IMHO

Just a collection of the day

RUS SOF PR vid
 

I believe it would be interesting to discuss how behaviour of CMBS units and equipment compares to their what they demonstrate in real life and how different sides in CMBS match against each other. To keep as far away from useless flame as possible I suggest we argue only quantifiable data that can be traced either to real life sources or comparable in-game datasets.

I believe it would be interesting to discuss how behaviour of CMBS units and equipment compares to their what they demonstrate in real life and how different sides in CMBS match against each other. To keep as far away from useless flame as possible I suggest we argue only quantifiable data that can be traced either to real life sources or comparable in-game datasets.

I'm sure we all want an accurate representation of reality. So if you believe I'm wrong in my assessment may be you can offer your logic of calculation and input checkable to the actual specifications or tests. Then we can discuss the numbers instead of who wants what...

Infantry detection test
Objective: To understand how detection capabilities of US and Russian infantry units match against each other.
Test setup: 40 isolated lanes of 200m each. Lanes are plain and only grass-covered. TOD is midday, the weather is clear, sunny and dry. On either side of the lane there's a three-man breach team - US and Russian. The teams are veteran, normal motivation and no leadership bonus. Teams are not hiding and facing each other.
What we track: how much time each team needs to detect AND identify the opponent.
Graph: Axis X is the number of seconds passed after the start of the test. Axis Y - the number of units detected by this time. 

Surprisingly RU team is almost as good in detection as US  This is my first take - feels like more tests at larger distances wouldn't hurt 

I believe it would be interesting to discuss how behaviour of CMBS units and equipment compares to their what they demonstrate in real life and how different sides in CMBS match against each other. To keep as far away from useless flame as possible I suggest we argue only quantifiable data that can be traced either to real life sources or comparable in-game datasets.

I found this link today: 
https://www.reddit.com/r/Warthunder/comments/830d70/the_source_bomb_on_modern_tanks_just_dropped/
 
Which referred me to these two:
https://cloud.mail.ru/public/FVLe/iUZw87trH
http://sturgeonshouse.ipbhost.com/topic/1395-contemporary-western-tank-rumble/?page=5&tab=comments#comment-124945
 
Both of these have a ton of information on modern MBT armor, the latter especially. 

Give me Abrams' 65 tons...
PS By the way these are pics from standard Russian tank training facilities.

Give me Abrams' 65 tons...
PS By the way these are pics from standard Russian tank training facilities.

This part is true. 
This part is not. 
No to both. 
Roads, off-roads, it really doesn't matter. Before the Stryker, the Army had two types of forces: very light, and very heavy. Very light forces can be deployed extremely quickly (anywhere in the world with only 24 hours notice when on alert status, etc). The downside of light forces is they have little to no offensive combat power (operationally speaking). Heavy forces take a long time to deploy, generally 3 weeks is the earliest heavy forces can be moved to a new theater. However, heavy forces are where all of the decisive offensive combat power (operationally speaking) lies. 
During the Cold War, the Army had all of its heavy forces already in country, thus did not have to redeploy them to counter the Soviets. Everything else that happened in the world was essentially left to the light forces to take care of, or at least take care of long enough for the heavy forces to arrive. So, for roughly 45 years, the Army had no issue operating light and heavy forces against the threats they were arrayed against. 
This changed in the 90s with the fall of the Soviet Union. With new threats popping up in other locations of the globe (Iraq 1991, Bosnia 1990's, etc) it was apparent that the US Army needed to be able to rapidly deploy all of its combat power (both light and heavy) around the world quickly. However, they found they could not do this, because heavy forces are called heavy for a reason. They are hard to strategically relocate, and they have a large logistical tail that must be set in place to keep them functioning as well. (Note: ALL heavy forces, regardless of the country they are from, suffer from this.) 
Enter the Stryker. The entire idea behind the stryker is to have a 'medium' force. Essentially, light infantry with operational mobility. The stryker as it is excels at this role. It does what heavy and light units both cannot (deploy rapidly while being able to be operationally mobile in theater with a smaller logistics tail than a heavy unit while still packing a tremendous amount of organic firepower). There are other benefits the Stryker brings to the table as well, such as increased C2 capabilities, etc. 
The point is, the stryker has a specific job to do, and it does very well at its job. No vehicle is perfect. No a stryker isn't great at climbing a mountain off road, but then again neither is a humvee or a tank. Again, the thing has flaws, plenty of them. But the main point is that it achieves its operational (read: most important) goals, and it achieves them very well. 

I understand, I've done the same myself on a number of occasions. 
The story of the humvee is another rather long one, but I'll try to be brief. 
It was introduced in the 80's as a logistics vehicle. Essentially, it was designed to ferry commanders around, and bring ammunition to tanks during the night/during a lull in fighting. This is the main reason it had plastic doors and such. Like every military vehicle, someone decided to slap a weapon system on top and used it outside of its main role. Some of this was good, such as the TOW humvee, other ideas weren't so good like sticking a .50 cal on the roof for anything other than close in defense. As a side note example of this, many LMTVs (a purely logistical truck similar to a WWII 2.5 ton truck) have a turret ring with a .50 cal on top. This doesn't mean anyone is riding logistics vehicles into combat. Its meant as a defensive thing. 
Essentially, light units were never married with the humvee in any real combat role. The closest the humvee came to a combat role was as a TOW carrier in the weapons company of light units. You can see this for yourself in CMSF if you load up a US Army light infantry battalion. All the infantry are dismounted, and the weapons company (and recon element) have humvees. The humvee was never meant to be used as a front line combat vehicle by line infantry in light infantry units. 
However, when Iraq (and to a much lesser extent) Afghanistan became urban based (again mostly Iraq) counter insurgency operations, the humvee was pressed into service as a patrol vehicle. Similar in concept to a police car. Motorized transport allows you to get places much faster, and carry more gear (ammo, food, water, equipment, etc) than you can on foot. Add in the 120F temperatures and you can see the appeal of not having to walk everywhere. Then of course, the insurgents started targeting the humvees, and then the whole up armor craze began. The humvee was basically used to fill a role that was missing from light/occupation forces in a specific theater. But the humvee was never added to the TO&E of light infantry units (that is, the line infantrymen). For example, if 10th Mountain ( a light infantry division) was deployed to Poland in 2008 after a surprise Russian attack, the infantry would have been dismounted just like in WWII. Any motorized transport would have been non-combat, such as trucks and the like. 
Light units today (10th Mountain, 101st, 82nd, etc) are all still primarily dismounted infantry. After driving/heloing/parachuting onto the battlefield, they walk everywhere else. 

Give me Abrams' 65 tons...
PS By the way these are pics from standard Russian tank training facilities.

DEVGrus

RPG MIRVed

Modern version of this? :)))
 
 

Sounds like a cool job my friend.  

Test scenario. RUS Recon HQ that has 6 people shows up as having just 3 people. What's affected is unit interface for the adversary after surrender. The map is ok - it shows 6. RUS interface is OK as well - shows correct number of soldiers. No mods here.

z_test.btt

In my experience, airsoft hurts less. Yet, I suspect it depends on the velocity of the projectile. Still, a small, air-filled, plastic ball has less mass than a gelatin paint capsule.
I think, why they use paintball is because it leaves paint. You know exactly who hit what, because it's painted. In Airsoft, you have to raise your hand and call out if you were hit. Letting a lot of dastardly gentlemen pretending not to feel it. Large hectic battles would lead to confusion with people calling hit, or maybe just moving. Airsoft works with small close-knit teams, while paintball is more suitable for such a mass melee.
Really cool reenactment. I apologize, in advance, if I derail this thread further:
 

PS Actually though paintball is hardly any match to engagement ranges of modern infantry combat but mortars and rocket launchers were the pain in the ass. When carefully fire adjusted they wipe away detachments of many dozens. Hand-grenades, under-barrel GLs and RPGs are also used prolifically - just can't quickly find pics from the games.

Certainly US military technology taken overall is way ahead of Russian's. But if you take the rest of the pack then Russia is more than competitive except for very specific areas and sometimes is even ahead of the curve. You can take turbine blades for materials science or military grade electronics where your latest iPhone is many times if not many magnitudes more impressive as a computational platform than F-35 - and Russia produces sensible amount of industrial semis. The major problem for Russian military production is not that they are unable to produce a toy at a certain technological level but rather that there's little if any market for such a toy (if it's of Russian origin ). Russian military budget alone is peanuts compared to US's so Russia cannot afford both big series production and/or too high a per unit cost. And with cutting edge equipment R&D is a major part of your per unit cost so you end up in a vicious circle. A half-measure to alleviate this is to put up with a lower per year output while trying to stick to the same series production numbers by extending production timeframe. You'll run into different kind of troubles - high maintenance costs, "teething problems", subtle or not-so-subtle differences between equipment within the same series - but still it may let you jump over your head a little bit.
There was this idea that Russia may spend a hell of money overnight and come with a totally updated army in an eye blink - hordes of Armatas AND Boomerangs AND Kurganets, 5th gen fighters AND Stealth bombers AND a full lineup of new transport planes. The idea was peddled by people who know nothing about the economics of high-tech business and sometimes have reasons not to know 

Kudrin
Medvedev

Certainly US military technology taken overall is way ahead of Russian's. But if you take the rest of the pack then Russia is more than competitive except for very specific areas and sometimes is even ahead of the curve. You can take turbine blades for materials science or military grade electronics where your latest iPhone is many times if not many magnitudes more impressive as a computational platform than F-35 - and Russia produces sensible amount of industrial semis. The major problem for Russian military production is not that they are unable to produce a toy at a certain technological level but rather that there's little if any market for such a toy (if it's of Russian origin ). Russian military budget alone is peanuts compared to US's so Russia cannot afford both big series production and/or too high a per unit cost. And with cutting edge equipment R&D is a major part of your per unit cost so you end up in a vicious circle. A half-measure to alleviate this is to put up with a lower per year output while trying to stick to the same series production numbers by extending production timeframe. You'll run into different kind of troubles - high maintenance costs, "teething problems", subtle or not-so-subtle differences between equipment within the same series - but still it may let you jump over your head a little bit.
There was this idea that Russia may spend a hell of money overnight and come with a totally updated army in an eye blink - hordes of Armatas AND Boomerangs AND Kurganets, 5th gen fighters AND Stealth bombers AND a full lineup of new transport planes. The idea was peddled by people who know nothing about the economics of high-tech business and sometimes have reasons not to know