Vanir Ausf B

They expand on these numbers in the report.
Despite the prominence of anti-tank guided weapons in the public narrative, Ukraine blunted Russia’s attempt to seize Kyiv using massed fires from two artillery brigades. The difference in numbers between Russian and Ukrainian artillery was not as significant at the beginning of the conflict, with just over a 2:1 advantage: 2,433 barrel artillery systems against 1,176; and 3,547 multiple-launch rocket systems against 1,680. Ukraine maintained artillery parity for the first month and a half and then began to run low on munitions so that, by June, the AFRF had a 10:1 advantage in volume of fire. Evidently, no country in NATO, other than the US, has sufficient initial weapons stocks for warfighting or the industrial capacity to sustain large scale operations.

It's a gold mine of information and lessons learned. Required reading.
At the height of the fighting in Donbas, Russia was using more ammunition in two days than the entire British military has in stock. At Ukrainian rates of consumption, British stockpiles would potentially last a week. Of course, given that the UAF fielded more than 10 times as many operational artillery pieces as the British Army at the beginning of the conflict, it might take more than a week for the British Army to expend all its available ammunition. All this demonstrates, however, is that the British Army lacks the firepower to deliver the kind of blunting effect that the UAF achieved north of Kyiv. The oft-cited refrain of the UK Ministry of Defence that these deficiencies are not a problem because the UK fights alongside NATO allies would be more credible if the situation were much better among any of the UK’s European allies. It is not, except in Finland. Nor – as Ukrainian troops discovered to their surprise – are ammunition, charge bags and other essential consumables consistent between NATO artillery systems; there is an inadequate capacity to draw on one another’s stocks.

They expand on these numbers in the report.
Despite the prominence of anti-tank guided weapons in the public narrative, Ukraine blunted Russia’s attempt to seize Kyiv using massed fires from two artillery brigades. The difference in numbers between Russian and Ukrainian artillery was not as significant at the beginning of the conflict, with just over a 2:1 advantage: 2,433 barrel artillery systems against 1,176; and 3,547 multiple-launch rocket systems against 1,680. Ukraine maintained artillery parity for the first month and a half and then began to run low on munitions so that, by June, the AFRF had a 10:1 advantage in volume of fire. Evidently, no country in NATO, other than the US, has sufficient initial weapons stocks for warfighting or the industrial capacity to sustain large scale operations.

It's a gold mine of information and lessons learned. Required reading.
At the height of the fighting in Donbas, Russia was using more ammunition in two days than the entire British military has in stock. At Ukrainian rates of consumption, British stockpiles would potentially last a week. Of course, given that the UAF fielded more than 10 times as many operational artillery pieces as the British Army at the beginning of the conflict, it might take more than a week for the British Army to expend all its available ammunition. All this demonstrates, however, is that the British Army lacks the firepower to deliver the kind of blunting effect that the UAF achieved north of Kyiv. The oft-cited refrain of the UK Ministry of Defence that these deficiencies are not a problem because the UK fights alongside NATO allies would be more credible if the situation were much better among any of the UK’s European allies. It is not, except in Finland. Nor – as Ukrainian troops discovered to their surprise – are ammunition, charge bags and other essential consumables consistent between NATO artillery systems; there is an inadequate capacity to draw on one another’s stocks.

It's a gold mine of information and lessons learned. Required reading.
At the height of the fighting in Donbas, Russia was using more ammunition in two days than the entire British military has in stock. At Ukrainian rates of consumption, British stockpiles would potentially last a week. Of course, given that the UAF fielded more than 10 times as many operational artillery pieces as the British Army at the beginning of the conflict, it might take more than a week for the British Army to expend all its available ammunition. All this demonstrates, however, is that the British Army lacks the firepower to deliver the kind of blunting effect that the UAF achieved north of Kyiv. The oft-cited refrain of the UK Ministry of Defence that these deficiencies are not a problem because the UK fights alongside NATO allies would be more credible if the situation were much better among any of the UK’s European allies. It is not, except in Finland. Nor – as Ukrainian troops discovered to their surprise – are ammunition, charge bags and other essential consumables consistent between NATO artillery systems; there is an inadequate capacity to draw on one another’s stocks.

It's a gold mine of information and lessons learned. Required reading.
At the height of the fighting in Donbas, Russia was using more ammunition in two days than the entire British military has in stock. At Ukrainian rates of consumption, British stockpiles would potentially last a week. Of course, given that the UAF fielded more than 10 times as many operational artillery pieces as the British Army at the beginning of the conflict, it might take more than a week for the British Army to expend all its available ammunition. All this demonstrates, however, is that the British Army lacks the firepower to deliver the kind of blunting effect that the UAF achieved north of Kyiv. The oft-cited refrain of the UK Ministry of Defence that these deficiencies are not a problem because the UK fights alongside NATO allies would be more credible if the situation were much better among any of the UK’s European allies. It is not, except in Finland. Nor – as Ukrainian troops discovered to their surprise – are ammunition, charge bags and other essential consumables consistent between NATO artillery systems; there is an inadequate capacity to draw on one another’s stocks.

It's a gold mine of information and lessons learned. Required reading.
At the height of the fighting in Donbas, Russia was using more ammunition in two days than the entire British military has in stock. At Ukrainian rates of consumption, British stockpiles would potentially last a week. Of course, given that the UAF fielded more than 10 times as many operational artillery pieces as the British Army at the beginning of the conflict, it might take more than a week for the British Army to expend all its available ammunition. All this demonstrates, however, is that the British Army lacks the firepower to deliver the kind of blunting effect that the UAF achieved north of Kyiv. The oft-cited refrain of the UK Ministry of Defence that these deficiencies are not a problem because the UK fights alongside NATO allies would be more credible if the situation were much better among any of the UK’s European allies. It is not, except in Finland. Nor – as Ukrainian troops discovered to their surprise – are ammunition, charge bags and other essential consumables consistent between NATO artillery systems; there is an inadequate capacity to draw on one another’s stocks.

RUSI higher level overview of the UKR and RUS performances in the war so far. 
https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/preliminary-lessons-conventional-warfighting-russias-invasion-ukraine-february-july-2022
Jack Watling et al. 
Full Pdf here. 
I knew it was high,  but I thought maybe 75%.  So yah, Drones functionally = munitions. 
 

I would not have guessed this.
 

I was triggered.
Because it reminded me that grenade launchers are still direct fire only in CM 😏

I was triggered.
Because it reminded me that grenade launchers are still direct fire only in CM 😏

I was triggered.
Because it reminded me that grenade launchers are still direct fire only in CM 😏

I was triggered.
Because it reminded me that grenade launchers are still direct fire only in CM 😏

I was triggered.
Because it reminded me that grenade launchers are still direct fire only in CM 😏

A girl ZU-23-gunner )
 

Good ol Hertling gives a look over

Years of playing CM have taught me that LOS through trees is less static than the LOS tool indicates. What trees in CM really seem to do is reduce spotting chances rather than prevent spotting altogether. When the tools says "no LOS" that is true at that moment but it could change at any time. I have had vehicles suddenly spot enemy vehicles through trees (and vice versa) when both vehicles have been stationary and out of LOS of each other (according to the target line) for several turns. You can't trust trees for concealment unless there are A LOT of them. It's kinda random and unpredictable but it's not a bug.
__________
The game does make some gross generalizations about foliage in order for it to work.  The big one is the same one that is pervasive throughout the game.  Specifically that LOS is not pixel by pixel, millisecond by millisecond.  There is no home computer on Earth that can do that and be a viable game.  Which means the LOS is determined by more-or-less the same sort of rules that one expects to see in a paper and dice game.  More sophisticated and nuanced, for sure, but inherently similar.
The way it works is the LOS line is "degraded" as it is drawn from point to point.  The more cumulative crap in the way the less strong the line becomes.  The quality of the spotter, the less restrictions on view, etc. give the line a higher starting value than a LOS line drawn from a unit with negative factors.  Some of the factors are specific (restrictions on range of view or height for example), others are general (optics of X type vs. eyeballs is the best example).  Each piece of terrain has ratings which determine how much the line is degraded when it comes to that piece.  At some point the line is so degraded that it is considered "blocked".
 
 

Years of playing CM have taught me that LOS through trees is less static than the LOS tool indicates. What trees in CM really seem to do is reduce spotting chances rather than prevent spotting altogether. When the tools says "no LOS" that is true at that moment but it could change at any time. I have had vehicles suddenly spot enemy vehicles through trees (and vice versa) when both vehicles have been stationary and out of LOS of each other (according to the target line) for several turns. You can't trust trees for concealment unless there are A LOT of them. It's kinda random and unpredictable but it's not a bug.
__________
The game does make some gross generalizations about foliage in order for it to work.  The big one is the same one that is pervasive throughout the game.  Specifically that LOS is not pixel by pixel, millisecond by millisecond.  There is no home computer on Earth that can do that and be a viable game.  Which means the LOS is determined by more-or-less the same sort of rules that one expects to see in a paper and dice game.  More sophisticated and nuanced, for sure, but inherently similar.
The way it works is the LOS line is "degraded" as it is drawn from point to point.  The more cumulative crap in the way the less strong the line becomes.  The quality of the spotter, the less restrictions on view, etc. give the line a higher starting value than a LOS line drawn from a unit with negative factors.  Some of the factors are specific (restrictions on range of view or height for example), others are general (optics of X type vs. eyeballs is the best example).  Each piece of terrain has ratings which determine how much the line is degraded when it comes to that piece.  At some point the line is so degraded that it is considered "blocked".
 
 

Years of playing CM have taught me that LOS through trees is less static than the LOS tool indicates. What trees in CM really seem to do is reduce spotting chances rather than prevent spotting altogether. When the tools says "no LOS" that is true at that moment but it could change at any time. I have had vehicles suddenly spot enemy vehicles through trees (and vice versa) when both vehicles have been stationary and out of LOS of each other (according to the target line) for several turns. You can't trust trees for concealment unless there are A LOT of them. It's kinda random and unpredictable but it's not a bug.
__________
The game does make some gross generalizations about foliage in order for it to work.  The big one is the same one that is pervasive throughout the game.  Specifically that LOS is not pixel by pixel, millisecond by millisecond.  There is no home computer on Earth that can do that and be a viable game.  Which means the LOS is determined by more-or-less the same sort of rules that one expects to see in a paper and dice game.  More sophisticated and nuanced, for sure, but inherently similar.
The way it works is the LOS line is "degraded" as it is drawn from point to point.  The more cumulative crap in the way the less strong the line becomes.  The quality of the spotter, the less restrictions on view, etc. give the line a higher starting value than a LOS line drawn from a unit with negative factors.  Some of the factors are specific (restrictions on range of view or height for example), others are general (optics of X type vs. eyeballs is the best example).  Each piece of terrain has ratings which determine how much the line is degraded when it comes to that piece.  At some point the line is so degraded that it is considered "blocked".
 
 

On a similar note, an interesting interview with someone from the Russian side.
__________
There is a thesis that the lion's share of drones used by soldiers are supplied by humanitarian orgs. Is that true? Many experts say that our military-industrial complex has "missed" small drones. Yes - the bulk of small UAVs are supplied by volunteers, including our org. The problem with the (quadcopter) drone is the fact that these are consumable products, and the life of a drone on the front line is very short - literally a few weeks from the first flight to its destruction. This is true even if the drone is piloted by a trained operator. And if the operator has not had the appropriate training, does not have relevant combat experience, then this is 1-2 sorties - and the drone will be lost. But at the same time, it is necessary to clearly understand the whole story with drones, and its not exactly true that our Armed Forces were not ready for the very appearance of this type of weapon.
We are witnessing a unique situation - the first mass use of small drones in history. I agree that up to this point, small drones have been used in various military conflicts, for example, in Syria, Yemen, and during the military conflict of 2014-2022 in the Donbass. Our military-industrial complex periodically paid attention to this, but it either did not have resources, or did not have direct orders from the government (to mass produce small drones). As a result, our military-industrial complex was engaged in the production of heavier drones with a narrower specialization, such as Orlans, Zala Aero products and the like. They (Russian military drones) just have a different purpose, are more narrowly specialized, are more expensive and require a different attitude to their use. Do small drones exist in the US Army? No, they don't exist there in larger numbers either. Their (American) military-industrial complex missed this (drone) moment in the same way, and by and large, none of the modern armies of the world was ready for the Mavic phenomenon. To say that only we missed that is fundamentally wrong. The bottom line is that there was no such massive drone as the Mavic in any army, and not a single military even imagined that it would be needed in such volumes.
To what extent has this war changed the idea of small drones - should we expect them to appear in all armies now? Speaking philosophically, this war has changed many views on the Armed Forces, not only in terms of drones, but also in terms of command and control. Flaws in the organization of communications, high-precision weapons became visible. I'll give you an example. For example, the American HIMARS themselves are rather mediocre multiple launch rocket systems, they don’t shoot well, they don’t hit so far, but when satellite-guided precision munitions are used in this system, it turns from mediocrity into a first-class tool for suppressing and destroying enemy rear lines. All this works when it can hit the given targets with high accuracy. We also have similar systems, like Uragan and Smerch, which have precision-guided munitions, satellite guidance, and so on. The problem is that the Americans, in addition to high-precision guidance, have a satellite reconnaissance complex. It allows real-time tracking of targets on the surface of the earth. We have the components of multi-domain integration, communications and control, but, unfortunately, the components of multi-spectral spatial reconnaissance have not been given due attention. We thought that the Americans were spending crazy money, sawing the budgets into some kind of meaningless toys. But we proudly open the 1980s ground force combat manual and everything is "fine" with us. But it turned out that these gadgets actually work.
It suddenly became obvious that our army also needed them. This is also a matter of worldview. It is necessary that generations of officers, generals, those who promote military science, change their worldview in terms of applying new modern technologies. We need gadgets that allow us to increase the effectiveness of conventional weapons, the speed of information processing, and combat control. Old weapons that could no longer be upgraded and effectively used, once equipped with "gadgets", can be very effective. In this sense, the war made it possible to look at these approaches with different eyes, to show that those approaches that dominated military science and the military-industrial complex for decades turned out to be outdated and inappropriate. Now it is necessary to develop new solutions that will allow Russian Armed Forces, our military-industrial complex to come together, and to rethink the national security...
...I would advise you to pay attention to communications, because traditionally (I can’t say why) our army is always bad with them. Buying some kind of radio station, albeit an analog one, is probably helpful in this conflict.
https://twitter.com/SamBendett/status/1595788630206849024
 

On a similar note, an interesting interview with someone from the Russian side.
__________
There is a thesis that the lion's share of drones used by soldiers are supplied by humanitarian orgs. Is that true? Many experts say that our military-industrial complex has "missed" small drones. Yes - the bulk of small UAVs are supplied by volunteers, including our org. The problem with the (quadcopter) drone is the fact that these are consumable products, and the life of a drone on the front line is very short - literally a few weeks from the first flight to its destruction. This is true even if the drone is piloted by a trained operator. And if the operator has not had the appropriate training, does not have relevant combat experience, then this is 1-2 sorties - and the drone will be lost. But at the same time, it is necessary to clearly understand the whole story with drones, and its not exactly true that our Armed Forces were not ready for the very appearance of this type of weapon.
We are witnessing a unique situation - the first mass use of small drones in history. I agree that up to this point, small drones have been used in various military conflicts, for example, in Syria, Yemen, and during the military conflict of 2014-2022 in the Donbass. Our military-industrial complex periodically paid attention to this, but it either did not have resources, or did not have direct orders from the government (to mass produce small drones). As a result, our military-industrial complex was engaged in the production of heavier drones with a narrower specialization, such as Orlans, Zala Aero products and the like. They (Russian military drones) just have a different purpose, are more narrowly specialized, are more expensive and require a different attitude to their use. Do small drones exist in the US Army? No, they don't exist there in larger numbers either. Their (American) military-industrial complex missed this (drone) moment in the same way, and by and large, none of the modern armies of the world was ready for the Mavic phenomenon. To say that only we missed that is fundamentally wrong. The bottom line is that there was no such massive drone as the Mavic in any army, and not a single military even imagined that it would be needed in such volumes.
To what extent has this war changed the idea of small drones - should we expect them to appear in all armies now? Speaking philosophically, this war has changed many views on the Armed Forces, not only in terms of drones, but also in terms of command and control. Flaws in the organization of communications, high-precision weapons became visible. I'll give you an example. For example, the American HIMARS themselves are rather mediocre multiple launch rocket systems, they don’t shoot well, they don’t hit so far, but when satellite-guided precision munitions are used in this system, it turns from mediocrity into a first-class tool for suppressing and destroying enemy rear lines. All this works when it can hit the given targets with high accuracy. We also have similar systems, like Uragan and Smerch, which have precision-guided munitions, satellite guidance, and so on. The problem is that the Americans, in addition to high-precision guidance, have a satellite reconnaissance complex. It allows real-time tracking of targets on the surface of the earth. We have the components of multi-domain integration, communications and control, but, unfortunately, the components of multi-spectral spatial reconnaissance have not been given due attention. We thought that the Americans were spending crazy money, sawing the budgets into some kind of meaningless toys. But we proudly open the 1980s ground force combat manual and everything is "fine" with us. But it turned out that these gadgets actually work.
It suddenly became obvious that our army also needed them. This is also a matter of worldview. It is necessary that generations of officers, generals, those who promote military science, change their worldview in terms of applying new modern technologies. We need gadgets that allow us to increase the effectiveness of conventional weapons, the speed of information processing, and combat control. Old weapons that could no longer be upgraded and effectively used, once equipped with "gadgets", can be very effective. In this sense, the war made it possible to look at these approaches with different eyes, to show that those approaches that dominated military science and the military-industrial complex for decades turned out to be outdated and inappropriate. Now it is necessary to develop new solutions that will allow Russian Armed Forces, our military-industrial complex to come together, and to rethink the national security...
...I would advise you to pay attention to communications, because traditionally (I can’t say why) our army is always bad with them. Buying some kind of radio station, albeit an analog one, is probably helpful in this conflict.
https://twitter.com/SamBendett/status/1595788630206849024
 

On a similar note, an interesting interview with someone from the Russian side.
__________
There is a thesis that the lion's share of drones used by soldiers are supplied by humanitarian orgs. Is that true? Many experts say that our military-industrial complex has "missed" small drones. Yes - the bulk of small UAVs are supplied by volunteers, including our org. The problem with the (quadcopter) drone is the fact that these are consumable products, and the life of a drone on the front line is very short - literally a few weeks from the first flight to its destruction. This is true even if the drone is piloted by a trained operator. And if the operator has not had the appropriate training, does not have relevant combat experience, then this is 1-2 sorties - and the drone will be lost. But at the same time, it is necessary to clearly understand the whole story with drones, and its not exactly true that our Armed Forces were not ready for the very appearance of this type of weapon.
We are witnessing a unique situation - the first mass use of small drones in history. I agree that up to this point, small drones have been used in various military conflicts, for example, in Syria, Yemen, and during the military conflict of 2014-2022 in the Donbass. Our military-industrial complex periodically paid attention to this, but it either did not have resources, or did not have direct orders from the government (to mass produce small drones). As a result, our military-industrial complex was engaged in the production of heavier drones with a narrower specialization, such as Orlans, Zala Aero products and the like. They (Russian military drones) just have a different purpose, are more narrowly specialized, are more expensive and require a different attitude to their use. Do small drones exist in the US Army? No, they don't exist there in larger numbers either. Their (American) military-industrial complex missed this (drone) moment in the same way, and by and large, none of the modern armies of the world was ready for the Mavic phenomenon. To say that only we missed that is fundamentally wrong. The bottom line is that there was no such massive drone as the Mavic in any army, and not a single military even imagined that it would be needed in such volumes.
To what extent has this war changed the idea of small drones - should we expect them to appear in all armies now? Speaking philosophically, this war has changed many views on the Armed Forces, not only in terms of drones, but also in terms of command and control. Flaws in the organization of communications, high-precision weapons became visible. I'll give you an example. For example, the American HIMARS themselves are rather mediocre multiple launch rocket systems, they don’t shoot well, they don’t hit so far, but when satellite-guided precision munitions are used in this system, it turns from mediocrity into a first-class tool for suppressing and destroying enemy rear lines. All this works when it can hit the given targets with high accuracy. We also have similar systems, like Uragan and Smerch, which have precision-guided munitions, satellite guidance, and so on. The problem is that the Americans, in addition to high-precision guidance, have a satellite reconnaissance complex. It allows real-time tracking of targets on the surface of the earth. We have the components of multi-domain integration, communications and control, but, unfortunately, the components of multi-spectral spatial reconnaissance have not been given due attention. We thought that the Americans were spending crazy money, sawing the budgets into some kind of meaningless toys. But we proudly open the 1980s ground force combat manual and everything is "fine" with us. But it turned out that these gadgets actually work.
It suddenly became obvious that our army also needed them. This is also a matter of worldview. It is necessary that generations of officers, generals, those who promote military science, change their worldview in terms of applying new modern technologies. We need gadgets that allow us to increase the effectiveness of conventional weapons, the speed of information processing, and combat control. Old weapons that could no longer be upgraded and effectively used, once equipped with "gadgets", can be very effective. In this sense, the war made it possible to look at these approaches with different eyes, to show that those approaches that dominated military science and the military-industrial complex for decades turned out to be outdated and inappropriate. Now it is necessary to develop new solutions that will allow Russian Armed Forces, our military-industrial complex to come together, and to rethink the national security...
...I would advise you to pay attention to communications, because traditionally (I can’t say why) our army is always bad with them. Buying some kind of radio station, albeit an analog one, is probably helpful in this conflict.
https://twitter.com/SamBendett/status/1595788630206849024
 

Years of playing CM have taught me that LOS through trees is less static than the LOS tool indicates. What trees in CM really seem to do is reduce spotting chances rather than prevent spotting altogether. When the tools says "no LOS" that is true at that moment but it could change at any time. I have had vehicles suddenly spot enemy vehicles through trees (and vice versa) when both vehicles have been stationary and out of LOS of each other (according to the target line) for several turns. You can't trust trees for concealment unless there are A LOT of them. It's kinda random and unpredictable but it's not a bug.
__________
The game does make some gross generalizations about foliage in order for it to work.  The big one is the same one that is pervasive throughout the game.  Specifically that LOS is not pixel by pixel, millisecond by millisecond.  There is no home computer on Earth that can do that and be a viable game.  Which means the LOS is determined by more-or-less the same sort of rules that one expects to see in a paper and dice game.  More sophisticated and nuanced, for sure, but inherently similar.
The way it works is the LOS line is "degraded" as it is drawn from point to point.  The more cumulative crap in the way the less strong the line becomes.  The quality of the spotter, the less restrictions on view, etc. give the line a higher starting value than a LOS line drawn from a unit with negative factors.  Some of the factors are specific (restrictions on range of view or height for example), others are general (optics of X type vs. eyeballs is the best example).  Each piece of terrain has ratings which determine how much the line is degraded when it comes to that piece.  At some point the line is so degraded that it is considered "blocked".
 
 

DUDE --  I think you are looking for things that aren't there.  The entire post is a joke -- how is that not obvious????  I said that RU simply wants clean clothes based on their deep desire for good hygeine.  UKR twarted that completely innocent desire by hoarding all the washing machines.  A joke based off the colonel that demaned washing machine as bribe.  If the folks on the forum actually think that was a serious post, I'll delete but I thought the level of absurdity made it obvious as parody.
The other half of the joke was a commentary on the levels of absurdity that the tankies use to excuse RU genocidal war. 
But worst of all, and quite devastating to me, is that DanCA didnt' think it was funny.