, 2022 by The_Capt

[Erwin]

For the past months it feels like we're reliving the 1930's with the rise of two militaristic totalitarian nations intent on either regional or world domination.  They don't necessarily like each other but will cooperate (for now) to bring everyone else down.  Meanwhile, the democratic nations struggle to re-arm as that takes many years.