Grisha

Hi, I used to play CMBB a lot (still have it on my vista machine even), and was thinking of moving on to ToW. I'm a fan of the Soviet-German War, so my question is: which should I choose, ToW1 or Tow2: Kursk? Any advice would be most appreciated!

Thanks, Jonny, will check it out!

An old CMBB grog who has just bought into the newer iteration of CM with CMA. Am liking it as well. Did this just come out? The repository has not a single scenario in it. Definitely a different sort of warfare from CMBB.

This is my system: Alienware Area-51® m5550 Video/Graphics Card: 256MB NVidia® GeForce™ Go 7600 Display: 15.4" WideUXGA 1920 x 1200 LCD - Saucer Silver Processor: Intel® Core™ 2 Duo Processor T7200 2.0GHz 4MB Cache 667MHz FSB Memory: 2GB Dual Channel DDR2 SO-DIMM at 667MHz - 2 x 1024MB Motherboard: Alienware® Intel® 945PM + ICH7 Chipset Operating System (Office software not included): Genuine Windows Vista™ Ultimate - Without Remote Control or TV Tuner System Drive: 100GB Serial ATA 1.5Gb/s 7,200 RPM w/ NCQ & 8MB Cache Primary CD ROM/DVD ROM: 24x DVD-ROM/CD-RW Burner Sound Card: Intel® 7.1 High-Definition Audio Wireless Network Card: Internal Intel® PRO Wireless 3945 a/b/g Mini-Card Communications: Integrated 10/1000Mb Gigabit Ethernet & 56K V.92 Modem I have DX10 on my system as well. I also run and play CMBB with no trouble. Is the problem being mentioned here to do with CMC per se or CMBB?

I can't believe this thing keeps crawling out of the woodwork. The reason why Suvorov's claim seems to jive with Zhukov's statement is because it's a half-truth exploited by Suvorov. Soviet military doctrine was closely aligned with Russian Communist doctrine which would not accept a defensive response to an external threat. Rather than wait for the enemy to attack and ravage the Motherland, the thought was to pre-empt an invasion with an attack. All Soviet plans for repelling an invasion were based on premptive attacks. There was no 'defensive' plan, because that would have been construed as 'defeatist'. Even as great a Soviet military mind as Svechin was discredited in the 1930s after his insistence on a defensive response to an invasion. It was simply unacceptable to the Soviet ideology. But, to somehow ascribe this as evidence that the Soviets planned on an expansionist world policy is stretching it. The fact of the matter is that the author of "Workers of the World Unite!" died in Mexico, an outcast in his own country, with an icepick in his head, and Stalin was more interested in keeping what he had. If you want to read an article written by John Erickson on the subject, here's the link. The actual article is only available online via payment it seems (do a google search of the title: BARBAROSSA JUNE 1941: WHO ATTACKED WHOM?, and you'll see what I mean). Anyway, I thought this ugly beast was long dead and gone, but I guess not. As in most things in life, it's a matter of not seeing the forest for the trees. I'll admit 'Suvorov' is a clever man, but that doesn't make him right, just misleading.

Interesting. Am reading the AAR now. So far, it sounds good. And, yeah this has been a long time ...

Thanks as well, John!

Also, you can get a better price here abebooks.com

From what a friend told me, I don't think this book is half bad. It covers the period of the Reichswehr when the Germans were still under the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty. The Soviets allowed the Germans to practice their tactical theories as it was being developed under von Seeckt (I remember the Germans had a school located as far away as Kazan). Much of it has been little known, so maybe this book offers some detailed insight into it all. What I find particularly interesting is if the Germans were in any way influenced by the Soviet development of operational art which was formulated exactly during this period. This would've been a time when the likes of Tukhachevskii and Triandafillov could've met with the likes of Beck.

Soviet troop razvedka was a number of things, from raids for capturing 'tongues' (taking prisoners for interrogation) and/or documents, to observation, to combat reconnaissance. Observation was pretty much as Jason states, the razvedchiki maneuvering under cover of darkness or terrain to their assigned objective, then setting up camouflaged OPs to observe and record. Radios could be taken when intelligence was timely. Raids were often bloody affairs since the objective was to capture either personnel or documents. There was usually no rhyme or reason to the objective, mostly to keep the Germans guessing. Subsequently, who or what was captured could vary quite a bit in intel value. The possibility for a raid to SNAFU was always there though experienced troops saw less of it than others. The Soviets took a lot of pride in their ability to snatch 'tongues'. Combat recon was usually done immediately prior to a planned assault (say, a day before to hours before). The primary intent was to confirm the 'freshness' of a specific intelligence picture, so the task was mainly to draw fire in a convincing display of an assault, then start matching gunfire to location. As the game of Soviet prep artillery against exposure of German troops in the trenches developed in the war, combat recon in turn developed with it. By 1945, combat reconnnaissance was conducted hours prior to an actual assault, sometimes with a short arty prep, sometimes not. The recon battalions assigned these missions had orders to see if they could take the first couple trench lines without much resistance, and if so, to radio back, at which point the army HQ would give the go signal for immediate full assault. Because of all the ploys and counterploys between Soviet and German wrt artillery barrages and exposure in the trenches, it was easier than it would seem at times.

Best of luck to you, WineCap. If that nomination is what I think it is, go easy on the bookings, eh? Unless it's one of those dolts diving in the box

If you want to get an idea of how Soviet foward detachments were typically comprised, see Glantz' Soviet Conduct of Tactical Maneuver: Spearhead of the Offensive. He has them depicted below brigade level in a few examples. Of course, you could just consider a reasonable assembly of units, based on the needs of the mission, and you probably wouldn't be far off. The Soviets were quite sensible in that regard, understanding fully the need for a self-reliant formation tasked with operational exploitation. Just bear in mind that a forward detachment was meant to clear the path for, or expedite the advancement of, the main forces, and you should likely come up with something credible. Missions often centered around securing a bridgehead, or attacking a town hastily defended. Later in the war it wasn't unusual for major forward detachments to be 50-100kms ahead of their parent tank corps.

Very happy to see that Maddox and his boys from Moscow have hooked up with you boys from BFC I always thought the two companies were ideal for one another. Don't know if my present computer can handle ToW, but if/when I get one that does, I'll get ToW. Even starting to play CMBB again albeit a little at a time Take care.

Shmavis, There are errors like that in Glantz' book. He tends to miss a detail here and there when it comes to the Germans. You would be better served to confirm these things with more typical German references or sources. I think Glantz even mentions in the book that the PzV had an 88mm cannon. Truth of the matter is, these sort of errors are beside the point of his book, which is to determine what really happened at Kursk, and why? Glantz goes into painful detail to unfold the sequences of events from both the German and Soviet sides. He shows in no uncertain terms that the Soviets took a horrendous beating tactically especially in armor. But, Glantz also shows that it was the timing and tempo of Soviet counterattacks that bogged German operational maneuver, forcing them to react numerous times to engagements on their flanks. It should also be pointed out that German losses in manpower during Zitadelle were quite high as well, relatively speaking.

Glad to see you found it useful, John

If you are a Russian who has pride in his country's contribution to defeating Germany in WWII, the whole Barbarossa episode can be very distasteful, especially since it makes Stalin look like he was duped. Suvorov's fantasy offers a more agreeable explanation to some for Stalin's seeming gaff to the whole German invasion: he was planning to attack all along, but was beaten to the punch by a few months. Others also find this theory very attractive, because it turns the Germans into pseudo-saviours of European culture. The problem is that there is no way the Soviets could've attacked anybody along their western border with any semblence of competence in 1941. The Red Army that first attacked Finland in 1939 had been in better shape than what was lined up along the Baltic, Western, Kiev, and Odessa Military Districts.

John, I think the book in question is "Icebreaker."

Would the Soviets have attacked Germany, if the Germans did not do so first? Yes, but a year, possibly two years, later. And, likely only if the Germans were engaged in other theaters. The Soviets and Germans had no illusions of their non-aggression pact. It was precisely that, a non-aggression pact, a promise not to attack one another for a period of time. Stalin had no wish to be bled white while the western allies looked on, and tried to arrange some sort of alliance with the Brits and French, hinging on German aggression. The western allies weren't biting at the time, being satisfied, instead, with going along with Hitler's plans of 'peacefully' incorporating Czechoslovakia. The Germans then came knocking on Stalin's door, emphatically pushing for a non-aggression pact. With the West seemingly not interested in an alliance, Stalin was determined not to be the West's 'fall' guy, and so began negotiations with the Germans. Soviet ideology and politics viewed itself as forward-looking, dynamic, and driven by the people--sort of how Napoleon's France and army were motivated as a revolutionary force of commoners. Because of this dynamic quality to the new Soviet State, the Soviets thought in terms of attack based on ideological and political principles. Defense was not an option. No longer were the Soviets going to allow aggressors to invade their country--much like the West did in the Civil War. Rather, any hint of invasion would be met by preemptive attack, if possible. Thus, should the Soviets determine that a nation intended to invade the Soviet State, immediate attack was their default military strategic course of action. By 1939 it was obvious who would be the most likely nation to attack the USSR. Hitler had been quite vocal from the mid-1930s of his long term goals for the Soviet State wrt German colonization. It was no secret. The non-aggression pact merely saved both sides a little time from the inevitable. Stalin was hoping that the Germans would first get mired in a conflict with the West before he would play his military hand--a hand that couldn't be played until mid-1942 at the earliest. As it turned out, Hitler called first, and to make things worse, Stalin was obsessed that Hitler was bluffing.

There are some good rebuttals to Rezun's (aka Suvorov) "Icebreaker" theory. First, there is Glantz' "Stumbling Colossus," then there is Gabriel Gorodetsky's "Grand Delusion." Of the two books I think Gorodetsky does a more convincing job, though Glantz' treatment is certainly more well known. Also, there was an article authored by the late John Erickson in History Today that discusses this very subject. It used to be freely available from FindArticle.com, but that's no longer the case. The title is "Barbarossa 1941: Who Attacked Whom?" All three are very respectable historians who have put an enormous amount of time and research into the study of the Soviet-German War. Given what Rezun has published since his sensational book, I would be more inclined to consider him a hardcore nationalist than an historian.

What brings about victory is not so simple, exactly true. Modern nations are much too complex with too much infrastructure to be reduced with simplistic notions of victory or defeat. To defeat a modern nation requires a systemic approach to strategy and operations.

Actually, Cuirassier, my point was not with respect to any one operation or phase of the Great War, but the limitations inherent in the prosecution of that war by the various sides. Neither the Allies or the Germans were ever able to effect an operational breakthrough in WWI. Without that ability the war mired into an economic struggle for the most part.

Rail was a big factor in stopping Germany's advance, or anyone's advance in WWI. It was simply too easy to quickly shift fresh reserves to a stricken sector, limiting any enemy exploitation to tactical depths. Supply and insufficient mechanization did, indeed, limit rates of advance. Concentrated artillery fire and machinegun fire halted the advance of, essentially, soft targets. There were methods for getting around this, but advances were still limited to a tactical nature without mechanization. To clarify, supply and lack of mechanization limited operational gains to the tactical. Rifled artillery and machineguns made any sort of advance a very difficult and costly problem. It didn't have to be as costly as it was in WWI--that was due to lack of dissemination of effective theories and regulations then in existence. But even these aids would have been for tactical gains for the most part. I should qualify all this by saying it applies to the Western front alone where densities were very high. The Eastern front is another story with different lessons.

Actually, this was more a response to the destructiveness of modern weaponry. Prior to WWI there had never been such a preponderance of rifled artillery and machineguns. The funny thing is western military theorists had studied all these developments, making sound conclusions and developing valid military theories (for the most part). The problem was disseminating this knowledge to the military field officers and noncoms. Apparently this failed for a number of reasons. One big stumbling block was the traditional 'romanticism' of war.

In summer 1941, the Red Army was at an extremely vulnerable point. Their force structure was in transition, their tactical and operational theories were a confused mess due to the purges, and their leadership was gutted from those same purges. It is absolutely no surprise (now) that as well trained and tactically modern a military force as the Wehrmacht would slice through that confused mass of a Red Army. An invading army could not wish for a more favorable situation. The Soviets spent the entire war fighting a force that was better tactically trained with better overall equipment. What the Germans did not have was as many men or as much equipment as the Soviets were willing to mobilize or produce. What I don't get is why brilliant tactics is so important to so many. Sure, it can be a great method to winning a battle, but it won't win you a war necessarily. Brilliant tactics is less important than a sound understanding of maneuver warfare, long known in Russia under the study of operational art. The Soviets trained their troops as best they could given the conditions. They also made the best use of their resources and technology to meeting their understanding of war. Besides, who needs Aufragstaktik when you can manipulate German intelligence enough to create overwhelming numerical superiority and extract extensive knowledge of the German's defensive forward edge. By 1944, this was routinely done in Soviet operations. I agree. When I speak of attrition warfare, I'm not talking about total war or limited war. Of course, attrition at the strategic level is a very real concern in war, and has been for thousands of years. From the perspective of military operations, though, attrition and maneuver have come to define the necessary transcendence of tactics to winning post-nineteenth century wars.

The Germans saw combined arms and mechanization as the means of overcoming a modern tactical defense. They also recognized the possibility for armor to effect the 'cannae' like maneuver of encirclement to rob the enemy force of support and security. The problem was these developments were seen from a mainly tactical perspective, limited to battle and its immediate post-stage. Thus, the Germans of WWII were quite adept at slicing through enemy defensive lines, then encircling them. However, there was no rhyme or reason to these encirclements, which resulted in severe overextension of the German infantry, excessive delays in overall operations, and the subsequent escape of many encircled troops. Also, German operations were rudimentary in their encirclements, generally being no more than two pronged, and deep to 'bag' as many enemy as possible. Contrast this to latter war Soviet operations which employed numerous smaller encirclements along multiple axes. The many smaller encirclements were more efficient, more secure, and less time-consuming than one huge one as was German practice.