LongLeftFlank

that was just mean.   
and by mean I was referring to your backhand way of reminding me how old I am.  Get off my virtual lawn.

Breaking away for a moment from the "Canadians who made it onto US cultural radar" banter, is this map new or a reboot (with water) of a CMSF1 map?

Either (pronounced "eye-ther") way, a little constructive criticism of this village.
It's presumably a bunch of structures dropped into an actual Google earth footprint. Fair enough for a start, but it looks more like something you'd see in the treeless deep desert, which is clearly not the dominant terrain on this map.
All structures except shops (mostly open fronted) should have some kind of compound wall surrounding them; low stone walls for farmhouses, high walls for more modern residences. Houses should also have a fair number of palms and mature shade trees, maybe an orchard. And outbuildings. I was hoping the little shed would make it in from CMBN, but alas no joy.  Where's the mosque? (a village this size will have one, even if there isn't a dome or minaret)
This is *not* just eye candy; it has very real implications for the battle. A 'dense' village squarely in the centre of the map provides a ready made fortress, with robust and varied concealment and cover for units, especially infantry AT teams who can keyhole and break contact at will.
I'd expect this benighted hamlet to be leveled by artillery or air in due course, but the rubble, walls and ditches would still provide plentiful and stubborn tactical cover. In its current barren state, AT teams can't so easily flit from building to building to keyhole, and can be readily pinned and killed off by ranged tank/IFV guns. Uber armour uber alles again, yawn.
Settlements are one of the only features that counter the overwhelming superiority of (usually) NATO ranged weapons. If you want a fair fight and a more fun game (IMHO), give these features more of their real life tactical properties! 
Here endeth my catechism. Exit Falstaff.

[/snark] 

I liked your mix and match Uncons mod, with Combatants a 50/50 mix of masked and unmasked (Spy) guys. That's how they generally fight when TV cameras aren't filming.

I liked your mix and match Uncons mod, with Combatants a 50/50 mix of masked and unmasked (Spy) guys. That's how they generally fight when TV cameras aren't filming.

Monneneywarria!

I am gonna blaspheme the living crap out of this discussion and tell you right now that ATF's version kills Falco's!
On top of that I can't stand Bakshi.
I still like you guys though.
Mord.

The only version I would except, outside of the original Falco version, is one animated by Ralph Bakshi.

...And definitely the Falco version (chain smoking video, not totally lame lame roller skating in front of bluescreen MTV edition). As for 'After the Fire' English remix, know O believers that it is haram and shall be consigned to eternal columns of fire, by Allah (pbuh)!

Wow, lighten up mate. Maybe take a walk and get some fresh air. Or just use the Ignore thingy if I really bother you that much.
But anybody who reads my handle or has any idea of my work knows I am part of the OCD Mr Picky vanguard. To each his own.
Peace. 

Stop. Mord. Will you. Stop. Mord. I'm a-fraid. I'm a-fraid.
Daiiiisy, Daiiiisy..... 

(been doing business in Beirut this week. Nice town, definitely safe downtown now and worth a visit, but more expensive than expected).
The lessons of Ramadi and Anbar are very well summarized in a number of recent papers. This one discusses what happened in the wake of occupation up to the Fallujah/Sadr City uprisings of April 2004.
http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/2383/06Dec_Broemmel.pdf?sequence=1
The security force presence in Ramadi changed frequently during 2003, never reaching a 20-to-1000 troop-to-population ratio. The estimated population of Ramadi in 2003 was approximately 390,000. According to the recommended troop-to-population ratio, a population of this size would require a security force of 7,800 police and troops.... With such a frequent force rotation in Ramadi, units had difficulty becoming intimate with their area of operations. 
In Ramadi and Samarra, the unit headquarters responsible for each city had additional priorities that focused the unit’s attention away from these two cities... vast stretches of western Anbar Province and the Syrian border.... These conflicting priorities forced each headquarters to assign subordinate units that it could spare with economy of force missions to administer these two cities as effectively as possible. The negative results of this approach became apparent in the spring of 2004....  units were not able to reach enough of the local security force or population to make a difference.
Units made extraordinary efforts to train ISF (police and military) to alleviate the security situation in the city with varying degrees of success. Units reported that when accompanied by U.S. forces, ISF could accomplish small scale operations at the platoon and company level; however, they could not operate independently. At times, ISF check points were left unmanned. ISF leadership was frequently threatened by AIF personnel, causing some to resign or desert. One company reported an AWOL rate of over 70%. In some cases, insurgents who were detained were later discovered through interrogation to be ING or police personnel.... Insurgents penetrated some ISF units. As a result, Coalition Forces did not give them too great of a responsibility and did not give them information a long period of time in advance of an operation.  
In Ramadi during 2003, units operated mainly from two FOBs in north central and North West Ramadi. By the beginning of 2004, coalition units in Ramadi occupied combat outposts along the main supply route through the city. While security of the MSR was the main catalyst for this move, the result was beneficial to local security of the population. In all three cities, units that operated with squads in mutual support or with platoons in mutual support, often employed from neighborhood police stations, were best able to bring security to neighborhoods. In doing so, they were also able to reduce the IED threat faced when “commuting to war” from an FOB....  interpreters are essential to Iraqi and Coalition cooperation.
[CPT Nick Ayers B/1/34 AR]"I found that a lot of the deployment is a credibility game with the public and the insurgents. I felt the insurgents targeted units that they felt were weak. The public didn’t trust units that were not professional or couldn’t provide security or assistance (especially if they promised such assistance).... 
"The enemy is human and succumbs to patterns and routine. Because the insurgency operates in the local neighborhoods, the population holds the solution to gaining actionable intelligence. Actionable intelligence is verifiable information that can place a specific target at an exact location during a particular time... [It is] time sensitive, requiring units to have the flexibility to react quickly.... If a unit routinely receives its intelligence about its sector from higher level intelligence sources, this may indicate that the unit cannot effectively see and therefore cannot control its sector.
"The higher percentage of casualties caused by IEDs and indirect fire resulted from insurgent preferences that avoided direct fire confrontation with Coalition combat units.... units employed squads and platoons in the contested area in order to improve upon their information disadvantage.... Once established in city neighborhoods, insurgent groups were forced to take action against the Coalition encroachment into their area.... The willingness to establish small unit combat outposts in support of local security forces was a characteristic of units that effectively partnered and supported local Iraqi government.... Units must have the tactical, logistical and cultural skill to operate in platoon and company combat outposts."
Of course, maintaining (and supplying and defending) a foreign military presence in the heart of Ramadi was purely optional, and driven from Washington.  The Anbar governorate could just have easily conducted business from a fortified compound outside town. But ceding the city centres to Baathists and later masked jihadis didn't have look good on TV. They tried that in Fallujah from April to November and ended up having to assault a fortress. So Americans and Iraqis had to die to keep flags flying in increasingly shattered downtowns for 4 years.... 
That said, one cannot but be  impressed with the intelligence and creativity most US commanders brought to this difficult mission. Even though each rotating unit seemed to have to relearn the same lessons, with both them and the locals paying a price each time.
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=92750254
MAJ John NAGL (Ops officer, CENTURION 3)  September 24, 2003, through September 10, 2004
...by September, two of its three tank companies were conducting combat operations in the Sunni Triangle mounted on Humvees and dismounting to fight as dragoons, with just one company fighting from M1A1s...
The battalion staff had to change its entire approach to combat, shifting its focus from battle-tracking enemy tank platoons and infantry squads who fought in plain sight to identifying and locating an insurgent enemy who hid in plain sight.... a task more akin to breaking up a Mafia crime ring than dismantling a conventional enemy battalion or brigade. "Link diagrams" depicting who talked with whom became a daily chore for a small intelligence staff more used to analyzing the ranges of enemy artillery systems.

In honor of the imminent release of CMSF2, I figured I would get a heads start on the time honored tradition of complaining about every new release by making it into a fun game!
I give you, CMSF2 BINGO!

All in good fun of course.

Know, O lions of CMSF, I scratched my Ramadi itch by building out the rest of the Anbar health complex, the high schools and (bombed out) Iraqi army depot on the master map, filling out an area of 150 x 400m, mostly industrial structures. Nice spot for some Marine LAVs to stalk AQIZ RPG gunners.

Indeed, although I have never been quite so smug about that since an American friend pointed out that our extra "u"s merely advertise that 1000 years ago, our mother country lost a war. To the French.

Indeed, although I have never been quite so smug about that since an American friend pointed out that our extra "u"s merely advertise that 1000 years ago, our mother country lost a war. To the French.

Wow, lighten up mate. Maybe take a walk and get some fresh air. Or just use the Ignore thingy if I really bother you that much.
But anybody who reads my handle or has any idea of my work knows I am part of the OCD Mr Picky vanguard. To each his own.
Peace. 

Wow. An IDF officer I got to know was very insistent on the principle: "Anti-infantry armour and anti-armour infantry." You have provided his school solution here, Bil!
Also, your riveting AAR has turned me into a refreshing monkey for a bit. 🙈🙉🙊

Wow. An IDF officer I got to know was very insistent on the principle: "Anti-infantry armour and anti-armour infantry." You have provided his school solution here, Bil!
Also, your riveting AAR has turned me into a refreshing monkey for a bit. 🙈🙉🙊

Hope you don't mind, I quoted you on my Blog page for this AAR.   

I think this is a good place to stop for a bit and discuss my tactics and approach to this fight.  From the beginning I had a two phase plan (not including recon), and it hinged on my Javelin teams.
The Reconnaissance Phase was just supposed to tie the enemy down, and entice him into moving as much combat power as possible into Engagement Area 1 (EA1).  During this phase of the action I intended to gather as much information as possible and recover the enemy order of battle, identify his intent, etc. I only really engaged the enemy with my two LAV-ATs (which I subsequently lost), the Syrian ATGM team (a failure so far), and a couple LAVs I was hoping they would attrit the enemy recon elements but at this they failed, only being able to destroy one Fennek The enemy did feel comfortable enough to move a lot of his combat power into EA1, and did not seem to hold back a reserve.  PHASE I - the first phase of the actual battle proper started when I received my Main Body reinforcements.  The intent was to move two platoons of Bradleys into KT2, dismount Javelin teams and kill as many enemy vehicles as possible, mainly with dismounted Javelin teams. Note, once inside EA1, it is going to be very tough for Baneman to extricate his armor and IFVs, especially as more and more Javelin teams come on line I actually have four Javelin teams in overwatch positions at this stage in the battle with a few more still to deploy. Baneman continues to move vehicles into EA1 and especially toward the Ruined Farm Battle Position 1 (BP1)  has been an unexpected boon for me, and really is turning out to be the most important terrain in the AO so far.  A good majority of the enemy vehicles killed came from this position The Bradleys that are on the reverse slope of KT2 (two platoons) are a local reserve, and will join in any attack I make with my main reserve, but on a different axis to spread the enemy and keep him from shifting elements The intent is to engage the enemy with as few units as possible and still cause serious harm, most of my combat power will be husbanded for PHASE II.  I want him rocking back on his heels when I hit him with my main combat power. PHASE II - this is the Main Attack phase of the action.  I have identified a few key avenues of attack but have yet to decide how I am going to attack The elements in EA1 are the main target Isolating and eliminating the enemy units at OBJ DIAMOND, FARM 002, and the FARM 011-012 complex are lower priorities All elements not in the KT2 and BP1 positions will join in this effort, including: USMC Recon dismounts and LAVs x2 BMP-3 Mech Infantry platoons x1 Syrian dismounted infantry platoon  x1 Bradley platoon and Bradley Company HQ element (five vehicles with dismounts, the BFIST will be kept in the rear area) T-90 Platoon Ultimate goal is to eliminate or mitigate the enemy armor threat to such an extent that I can start to clear DUMAYR and all of the red colored objectives (see image above) of all enemy irregular elements I am currently still in PHASE I, but am starting to plan for PHASE II.  More to come as I complete my analysis and decide on a course of action.
 

Wow. An IDF officer I got to know was very insistent on the principle: "Anti-infantry armour and anti-armour infantry." You have provided his school solution here, Bil!
Also, your riveting AAR has turned me into a refreshing monkey for a bit. 🙈🙉🙊

Direct answer: no OIF campaigns exist. 
1. I did 2 historical OIF-2 Marines vs uncon ambush-and-relieve scenarios set in central Ramadi in 2003. 
2. @Combatintman did a number of OP TELIC British scenarios set 2003-2004, plus others set in A-stan. 
 3. @Sgt.Squarehead did 2 bloodbaths set in the Mosul siege 2016.  
Apologies to anyone else I left out here. I faintly recall someone once trying 73 EASTING but hazy on details.