Grisha

Guys, just realize you're going to takes losses. It's a given. Just make sure you have fewer losses than the enemy. So, move fast, stay spread out while trying to draw fire, concentrate fire quickly as needed, and keep moving. The Soviet way

I will say this, Michael. A major weakness of the German Army was its lack of an operational level of combat. The excellence of the German General Staff tended to compensate for it, but without an infrastructure or doctrine that defined it and formulated a methodology, the German Army really had no means of meeting the gap between tactics and strategy. In the field of operations, this was dealt with intuitively by the General staff, though levels of skill were based on the individual. But in the areas of intelligence and logistics, there was a large gap that was never filled. Because of this lack of a defined operational level, the German campaigns lacked the ability for true depth and continuity in attaining strategic objectives. German campaigns tended to assign strategic objectives to their initial operation, and in France, Poland, and Greece this worked because the operations were fully capable of achieving those objectives. But in Russia, it was impossible due to the sheer distances involved. The only way German campaigns were geared to win was by the first operation, since there was no methodology for a series of operations used to achieve strategic objectives. Thus, either a)the Germans won outright in that first operation, or b)they would deal such a devastating blow on the first operation that the Germans would have enough time to build up and put another operation together in hopes of finally dealing the death blow. In Russia, they almost made (.

Terence, Tankodesantniki, or tank-riding infantry, were pretty standard fare (meaning, TO&E) with most Soviet armored units by 1943, due mainly to the lack of Soviet APCs. And there were no gimmicks or advantages that Soviet tank riders had over the average tank rider in any other army - well, they did have hand rails to hold onto Soviet tactics dictated that tankodesantniki were to stay on until their dismounting would allow them to effectively interact with armor in a combined arms fashion. Basically, they weren't supposed to get off until the tanks were in position to fight. However, reality could disrupt this - in the form of mg or mortar fire - and force the tankodesantniki to disembark earlier than expected, resulting in subsequent tank losses from German infantry. [ August 05, 2002, 04:22 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

All, While I can say that it was a single thread in particular that got me to thinking about this (no offense to either Treeburst155 or Fionn, it's not for me to judge - I wasn't a part of it), it was further comments made in other threads regarding the lack of timeliness with opponents that finally prompted me to post my concerns. The comments I've read so far in this thread are just what I'd hoped for from a community of adult wargamers. I agree that the understanding goes both ways, and while RL should be honored, players should show respect to their opponents by letting them know of any personal circumstances that may adversely impact a game or its schedule. I also agree that players need to decide just how much committment they can put into the game before taking on any game related responsibilities. I used to be greatly involved with a number of WWII online flight sim communities as a CO for an internet squadron, but with my increasing responsibilities in RL, I had to bow out from them. It was a move I didn't want to make, but one that had to be done if I was to show my respect to my squad and the community. In any case, it really is one of mutual respect like most things in (real) life Thanks for the responses.

It's unfortunate the sort of dialogue that's been posted in this forum of late. While I can understand the desires for making the gaming experience enjoyable (especially extended versions, like ladders, multiplayer campaigns and tournaments), the demands of real life should really be unquestionable. I've been able to live both lives. First, as a single man who's only concern was getting home in time to make an online scenario with my internet 'squaddies'. Then, as a married man who's time seems whittled away with thoughts/worries for son, wife, house, bills, friends, work, pets, health, and whatever else intrudes upon my life on any given day. Should those of us with busy lives not consider entering these sorts of events on the grounds that RL concerns may be 'frowned upon'? I don't ask this lightly, but as someone who wants to know where the consensus is with this community, since it will most definitely influence my decision to participate in future events with CMBB, a game I am particularly eager to acquire and play.

I think Jason makes a great assessment of the situation. By late 1944, the Soviet practice of intelligence/reconnaissance( razvedka ) and deception ( maskirovka ) was highly effective in producing surprise for their attacks. Soviet intelligence collection and processing probably enabled them to create precise plans of attack, while the deception planning guaranteed very favorable odds.

I think Jason makes a great assessment of the situation. By late 1944, the Soviet practice of intelligence/reconnaissance( razvedka ) and deception ( maskirovka ) was highly effective in producing surprise for their attacks. Soviet intelligence collection and processing probably enabled them to create precise plans of attack, while the deception planning guaranteed very favorable odds.

Nice story, Runyan99

Thanks, Ted

There's a box cover? Seriously, all I do with box covers for computer games is tear them open to get at the game, then toss it in the trash. I see it for about 15 seconds total. As for the Il-2, in Russian it's pronounced "Shturmovik". Actually, it's pronounced more like "Shturmavik,"(at least Moscow dialect) but that would only start bad language habits [ July 31, 2002, 05:30 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

First scenarios will be of my own making, so that I can 'test' weapon systems and their effects.

Bog, The Soviets liked the Shermans as well. The 76mm versions ended up being comparable to the T-34/85s overall.

The LaGG-3 was actually a pretty good plane, nothing to brag about but not the deathtrap alluded to by that nickname. Most Russians never heard of this nickname. And one book put out in the West called Swastika in the Gunsight has only good things to say about it - certainly better than what it says about Hurricanes. The book is a memoir of a VVS ace, Kaberov, who flew with the 5th Guards Fighter Air Regiment, Baltic Fleet.

I've posted what Kirosheev has on the Yassy-Kishinev operation at the map site of same [click here]. The data is split up between the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts as well as breaking down the the units involved.

I've posted what Kirosheev has on the Yassy-Kishinev operation at the map site of same [click here]. The data is split up between the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts as well as breaking down the the units involved.

Konew, but Shukow got all the glory Konew is very magnanimous in his memoirs though, and manages to (barely) conceal the seething rage that he and Rybalko must have felt when the new line dividing 1st Byelorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts was drawn south of the city centre by Stalin. 'The telephone conversation I had with Rybalko about this was less than pleasant [unerfreulich].' He then goes on dressing it up nicely. Andreas, you actually spoke with Rybalko, commander of 3rd Guards Tank Army??? Wow. If you have any other stories to pass on, please do Incidently, Rybalko's tank army figures prominently in that Leavenworth paper on Soviet deception I linked in the Soviet Rifle Corps Attacks thread. Regarding Konev-Zhukov, Glantz has said that Konev was indeed enraged at Zhukov, but the Berlin demarcation was only the icing on the cake. During operation Mars Glantz felt that Konev may have been made the scapegoat for its failure by/for Zhukov. Also, during the actual approach of Berlin, Konev's forces were taking artillery from Zhukov's forces. Pretty sad too when you realize that it was probably Zhukov who saved Konev's life in 1941.

Konew, but Shukow got all the glory Konew is very magnanimous in his memoirs though, and manages to (barely) conceal the seething rage that he and Rybalko must have felt when the new line dividing 1st Byelorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts was drawn south of the city centre by Stalin. 'The telephone conversation I had with Rybalko about this was less than pleasant [unerfreulich].' He then goes on dressing it up nicely. Andreas, you actually spoke with Rybalko, commander of 3rd Guards Tank Army??? Wow. If you have any other stories to pass on, please do Incidently, Rybalko's tank army figures prominently in that Leavenworth paper on Soviet deception I linked in the Soviet Rifle Corps Attacks thread. Regarding Konev-Zhukov, Glantz has said that Konev was indeed enraged at Zhukov, but the Berlin demarcation was only the icing on the cake. During operation Mars Glantz felt that Konev may have been made the scapegoat for its failure by/for Zhukov. Also, during the actual approach of Berlin, Konev's forces were taking artillery from Zhukov's forces. Pretty sad too when you realize that it was probably Zhukov who saved Konev's life in 1941.

tero, Glantz has Soviet casualties for the Yassy-Kishinev Offensive as a whole in When Titans Clashed. PERSONNEL LOSSES Strength: 1,314,200 Killed or Missing: 13,197 Wounded: 53,933 Total: 67,130 MATERIÉL LOSSES Tanks and SP Guns: 75 Artillery: 108 Aircraft: 111 Hope it helps. The time period is 20-29 Aug. 44.

tero, Glantz has Soviet casualties for the Yassy-Kishinev Offensive as a whole in When Titans Clashed. PERSONNEL LOSSES Strength: 1,314,200 Killed or Missing: 13,197 Wounded: 53,933 Total: 67,130 MATERIÉL LOSSES Tanks and SP Guns: 75 Artillery: 108 Aircraft: 111 Hope it helps. The time period is 20-29 Aug. 44.

You hit on a very important observation, because it wasn't a one-time anomaly, but a result of the development of deception, or maskirovka by the Soviets. In Glantz' book on the subject he says this within the Introduction:

You hit on a very important observation, because it wasn't a one-time anomaly, but a result of the development of deception, or maskirovka by the Soviets. In Glantz' book on the subject he says this within the Introduction:

For VVS aircraft one might have at their disposal in CMBB:</font> Early fighters(Yak-1, Yak-7, I-16, I-153, LaGG-3) who in 1941-42 did a lot of the ground pounding while Il-2 production went into full gear. Most could carry small bomb loads and/or four-six 82mm rockets.</font> Il-2. This aircraft came initially as a single-seater, then was field modified to house a rear gunner, then the factories followed suit with production two-seaters. Munitions were wide and varied from all types of HE bombs(up to 250kg bombs), 82 & 132mm rockets(both HE and HEAT), cluster bomblets, special anti-tank HEAT bomblets (90 to almost 200 of these things in a single loadout), combustible vapor munitions, and even a torpedo. Primary armament of most Il-2s were the two VYa-23(23mm) cannons in the wings. The VYa could penetrate up to 25mm at longe range, firing 500 rds/min. at a muzzle velocity(m.v.) of 905m/sec. By the time of Kursk some Il-2 were equipped with two NS-37(37mm) cannons. These cannons could penetrate 40mm of armour at angles to 45 degrees. NS-37 rate of fire was 250rds/min at a m.v. of 900m/sec.</font> Pe-2. Fast twin-engined tactical bomber capable of dive-bombing(had dive-brakes). Could carry up to 1,600kg of bombs. Saw service throughout the entire war.</font> Tu-2. Similar to the Pe-2, though not a dive-bomber. Normal bomb load was 1-3 tonnes, but could be overloaded to 4 tonnes. Saw service from late 1942.</font>

The reason I added Bergstrõm's link was not to prove superiority, but to emphasize the role played by the VVS, which was in contrast to the Luftwaffe, particularly the jagdfliegeren. It's difficult to find Soviet aerial accounts translated into english, and the field of historical military aviation studies of the VVS has really only barely begun in the West. Two of the planned six volumes on the air war in Russia by Bergstrõm & Mikhailov have already been published, and are very good. Unfortunately, volume 2 only takes the war to mid-1942. As to why I believe the VVS was better at CAS than the western allies has less to do with innovative methods or training than it does with focus and quantity. It would appear that the methods of air-ground coordination were fairly similar between the allies, and even the Luftwaffe as well. How well the respective military forces practiced such coordination may have varied to degrees for a number of reasons, but the methods were by and large the same. What made the VVS different was that it was:</font> Almost entirely an air force based on tactical aviation.</font> subordinated to Red Army ground operations.</font>These two factors did much to focus VVS operations en masse to specific ground operations as a support arm within a combined arms doctrine. What I'm trying to convey is that rather than asking an independent air arm to offer support with an impending ground operation, the VVS was an integral part of Red Army ground operations and fully expected to perform as a support arm of the Red Army. For all practical purposes, the VVS was very much the 'flying artillery' of the Red Army. By 1944, it was not unusual for 1,000-2,000 operational Soviet combat aircraft to support a frontage of 200-400kms. I know this doesn't answer to what degree VVS tactical aviation was CAS or interdiction, but from what I've read both were of equal importance.

Like I said before, glad to be of service Anything that furthers knowledge of the Soviet-German War is well worth the time and effort spent.

Like I said before, glad to be of service Anything that furthers knowledge of the Soviet-German War is well worth the time and effort spent.