Grisha

Gospodin Picky points out that Loza was wounded in a Matilda in Spetember 1943. Source: "Commanding the Red Army's Sherman Tanks", Dmitriy Loza HSU, tr. James F Gebhart, University of Nebraska Press, 1996, page 157. All the best, John.</font>

Heh. This is an earlier post I made here, and it's incorrect. Loza himself was a tanker in the 5th Mech Corps, and when they were refitted in fall-winter of 1943 at least his brigade received Emchas, or M4A2s. I believe, by the time 5th Mech Corps had been designated 9th Guards Mech Corps, the entire unit had switched to Shermans. Incidently, Loza was wounded in a Valentine in 1942.

Wow, go to sleep, and come back to see this thread at 31 replies! Anyway, Hortlund, regarding your question about Sherman ammo storage. Yes, the Soviets are indirectly referring to wet storage. Steve G. posted Loza's account of his crew sitting underneath their brewing tank, unable to get out from under it due to enemy fire. Loza and his crew thought they were all going to die from secondary explosions, but that wet storage system insured that they just got a little too warm for awhile. And they sat underneath that thing for quite awhile, too.

Poobear, It depends. SUs were in two categories: tank hunters, and assault guns. The SU-85 and SU-100 (and ISU-122 to a degree) fit the tank hunter category. The SU-100 was particularly deadly - an outright Tiger/Panther killer. The other category, assault guns, were where the majority of the SUs fit in: SU-122, SU-152, SU-76, ISU-122, and ISU-152. These were intended for the penetration phase of an attack, directly support the infantry assault, particularly against hardpoints. The SUs were generally the furtherest back of all the attack echelons, offering fire support where needed. [edit] Oops! Andreas beat me to it [ September 11, 2002, 02:58 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

gunnergoz, Sure does. Regarding Matildas & Valentines, 1,084 and 3,782 were sent to the Soviet Union, respectively. Of these, 252 Matildas and 320 Valentines were lost in transit.

Yeah, Steve, I don't want to think about that. Matildas, too. I believe the 5th Mech Corps was hastily formed up, only receiving their commander a month before, to go fight along the Don during the encirclement battles at Stalingrad. They were entirely equipped with nothing by Valentines and Matildas. By 1943, almost all of their tanks were Valentines, and it wasn't until Sept 1943 that 5th Mech Corps finally replaced them with T-34s. Now, that's what I call 40mm Blues. gunnergoz, Sharp says 417 Shermans 'were lost in transit.'

I don't know how many know this but here's how many Shermans made it to the Soviet Union: </font> 2,007 M4A2 w/75mm gun</font> 2,095 M4A2 w/76mm gun </font>According to Charles Sharp here's what the Soviets had to said about it compared to a T-34/85: </font> Faster turret traverse and better sights.</font> Could carry far more ammunition for main gun.</font> Better protected ammunition storage.</font> More mechanically reliable (T-34/85's engine life, measured in running hours, was shorter than a Sherman's track shoes).</font> 76mm gun had better armor penetration than the 85mm gun. </font>The mechanized corps was considered the premier operational-tactical armor formation of the Red Army, and in 1945 there were 9 with Guards designations (out of a total of 14 mech corps). Guards units usually had first consideration for equipment, a Guards mech corps especially. Out of the 9 Guards mech corps, three were completely equipped with M4A2 Shermans, and one even turned in all their T-34/85s for Sherman tanks. Now, I have a great interest in Soviet military forces, as well as admiration for their military art, so when 3 Guards Mech Corps are completely equipped with Shermans, that tells me something. </font> </font>Another interesting lend lease fact is the number of halftracks the Red Army received. From the USA it was: </font> 100 M15A1s (1 37mm, 2 .50cal - AAA)</font> 1,000 M17s (4 .50cal - AAA)</font> 650 T48s (SU-57, in Russian. Had 57mm gun)</font> 342 M2 halftracks</font> 421 M5 halftracks</font> 413 M9 halftracks</font> 3,340 M3A1 halftrack Scout Cars </font>From the UK: </font> 2,560 Universal Carriers </font>

Abbot, Nice shot of an SU-76. How about an ISU-152?

I was looking at the PC Games review of CMBB, and saw the scenario display. While looking at the Soviet icons, I idly wondered at the differences in background color, then it dawned on me. You guys are trying to match service colors. Tank forces were black, rifle were a raspberry sort of red, airborne were blue. Very nice attention to detail - thanks!

Tak, u vas est' problema c Russkim? Eto - zhalost'

This was discussed earlier in this thread(click). Amazing what we in the west have yet to learn about this war. For example, I never heard of a shaped-charge anti-tank grenade until about a year ago, but Soviet were making them, complete with a stabilization mechanism so that once it was thrown the grenade would hit head first. That's what the tank hunter teams in the Citadel scenario are using along with molotov cocktails. They were called RPG-43s

I believe you're right, Michael. I even remember reading one story where Churchill and Stalin had gotten to the conference room before Roosevelt. Compared to the other two, Roosevelt was somewhat of an idealist. Churchill and Stalin on the other hand, while they might have not trusted one another, did share a similar view of the world. The story goes that Churchill, without speaking a word, took out a piece of paper, wrote down the names of some countries in Europe, then passed the paper to Stalin. After looking at the names for a bit, Stalin then wrote some names of countries, and passed it back. Churchill looked at Stalin's choices, considered them for a spell, then nodded in agreement. At that point, Roosevelt showed up, none the wiser.

Andreas, To expect anything but fanatical defense of their homeland would've been naive of the Soviets, no doubt. And we're talking of an operation that while amazingly successful (very light causalties as well), was still on the very end of exploitation when it reached the Oder River. I really can't comment one way or another on it, and hope that Glantz puts something together on this before too long. Michael E., Your comment about psychological will of the enemy is interesting. The Germans believed in this concept as a precept of war, but the Soviets didn't. To all, As for the obsession for Berlin, I can say with confidence that Stalin didn't need to do much cajoling, if any, to get the Soviet people behind him on this. Actually, it probably would have been a very unwise decision domestically if Stalin had given Berlin to the west. For the average Soviet citizen during WWII, taking Berlin was the only way they were going to feel any sense of justice to what had happened, and they said as much. Alexander Werth's book can really give you a sense of the outrage Soviet citizens felt about the German invasion of their homeland. I'm not trying to pass judgement, or make political calls, just making an attempt at ensuring a particular perspective is addressed. Namely, the people who probably suffered the most in the war in Europe - the Soviet people.

Andreas, The strange thing is that Glantz has been recorded recently of stating that he has new evidence that indicates Berlin could've been taken in February-March, and with far fewer casualties. The reasons it wasn't was political and on Stalin's orders. I don't know what evidence Glantz speaks of, but it should be interesting if/when it's published. Personally, I find it all confusing, since it's well known that during the Vistula-Oder operation there was an emerging threat from Pomerania with up to 40 German divisions forming there. However, Glantz doesn't make such claims lightly. From what I've gathered from Glantz and my own knowledge, Stalin initially gave the order to continue on to Berlin into mid-February. Then, there was the Yalta conference, and during this time Stalin called a halt to operations up north once he obtained the west's promise not to take Berlin. After this, Stalin immediately called for an operation to take Vienna, shifting significant forces from the Berlin direction southwards. Once, this was complete, the operation for Berlin was planned. Makes for interesting discussion, even 60 years later, no?

Gaylord, the MiG-3 was no longer in serial production by mid-1942 with only 134 in the VVS inventory by that time. By 1943, at least one fighter air regiment, 122nd, still had MiG-3s, but they were deployed away from the intense fighting down south. This unit did encounter a few 190s in the Western Front's sector, but by and large MiG-3s were a rarity at this time in the war. Most of them had been transferred to PVO units by then. It would've been far more common for the Luftwaffe to encounter P-39Ns, lightened versions of LaGG-3s, Yak-1B/7B/9/9Ds and La-5/5F/5FNs by 1943.

Incidently, Bastables, the event you quoted was part of an air campaign that saw 1000+ combat aircraft on either side arrayed in tense air combat. There were days when it seemed like planes were falling from the sky every 10 minutes. The entire air campaign lasted through April and May, and ended with Luftwaffe forces calling off air operations. Losses were substantial for both sides, but the VVS considered this campaign to be their 'Midway,' it had such an effect upon their development in tactics and operational effectiveness. After the Kuban Bridgehead, the VVS stayed on an offensive footing until the war's ended. In another thread, I posted the reasons why the Luftwaffe was able to hold local superiority until war's end, and suffice to say it had more to do with VVS doctrine than the lack of ability of Soviet airman - at least from mid-1943, on (though I have to say initial VVS performance during Kursk is starting to look pretty poor). The way the VVS was subordinated to the Red Army as a supporting asset for ground operations had its advantages from the Soviet tanker's and rifleman's perspective, but it did allow the Luftwaffe to remain a force in the East throughout the duration. That's probably much more information than you even wanted to know, but I've always had a soft spot for air combat. Anyway, it makes for a great situation for us, because both sides could conceivably have air assets throughout the entire war

Incidently, the Soviet RPG grenades are shaped charge deals designed to hit on the important side when thrown.

You can also use covered arc for moving units so that they keep their attention in a specific area.

AussieJeff, I'm currently playing Yelna against a human opponent and I'm not seeing any vast increase in processing time. Don't know what to say. Strange.

Slowdown? Not here. I have a AMD XP 1900+ with 512Mb DDRAM, and a GEForce3 vidcard. I'm doing fine. In fact, it seems that CMBB scrolls across the 3D environment less haltingly than in CMBO.

I agree. The Soviets divided the Soviet-German War into three periods for analytical purposes: </font>1st Period - From the beginning of Barbarossa to November 1942. </font>2nd Period - December 1942 to December 1943. </font>3rd Period - 1944-45. </font>I'd say each period does a much better job of defining the state and effectiveness of Soviet forces in WWII. The Germans did only have a rudimentary understanding of operational art. There was no theory in German military art that formally addressed the study and conduct of operations as a level of military art, and how it related to strategy on the one end and tactics on the other. There was an understanding of operations, insomuch as they were methods of focusing tactical actions within an overall objective, but the details for this were pretty much left to the operational commander to figure out for himself. Thus, while some German commanders, most notably von Manstein, showed a high level of skill for the operational level, this was purely dependent on a commander by commander basis. And the German combined arms concept known generally as blitzkrieg was just that - a combined arms concept, nothing more. It's application in the tactical realm were formidible, but at the operational level it was nothing more than a means to an end - a tool that could be used with great effectiveness at the operational level. There was a thoroughness to Soviet operational theory that by 1944 manifested itself in operations that displayed amazing complexity, yet because of the degree of centralization could exhibit surprising flexibility at the operational level. Another thing is that Soviet tactics and tactical questions were generally determined by operational objectives and priorities. When Soviet tactical commanders were given authority to act freely within their assigned orders (as in forward detachments) they performed with great effectiveness at that level. And the reason Soviet tactical commanders weren't generally given such freedom of action was because the thoroughness of operational planning had already done a lot of their work for them. For example, operational intelligence plans generally insured that German defensive positions were mostly detected and identified at the tactical level, and most German tactical and operational reserves, as well as artillery positions, were located. A proper discussion of Soviet operational theory encompasses a number of fairly extensive military fields of study, such as intelligence/reconnaissance, operational planning and manuever, and deception. There are whole books on each of these three areas, and with some friends I'm still delving into it all. Also, because operational art was placed between strategy and tactics, it created two new relationships that must be understood: the tactical-operational and the operational-strategic. It's an amazing subject of study, and one I'll be immersed on for years to come. Your comments on deception, or maskirovka, are accurate. However, in order for an operation to plunge 600km into the German rear in 2 weeks requires more than a sound penetration of German defenses. Quite a bit more, and Soviet operational theory was the foundation for conducting such a feat.

Well, Hi Hortlund, glad to see you've decided to grace this forum after your tumultuous stay at the Aces High Forum - you usually post in the 'O'Club Forum,' correct? Have you suddenly taken a liking to ground combat simulations? Or, was it perhaps the fact that the Soviets were involved? Many of your points regarding the Red Army are very similar to those made soon after the war by German Generals like Guderian, von Manstein and von Mellenthin, as well as many other German officers interviewed by the US Army and Air Force in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The weakness of their arguments were in the fact that they did not understand the Red Army, nor operational art, as well as they seemed to. In fact, the US Army didn't really begin to grasp operational art until the 1980s, a full 35 years after WWII. Much of what the German postwar memoirs/interviews interpret as tactical deficiencies were either based on Soviet operational priorities, or generalizations that while existed in the beginning part of the war, no longer was done to any great extent in the latter part of the war. The strength of postwar German accounts is that some of these deficiencies, such as blocking detachments, or penal battalions, did in fact occur all through the war. But, then again, so did German use of such things as penal units. It is a fact, for instance, that the percentage of total German military personnel executed or imprisoned for 'indisciplinary action' by the German military forces was over two and a half times as high (3.3%) as the percentage of Soviet soldiers similarly dealt with by the Red Army (1.25%). If you wish to pursue this fact further I can direct you to Richard Overy's Why the Allies Won, p.304. I leave it to you to judge his sources. So, did the Soviets deal harshly with their own? Yes, they did at times, especially during the darkest hours of their fight for survival in 1941-42. But, this type of treatment wasn't limited to the Soviet Union, you can be certain of that. Another problem is that many people do not understand how the Soviets fought, and by this I mean where the Soviets 'hinged' (to use a friend's term - and a good one at that)in their command structure, as well as the operational, intelligence, and logistical aspects of conducting war. It was at the operational level, a field of military art that was incompletely understood by all other combatant nations in WWII. The use of operations was an outgrowth of WWI, but the theory and practice of conducting operations was a study conducted solely by the Soviets at that time. It was during the period of the 1920s and 1930s that operational art came into being as a distinct level of military art, between strategy and tactics, and this distinction was established by Soviet military theorists. The purges of 1937 undid much of this work, and contributed greatly to the dismal performance of the Red Army in the early years of WWII, but these military concepts were revived, studied, and refined during WWII such that from mid-1943 to war's end the practice of operational art by the Red Army was formidible in effect and elegant in execution. There are many elements to operational art, far too many that I'd want to continue in this thread, and since I'm writing a paper on it at the moment which is intended for the wargamer community, I'll not go any deeper than that. However, if you do wish to understand this vital aspect of the Red Army I suggest you read Glantz, preferably his Frank Cass publications. So, welcome, Hortlund. And I do look forward to seeing you in battle in CMBB - as Soviet

Sorry, but I don't quite follow you.

Okay, I just did a very inane thing: deleted a post I thought was a double, but was in fact not <sigh>. Once more from the top, and with feeling this time ... Apparently, I did get my facts wrong. The Germans had prepared a large quantity of granite blocks for the construction of a monument to Hitler in Moscow sometime after Barbarossa. These blocks of granite were even sent into Russia in anticipation of Moscow's fall. When this was no longer a possibility, the Germans then left the shipment of granite in Russia. After the war, the Soviets made use of them as foundations for urban buildings on Ulitza Gorkogo (now, Tverskaya Street). The story of the Party members, and Stalin's rejection still stand though. [ September 04, 2002, 03:58 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]