Sarjen

it was only a matter of time
 
 

The thing that doesn't get enough press is how little faith we had in the Ukrainian Government before the war. It was just assumed that it was completely undermined by Russian operatives. This is now 100% proven not to be the case. The difference this makes is hard to overstate. If we had had this much faith in the Ukrainian Government six weeks ago we would have done a LOT of things differently.

Ah, now that I have recovered from busting a gut after that post re: Orville Peck secret identity....
Great stream of (mostly) curated picks from social media. My favourite today is this one by @Haiduk. I find remarkable how good UKR is at using conventional artillery as a stand in for eye wateringly expensive PGM. It looks to me that since UKR had to rebuild its military from scratch, had an opportunity to adopt new ideas and technologies dealing with little or no institutional inertia.
I wonder what the process is for those arty strikes, maybe something like this?
1. Drone controller has UAV loitering on suspected area of RF activity.
2. Controller spots location of RF assets, then registers the location by taking snapshots of target from several points and angles (see this for instance https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0926580518308641)
3. Photos, along with camera parameters and geo location info forwarded to fires coordination center. Firing solution calculated automatically and fire task assigned to friendly asset.
4. Fire task executed, drone controller reports damage assessment.
An iteration over the above wouldn't take very long at all, the most finicky part being that of maneuvering the UAV to take the measurements you need for registration.  And that could be automated too (the controller activates the "registration" behaviour and that's it).
The workflow above could be implemented with very few fancy equipment/algorithms, you just need good software and network engineers using pretty mundane hardware.
--------------
On another topic, I am glad to see tactical psychology being used... the most efficient way to defeat an adversary is to destroy its will to fight. So far UKR has been fighting smart, they just need to keep doing so!

Have to disagree with you there Steve, they don't have our secret weapon:
Rooaaawwr!!  Get those engines running ladies....  

Russians at Bucha are surrounded. 
 
 

Russians at Bucha are surrounded. 
 
 

I hope they don´t fall for the trap to only take territory. That is meaningless unless they don´t take away huge amounts of enemy soldiers.

This is wrong photo. If this not our PsyOps operation, Russian tank driver brought to us T-72A. Knowingly, Russians use robbed cell phoes, so our ELINT units of SBU or Intelligence Directorate are sending on this cell.numbers SMS with a terms of surrender. As if one Russian tank driver communicated with Ukraianian side and told he is ready to surrender with own tank. As if other two crewmens alredy deserted, their unit have lack of food, chaotic command&control etc. Their commander threat to all other to shot out if anybody else will deserted.
Our SOF gave to him a place of rendezvous and when the tank appeared, the drone was took off to make shure this is not ambush. The tanker was captured and brought to safe place. Russian trooper reportedly will be interned to the end of war in comfort room with bath and TV. After war will over, he will receive 10 000$ of award for tank and he can apply for Ukraianian citizenship. 
Here the photo of catpturing. 
 

I don't think we are even in the hypothetical thinking of a tactical nuke. First, Putin will use chemical strikes. To go nuclear , even if it is "only" tactical, is to forfeit his grand scheme - his legacy.

Landing Ship is unloaded at port facilities. So no landing at Odesa? 
 
 
 

Something from the economic „front“. 
 
 
 

Don’t get me wrong, I’m all for standing up to effing s**thead Putin, but the sad fact is that we have to factoring in the reality of the worst before deciding what to do. Personally, my fear turns to white hot anger in a somewhat productive way. If I didn’t worry, then I would start to worry if you get what I mean. So, when the war is over and we are all hopefully still here, I intend on turning that anger into a strong opposition to nuclear weapons. They are barbaric. It is insane that some countries can have them and thereby weild enourmous power over other countries. And they can have thousands of them. Can Sweden have one? Noooooo! So, my conclusion is that no one should have any. Is that realistic. No. Does that mean I will accept it. No. Anger/fear in this case turns to reaction/action which is productive for me. Accepting that people toy with the world for power’s sake (see lyrics for Dylan’s Masters of War). Am I a pacifist? No, but darn close to.

The one trillion dollar nuclear question that everyone asked in the Cold War: Would Washington trade New York for Hamburg or Bonn? Would it risk a total strike against the homeland to save the skin of some Europeans, if push really came to shove.
This is an unanswerable question. You cannot logic your way to an appropriate solution, trust me many far smarter than we have tried. Short of testing out your pet theory with a little light nuclear warfare, what remains for the US is convincing the other guy they might trade Bonn for Boston. If the risk is sufficient enough to prevent the USSR from taking a shot to test the theory, then deterrence has worked. 
But we have now an interesting wrinkle in our deterrence theory. The defender, the responder to escalation, is always in the weaker position. The enemy always has the plutonium stick to shake around. They can constantly flirt with the proposition that perhaps they make test the question and find out. Therefore NATO and the US, as the reactive party, always had to ensure that their deterrence threat was credible. This required a very careful balancing of both nuclear and conventional forces to prevent a Russian attempt at 'wormhole' escalation at any level. But it also required the careful selection of policies and crafting of forces to ensure that an appropriate and overwhelming retaliatory strike was on offer, and to suggest that there was genuine will to match any Russian raise. 
This is why I think the 'weak west' narrative is so mistaken. As with the rest of the conflict, if the US backs down from nuclear confrontation with the USSR in the face of an overt threat or Russian first use, it would spell the end of the entire ballgame. The answer to the above question must never move from maybe to probably not. If it did, Taiwain, Poland, Norway, everything would be up for grabs. There would be nothing to deter other powers from going 'all in' against US allies, especially if the plutonium stick works so well. This is one of those things the US just has to do if it wants to stay a superpower. To do otherwise would require the US to basically hang up the cape. It would be akin to totally withdrawing from NATO. It also explains why the US policy has been so moderated and calculated. It has to thread the eye of a needle between escalation and a firm response. Firm enough that no doubt is created regarding US resolve, but soft enough that there is no serious enough threat to require a Russian escalation. Very difficult tightrope.
But make no mistake, if it comes down to it the US will have to retaliate against a Russian nuclear attack in the Ukraine. That may not come in the way of a counterstrike, but it will happen. It has to happen. Because otherwise the entire proposition of deterrence is undermined. The entire NATO system is sabotaged. There can be no leaks under the nuclear umbrella. 

Some improving news on the nuclear reactor front. Half the staff at Chernobyl has been able to rotate out and go home replaced by off duty staff. More rotations to come. And I'll note here again since it's been a number of pages, that the last paragraph that mentions safeguards information from Chernobyl not being received by the IAEA. The safeguards they are talking about are not reactor operations. They are non-proliferation safeguards to prevent the diversion of nuclear material. I don't consider this much of an issue. The spent fuel is not terribly useful for any weapon purpose, even a dirty bomb, since due to the long time period since shutdown, it's not terribly radioactive anymore. Also, Russia has no need of it. Can't believe Ukraine would bother with it either.
Dave
https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-27-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine
 

It's from 11 days ago, so it's probably relatively safe. Although it might let the Russians know where some of their units are that they lost contact with
 

I think we described this way back, I referred to it as the Nagasaki strategy.  A lot of problems with this:
- First, I am not sure it would work.  Say the tac nuke Mariupol and "demand surrender, or else".  Well I am not sure at this point if the UKR PM stood up and declared "unconditional surrender" that the Ukrainian people or the UA would even listen.  At best, Russia is now looking at a very long term resistance and occupation it cannot afford.
- Blow back from Ukraine may include asymmetric actions within Russia from domestic insurgency/mutiny that may be western backed.   Might work, might, not but even the Russian people have a breaking point and this might be near it.  It may also result in his military finally bucking or those in power deciding that their interests are better served with Putin in a hole in the ground. 
- It gives the West permission.  By using nuclear weapons Putin throws one of his last cards on western restraint.  I am not sure if it leads to a no-fly zone but it does create a forcing function for western leaning in.  I am not sure we have a red line in Ukraine but a tac nuke might just do it.  I know a lot of people are frustrated by the response from the West ("why aren't we doing X"), that is because the ultimate risks of where this might lead far outweigh any direct actions we might take.  A thermonuclear war with Russia is a civilization re-set event, hundreds of millions die immediately, billions on what follows. You can downplay it (it will never happen), or sidestep it (Russian capability is a lie) but the facts are the west will do everything it can to avoid that escalation...unless Russia moves first, then the calculus changes.  I am pretty sure that "first strike" options are out there and they won't be theoretical if Putin starts playing fast and loose with nuclear weapons.
- Zero chance of normalization with the west, may even alienate the Chinese.  Those sanctions will become a new Iron Curtain, which may happen anyway but China is not some rabid dog nation.  They are rational in their objectives and strategies, even if we disagree with them.  Dropping tactical nuclear weapons is so disruptive and bad for business that it may spoil China's game and they will draw back.
- Misunderstanding signals.  Lot of fingers on nuclear buttons right now and Putin knows it, because he started it.  A nuclear detonation in Ukraine could be how it all starts up, and by "it" I mean the real deal.  Putin has to be wondering what the US did with all that SDI technology over the last 30 years and if the nuclear deterrence equation doesn't have his back anymore.  He talks tough but that usually points to what he is really afraid of, so employment of nuclear weapons is a really big step.
So, no, the nuclear button is not the "easy button" by a long shot, or he already would have pushed it.
  

The last independent journalists to leave Mariupol:
https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-europe-edf7240a9d990e7e3e32f82ca351dede

More economic view and forecast for the economy of Russia. TLDR: Russias economy is already at the bottom of the barrel, unable to recover for the next decade. Russia will be Chinas cheap  little gas station.
Are we financing Putin's war? Military economist explains: (www-lto-de.translate.goog)
 

More info on the work of the Belarus railway sabotage.
 

Landing Ship is unloaded at port facilities. So no landing at Odesa? 
 
 
 

More info on the work of the Belarus railway sabotage.
 

"But Capt, we didn't control the entire route up to Bagdad..."
True but two very different things at play.  First off we adopted the Combat Logistics Patrol (CLIP) which is basically a fighting logistical unit that can push through attacks.  And second, we are talking about an entirely different level of opposition.  In Iraq and Afghanistan, we had an insurgency, which by definition is a marginalized group of sub-society who decide armed violence is a means to a political end.  They are in the minority, often working in lose networks and cells with limited support.  In Iraq, that band of disgruntled ex Iraqi military were still able to make life a living hell for logistical resupply in the early days of the insurgency.  In Afghanistan, the Taliban did it for 20 years despite everything we could throw at them...the Ukrainians are not even in the same league, in fact they are a different species entirely.
The UA's hybrid approach is built on a foundation of widespread resistance, which is not normally in the minority nor is it marginal.  Further, they are able to project hybrid forces behind those lines, armed with next-gen weaponry.  So a Russian CLIP is just going to get cut to pieces at range and we are back to "controlling corridors" where as has been mentioned the math does not add up.
And here I do express frustration with the endless stream of "experts" because they are either using the wrong math metrics (force sizes) or simply missing the math that matters.  [aside: When I see a "bro" with either ballcap/slick backed hair and their SF T-shirts on, I immediately stop listening because this is war college level stuff.  The US has an entire sub trade(s) quals that are groomed to do this sort of planning].
The Russian math hasn't really added up since day 1 in my book, but they might have another shoe to drop...you know so now both feet are naked.  

More info on the work of the Belarus railway sabotage.
 

So I think we are at the point that we can call it, I think the Russian strategic Offensive Phase of this war is pretty much at an end.  We went from Quick War, to Siege/Grinding War, to what is looking more like Balkan War as Russian forces appear to be 1) pulling back and consolidating and, 2) trying to assert control in the areas they do "control".  This does not mean we won't see offensive action at the tactical scale, in fact I suspect the Russians will burn assets and troops trying to take Mariupole and any other hub they can; however, the big red sweeps are likely over, at least for now.
So what happens next?  Or maybe what could happen next? 
- Strategic Pause.  The Russians almost look like they are trying to conduct a strategic pause, which is in effect and attempt to re-mobilize within political constraints/restraints.  Stories of troops being pulled in from the east and weird "contracts" are a possible sign that Russia is trying for a major re-org/re-boot before they would likely double down on Plan A.  Given how badly they have been chewed up this theory is not too far out there.  If Russia goes this way, it means they think they can sustain the war for months into the summer and make another run at Putin's Dream.  They will need to re-stock a lot of equipment and ammunition so there should be signals in strategic Russian production and pulling out of war stocks.  On the pers side we might see some sort of rumors of a Russian version of "stop-loss" as they start playing fast and loose with military contracts.  I don't think Putin has the backing to go full national mobilization (or he would have likely already done it), so this will be "as much as we can and still be able to call this a 'special operation' nonsense".
- Grab, Hold, Bargain.  More likely, but not exclusive of the Strategic Pause theory is that Russians are going to try to dig in and hold onto as much leverage as they can in order to shore up their position at the negotiating table.  This will likely see lots of medieval stuff to terrorize the UKR government into concessions.  We saw exactly the same ploys in the Bosnian War with Sarajevo (and Mariupole is starting to look worse than that).  The question will be how long this takes but it cedes the pressure back onto the UKR government in a typical extortionist/domestic abusers argument of "it is your own fault that I have to beat you". 
- Last Gasp.  Another option, and one I know favored by Steve, is that this is the beginning of the end for the Russian military in Ukraine.  What we are seeing is a lot of "scrambling for success" a the lower levels so that they can say "we did our part" while the higher levels are no doubt thinking about "alternative options".  The test as whether this is collapse or simply digging in will be how well the Russians can hold up to inevitable UA counter attacks.
So Whats?
    First off the Russian military has an enormous defensive problem, entirely of their own making.  By my rough measurements, by attacking along 4-5 separate operational axis of advance in an attempt to take the whole eastern part of the country, they now have a frontage of roughly 1400km+ to try and "defend".  That is roughly three times as long as the entire Western Front in WW1.  To make any areas they control even close to airtight, they are going to need hundreds of thousands of troops to do it.  Troops I am not sure they have, nor can equip, let alone conduct C2 for at this point.  If Russia is serious about Grab, Hold Bargain, they may have to simply wholesale abandon some axis and gains likely in the East in order to be able to create credible defensives and pressures.  We do know the UA has troops all along those 1300km frontage, they are either regular, hybrid, or resistance/territorial defence.  They know the ground intimately and are continuing to see a steady flow of weapons in from the west.  How the UA counter-offensive goes will be key to determining the actual situation of Russian forces.
    Second, without making the areas they defend "airtight" they will continue to be plagued by attacks along their LOCs.  The Russians might try to make ironclad support corridors but given the ranges of the UKR weapons systems this is a huge undertaking of interlinked strong points just to get the supplies to some sort of front.  This will make the logistics problem worse.  That, and defence still puts a lot of strain on logistical systems, but in different ways.  Ammunition, not gas becomes the central issue.  Field defence stores and landmines take a lot of truck space, so we should be seeing more of that, along with of course artillery and other ammunition.  That and now Russia needs a lot more manpower, which all need a lot more pers-based supplies such as food, water, clothing, sanitation (unless you want General Disease getting into the game) and medical.
    Third, C4ISR in the defensive is a bit of a nightmare.  Whereas in the offence you can prioritize your main efforts, in the defence you have to be able to see and coordinate fires everywhere at the same time.  Doing that along a 1300km frontage is...well, simply insane but hey here we are.  The UA, did a pretty good job of it but it was their ground, they had the HUMINT going their way, and very likely buckets of ISR feeds from the west.  The Russian architecture has not demonstrated they are set up for this.  Further, this is contested airspace so one cannot simply dig in and sit, they are going to have to keep high value assets moving, like artillery, all the time or it will get tagged and hit quickly.  This will mean that Russians will need to employ a dynamic manoeuvre defence, much like the UA did, and I am not seeing that within the Russian repertoire.
    The UA counter-offensive will be key.  I suspect they will stick with the game that has carried them this far and simply cut up Russian rear areas to isolate and then chop up slices piecemeal to keep making gains.  Their hybrid "sharp mass" has been extremely effective in the defence, we will see how it does in the offense but I give them good odds to be honest.  
   If the Russians can do a full Strategic re-set, a big ask, then we could see a Round 2 Offensive Phase of this thing but the odds of it success get worse everyday as the UA "beginners" are becoming veterans very widely.  Further they are likely refining C4ISR building on their successes and more and more lethal aid is pouring in from the west.  If the Russians cannot get back up and moving before that $800M from the US shows up, well they too deserve what happens next.   
   To be honest, if someone tasked me with shooting for a Russian Strategic re-set, I would tell them it is going to take years because whatever they came with in this "come as you are war" was a failure and we are talking about deep military reforms and training in order to re-build a force that could actually pull off what the aspiration of this thing.  In fact you might need to invent a military that does not exist on this planet.  In '03 the US had to advance roughly 500kms to Bagdad and they owned the sky and the sea, had set operational pre-conditions, massive C4ISR overmatch, and have some of the best military logistical systems on the planet.  It took the US 3 weeks to take Bagdad and they were fighting a eroded and beaten Iraqi military that had zero outside support.  The US did not try a 4-5 axis grab along a 1300km frontage because the military planners knew it was impossible with what they had, which was 2-3 times what the Russians brought to this fight (466K, over 500k with allies).  And, politics completely aside, Iraq '03 was not well thought of and still is not well thought of in professional military circles as it failed to secure the gains and led to a multi-year insurgency.  
   So as we proceed on this journey, I am wracking my brain to make a list of the "Dumbest Wars in History" but this one has to be on it and moving upwards rapidly.
 
 

No, if this document is true, it just recommend to YouthArmy chiefs to seek most ideological youngsters of 17-18 years old, which ready to participate in "special military operation". All appropriate conscripts have to be mobilized and to sign contracts during spring and autumn drafts