Grisha

Romania did have an indigenous fighter called the I.A.R. 80. Not a bad plane if a little underpowered: http://www.fortunecity.com/tattooine/farmer/120/iar.html

killmore, actually you are right! I got my facts wrong. Here's the quote from Black Cross/Red Star, Vol. 1: The plot worked. Source reference is to - A. Glass, K. Cieslak, W. Gawrych, and A. Skupiewski. Samoloty bombowe wrzesnia 1939. Warsaw: SIGMA-NOT, 1991. God, can't type to save my life today. [ August 14, 2002, 11:12 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

No, it was Germany that bombed Hungary. Check the latest book, Black Cross/Red Star. It was a German ploy to get Hungary in the war. They flew planes marked as Soviet aircraft.

NightGauntt, The fact that both players would have the same time to decide what to do more or less evens it out, whether playing under a timed constraint or not. Since information is never complete for a good portion of the game, a bit of thought is required in determining possible enemy dispositions and intentions, so having a large time factor to give orders does not necessarily confer a greater advantage - though it probably allows one to act on one's hunches more completely. Another thing to think about is the actual issuing of orders. It’s one thing to call on the radio/land-line/runner and have a platoon ‘secure the treeline on the right’, and another thing to actually make the moves necessary in CM to execute that order, or even a phase of that order. As units multiply in larger games the amount of micromanagement needed to actual conduct the execution of the most basic orders increases. How much time is needed for that? Should there be two timers, one for orders and one for moves? This could get complicated. I’m not convinced that rushing players into finishing their turns as quickly as possible is realistic wrt CM. You state that by rushing to finish orders one makes up for the universal spotting effect as well as insufficient command delay. I contend that by rushing orders you do not allow your subunits to act/react as fully as they would be able to. Go your way and we have a game that results in overall poorer subunit conduct, go my way and the commanders have too much control over the battle. In traditional wargames, while it was always fun to win (okay, more than fun), the main reason many people participated in this hobby was to try and learn more of the conflict in question, so as to understand just how events or impressions came to pass. The interest was military history and military art, not winning or difficulty of play. Winning in games is fun, but if that’s all you’re interested in, why bother with wargames?

I think I did hear that saved games can be played as new games. Which means that a saved game on a huge map can be played for so many turns, saved, then opened up in the editor to add reinforcements etc - though this might require 3rd party intervention. Anyway, it's another option to the in-game operation, given I have my facts straight

NightGauntt, My issue with ‘timed’ games is that they fly in the face of logic sometimes. If I were to send a platoon towards an area that they knew had an enemy mg nest or infantry gun you can be fairly certain that I would be receiving word of this situation via comms/runners very shortly. Hence, my rushing to make orders that are poorly based on my intelligence picture – since what my subunits spot will be general knowledge in some timely manner – is illogical, and poor leadership. If a platoon under my command sees an enemy position, the rest of the command will be aware of it in time. Certainly not to the degree as it exists in CM now, but it is inevitable. I believe the primary reason for placing a timer for TCP/IP games in CM was because some people are very impatient, and this gave them a means of moving the game along a bit faster. Another example of a tactical RTS is ‘Close Combat’.

Thank you, CMPlayer, for pointing that out. I began to respond to this last night but, after the 3rd paragraph, gave up. The CM community seems to possess a greater percentage of 'traditional' wargamers (maps, counters, rulebooks, dice) than most other computer 'wargames' (I'm sorry, a tactical RTS is not a wargame. However, the idea of an RTS for strategy-level wargames is an interesting idea. One caveat should be that the term 'real-time' refers to the game design, i.e. no game stops, rather than a correlation of actual time to game time). I guess it needs to be reiterated from time to time what a wargame is - including a computer version like CM. Personally, if I'm playing TCP/IP I need a minute of time for every HQ unit in the game. [ August 12, 2002, 03:30 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

One thing to remember is that nearly the entire German spy network in the U.K. were comprised of British double agents. It was one of the biggest intel coups of the war.

Lucy wasn't a spy ring, but an agent (Rudolph Rossler) who was part of another agent's ring. This agent was called Dora (Alexander Rado). One rumor has it that Lucy had access to a key German intelligence source call Werther. Another rumor claims that Lucy was the pipeline from which ULTRA intelligence was delivered to the Soviets. The official history of British Intelligence rejects this claim, and besides most of the information regarding these 'spy rings' is journalistic in nature and undocumented. Wrt to actual Soviet intelligence, either by NKVD or GRU, certainly these spy rings existed, but nothing conclusive can really be said until Soviet archives on these issues are accessible. The general consensus within Soviet military history is that these agent activities were largely unproductive. Information received was of a general strategic nature, lacking in detail, and dated. Some historians of Soviet military history even claim that many if not most of these spy coups, i.e. Kursk intel, were just cover stories for what was actually much more comprehensive and military-oriented intelligence/reconnaissance (razvedka) work. [ August 10, 2002, 12:04 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Stormhouse, Very good point about communication. Even at the time of the Poland invasion all German tanks had radio receivers and all command tanks, transmitter/receivers. As for the lack of German intelligence on the Soviet Union, it's important to understand the attitude the Nazi Gov't. and German military in general had for the Soviet Union. Hitler didn't order a strategic intelligence operation on the Soviet Union until after he decided to begin plans for Barbarossa. This was mostly due to a sense of overwhelming confidence in the German military as well as a very low opinion in Soviet capabilities as a military force and a people. A good book to read on this is Kahn's Hitler's Spies. He spent eight years researching German military intelligence, using German archival records.

Incidently, those first three or four shots remind me a lot of the countryside just outside Moscow.

Matt, Another thing I really love about CMBB is the backdrops. They just seem to merge a lot better with the foreground 3D environment.

Matt, Many thanks! The modelling and skins are beautiful! September is just too far away. [ August 07, 2002, 10:47 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Seeing as how this thread is metamorphasizing(?) with each click of the refresh button, I can just see in my mind's eye a man typing away feverishly, cursing at irregular intervals ...

Andreas, Regarding any evidence that the German Army collected war experience for the purposes of improving combat performance, good question. One way of finding out would be to see if the Germans updated their combat regulations. The Soviets updated theirs on an annual basis in direct response to new developments in combat experience. M.Dorosh, Ahh, so the question that started this whole thread was from a regimental perspective? Well, that changes things quite a bit - just take everything I posted and chuck it out the window Seriously though, at regimental level the war was mainly a tactical problem, and since loss ratios didn't even up between the Soviets and Germans until 1945, one could say that German effectiveness was superior to the Soviets at the tactical level until 1945. German tactical training, both in tactics and leadership, was simply outstanding and no one in WWII matched it, period. The Soviets improved vastly throughout the war, but could never equal the Germans until the last year of the war - and this had just as much to do with the drop in German training and experience as it did in the rise in Soviet training and experience. However, it must also be said that the concern for tactics was less vital in the Red Army, because of their development of operational art. This was because operational art solved a number of the problems normally associated at the tactical level. I know, digressing yet again, but this information needs to get out. It's been 55 years in need of the telling

JasonC, Great point. In one test scenario I made for CMBO, I tested just this, using a small but powerful Brit armor force with infantry riding on the tanks who were attacking a German hasty defensive position(probe in CMBO). When I came to what seemed the most likely first line of defense, I got fairly close to the probable position - a treeline. At 200m, I dismounted the tank-riders. The enemy didn't expose themselves by firing until my tank-riders advanced to within about 100m of the treeline (grant you, I wasn't really focusing on good tactics, just wanted to see the reaction priorities). However, the platoon lived long enough to draw all enemy fire, allowing the tanks who were at a mere 200m to blast the enemy position without trouble.

Yes, I think we do agree actually, just some details here and there.

JasonC, You are correct to state that German operational-strategic directives were very general in meaning, and that it was the field officers, the large unit commanders (Army Group, Army) who made a lot of the decisions past the breakthrough stage. I took license with the German General Staff planning in order to prove another point, and now I stand corrected. However, this does further illuminate just how the German General Staff officer corps intuitively understood operational art, since they did link their operations and make a lot of the right decisions early on from that level of warfare. However, its one thing to have an intuitive sense for operational art, and quite another to fully grasp its capabilities. And, yes, maneuver is only as good as its ability to contribute to the destruction of enemy forces.

Excellent question, Michael, and one the Germans should've asked themselves between the wars as well. But to be fair, Soviet experiences during the Russian Civil War had a lot to do with their development of operational art. Let me quote the Soviet definitions for each: Military Strategy Embracing the theory and practice of preparing the nation and armed forces for war, planning and conducting strategic operations and war as a whole. The theory of military strategy studies the laws and nature of war and the methods for conducting it; and works out the theoretical basis of planning, preparing and conducting strategic operations and war as a whole. Operational Art Operational art encompasses the theory and practice of preparing for and conducting combined and independent operations by large units (fronts, armies) of the armed forces. It occupies an intermediate position between strategy and tactics. Stemming from strategic requirements, operational art determines methods of preparing for and conducting operations to achieve strategic goals. Operational art in its turn establishes the tasks and direction for the development of tactics. Tactics A component part of military science, embracing the theory and practice of preparing and conducting battle by subunits (battalions), units (regiments) and formations (divisions, corps) of various types of forces, branches of forces or specialized forces. The theory of tactics investigates the rules, nature and contents of battle and works out the means of preparing for and conducting battle. Of course, this requires the definition of 'battle' and 'operation'. So, FORMS OF COMBAT ACTION (BOEVYE DEISTVIIA) </font> combat - an organized clash of combatant units.</font> blow - a short term attack on the enemy with forces or weapons (main, frontal, flank)</font> battle - an aggregate of combat and blows aimed at achieving operational aims or particular objectives. The basic form of army combat actions.</font> operations - actions conducted by large operational units (front, army); an aggregate of combat, blows and battles conducted in a theater of military operations or on a strategic (operational) axis, with mutual and interconnected aims, locations, and timing, according to a single concept or plan aimed at achieving strategic, operational-strategic or operational objectives (strategic, front, army)</font>By looking at these definitions one could say that the Germans conducted operational, operational-strategic and strategic operations without the full[edit!] benefit of operational art. It's just that I couldn't say it this way before without these definitions, because of western military ambiguities for the word 'operation'. It would've made no sense at all [ August 06, 2002, 04:19 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Yes, Gpig, I do seem to be hammering away at semantical differences, but I really feel it is important to make the distinction, because this is exactly why the Germans lost on the Eastern Front. While they intuitively grasped the use of operations, German military doctrine didn't officially recognize operational art as an intermediary level between strategy and tactics. Because of that, the German armed forces operated with serious deficiencies at the operational level in the areas of intelligence and logistics. The Soviet recognition, development and practice of operational art as a distinct component of military art (namely, tactics-operational art-strategy) resulted in them possessing a significant mid-late war advantage in the conduct of warfare, much like blitzkrieg gave the Germans earlier in the war. This advantage shouldn't be considered as an immense one since the Germans did after all grasp operational art from an operations standpoint ('operations' meaning in this case the operations staff, which alongside the intelligence staff and quartermaster/logistics staff, comprised the majority of the General Staff). But because the Germans never recognized operational art as a separate distinct level between strategy and tactics, they could not correctly address their weaknesses in this regard. Okay, I promise to make no more posts on this issue. I'm done. Apologies to all who had no interest in my insistent postings

Forgive me, Andrew, but this sounds wrong. In Soviet terms, In the 1930s a Soviet military theorist, Aleksandr Svechin, explained Soviet military art concisely: "Tactics make the steps from which operational leaps are assembled; strategy points out the path." So, to get back to your statement, "linking operations up to achieve some objective is operational art." Strategy is the means by which operational art is directed to achieve ultimate victory.

Michael Emrys, I believe the Germans started to consider the concept of operations in WWI, using the word operativ. However, this idea wasn't picked up after the war. It was the Soviets who really put operational art together during the 1920s and 1930s in theory. But it wasn't until WWII when they were able to put it into practice. [addition]However, I do think we may be talking semantics. It's just that the Soviets were meticulous about their military-political terms and 'operations' within the context of operational art had a precise meaning As for tactical excellence, I agree completely, nobody in WWII could compare to the Germans. Zitadelle, Regarding your reference to Berlin as an objective previously, I think you're referring to the Vistula-Oder operation of 12 January 1945. Actually, it was originally called the 'Vistula-Poznan' operation, but advance rates were going so well STAVKA gave the go ahead to continue onto the Oder. Still, this doesn't contradict my statement, since it turns out Soviet operational objectives ended up being conservative. With the Germans, the opposite was often the case. [ August 06, 2002, 11:35 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Michael, Yes, the Germans were good at operations per se, but they didn't understand operational art. A good way to understand this is by looking at what were the operational objectives for Germans and Soviets. When you look at German operational objectives from 1941-42 you often see strategic objectives like Moscow, Leningrad, the Donbasin, and Baku. When you look at Soviet objectives from 1944-45 you see objectives firmly grounded within the limits of the forces involved - operational objectives. Examples to compare would be Barbarossa with Bagration. The only Soviet operation that placed Berlin as its objective was when Soviet forces were on the banks of the Oder. Furthermore, each Soviet operation set the foundations for the next one to come. The Germans never did this, because they didn't think of operations as intermediate steps towards which strategic victory was achieved. I know I'm not explaining myself well, but I think the point has to deal with the definition of operation. For the Soviets, an operation in 1944-45 was a very distinct and defined part of their military art. For the Germans, the term 'operation' in 1941-42 had a loosely defined meaning that encompassed a military campaign of variable length and scope with immediate strategic implications.

Actually, Ligur, the Eastern Front at the operational-strategic level is a fascinating subject and one that has only fully come to light in the last decade, or so

Not quite. But to use your example, here's what would happen. The German General Staff would give a strategic order, say 'take Paris', then give senior officers general directions on who was to go where and how long they had to do it. Senior officers would do likewise, on down the chain of command. Blitzkrieg combined arms warfare combined with excellently trained troops would blow holes through the French line, then send Panzer divisions to exploit deeply into the French rear. Distances are such that those Panzer divisions can make it to Paris within the confines of the operation. Hence, operational goal matches strategic goal. They were able to do this in Poland, and also repeat it in Greece, thereby reinforcing the idea of a one-operation strategic victory. It allows the Germans to skimp on things like intelligence and logistics, since initial surprise and blitzkrieg (defining blitzkrieg as a combined arms concept that has tremendous tactical applications and operational implications) alleviate the need for more detailed intelligence, and the operation doesn't last long enough to consider a more long term approach to logistics. Now, the Germans attack the Soviet Union. German General Staff says, "Take Moscow, Leningrad, and the Don basin," thinking this will force the Soviets to surrender. Maximum planning is for 3-5 months, but nobody seriously thinks it'll get past 3. It's now November, and the Germans have still to take Leningrad and Moscow. They fail. Now what? The Germans had no methodolgy for using operations as stepping stones for achieving strategic victory. For the Germans, only one operation was needed to either defeat an enemy nation outright, or fatally wound them. When forced to conduct successive operations against the Soviet Union, they still approached each new operation as the 'one that was going to win the war,' or something similar. And because their intelligence and logistic departments were not formed to operate within an ongoing operational context, they had to improvise in these two areas as best they could, resulting in logistical inefficiency and a weakpoint that the Soviets maximized on - intelligence. [ August 06, 2002, 03:57 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]