fireship4

I disagree.  People on the ground have their role, as eyes and ears and to communicate the facts and feeling on the ground.  They also capture small bits and pieces of info that are useful to people like us who are interested in the nuts and bolts.  And you might want them writing the copy, not being very familiar with the field I don't really know the pro's and con's of that.
But journalism (not entertainment news) is about explaining what is going on.  And for that you need a guy behind a desk, and a big map.  And a bit of time.  With digital TV it should be easier than ever to get in-depth context via a second channel for those that want it. 
What we have however, for the most part, is singed teddy-bear hunting, and the latest emotional event done to death.  'War reporter voice', and in general 'reporter on the scene voice' is something I can't stand for the last number of years (honourable mention goes to 'pre-offended police officer voice').  24hr news may be good for something (over-worked people getting updated whenever they have the time to turn on the TV as opposed to 'The News at 10' for example), but I wouldn't be surprised if has contributed to emotional desensitisation to the subject from over-reporting, and of things that happened, instead of 'why'.
I think we have it about right here.  This is journalism of sort, we have sources, we have experts, we have discussion, interviews, talks etc. all filtered by the fact we are trying to understand what is going on.  A distilled version of that is what I'd like to see mainstream news move back towards, but I wonder if the incentives in the other direction are too much.  Leaving the war aside for a moment, and I understand there is some call for news to stand as a record of events, but why do I need to hear about shooting after shooting when I switch on the TV or radio.  Just tell me how many there are in a year and tell me what people are doing or not doing to change that.
Back on the war I have been following it since day one... every day, and I wonder if I am too hooked into it.  It does affect us (we are in interesting times indeed), but it's like we are all a little bit at war with the stress that goes along with that.  The old Bill Hicks line about crickets outside the window comes to mind.  A bit of self-discipline is perhaps what is needed, but it's addictive, as the spectre of nuclear war tends to be.  Of course the people directly involved need the support of the world around them, I just wonder where the line is in this age of being in touch with the whole world.
Anyway I recommend the series 'Newswipe' for a look at modern news, this rambling post brought it to mind.
 

I think I was a bit harsh on journalists, there is some good stuff mixed in there with the 'oh dearism' - stuff that just makes you say 'oh dear' without really understanding anything better (there's an Adam Curtis mini-doc about it online, to reveal one of my influences). 
However, I question to what extent it is useful for journalists to be at the front, if the point is to inform the public (not entertain or propagandise to them).  Surely that is the place where they know the least about what is going on overall, and rumours are probably rife.  In addition, being embedded with people with whom you share risks and rely on for protection and see the struggle and sacrifice of, you are hard-pressed to remain objective.  At least you're in with people who are deeply engaged with the war, so you get a better perspective than sitting in a coffee shop, but a large amount of what you can communicate is 'it's bad' and how people feel about stuff.  And video of things blowing up.
I am also not watching TV, and I think us 'online savvy' folks really should thank our lucky stars we can pick and choose our media.  It requires a discerning eye of course, plenty of rubbish out there if you go looking for it, from the things I hear at work, it might be a good thing.  The general population has been overworked to the detriment of their critical thinking and other skills a model member of society/renaissance man should value, either that or those ideas just aren't as widely shared as an intellectual bubble would have you believe.  The penetration of illogical conspiracy theories is deeper than I would have believed. 

Bloody hell it backfired!  Well what can you do... bottoms up.

Bloody hell it backfired!  Well what can you do... bottoms up.

More footage of the river crossing, with artillery damaging or destroying a boat of some sort interacting with a pontoon:
https://nitter.net/Blue_Sauron/status/1525519492373270528#m

Bloody hell it backfired!  Well what can you do... bottoms up.

Bloody hell it backfired!  Well what can you do... bottoms up.

Russia... Nul pointe.
...This just in, UK accused of militarily assisting Ukraine to boost scores in Eurovision Song Contest after a spate of zeros plagued the country over the last...

Flexibility maybe, but faster?  I think the opposite is true.  The advantage of the West is that democracies (and not just the institutions and laws but the values instilled in peoples' heads) are error correcting - trial and error which can bring them over time toward being better.  It is also somewhat of a safety valve against revolutions - when things go too far in one direction you blame the one in charge and kick them out.  In fact a poster a little while ago bemoaned the state of US politics that had the opposition take the opposite side of each issue to the incumbent party.  I have come to see the value in this (though I'm not convinced of it in practise, as it makes for politicians without values): the electorate in this case has a clear way of changing policy.  In the case of there being no obvious party to vote on that supports 'x' policy, it does not get implemented.  Over time the window of which policies are up for public debate moves around.
On actual military OODA loops, it seems that the Russia military has believed it can be quicker in this respect also, through centralised command and automated/pre-set plans adjusted to context.  From 'The Russian Way of War' by Grau & Bartles:
[EDIT: Unfortunately for them, many of the centralised commanders have been spread around a bit to be blunt, ignoring for a moment the human horror of it for the sake of poetry.]
This approach can be compared and contrasted with the (more) free market model in economics vs. central planning.  One good thing about a free market is that it empasises computation by those closest to the ground - how is Gosplan supposed to know I need nylon stockings?!  In a similar sense this is something this approach seems to lack - judgement and action by units lower down in a formation.  I think a mix of top-down big picture stuff and lower level price finding and idea trying in both politics, economics and warfare is where it's at.  [EDIT: More or less what the West has with a democratically elected executive enacting laws and independent actors starting businesses.  In fact you could say the US constitution is problematic in this sense, as far as it holds back experimentation and correction.]

Flexibility maybe, but faster?  I think the opposite is true.  The advantage of the West is that democracies (and not just the institutions and laws but the values instilled in peoples' heads) are error correcting - trial and error which can bring them over time toward being better.  It is also somewhat of a safety valve against revolutions - when things go too far in one direction you blame the one in charge and kick them out.  In fact a poster a little while ago bemoaned the state of US politics that had the opposition take the opposite side of each issue to the incumbent party.  I have come to see the value in this (though I'm not convinced of it in practise, as it makes for politicians without values): the electorate in this case has a clear way of changing policy.  In the case of there being no obvious party to vote on that supports 'x' policy, it does not get implemented.  Over time the window of which policies are up for public debate moves around.
On actual military OODA loops, it seems that the Russia military has believed it can be quicker in this respect also, through centralised command and automated/pre-set plans adjusted to context.  From 'The Russian Way of War' by Grau & Bartles:
[EDIT: Unfortunately for them, many of the centralised commanders have been spread around a bit to be blunt, ignoring for a moment the human horror of it for the sake of poetry.]
This approach can be compared and contrasted with the (more) free market model in economics vs. central planning.  One good thing about a free market is that it empasises computation by those closest to the ground - how is Gosplan supposed to know I need nylon stockings?!  In a similar sense this is something this approach seems to lack - judgement and action by units lower down in a formation.  I think a mix of top-down big picture stuff and lower level price finding and idea trying in both politics, economics and warfare is where it's at.  [EDIT: More or less what the West has with a democratically elected executive enacting laws and independent actors starting businesses.  In fact you could say the US constitution is problematic in this sense, as far as it holds back experimentation and correction.]

My backup has moved here: https://www.dropbox.com/sh/fdgcyjxwy99csp5/AAB2HVemThOm9vyqdj2lj_I8a?dl=0
I created a thread announcing such on this forum, it's currently half way down the front page: https://community.battlefront.com/topic/139975-mods-by-bil-hardenberger-btr-kieme-vein-zveroboy1-new-backup-location/.
 

Sorry for spamming, but it's just too good to skip. Apparently Putin(!) apologised(!!!) for Lavrov's comments. That would be the first apology in history of Russian foreign policy - now we have proof Putin is really sick (there's a link to Haaretz article down in the thread).
 

Yes, something I have advocated before is a second look at laser warning systems on tanks in CMBS - it has such a large impact on tactics, and I was unsure whether they were as effective as they are in game.  In light of this, perhaps the next patch should simply switch them off!  It would be a new game...
But back to the main topic.  I haven't much to add, I'll probably post a bunch of links again at some point to useful resources on the war for those that would find it useful. 

You are very welcome.  However the real hero we have had on this thread and deserves the thanks is @Haiduk.  He stayed in country, scoured Ukraine social media, and translated from day 1.  Without that contribution, along with all the others who have been scanning open source, we would have been blind on all this.

Some humour is necessary after all. Enjoy Alexander Nezorov!
Uncanny predictions of Ukraine's war from April 2021 by former Russian MP Nevzorov
 
 

https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2014/11/06/did-nato-promise-not-to-enlarge-gorbachev-says-no/

Aggressive.
He refers to the history of Brandenburg, trying to make the point that Brandenburg was forced to chose between becoming a naval power and becoming a land power. This is part of his larger argument that, for reasons of court politics, Russia failed to develop a clear focus in land power primacy, and so this explains why it is today struggling. He argues that Prussia abandoned its naval power colonial aspirations in the 18th century to become a "land power max" country. Setting aside the rather burdensome video metaphor, this is pretty roundly wrong and ignores nearly 100 years of the countries history which led to this choice. Brandenburg was devastated by the 30yrs War, it had been forced to repeatedly 'pick sides' at the point of a pike as its military was not powerful enough to preserve the country from outside threats. This, not the failure of any maritime policy, led to the rise of Brandenburg as a land power. Robert Citino, in his book (which is not a textbook, and is very much worth the read) highlights that this initial choice for security transformed after the union with Prussia into a question for a land corridor. Excellence in Prussian arms was developed as early as the Scanian of 1678  in which the Prussian army famously mounted sleds and conducted a rapid winter march from its quarters into the depths of Swedish occupied Germany. So dramatic, and important, was this to the Prussian ethos that Heinz Guderian himself said the campaign was one of his inspirations for his ideas. 
Anyway I dispute even the basic premise of this 'naval max or land max' analysis. Is too brutish. The US is the preeminent global land, sea, and air power. Dont think most countries would challenge that really, except China. Who is currently a major land power trying to go to sea. And of course the British had the RN in the early 20th century. The British Army in 1938 was right up there with the German in terms of modernization, thought it was small. And nobody remembers that the British also had the largest volunteer army in the world, the British Army in India had almost 3.5mil volunteers in 1945. More even than the US. Lots of people like to talk about the German system, but really the British were probably still the worlds leading power right before WWII, they had the biggest and best navy, the biggest army, and one of the best motorized cores as well. 
Later, the poster discusses the history of Soviet maritime strategy. But its also pretty off, to be honest. Documents are quite clear really that Stalin wanted, after WWII, to build a navy which he thought would be able to challenge the RN and USN for control of the seas. But, just as important, Stalin saw the navy as a prestige tool. Some have tried to explain the Second World War, especially the war in Asia, as having been driven in part by the unequal distribution of battleship allotments in the interwar naval treaties. While I dont think he thought in those exact terms, Stalin felt that capital ships equated to great power status on some level and so he wanted them built. The plans were laid out and IIRC the keels of several ships were laid, but Stalin's death interrupted this program. Khrushchev diverted those resources both into the Army and into civilian programs. But his successor, Brezhnev, rebuilt some of the naval program. While the technology had changed, many of the motivations were the same. Brezhnev, especially after 1968, tried to rehabilitate the USSR to the rest of the world. He introduce a global strategy which aimed to turn decolonizing and decolonized nations over to the USSR and defeat the west this way. Prestige and good relations are important to that, and nothing says good relations like a port visit. Building up the navy also gave the USSR the ability to participate more directly in global crises, ala 1973 and the Yom Kippur War. And of course it would have checked Khrushchev's biggest failure: the Cuban Missile Crisis. This is also the era of admiral Gorchakov, the Soviet submarine theorist. Westerners love him because he thinks like we do about naval power and wanted the USSR to do what we would have, fight a third battle of the Atlantic. But Gorchakov is really actually a marginal figure in the USSR's military establishment. Its critical to see the revived Soviet Navy in the context of what it was meant to do. 1) it had to secure the SLBM bastions in the White Sea and around the Artic ice cap. 2) It had to protect the USSR's long coastlines from both subsurface and naval aviation threats, a big fear was a rapid USN deep penetration raid against USSR nuclear facilities or, of course, the SSBNs. Something BTW the USN practiced and was very good at. 3) Only once these two were done would the navy be permitted to move onto an offensive footing and operate along traditional lines. Which is to say never, as the new US maritime strategy of the 70s and 80s called for projecting power against the Soviet coasts in a way that would have never allowed for the security required to satisfy 1&2. More importantly, the basic defensive mission of the Navy was important in that it did not detract from the Army's offensive mission in central Europe. That is, the Navy was always the branch getting leftovers, not dictating the whole pie. It was assumed that what was at sea would be destroyed (so better have it take a shot at a carrier at least!) Once war was declared reserves, safe in the bastions, would be parceled out to accomplish the three missions as befitted the strategic and operational situation in central & norther Europe. 
And then we get into more minor things, like the fact that he calls the Russian operational theory Blitzkrieg. Its not. They grew from the same root, Cold War or even modern Deep Battle is very different than the modern form of the blitz practiced by western nations. 
Like I said, the person seems to have a strong understanding of Putin and his court, but his use of history is pretty clumsy. Worse yet this makes some of the analysis suspect because a big part of his argument in the thread that was first linked is based on this idea that Russia has a historical tendency of overdiversification of arms. Except, historically, thats not really true. So it kind of leaves him out there twisting in the wind with some of these conclusions. 
Also do we really need to worship all our sources as heroes? Just because Col M served once and said some things people like doesn't mean his word is inviolate forever. Just because someone published a book you like doesn't meant this time theyre right by default. Just because a guy on twitter says one thing you like doesn't make it a personal attack if someone else disagrees. I dont like a lot of the things I read, and if I didn't complain I'd hardly be a Grognard now would I? 🤣 Judge somebody by their words and ideas on a case by case basis. Does what they say pass the smell test? Does it fit into the other information youre reading? Is this person mainstream on this issue or are they are bucking the orthodox, if so why? Is it to be contrarian, or because theyre crazy, or dumb, or are they on to something truly different? You can even apply the same test to me! Im an asshole and surely most of the dumb things I say will wither under a critical gaze, but better to be critical than to accept the things I say whole cloth. After all I could be a crazyperson. 

"In Moscow's Shadows".  Interesting podcast by Mark Galeotti, talking in part about the lreasons behind lack of preparation for the war. Apparently standard practice would be to set up a 'Combat Management Group' (ГЬУ.) months ahead of the proposed operation to coordinate plans and resources. In this case it's possible that the ГЬУ was only established after  the Putin speech where he was seen browbeating various ministers. The whole podcast is 45mins but go to to 14.30 to hear about the Russian National Defence Management Centre and Combat Management Groups.
Ukraine War: 'Go and fight', says foreign fighter who joined the war in Ukraine A short (3 minute) Youtube clip. Interesting that he says that volunteers should have not just military, but actual combat experience.

Speaking of which...
https://nitter.net/kamilkazani/status/1502673952572854278

Speaking of which...
https://nitter.net/kamilkazani/status/1502673952572854278

A wild over-reaction to a reasonable post.  He has played other games in the series, gun runs are often repeated if there is ammo, perhaps he checked to make sure on youtube, perhaps not, but is he wrong?  Are you saying it already makes one pass only?  Or do you perhaps disagree with the reasoning?  Your post does not add anything but emotion.
Furthermore, he didn't 'trash' the game at all, he made a simple post about finding out that a certain gun caused the firing aircraft problems and should perhaps be limited due to that, with the assumption it has not been already.  Where is the problem?  Your post and the completely unnecessary:
Evoke schoolyard crap (in this instance a sidekick is peering over your shoulder) I see all too often around John's posts.  Some of you are sensitive to him/how he posts - fine.  I don't see it, I find his stuff largely informative and interesting, occasionally off the mark or over-stated, but I put that down to him being a human being, and it's something that can be critiqued without lowering yourselves to such off-putting bull****, it stinks up the place.

Great thread.  I thought I would post some of the sources I have been using to stay up to date with the war:
First of all, the Reddit live thread is a good general starting point, and much of the following sources will pop up there every so often.  I have also dipped my toes back into the water of an old community of mine, United Operations, and check into their teamspeak every so often - you always get some choice tidbits when talking directly to people with a good amount of military knowledge (if someone wants an invite I can perhaps make that happen).  I advocate for an audio discussion room for this subject on the battlefront discord if there isn't one already.  People are clearly interested and we have not a few people with insight.
https://www.reddit.com/live/18hnzysb1elcs/
Live Maps:
https://liveuamap.com/
https://www.scribblemaps.com/maps/view/The-War-in-Ukraine/091194
https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#m:tsd;d:today;@32.0,48.8,7z
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine#/media/File:2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine.svg
Websites:
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone
https://www.understandingwar.org/
Twitter (via nitter.com):
https://nitter.net/Osinttechnical
https://nitter.net/christogrozev
https://nitter.net/Militarylandnet
https://nitter.net/Caucasuswar
https://nitter.net/Justin_Br0nk
https://nitter.net/DanLamothe
https://nitter.net/Blue_Sauron
https://nitter.net/billroggio
https://nitter.net/Nrg8000
https://nitter.net/SotisValkan
https://nitter.net/AaronMehta
https://nitter.net/kamilkazani
https://nitter.net/JimmySecUK
https://nitter.net/RALee85
https://nitter.net/polijunkie_aus
https://nitter.net/ELINTNews
https://nitter.net/Eastern_Border
 

Well the first thing to remember when looking at UKR forces is that there are layers here.  Unlike the Russian forces who, for the most part, try to control where they are with LOCs back to Belarus or Russia, these are horizontal forces and relationships.
The Ukrainians have vertical forces and relationships in addition to horizontal ones.  So take any map of the conflict:

This one from wikipedia - So the interplay of red and yellow with tac signs is horizontal.  And from this it does look like the Russians are trying to do some operational pinching which would normally point to some trouble for the UA.  The reality is though that the map is really three dimensional.  Vertically there is a foundation of local and regional support and combat power in the form of an ever growing resistance (I hear a lot of western experts say "insurgency", I think I even used the term early once and this is inaccurate, a resistance is really something else from a lot of directions).  Further, for every day that the Russians bog down, that vertical resistance gets better armed, better organized and better prepared. 
So what?  Well from a Russian viewpoint that vertical layer underneath means two very bad things: support and friction.  Ukrainian force will be able to draw support from that layer in the form of manpower and logistics.  This means the Russians are now force to make those "pinches" air tight, which is extremely labour intensive.  For example, locals can push fuel and ammo into a pocket, through all the backroads and farmers fields, which they know very well, and continue to supply fighting power to seemingly cut off troops.  The level of control required for that is extreme, as the US learned in Vietnam.
Second is friction.  Having even low tech resistance everywhere is exhausting in terms of constant attrition and morale.  Every move you make is watched and reported on, every road move is like the freakin Memphis Bell mission over Germany - someone is going to get killed and we are all hoping it isn't us.  Logistical lines need to be iron-cladded.  And this will inevitably lead to over use of force on civilians which does nothing for the information war.   
So in this sense it is really hard to judge where the Ukrainians stand by using the pins on the mapboard.  They have already gone hybrid.  For example, how many major tank battles have we heard about?  There have no doubt been clashes but the Ukrainians are already fighting like Comanches with drones right now offensively and it is working for them.  Defensively, again layers, they can dig in and be very difficult to dig out, and even if you do, you still have a deeper resistance to deal with in the civilian population.
My assessment matches what we have been seeing all over mainstream.  The Russians have stalled...bad.  This was not a consolidation or re-org or clever trap, it was a significant stalling an a systemic level going all the way back through those LOCs.  The Ukrainians have created so much friction on the Russian advance that the war machine looks like it broke.  They are now staging local c-attacks and very visible attrition actions from what I can see. 
The question the remains is "can the Russians re-org/re-boot and somehow regain the operational offensive?" This, particularly around Kyiv.  Or are we going to see what I call "zombie muscle twitches" as formation commanders try and look busy to get the heat off them that is coming from Moscow?  These can even seem dramatic but they do not translate into any real operational gains.  Don't know, a lot of opinions out there for either side.
Few things I do notice:
- Russians are not even talking about Western Ukraine anymore.  If the aim was to take the whole perogy, Kyiv is more symbolic.  In order to do that "entire Ukraine" thing, one has to cut off support from the West.   Which really means that all this prom-night groping in the East - so sweaty but not really going nowhere - is missing the point entirely once we accept that Ukrainians will very likely keep on fighting both conventionally and unconventionally even after Kyiv falls.    Why there was not a very sharp attack from Western Belarus at what it the real strategic Center of Gravity in all this, Lviv, to seal up the western end of Ukraine, including the Carpathians, was the first sign that the Russians did not think this through.
- Operationally, the Russians have still not established pre-conditions and we are over two weeks in.  Air, info, electronic, cognitive/decision and logistical superiority have all been a hard fail.  For example, Russian Air Forces should be hitting logistical resupply from the west 24/7 - an air campaign for the history books- and they are largely tepid and absent.  They need to work on that or this grind is going to be much longer, to the point they very may well not be able to sustain.
- Operationally, the Ukrainians are not showing signs of buckling in all those pre-conditions areas. There is no doubt erosion but they still can find, fix and finish Russians and even do local offensive actions. All the while they coordinate and communicate effectively and are still able to push support in from the West as they get better and better prepared. 
So in summary, keep an eye on that vertical Ukrainian dimension because it is decisive and something needs to demonstrate the Russians are even able to set what should have been initial conditions and I may start to buy in on the "Russian Grind" strategy.  Until then we are at Balkan-No-Step, everyone digs in and tries to influence the negotiation table, or Death March to Moscow as the Russian military simply quits.  I mean the Russians do have the numbers for the Russian Grind but that is on paper and looking at the horizontal dimension only.  This is unfolding like a European version of that anecdote from Afghanistan, "Russians have all the fancy watches but the Ukrainians have all the time".      

Great thread.  I thought I would post some of the sources I have been using to stay up to date with the war:
First of all, the Reddit live thread is a good general starting point, and much of the following sources will pop up there every so often.  I have also dipped my toes back into the water of an old community of mine, United Operations, and check into their teamspeak every so often - you always get some choice tidbits when talking directly to people with a good amount of military knowledge (if someone wants an invite I can perhaps make that happen).  I advocate for an audio discussion room for this subject on the battlefront discord if there isn't one already.  People are clearly interested and we have not a few people with insight.
https://www.reddit.com/live/18hnzysb1elcs/
Live Maps:
https://liveuamap.com/
https://www.scribblemaps.com/maps/view/The-War-in-Ukraine/091194
https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#m:tsd;d:today;@32.0,48.8,7z
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine#/media/File:2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine.svg
Websites:
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone
https://www.understandingwar.org/
Twitter (via nitter.com):
https://nitter.net/Osinttechnical
https://nitter.net/christogrozev
https://nitter.net/Militarylandnet
https://nitter.net/Caucasuswar
https://nitter.net/Justin_Br0nk
https://nitter.net/DanLamothe
https://nitter.net/Blue_Sauron
https://nitter.net/billroggio
https://nitter.net/Nrg8000
https://nitter.net/SotisValkan
https://nitter.net/AaronMehta
https://nitter.net/kamilkazani
https://nitter.net/JimmySecUK
https://nitter.net/RALee85
https://nitter.net/polijunkie_aus
https://nitter.net/ELINTNews
https://nitter.net/Eastern_Border