Grisha

So, it is effective then? This is what I'm trying to determine, or was that difficult to assess from my original post? I should hope the game arrives tomorrow, so let's just let this one lie. I'll figure it out.

Thanks for lend lease figures!

You're right. You are scum

Guess I'll need to wait for my copy before I get anything intelligent on this ...

Weeping in Seattle. Apparently the game got to Gig Harbor before Seattle (Gig Harbor is about 40kms south of Seattle, as the crow flies). You're not alone, bobo

Since I have still yet to receive my copy of CMBB, can someone test the effects of Il-2s on a German truck/tank column?

I had to be at work by 2pm, which means if CMBB landed at home, it's there - and I'm here. At work. ARGGGHH!!!

That explains why he's a Commissar. (Commissars and party officials all live in dachas in Redmond, Bellevue, Issaquah and Samammish). (Gig Harbor/Key Center)</font>

Commissar, Where in Seattle? I live in Greenwood! Michael Emrys lives in Port Townsend, and Jeff Duquette's in Portland

My bud, Jeff, an ex-tanker corrected me about tank turns. Redwolf is right, as long as a tank had the ability to either:</font> operate both tracks in opposite directions. It's referred to as neutral steering.</font> brake one track, then operate the other track. Sort of a half-neutral steer. </font>Some tanks could do neither, for example, the M4 Sherman tank, and should have a slower standing turn. But, the majority probably should have a faster turn.

I see what you're saying now. I can place a fast move order to a nonmoving tank, assigning it to move 180 degrees from the initial point, and that tank will - after a time delay - rotate very quickly to 180 degrees of its initial heading, then set off at speed. This initial rotation will be much faster than a rotation command for the same heading change. Well, one could either explain it away by assuming that the initial rotation from a fast move is a 'shortcut' of a very tight turn under movement, or one could suggest to BFC that they impose some sort of rotational inertia function much like the translational inertia function in place for tanks that begin movement.

And, assuming that my previous post follows you correctly, BFC posted this as a new feature for CMBB: Halted vehicles rotate their hulls more slowly.

If you are saying that a tank should turn faster from a standstill than while on the move, I disagree. From a physics point of view, your line of logic makes no sense.

Hey, my two and a half year old son says, "Gaddy [his way of saying 'daddy'], see tanks. See steam." He loves watching those main guns go off in the CMBB demo

To be honest, I kind of like the personal commander reconnaissance

Geez louise! I can see why the Soviets chose the 122m L/48 over the 100mm L/54, just look at the penetration values for HE shot in the 122 L/48 (mike8g's post on page 11, at the bottom)! [ September 21, 2002, 02:37 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Well, Hooded One, it could be worse. You could live in Russia ... ... but, then again, the Russians do have their ways, I guess. [ September 20, 2002, 06:11 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

I remember when it was Avalon Hill's project for computer Squad Leader - in the Bigtime Software days (really enjoyed Over the Reich, too, Charles). When I first saw it I thought, "You've got to be kidding..." Wasn't impressed at all. Finally, played the demo after Avalon Hill was assimilated by Hasbro and I was hearing good stuff about CMBO. The first time I played it I thought, "God, I hope they're coming out with the Russian front!" Many thanks, BTS->BFC! And, well done

Has either Spkr or Capt thought of opening email accounts with hotmail or yahoo?

The Soviets had no idea they had encircled 300,000 Axis troops. They thought the pocket only contained 90,000. It was a serious Soviet intelligence failure, and resulted in the lose of a large number of Soviet units who were needed to reduce this huge pocket. The encirclement and reduction of German 6th Army (and a major portion of 4th Panzer Army) did much to curtail Soviet plans to exploit the situation operationally.

Shosties, Regarding German operational capabilities, don't confuse German confidence in their ability to conquer the USSR as a clear understanding in how they were to go about it. There really was no plan other than "you go that way, I'll go this way." When the Panzers ran up against resistance they dealt with it as they were trained to - and excellently trained they were. But German operations were almost done as if the Soviets weren't there. German field officers had a general knowledge of what Soviet units were on the front, and what Soviet units might be in reserve. They would then plan operations taking the worst case scenario that the enemy could realistically present. Hence, they really didn't take operations much above the tactical level. Some commanders were quite knowlegeable with operational aspects of warfare, and faired better than others, but none of this was taught. German operations set obscure objectives, then relied on their ability for tactical improvization to address any unexpected situations.

Spook, Okay, you ask about comparisons between western Allies and Soviet. It primarily has to do with scale and method of execution (Dang, I really wish I had this paper wrapped up, because it's all going to be in there). The Belorussian operation of June 1944 encompassed a frontage that was larger than the entire western front in northern France in Sept.1944. The Soviets were capable of conducting very large operations with complex maneuvering and timing. There was a distinct operational objective to Soviet operations, and every aspect of military art was applied in the successful attainment of that objective. There were few 'blind spots' in their operations, as every phase of the operation, from initial attack to final exploitation moves and consolidations, was planned for and covered. The Soviets understood how each of their services could be best employed in assisting in the completion of an operation, not just an upcoming battle, but the entire operation. I know people are going to scream when I make this analogy, but think of a 1944-45 Soviet operation in terms of a SpecOps raid from the point of view of planning and execution. This was pretty much how it was, except that the primary players were army and front commanders. Sure, there were mistakes, but that's a given in war. Soviet operations were precise in planning and meticulous in execution in order that the advantages they had acquired through extensive intelligence/reconnaissance and deception were maximized to the utmost. Because of these advantages the speed and effectiveness of their maneuvering was augmented, and the level of complexity was doable. Battles were often decided before they began, and enemy counterattacks were nipped in the bud more often than not. The Germans tactical prowess was formidible, but meant little when entire German formations were being encircled, to be destroyed piecemeal. I won't lie and say I know a lot about western allied operations, but I've been told by some knowledgeble people that western operations operated on a broad front and tended to the side of caution. There were dynamic leaders in the western allied army, but they were personalities, not a result of overall western military thinking in general. The western allies understood the operational-strategic relationship better than the Germans, but only as an acquired skill from their basic use of operations.

John, Understood, and that could have been equally as probable. With the amount of confusion and hard decisions that needed to be made in 1941 (while all this was going on, decisions also had to be made about moving heavy industry to the Urals as well - knowing full well this would impact production in terms of quantity and quality for months to come) it's not surprising to me in the least. To be honest, I don't think the Red Army had much choice in the matter. They just had to make the best of a very, very bad situation.

Juha Ahoniemi and John Kettler, I don't believe anyone's discounting the fact that this occurred. But, it must be seen in context. 1941 was a very chaotic time for the Soviets for a number of reasons, and that's not including the German invasion. When militia divisions were hastily formed along the Moscow direction in summer-fall of 1941, they were generally nothing more than untrained men with a paucity of weaponry. If sufficient equipment could've been appropriated for them in a timely manner they would've done it, but such were those chaotic days that it didn't happen. The fact that the Soviets were forming entire units out of untrained civilians should be enough indication of that. However, one shouldn't think this was a TOE practice. Even shtraf(incidently, a borrowing from a German military term) units had weapons on hand for all during the war. By spring-summer 1942, stories of unarmed Soviets was gone.

The first Shermans to be sent to the Soviet Union were gasoline engines. Stalin complained about this due to the easy brew-ups, and soon thereafter lend lease Shermans to the USSR were all diesel-powered. T-34s were diesel-powered as well.