c3k

Popasna and high ground
 
Popasna
The Russian victory at Popasna potentially unhinges Ukraine defenses east of that point. It is a serious incursion and needs to be countered. Attacking the shoulders of the penetration is the tried and true solution, but involves having more forces and capability than the Ukraine can field in that area at this time. Short of cutting off the penetration, resistance to the forward elements needs to coalesce such that it is either deflected or stopped.
The larger danger is that this penetration, aside from endangering Ukraine forces to the east (either by pocketing them or just choking off supplies), it gets past the field fortifications and defenses built up since 2014.
In short, it sets the stage for a left hook, getting behind the Ukrainian defenses to the southwest of Popasna.
That's the danger.
Ukraine can definitely stabilize the area...by pushing in (reliable) troops and more support.
 
And that brings us to high ground.
This conflict in the Luhansk/Donetsk area seems to be WWI-esque with less troop density. There are trenchlines, artillery support, raids, observation flights, and movement measured in much smaller distances than in conflicts after that period.
All the ravines that cut through the area (drainage basins) definitely cause a funneling effect. Look at how the German offense (Kursk) developed in this area at the tactical level: each village is important because they are on the high ground and on roads. The road network and the terrain are such that these pieces of high ground are worth defending.
That brings us back around to the trenches and observation. Sure, drones are available, but a trench in a low ground is just a pre-dug grave. (See German defense lines in WWI vs. what the British did.) If you're going to get pummeled by directed artillery, high ground or low ground is about the same...but if the enemy is going to use infantry to pry you out...high ground wins.
 
Finally, that brings up the "burn rate". The big pushes are what are getting attention, but what is the daily level of attrition in the "quiet" sectors? How many artillery shells are being used per day and to what effect? What about raids, recce, etc? Ukraine may have mobilized more and sooner, but we don't know how many are dying across the front.
This is what may have led to that Territorial Defense unit collapsing. Just the daily grind, followed up by a determined enemy advance.
Yes, Russia has lost more, and in a more spectacular manner, but what is going on in the rest of the engagement zone? 

Popasna and high ground
 
Popasna
The Russian victory at Popasna potentially unhinges Ukraine defenses east of that point. It is a serious incursion and needs to be countered. Attacking the shoulders of the penetration is the tried and true solution, but involves having more forces and capability than the Ukraine can field in that area at this time. Short of cutting off the penetration, resistance to the forward elements needs to coalesce such that it is either deflected or stopped.
The larger danger is that this penetration, aside from endangering Ukraine forces to the east (either by pocketing them or just choking off supplies), it gets past the field fortifications and defenses built up since 2014.
In short, it sets the stage for a left hook, getting behind the Ukrainian defenses to the southwest of Popasna.
That's the danger.
Ukraine can definitely stabilize the area...by pushing in (reliable) troops and more support.
 
And that brings us to high ground.
This conflict in the Luhansk/Donetsk area seems to be WWI-esque with less troop density. There are trenchlines, artillery support, raids, observation flights, and movement measured in much smaller distances than in conflicts after that period.
All the ravines that cut through the area (drainage basins) definitely cause a funneling effect. Look at how the German offense (Kursk) developed in this area at the tactical level: each village is important because they are on the high ground and on roads. The road network and the terrain are such that these pieces of high ground are worth defending.
That brings us back around to the trenches and observation. Sure, drones are available, but a trench in a low ground is just a pre-dug grave. (See German defense lines in WWI vs. what the British did.) If you're going to get pummeled by directed artillery, high ground or low ground is about the same...but if the enemy is going to use infantry to pry you out...high ground wins.
 
Finally, that brings up the "burn rate". The big pushes are what are getting attention, but what is the daily level of attrition in the "quiet" sectors? How many artillery shells are being used per day and to what effect? What about raids, recce, etc? Ukraine may have mobilized more and sooner, but we don't know how many are dying across the front.
This is what may have led to that Territorial Defense unit collapsing. Just the daily grind, followed up by a determined enemy advance.
Yes, Russia has lost more, and in a more spectacular manner, but what is going on in the rest of the engagement zone? 

Popasna and high ground
 
Popasna
The Russian victory at Popasna potentially unhinges Ukraine defenses east of that point. It is a serious incursion and needs to be countered. Attacking the shoulders of the penetration is the tried and true solution, but involves having more forces and capability than the Ukraine can field in that area at this time. Short of cutting off the penetration, resistance to the forward elements needs to coalesce such that it is either deflected or stopped.
The larger danger is that this penetration, aside from endangering Ukraine forces to the east (either by pocketing them or just choking off supplies), it gets past the field fortifications and defenses built up since 2014.
In short, it sets the stage for a left hook, getting behind the Ukrainian defenses to the southwest of Popasna.
That's the danger.
Ukraine can definitely stabilize the area...by pushing in (reliable) troops and more support.
 
And that brings us to high ground.
This conflict in the Luhansk/Donetsk area seems to be WWI-esque with less troop density. There are trenchlines, artillery support, raids, observation flights, and movement measured in much smaller distances than in conflicts after that period.
All the ravines that cut through the area (drainage basins) definitely cause a funneling effect. Look at how the German offense (Kursk) developed in this area at the tactical level: each village is important because they are on the high ground and on roads. The road network and the terrain are such that these pieces of high ground are worth defending.
That brings us back around to the trenches and observation. Sure, drones are available, but a trench in a low ground is just a pre-dug grave. (See German defense lines in WWI vs. what the British did.) If you're going to get pummeled by directed artillery, high ground or low ground is about the same...but if the enemy is going to use infantry to pry you out...high ground wins.
 
Finally, that brings up the "burn rate". The big pushes are what are getting attention, but what is the daily level of attrition in the "quiet" sectors? How many artillery shells are being used per day and to what effect? What about raids, recce, etc? Ukraine may have mobilized more and sooner, but we don't know how many are dying across the front.
This is what may have led to that Territorial Defense unit collapsing. Just the daily grind, followed up by a determined enemy advance.
Yes, Russia has lost more, and in a more spectacular manner, but what is going on in the rest of the engagement zone? 

Popasna and high ground
 
Popasna
The Russian victory at Popasna potentially unhinges Ukraine defenses east of that point. It is a serious incursion and needs to be countered. Attacking the shoulders of the penetration is the tried and true solution, but involves having more forces and capability than the Ukraine can field in that area at this time. Short of cutting off the penetration, resistance to the forward elements needs to coalesce such that it is either deflected or stopped.
The larger danger is that this penetration, aside from endangering Ukraine forces to the east (either by pocketing them or just choking off supplies), it gets past the field fortifications and defenses built up since 2014.
In short, it sets the stage for a left hook, getting behind the Ukrainian defenses to the southwest of Popasna.
That's the danger.
Ukraine can definitely stabilize the area...by pushing in (reliable) troops and more support.
 
And that brings us to high ground.
This conflict in the Luhansk/Donetsk area seems to be WWI-esque with less troop density. There are trenchlines, artillery support, raids, observation flights, and movement measured in much smaller distances than in conflicts after that period.
All the ravines that cut through the area (drainage basins) definitely cause a funneling effect. Look at how the German offense (Kursk) developed in this area at the tactical level: each village is important because they are on the high ground and on roads. The road network and the terrain are such that these pieces of high ground are worth defending.
That brings us back around to the trenches and observation. Sure, drones are available, but a trench in a low ground is just a pre-dug grave. (See German defense lines in WWI vs. what the British did.) If you're going to get pummeled by directed artillery, high ground or low ground is about the same...but if the enemy is going to use infantry to pry you out...high ground wins.
 
Finally, that brings up the "burn rate". The big pushes are what are getting attention, but what is the daily level of attrition in the "quiet" sectors? How many artillery shells are being used per day and to what effect? What about raids, recce, etc? Ukraine may have mobilized more and sooner, but we don't know how many are dying across the front.
This is what may have led to that Territorial Defense unit collapsing. Just the daily grind, followed up by a determined enemy advance.
Yes, Russia has lost more, and in a more spectacular manner, but what is going on in the rest of the engagement zone? 

Amazing work.
If you can make a map of this area Steve will love you long time...

A joke I saw a week ago elsewhere.
Russian mother calls her son, finds out he's in Ukraine.
"Why are you there?" she asks.
"It's a special military operation."
"A war? Will you be ok?"
"No mother, a special military operation. It's a proxy war between Russia and NATO, not a real war."
"Oh, that's good to hear," she says, "how's it going?"
"Well," he replies, "so far we've had 20,000 casualties, lost 1200 tanks and several thousand other armoured and military vehicles, had a cruiser sank and lost most of our officers."
"Oh," said his mother, "That doesn't sound too promising. How is NATO doing?"
"They haven't turned up yet."

Great question.
The US seems to have 3 anti-ship missiles: Harpoon, NSM, and (some) LRASM.
Harpoon's land-based launchers are a bit limited in availability. (I wonder if Taiwan has a lot of them?)
The NSM (Naval Strike Missile) has ~twice the range (up to 100-150 miles), but half the warhead (~250 pounds). It is Norwegian, and, as you'd expect from a country with the coastline of Norway, a very good shore-launched anti-ship missile. I have no idea how many are in stock, if there are extras, or if Norway and/or US would be willing to give them to Ukraine.
The LRASM has about double the range of the NSM (most think about 300 miles) and has a 1,000 lb warhead. Is stealthy and has various passive and active sensors, swarm capability, etc.  It has only just reached IOC and only on a limited number of platforms. I would think that the advanced technology in it would preclude giving it to Ukraine (even if any were available), due to concerns about capture.
TL;DR: If anything, I'd think just Harpoons, and not many. And that's only if politicians get past their fears of escalation. 

UKR AA-squad (probably 95th air-assault brigade), armed with Polish "Piorun" MANPAD and driving on Kozak-2M1 armored car. They search Russian UAV in the sky with thermal camera and launch a missile at it with unknown result. Commander says "shot down!", but there is no conformaition.
 

More about Russian crossing attempts for Steve @Battlefront.com
 

Crossing to hell
Composed panorama from many fragments of UAV filming, but it does not include last 7 tanks sunked by Russians in finale. 

Just seen this on another site I follow and just made me smile...
 

Because we can't like yout post, thank you Steve for this great summary

The urgency of getting a DOD wide license for CM professional edition is hard to overstate....

I remember back when the 'hot' thread was "Russian army underequipped?", there were certain folks who made much of the 'Ratnik' project. Turns out one of the key components of Ratnik - the commander's tablet - is simply a repackaged commercial tablet imported from Taiwan:
"the main part of it is commander's tablet. "Research and development works were carried out by dozens of Russian defense enterprises" as its creators claim"

"Which exactly "enterprise" "developed" this tablet you would ask? The battery is a clue:"

"It's 2012 Leica CS25 GNSS plus"

"It even had Leica serial numbers, but all labels are removed."

Bit more on this. Didn’t realize it, but this footage is also apparently from the failed river crossing at Serebryanka.  2S23 is a pretty rare vehicle in use in just a handful of units.  The ones I know are the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade and the 55th Mountain Motorized Rifle Brigade (and both have theirs painted solid green as seen here).  55th MRB is, of course, part of 41st CAA along with 35th and 74th MRBs. This, along with the knocked out VDV armor, suggests even more units involved in the crossing attempts, at least in small composite elements.

Ukrainian troops apparently at the Russian border north of Karkhiv:

 
 

This sounds very reasonable and in theory maybe this is how it should be or once was. 
However, I have to agree with @keas66.  He was referring to the MSM (Main Stream Media) which you called "generalist media".   I think your talking about CNN, MSNBC, BBC, etc. when you say "generalist"? 
The MSM often went into great detail and analyst about the war, especially in the beginning.  It was almost non-stop details and analysist that was often wrong.  Kyiv was about to fall, Zelenskyy needs to leave the capital, Poland might be invaded, nukes are possible, Putin needs an off ramp etc.  They had generals and colonels standing in front of map boards giving detailed analysis.  Lots of photos of IFVs / APCs generically called tanks.  Many experts and analysts giving their detailed input.  At the bottom of the screen the talking head often had expert, analyst, general, colonel, SF operator etc. in their title.  
But we knew they were wrong because we had this forum topic.  I couldn't (still can't really) get enough of it.  So I switched back and forth between six or seven MSM channels plus u-tube, twitter, internet, etc.  It was (is) all very interesting.  But one thing that became obvious was that the MSM was often wrong.  Even when they were right they were a week or more behind actual events on the ground.   
If the MSM was delivering a broad stroke first draft of the situation they were selling it as detailed expert analysis which was often wrong and out dated.  In an AAR of this historical event I think it is fair / appropriate to point this out.    

I like him, you don't. Let's leave it at that.

Once again, this thread is valuable when it stays on the topic of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
(As a citizen of the United States, do any of you think my opinion of Dutch politicians, Australian politics, or worse, a combination of both, would either be pertinent or accurate?)
 

It looks like they indeed tried multiple crossings, smoke, maskirovka, saturation artillery prep, etc., as discussed above. Looks like they even let infantry lead for a change, and actually made some headway in expanding their tiny bridgehead!
 
But for some reason they then let vehicles pile up AFTER the crossing, 1941 style, instead of getting them to the front. They would have lost the pontoons anyway, but spared themselves the photo op of the half-drowned scrapyard.

I'm familiar with him, and actually sat next to his former book agent on a plane a week or so before this past xmas (by dumb luck).  We didn't talk about Zubrin, but I think we did talk about space.
Russia is probably 40-ish years behind in space ISR assets, much like they're behind in things like microelectronics and NVG.  Most of it has the same root in the Soviet Union failing to try to copy Silicon Valley from the 70's on (and probably earlier).  The USSR and later Russia were/are fine at building big things made of lots of metal that spit out fire - tanks, missiles, rockets.   But without microelectronics they can't keep up with the kind of data volume that you can collect and integrate if you have relatively cheap high performance sensors and cheap, fast computers.  They've been able to buy some of those things to an extent, like the Thales targeting systems, and presumably microcontrollers for various things, but they can't do the kind of mass production that makes fancy chips appallingly cheap.
I came across an article (linky here) a while ago about when the big divergence between US and USSR capability happened in space. It's by one of the space journalists who figured out the capabilities of the first KH-11 in 1977 (launched in 1976) and sat on it for a year until a spy sold the details to the Soviets.  KH-11 can do about 10 cm (4 inch) resolution on  the ground, and there are 5 of the latest few versions in space right now.  And the NRO is giving away telescopes that size to other agencies, because they presumably have better. One of the things that the Aviation Week journalists held off  on publishing even longer was the existence of a second satellite network whose sole purpose was to be able to relay images in realtime from the KH-11.  So the US had realtime 10 cm resolution on the ground in 1977.  Russia was still returning film capsules in 2016.
And "New Space" has changed things drastically - commercial companies can give you multiple daily revisits of any location on earth at resolutions between 20 cm and 3 m.  Basically, kids in a garage in the US can make and launch cube sats cheap enough to do 3 m resolution more or less hourly.  If you have several billion dollars you could do half meter resolution that often, and there's probably a commercial market for it.  The stuff you need to do that is export controlled, and just about all the high res imaging companies are US based for that reason. The USG is the largest customer for those data.
Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) is becoming comparably cheap and there are multiple companies doing that, too. And it can see through clouds.  And those companies also tend to be US based for similar reasons to the optical imagers.
There were some twitter posts early on about likely degradation of GPS over Ukraine, figured out from looking at the errors reported on ADS-B data.  There was speculation that it was Russia doing it, but it seems more likely that it was the US/NATO.  Ukrainians know where they are and have maps, but the Russians appear to have lousy mapping and were using some commercial GPS units, so even being able to mess them up by putting them a couple roads over from where they were supposed to be could help UA.
And that doesn't even get into the SIGINT and ELINT stuff.  But three things are happening to ISR from space right now - the cost of launch is going down fast, the cost of making stuff to launch is going down fast, and the size of the electronics you need to make that stuff work is going down fast.  So the west has tons of space ISR going on, both commercial and government.  And Russia, well, doesn't.  They have two optical satellites that are getting old and probably don't have anywhere near comparable performance to western stuff.  They probably have some SIGINT and ELINT satellites, but the lack of a microelectronics base makes it likely that those are very limited in capability.
All of which leads to the Russian anti-satellite test in November.  There was speculation at the time that it was intended to produce a ton of debris to blind the west so that they could do exactly what they did.  They did succeed in making a mess, but didn't take out any significant satellites.  And even if they took out a few, there are so many that they wouldn't be likely get them all, and the three letter agencies tend to keep some sitting around on the ground for launch-on-demand, so they could launch above the debris if they needed to.
edit: here's where Russia is with ELINT/SIGINT satellites and SAR, which is basicaly nowhere:
 

Polish scholar evaluates the overall operation and the debacle at Bilohorivka, from RU sources, with maps. Translated below.... 


 
How was it under #Bilohorivka? Two days ago, you could read an excerpt from the action thanks to @ kms_d4k
The Russians are shocked by the development of accidents and the losses. Today you can see the full version of the events from the Russian point of view
2. The entire operation lasted from May 2 to 10, but battles with the Russian survivors are still ongoing. A massive forcing operation that is not over yet
3. On May 2-3, Russian forces crossed Seversky Donets near Shipilovka [break 1].
After the crossing, the Russian army joined the battle with the garrison of the settlement. There were no troops ready to fight in Shipilovka, the garrison withdrew towards Privolye. 
4. Russian units dispersed in small groups around the area. The fighting started near Novodruzhsk, on the outskirts of Privolye and #Bilohorivka. Until the occupation of Shipilovka, a relatively small calculation of forces and resources was involved, which was less than half the BTG
5. On May 4, the bridgehead near Shipilovka [crossing 1] was lost. It happened most likely due to the underestimation of enemy forces in the surrounding settlements. A full-fledged battalion of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was stationed in Privolye, which was soon reinforced by Novodrużesk and #Lysychansk.
6. On the night of May 4-5 and in the afternoon of May 5, on the left bank of the Donets Siewierski from Serebrianka to Privolye, massive artillery preparations began [yellow arrows]. According to reports from local chats, the coast and the vicinity of Shipilovka "were littered with the corpses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine".
7. On May 5, Russian forces crossed Donets near Serebrianka [crossing 2].
It was not possible to get a bridgehead on the opposite bank: the combat-ready units from Siewiersk were transferred to Serebrianka.
8. Seversk itself included newly rotated units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from #Sieverodonetsk, which were replaced by territorial defense units and national battalions. Artillery preparations at the positions of the #Ukraina Armed Forces continued for a few more days.
9. On 7-8 May, Russian troops crossed Donets Siewierski, near #Bilohorivka.
The Russian troops managed to occupy the dominant hills near the coast (the so-called Shipilovsky Mountains) and to capture the outskirts of Belogorovka along Pervomajska Street. 
10. Subsequently, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation met fierce resistance from Ukrainian units. The fortified area of the #Ukraine Armed Forces was in a residential area and near the Cretaceous quarry
11. On May 8, the Allied forces began a full-fledged pontoon crossing [crossing 3] across Donets Seversky near #Bilohorivka to introduce armored vehicles into the battle. Ukrainian artillery began to operate along the passages
12. Before the failure of the first pontoon, several pieces of equipment were transferred to the opposite shore. Russian forces continued their offensive on #Bilohorivka, where the Ukrainians transferred their reserves from Siewiersk.
At Sipiłowka, the Ukrainian troops were again thrown back to Privolye
13. On May 9, the pontoon crossing at #Bilohorivka [crossing 4] was restored. The transfer of up to 100 units of equipment began to the occupied bridgehead.
14. The approximate plan was to consolidate the success in #Bilohorivka and Shipilovka from Privolye, as well as prepare for the storming of  Seversk.
15. For an unknown reason, the equipment was not put into combat and was left near the headland on the other side of the Shipilov Hills. Presumably, on the night of May 10, the Armed Forces of #Ukraine conducted air reconnaissance and discovered a huge accumulation of equipment near the crossing.
16. Ukr. artillery launched a massive artillery attack on the outskirts of the Shipilov Hills. Most of the equipment moved to the eastern shore of the Dońca Siewierski (with the exception of the BTG equipment used in the battles of Shipilovka and #Bilohorivka) was disabled.
17. On May 11-12, Russian troops from #Kreminna and #Rubizhne were handed over to the assault on Privolye by the Russian forces remaining on the west bank of the river. Fighting in this area continues.
... 
4. A complicated situation under #Bilohorivka. Some of the Russian troops managed to survive (a lot of them had to be crossed) and are attacking the NE along #SiverskyiDonets. The Russians tried to evacuate them or send reinforcements, but the next crossing was destroyed by the Ukrainians.
5. Ros. They are gathering crossing equipment on the #SiverskyiDonets bend and will cross the river from the side of the captured #Rubizhne to connect with the unit from #Bilohorivka and go to the rear of the #Lysychansk defense. It is a very difficult place to defend due to possible attacks from 3 sides .

No I can't, but I never argued that. Nowhere in any post that I made to I say I don't want to assist Ukraine in defeating Russia. Because I do, I just keep getting pigeon holed into defending my stance and inferred that I have some particular liking to a particular political side, I don't, I despise all politicians. All I want is accountability to the people of the United States for where our money is spent, regardless of who pays for it, it's coming out of our coffers and it should be measured. After the last two money pits of conflicts we've been vested in I think it's the least we should ask for. All my opinion of course.