Beetz

It's always been questionable in my mind that some economists and commentators reckon that globalisation is a force that prevents war. It adds a layer to the decision making but trade as an absolute block on major powers not going into conflict due to economic loss? Seems like economic study/dark arts trying rationalise human decision making, that wealth is all that matters to everybody, especially at a time of violent crisis?
If I cast my mind back to my Uni days about 20 years ago (I'm old now), you have three primary causes for conflict to break out:
- Nationalism / Territorial - "I disagree with you owning that piece of land"
- Ideological - "I disagree with the way you think and do things"
- Ethnic - "I disagree with your religion, language, upbringing, race... I disagree with who you are."
The idea was conflict in 19th and early 20th century was primarily driven by the first point. This switched over to ideological in the run up to WW2 and the Cold War. The post Cold War era has been focused more on Ethnic issues driving conflicts. Now they are generalisations and it's pretty easy to argue that for many conflicts there are more than one driver in play or one is in play while others are used as political smoke screen by political elites to justify entering a conflict. Not to mention outliers or the belligerent sides having different perceptions on what is driving the conflict.
There was no reason not to think ethnic driven issues would continue to be the primary driver most conflict into the 2020's but I think the dangling of the idea of USA pullback/isolationism during the Trump years emboldened a bunch of other global players to start pushing against the west as the 'world cop' was potentially off the beat. Nationalism and Ideology (latter a smokescreen?) have been able to pop up again as a result. If we find ourselves in another 1939 situation but this time the world opts to let it happen because, "we want our trade numbers to stay strong", I think is a bigger cross against humanity and our political systems. The fallout of not responding to unwarranted aggression is also likely to have a bigger impact on global stability.
Mark Twain may have been right all along... "The more I learn about people, the more I like my dog."

1 year of the war is passed. From the start of the invasion and to the huge count of air and missile strikes. One of my friends has been killed by wagner artillery in Bohorodichne village near Bakhumt. My father-in-law has been killed by storming the defensive enemy positions in the Kherson region 1st of October. I gave 3 of my salaries (all what I have)on the first day of the war on the military budget. Thanks to all of you, thanks for your help. Taking carry of our refugees, helping our soldiers to destroy enemy forces with AT weapons, artillery, APS, AFV, and Tanks, peoples who served in foreign legions. Thank you for giving billions of money to support our economy. Special thanks to battlefront for small support for me, when I asked about a discount, they gave me 2 games with all DLCs for free - I didn't expect this. Some of my relatives were in Kherson in occupation, and all high-value electronic and expensive things were looted from them by Russian forces. And now we don't fear rocket strikes (10 times they exploded 700-1000m from my house) we don't fear nuclear threat, we don't fear the second army in the world and you shouldnt. Sorry for we English would that what I want to say for all of you, I can tell you many things about the war but first i will try to improve my language knowlages.

Ok, but these are also all strategies adopted by weaker sides of a confrontation, some straight out of Mao’s playbook - who he ‘borrowed’ from others.  I have no doubt the UA was planning an unconventional resistance and if we recall the early days of this war, they were kinda scrambling.  I think what surprised everyone one was just how well it worked.  It morphed from a resistance to a new form of defence/corrosive warfare that I am not sure anyone was ready for.  Further when Phase I collapsed, recall the RA did withdraw back to the border.  Even with all the abandoned gear they were not driven there by any conventional offensive waged by the UA.
I am not sure the Ukrainians knew the true state of the Russian military well in advance; I am not even sure the west did to be honest.  We could see it here on the forum about 72 hours in (I still have a copy of some of those posts).
Jumping to the end - ok, I think we agree on more than we disagree on these points.  One area that I do think the Russians did entirely get in their own way and frankly even with the force they have could have done much better, maybe even pulled off what they were looking for, was in the arena of military strategy.
They had several strategic COAs going into this from which everything that followed was a direct result.  They chose - typically Russian - a strategy of overwhelmtion (yep, it is a word that I did not just totally make up).  5-6 operational axis of advance and massively deep penetration requirements was ridiculous overreach for both the size of the force and the enablers they had available to them. NATO would be really stretched to pull off such a fight - if I recall correctly we only had 3 axis of advance in CMSF.  The Russian way overestimated their forces and way underestimated what modern equipped defence could do (they were not alone in that).  All of this was exacerbated by very poor operational level targeting and logistics, and as you not abysmal tactical C2 - frankly I am not even sure how the managed the road move, let alone contact.  And to your point, this over reach may still have failed if the UA was less capable - I say may because it would have been a much closer run thing, as you note straight up mass and speed still count for something.
Now if the Russian military had done two strategic things, this war may have turned out differently.  1) Establish preconditions.  This costs time but hitting key transportation and communication/information infrastructure and power production and distribution.  Economic/finance systems.  And finally actually tried something nuanced in the diplomatic space other than “lie, lie, still lying..and now I am going to prove I was lying…”. To this add build a competitive C4ISR architecture that feeds a joint targeting enterprise and then get some unity of command going to control the whole thing.  All this and keeping the political level - with zero military expertise - from micro managing.
2) Isolate Ukraine.  Once you make the nation go dark and even with everything Ukraine already had, you focus on cutting them off from all support.  I find it baffling that Russia not only did not do this in the diplomatic space, they did not do it as part of military strategy…here Russia sucking was a definitive factor.  Put the main effort on a drive to Lviv and cut the western corridor approaches.  Reduce the axis of advance to Lviv, Kherson and Kyiv, which is still very ambitious.
If they did that from Day 1, I am still not sure they would have achieved success, best case they are fighting an historic insurgency-from-hell fully backed by the west.  But this clown show they are in might have had a few less acts.
Military strategy is clearly the one area where Russia “sucking” is all on them.  Operationally and tactically I think it gets a lot more complicated and frankly the Ukrainian defence (and then offensives) will be studied for years to fully understand what just happened.  I am not sure anyone could solve for the Ukrainian resistance to be honest.  The fact that the RA itself was a key factor in them failing faster, I totally agree with.
I personally think that warfare has changed - the needle has moved - I think it has shifted much farther and faster than we ever expected, which is actually normal.  I think things as basic as force ratios and principles need to be revisited (Surprise, for example…what does one do with that?). 
Seriously, you guys should, start thinking about the Op Research game.  Training Cbt Tm commanders is cool, but I think there is going to be a serious market for OR - of course you will need to make CM massively bloated, less user friendly and cost over a billion dollars in order for western militaries to buy in.

The truly epic failure of the Russian air force needs to figure more prominently than it has. The fact that Ukraine has trains running, planes flying, and an integrated air defense system of some sort is utterly in defiance of pre war expectations. I don't think that would be the case against the U.S./NATO, not unless we posit more tech than Ukraine has. Would this difference be sufficient, probably not. but it would be large.

Gawd, I hate when that happens.
Ok, that is a major unsupported leap of logic, and frankly we are get way too many of these in the last 50 pages - at some point this is going to devolve this venture into the same rhetorical and propaganda spaces we see all over the internet, and at that point I will be lobbying to close the thread down because it is no longer keeping people informed, it will have become a dogmatic platform.
If Russia employs battlefield nuclear weapons, there will be a response, there must be.  However, let's say hypothetically that the West backs down and says "ok, well now it is getting real - let's negotiate an endstate".  Yes, it is not a good thing for the future risk the employment of nuclear weapons may have on imperialist expansion.  Russia will likely try the same game elsewhere; however what is missing between the Baltic nations and Ukraine is certainty. 
If Russia annexes, invades or attacks a Baltic nation, and IF that nation declares an article 5 then Russia is not getting handsie on some side hustle, it is declaring war on NATO.  "Oh, sure but who says NATO will actually do anything about it?" some say cynically - well 1) NATO nations sure as hell have done something about Ukraine and 2) NATO is too big to fail, and 3) if NATO does fail - and don't take this too personally - but we individually won't give two figs what happens in Baltics or the entirety of Eastern Europe, and even more bluntly in North America, we might not even really care too much about all of Europe anymore - at least as far as collective defence goes.
1) You know, a simple "thank you for having our backs" would go a long way once and awhile.  Instead we get "well what have you done for me lately" and "what do you mean you are not willing to risk nuclear escalation for Ukraine?!  How dare you!!"  I am very grateful that those voices are in the minority.  NATO has already committed to the defence of Ukraine, the question is how far will that will last in a nuclear exchange...good question, but I suspect it isn't to drop everything and declare unconditional surrender.  But we are not likely to be interested in a bottomless pit of cost and risk either.  And before anyone crawls on a morality high horse - take a long look at Africa and the Middle East, we have and will let places burn to the ground outside of our orbit/key interests or if risk/cost gets too high - "change the channel Marge."
2) In NATO and out of NATO is a very significant different state - kinda why we make such a big deal about entry.  By definition NATO is a collective defensive alliance, supported by a very complex and political treaty.  NATO is, in effect, the military power of the western world and the hard power that backs up the western rules-based order.  Without it, that order starts to unravel.  If Russia pushes the West into "well let us do what we want, and NATO collapses" situation, we are living in the End Times.  Russia, as immensely stupid as they have been, has yet to try and back the West into a corner, even though they themselves are being rammed into one.  Why?  Because the West would crush Russia beyond recognition to protect itself...and NATO is central to that equation.  I expect that NATO would accept nuclear exchange losses, leaving Russia a radioactive wasteland for a few centuries, before it is going to allow itself to fall apart through direct force.  Oddly enough,  Putin was on the right track to actually defeat NATO by continuing to support narratives that "NATO was irrelevant" - NATO could have evolved into something less than it is now, that would have given Russia more....wait for it...options space.  But then they did this useless war and pushed NATO in the exact opposite direction.  Maybe Russia needs NATO to be big and strong and scary so that it can hold itself together, but they even have to be smart enough to realize...they just made NATO big strong and scary.
3) If NATO collapses under direct pressure.  The whole edifice falls apart.  Then, and try not to be too hurt, we got much bigger problems than Ukraine, the Baltics or Russia to worry about.  We would likely see a series of new collective defensive bodies arise from the ashes, and a fair number of them can't even find Ukraine or the Baltics on the map.  The EU might hold together militarily but Europe has a bit of shaky history in that regard.  I suspect it may fall back on internal alignment, most of which won't care what happens in the Baltics.  The bigger players will likely try to hold it together, 5 EYES+ for example but even then, the most liberal humanist nations are going to start to contract back to their own borders and interests.  This will have economic repercussions as we no longer have unified collective military power to secure globalization. I expect China will be invading Taiwan the following Tues - at which point all of this Eastern Europe/Russia noise is going to fade to background while we hit a singularity decision point in Asia. 
So as bluntly as I can - The Baltics are more important to NATO and the West because  they are in NATO under the collective defence mechanism that affords.  We will take far fewer risks or BS from Russia in these countries because  they are within that framework.  I suspect that there are more than a few politicians that are quietly thanking whatever gods they pray to that Ukraine is not in NATO right now because we would not even have the option to pull back. 
That said, the issue of having Ukraine in NATO is likely largely settled at this point, so once this war is over, it will also come under that collective protection - for the love of god, just take the freakin win!  Russia nuclear deterrence is working in this war, that is why we are not Shock and Awing Moscow, Bagdad Style.  In this game of chicken Ukraine may lose - I personally do not think that is the most probable outcome but, dare we admit it and not get yelled at for 15 pages - it is a possibility.
Lastly, I am going to put out the question of "what are we doing here?"  On this thread?  If we are continuing the collective and distributed objective analysis and assessment of this war as it unfolds, then let's do that.  I think we are safe to say that we all agree Russia's war is illegal and immoral and they deserve everything they are getting.  However, if this is turning into a maximalist Pro-Ukrainian propaganda machine, I am out - lock it down and people can go elsewhere for their information.

"A man walks through the gymnasium of the school that served as a Russian military hospital in the recently recaptured area of Izyum, Ukraine, Wednesday, September 21, 2022. EVGENIY MALOLETKA / AP"

+1 to the above. Every story I read today apart from the above that contained "nuclear" in the reference to Putin's recent announcements was not really presenting it in accurate context.

That is old footage and situation at the border is relatively normal.
Check --> https://twitter.com/MPitkaniitty/status/1572824974376960000
Before going back to lurking mode big thanks to everyone contributing to this thread! It has been and it is my main source of INT concerning the situation in hand in eastern Europe.

All war is negotiation and sacrifice - all war is negotiation with sacrifice.
So Putin dropped the 'mobilization' boogey man, kinda.  And of course threatened nuclear war without saying it...oh my.
Well I think Phase 2-3 of this war were positioning for endgame - Russia's point "Imma gonna take the Donbas, cause that was what I wanted all along...well that plus Kherson and everything I did not lose in Phase I".  And Ukraine's counter-point "No you are not."  This could have gone on for some time longer but clearly things are coming to a head in Moscow.
So I think this is endgame.  What does a soft-mobilization/slightly-louder-threat-of-nuclear-war-based-on-bizarro -annexation-internal-legalities-that-no-one-else-is-going-to-recognize-for-a-century, really tell us?
- Well first it tells us that Russia is desperate. Putin and the gang are opening themselves up to significant political exposure here.  You average Russian may, or may not, have actually supported this war but they all had the luxury of staying out of it - changing that is a major shift.  We are already hearing rumblings in opposition, who knows how far that will go; however, we do know that Putin would not have pulled on this lever if Russia was winning.  This is a pretty clear sign of losses and the impact it is having on his war machine.
- Next, this is not an escalation, it is desperation.  This is an attempt to preserve military capability in the field and re-assert a status quo, not raise enough forces to re-take Kyiv.  In short, whatever the UA is doing, it is working very well.
- Russia is clearly on the defensive, and likely will stay there until this is over.  Throwing 300,000 conscripts in any variation is not going to create offensive military capability - unable to create positive decision, so at best negative and null (i.e. denial).  This signals a shift into a strategy of exhaustion, annihilation for the Russians has left the building.  This puts Russia a couple rungs above an insurgency as far as military strategy goes.  They are going to try and dig in an hold on to what they have until the other side gets tired.
-  We could be heading towards a nuclear decision point.  The battlefield use of nuclear weapons has always been a grey area in warfare.  It is an escalation but the West and USSR went around and around on whether one could have a limited nuclear war.  I suspect that Putin might be thinking about testing the norms around this by declaring all the territory they have taken as "mother Russia" - we freakin knew that Russian doctrine and law were useless to refer to because autocrats just move the goalposts.  So I suspect the redline is the Crimea, and maybe somewhere in the LNR/DPR.  If the UA push that far, we might actually see Putin try to go that way - I say "try" because he 1) might already be removed from power by then, or 2) someone will put a bullet in his dome before they drag Russia into a doomsday scenario.  If one does go off well it won't be the end of days, tactical nuclear weapons can effect a couple grid squares and were designed for heavy armor concentrations at Fulda - this war is far to spread out.  We will likely lose our minds in the West and the response will be key to what happens next. I suspect conventional escalation or other options to send a strong signal to Russia that they will be the first country in history to lose a strategic nuclear war.  Regardless, if Russia employs a nuclear weapon, we are off the map, beyond the Cuban Missile crisis; however, I also still think this actually happening is a long shot.  For those in Europe and NA, I would not start getting too excited until strange looking Patriot systems start being deployed around major urban areas and/or in the Canadian north.
  So the biggest question on the table is - "what does endgame look like?"  This is in the weird political space as militarily Ukraine has demonstrated that given time they can likely retake everything back to the pre-2014 border - the question is do they want to?  Do they need to?  Putting emotions to one side - I suspect the West will be putting a lot of incentives for Ukraine to push to 2014 borders and then stop.  Why?  Well some possible reasons:
- DNR and LNR are burned out wrecks with large sections of the population that clearly do not want to be Ukrainian, so let em go.  Ukraine gains nothing but a couple Northern Ireland scenarios if they re-occupy, that and a massive reconstruction bill.  Walk away and wish them luck with their sugar daddy.
- Crimea.  Here we could see "neutral and open" tossed around a lot more.  Without Sevastopol Russia is pretty much cut out of the Black Sea, and if they are out of the Black Sea they are out of the Med.  If Russia is going to go nuclear, it will be over Crimea...and to this guy over in NA, it is not worth it.
- Ok, so that is the unthinkable "bad", what is the carrot?  Fast tracked entry in NATO - this entire bullsh#t goes away if Ukraine has Article 5 to lean on, because that is simply too big to fail for the West.  Hell Ukraine is already armed better than most NATO nations, with NATO STANAG equipment.  Their training is US/UK standard and I have no doubt we have already built most of their ISR infrastructure.  Ukraine in NATO next week is a clear win for the west. 
Next, entry into the EU.  Bureaucratic nightmare that it is, this would cement Ukraine into Europe economically and set them up for post-war success.
Last, a reconstruction plan to rival Marshal.  The West commits hundreds of billions to turn Ukraine into a shining example of what our money can do as a counter-point to China's game these last 15 years or so.
As to Russia?  Well it made its bed. Sanctions stay in place until 1) reparation deal is cut and in motion, 2) war crimes of all sorts are investigated and prosecuted and 3) Putin regime is gone enough that we can pretend whoever replaces it is clean...or clean enough. If Russia refuses any of the above, well enjoy being a Chinese satellite with a Cold War Soviet standard of living and we will see you again in 30 years - we will risk manage Russia, we are good at that in the West.
So What War?  Well UA will likely focus on taking bights out of Donbas just to ensure 300,000 Russian conscripts don't feel left out.  They will re-take Kherson and push south over the Dnipro up to the Crimean border.  And Melitopol, cut that stupid land bridge and box the Russians and their cronies back to where they were before this nonsense started.
Anyway, crazy days and keep your head up because it might get crazier.
 

Herein lies the central problem - we are living in a post-Afghanistan world.  We are also living in a post-pandemic world - our resolve is shaken and will remain shaken.  The single biggest fear for the West now in Ukraine, is that it becomes another Afghanistan.  You have hit the nail directly on the head why western resolve is shakier.
Hell, we can barely stand each other post-pandemic, let alone bighting off yet another war on the other side of the planet. Let alone one that could escalate into something really bad. This is the reason why a journey into pre-2014 lines, or dragging this out carries so much risk.  The US and the West have been the global police force for 30 years and all it got us was unsolvable ethnic-based messes that we had to pay for and f#cking terrorism in our back yard.  We are tired of doing this but are kind of stuck with it - turned out winning the Cold War meant holding the bag.  China is in the backfield waiting for its moment and we want hands on the pens that re-write things so we are, again, stuck with the job.  However, we do not want any more misadventures - they days of a great new world order and shining city on a hill are over - humanity is crazy and we are tired of managing it, especially when we have our own crazy to deal with.
We need to stay committed and in this fight because it matters; however, the second it looks like it does not you can count on people voting with their...well, votes.  We need to finish the job, but that job likely does not include what you are proposing under the current conditions.  So everyone put on your negotiating shoes.  You do not have to like it, nor does it make it "right", but it is the reality.
I honestly hope I am wrong and either the RA falls, timed perfectly with a soft Russian power vacuum and Ukraine can take back those lines, and magically all those people that live there who prefer to be Russian either leave or change their minds.  Then we can have peace and happiness.  Russia will abandon autocrats and embrace real democracy and we can all link arms as we try and then put China back into a box - I can see the Federation starships from here. 
Just don't try and be too disappointed when that does not happen and we have to settle for bad and not worse.

I'm not saying you're wrong but I wouldn't be overly sure until you can produce lots of pictures.  AFVs will frequently have variations on small stowage boxes such as these depending on the whim of the crews or individual regimental policy.

I just went through Janes AFV 2004-2005 and 2008-2009.  Both show several pictures of the 1A5 with the box on the front.  Does that make it absolutely definitive?  No.  But its close.  Its the exact time period of CMSF (2008).  There were a total of four pics of the 1A5 and all had the box.  None of the 1A3s had them.  I have a couple more references I'll check.
btw, I have no issues with it.  Its so minor I'm surprised it even got a mention.
edit:  Just confirmed that Tankograd's 2007 book on the Marder also shows at least a dozen pics with the glacis-mounted stowage box.  In fact, in the description of the 1A5, they use that box and one on the back hull as the main recognizable external differences between the A3 and A5.  btw, it always kinda shocks me only about 4% of the Marders were ever upgraded to 1A5.

Hello everyone,
since the Marder IFV had it's 50th anniversary last week I wanted to point out some minor visual details regarding the differences between the 1a3 and 1a5 model. Currently both models look similar in game. Code-wise the 1a5 has its improved mine protection working though.
So if you take a closer look at the attached images the 1a5 model should have:
new armored skirts three metal boxes, one on the front and two on the backside new MLC, 42 instead of 37  
kind regards

 






picture sources:
http://www.primeportal.net/apc/hans-hermann_buhling/marder_1a_5/index.php?Page=1
http://www.d13pfad.de/media/medialibrary/2012/05/schutzenpanzer_marder_1_a5_thumb_1500x1500.jpg

Hello everyone,
since the Marder IFV had it's 50th anniversary last week I wanted to point out some minor visual details regarding the differences between the 1a3 and 1a5 model. Currently both models look similar in game. Code-wise the 1a5 has its improved mine protection working though.
So if you take a closer look at the attached images the 1a5 model should have:
new armored skirts three metal boxes, one on the front and two on the backside new MLC, 42 instead of 37  
kind regards

 






picture sources:
http://www.primeportal.net/apc/hans-hermann_buhling/marder_1a_5/index.php?Page=1
http://www.d13pfad.de/media/medialibrary/2012/05/schutzenpanzer_marder_1_a5_thumb_1500x1500.jpg

Hello everyone,
since the Marder IFV had it's 50th anniversary last week I wanted to point out some minor visual details regarding the differences between the 1a3 and 1a5 model. Currently both models look similar in game. Code-wise the 1a5 has its improved mine protection working though.
So if you take a closer look at the attached images the 1a5 model should have:
new armored skirts three metal boxes, one on the front and two on the backside new MLC, 42 instead of 37  
kind regards

 






picture sources:
http://www.primeportal.net/apc/hans-hermann_buhling/marder_1a_5/index.php?Page=1
http://www.d13pfad.de/media/medialibrary/2012/05/schutzenpanzer_marder_1_a5_thumb_1500x1500.jpg

In the barracks I shared my space with someone who had the ATB Milanschütze and I remember talking with him about his course. And what he told me about firing the Milan was that after firing it does take a few seconds until the rocket is center lined and you had to avoid obstacles like fires or trees. I suppose it's initial speed is slower than the average but it would still travel over hundred meters in 2-3 seconds. Could you still fight a closer target? I don't know. Unfortunatly I didn't ask him about minimum range. Other than that I only looked through it's thermal sight so I'm of no help here.