John Kettler

Baneman,
 
How I hate brain glitches! You are correct, and your BC remark was both clever and amusing--once I figured it out. My initial impression was that you were referring to flying rodent feces and mens insano--which certainly would've been noted and commented on.
 
Chazz,
 
That's an excellent suggestion. Even better now that I know I can theoretically at least run the game. Correction: It was an excellent suggestion, except that there's no CMRT Demo in the list. Was under the impression MikeyD had fixed this weeks ago.
 
Michael Emrys,
 
Splendid news. Don't suppose you know a talented Hogwarts grad who is adept at the incantation "Upgradius maximus video cardius!" do you? That's where I'm hurting the most--and for which I've yet to find a credible, let alone great, solution. I really do need to goose the RAM, though.

Very much appreciate all the suggestions and observations ref my iMac!
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

LC-,

There have been repeated tirades on the Forums about the believability of Forgotten Soldier, but if you head over to Amazon, there is quite the review of the book by a GD veteran, a Funker (radioman) who was attached to a sIG-33 unit. Might force some here into a rethink.

Regards,

John Kettler

VasFURY,
 
I can't speak to the game, but the actual analyses we conducted during my Cold War days at Hughes as a military analyst showed beyond all doubt that one and done was the only survivable approach to ground attack in a Fulda Gap type air defense environment. Repeat passes simply cost lots of planes and did very little further damage. Studies showed, the magic flight altitude number for approach prior to brief weapon delivery popup was 200 feet, high enough to avoid ground clobber (plane goes splat!), yet low enough to keep from being eaten alive by SAMs and AAA.
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

Faced with both growing interest in the game and growing temptation to buy it, I headed over to see whether it was playable on my iMac. Answer? Somewhat better than marginally, but not by a great margin. Am running OS X 10.7.5, have twice the minimum RAM and gobs of HD space, but verily sucketh on the VRAM front. After momentarily stunning myself by thinking I couldn't play the game (locked onto Preferred specs initially), I then realized I could. I headed over to look at the weapon lists and found my favorite CAS bird and proven tank eater, the A-10 Warthog, missing and that its much ballyhooed "replacement" the F-35 Lightning II (there, there Kelly Johnson, don't cry) was also absent.
 
Considering there is presently an entire ANG wing of A-10s in Bahrain, I find it both odd and annoying (how's that for restrained language?) that in CMBS we are evidently going to be Warthogless, while the OPFOR (as seen from the US end) has the flying tank Su-25 FROGFOOT aka A-9sky in military aerospace circles. How did we wind up deprived of our premier tank buster and the infantryman's friend--and get no supposed replacement aircraft either?
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler
 
P.S.
 
I tried the Search function here under "A-10" and got squat. I think the problem here is the same one that I ran into on another thread trying to find a T-64 post. The problem appears to be that the Search function isn't reading the hyphen/dash as a character, completely torpedoing the search. Would some kind soul on the BFC side of things please give Search a tweak so it does recognize the hyphen/dash? Thanks!

Moon,

The connectivity issues are now resolved, I no longer have to deal with that Capcha, but I still have no BFC (from anybody) response to my request for a clarification of Forum Rules on links and the uniform handling of links from an enforcement perspective. I would further request that serious consideration be given to expanding the realm of acceptable links.

As recently as last night, I had to refrain from posting a link to a really useful site on the PTAB bomblet in the Russian CAS thread, but note many others feel no such constraint when posting the links to their finds. And though it's not my intention to do so, I'm certain my not posting proper links is making some of my colleagues unhappy, too.

Wodin and Baneman,

Your idea would be sound, but given my already demonstrated lack of techno savvy here, putting up my own site isn't going to fly. The only reason I have a site myself is because my longtime friend is a web wizard. I write the content. For me, it's an achievement presently to get the oft demanding comments handled and heavily researched posts out. If BFC were willing to put up some sort of a link repository on the Forum, that would be fantastic. Someone else could also start a site of the type you describe, and it could become an online access tool to the mounds of research we've in aggregate found and noted for our fellow gamers.

Regards,

John Kettler

Was trying to find an earlier post in which I listed a CIA study on the T-64, now declassified, in the FOIA Reading Room. When I searched under the above terms in the Forums, I got zero results. Why? A search under "T-64 tank" and "t-64 tank" returned the very thread to which I'd just posted, but nothing else. Since I know perfectly well there've been quite a few mentions of the T-64 on both the CMSF and CMBS Forums, this has to be a mistake, nor should the response be affected by the dread minimum character count, there being four. Why is the Search not, well, searching properly? If it's not broken, it sure acts that way.
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

76mm,

Not so. The Lend Lease Act was a legitimately passed and signed into effect law. It was intended to supply war materiel, not production means. It was intended to supply the fruits of science and technology, not the know-how underpinning them. Hopkins deliberately intervened in situation after situation and forced well-informed military authorities and civilian enterprises to hand over exactly those things. Hopkins stretched Lend Lease beyond all recognition, allowing Russia access to technology areas in which Russia had no real base; allowing Russia to conduct large scale military-industrial espionage (Major Jordan caught some particularly egregious examples but was overruled and forced to let them through) with impunity. In a very real sense, Hopkins helped create the Russian military-technical-manufacturing infrastructure which bedeviled us during the Cold War. This isn't to say the Russians weren't very sharp and ingenious in their own right, but life is so much easier when someone else has done the work already and you can capitalize on it. The Bell case saved Russia an estimated three years of development time and avoided any number of wrong radar engineering paths as well, over and above the huge ruble outlay which would've otherwise been required.

Clearly we disagree and will almost certainly continue to do so. I've made a strong case. You won't budge an inch. I'm still concerned Steve may opt to lock this thread. I therefore suggest we return to the issue of the Lend Lease AFV and their employment by the Russians.

Regards,

John Kettler

Having finished some 17 chapters in it, I can emphatically state Now It Can Be Told is a simply phenomenal book; a must read not just for WW I grogs or military history buffs, either, but for anyone with any interest at all in the human condition. I've read hundreds and hundreds of accounts of war, but I've never seen anything like this.
 
The author covered the war from before war correspondents were even officially allowed, knew everyone from the top commanders on down to some poor bloke just arrived in the trenches in the early days and knows nothing of the ways of war. Before his very eyes, he saw the professionals of the Regular Army wiped out, to be replaced with the New Army raised by Kitchener.
 
He talks about the sublimely ignorant keenness of the young men to get into battle, the generation annihilating losses, the pluses and minuses of the generals, who generally unimaginatively plot battles which do little than exsanguinate and rend asunder the British troops involved. He talks about those who actually do have brains, use them creatively and, when given rein by higher, actually accomplish something without wiping out the men wholesale in the doing.
 
He addresses the British Army's early lack of heavy artillery, MGs and the training to use them well (in the face of the Germans who invariably had the observational advantage) and what Regular Army rifle marksmanship did to the Germans at an open fire range of 800 yards (Mons, where the Germans thought they were being machine gunned). He rails at the British Government's and the Army's lack of understanding of the role and value of the press; he portrays the ins and outs of combat journalism and the mental dislocations occasioned by shuttling daily, by car no less, from a comfortable shared house where he and his fellows waged ceaseless combat to meet article deadlines to the squalor and terror of a frontline in which the ramparts are partially constructed of corpses, then back home again.
 
He details the immense frustration and, sometimes, guilty feelings of the REMFs going nuts because, try as they might to get to the front, they're needed in the rear to do logistics, push paper, conduct training and perform a thousand and one noncombat tasks necessary to arm, feed and support the relative handful (despite its apparent immensity) doing the fighting.  
 
Philip Gibbs is nothing short of a brilliant writer, and I'm of firm opinion that his book should be mandatory in Literature classes, for it is a masterwork in how to write beautifully, economically, effectively and with staggering emotional power. Moved me to the verge of tears repeatedly! 
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

JonS,

I didn't make the statement, the Air Munitions Data (Appendix 2) did.

"The distances listed represent the range at which a fragment from the particular munition will not penetrate the skin of an individual standing in an open field. The figures are based on a probability of kill of zero (Pk=0)."

Additionally, while it's fair to use the term blast radius in the cookie cutter wargaming sense, in reality, blast isn't much of a factor unless quite close to the detonation. Therefore, a more accurate characterization would be Radii of Casualty Effects vs Protected and Unprotected personnel.

Finally, it would be wise not to confuse the properly sourced message with the messenger, toward whom your animus has been heavily publicized.

Regards,

John Kettler

Wanted to let you know I was raiding and pillaging in Amazon's Kindle military history section when I discovered there are DOZENS of WW I books there for FREE. More than enough to keep you busy for months, if not years. Lots of personal accounts, unit histories, official histories (Gallipoli, anyone?) and much more. As something of a lark I picked up Now It Can Be Told, by Philip Gibbs, and it looks to be first rate. Other goodies for the period can be had for a song, too. Thought you'd like to know.
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

Steve,

I've been in a Sherman 76mm recently, and I can tell you, having looked at the world from that cupola, that I see no way at all it can come even close to the view from one of those German drum cupolas. The drum cupolas have their vision openings well above the roof of the tank, whereas the Sherman 76mm has what amounts to a bump on the turret roof. While the Sherman 76mm cupola is certainly a big improvement over having none at all, I'd expect German AFVs with drum cupolas to do significantly better in the spotting department.

Regards,

John Kettler

Krasnoarmeyets (Red Army, I believe?)
 
Welcome aboard!
 
That is a tremendous first post. More like a thoughtful essay, in fact. Well done, sir!  Here's some good English language material on Nakidka. It appears to be from NII Stal's site. I, and I'm sure others here, notably BFC, will appreciate that, rather than coming in fangs bared demanding things be done your way, you've instead identified a series of issues, asked questions about them, while considering matters of game implementation, then offered your suggestions on how the areas you identified as of concern could potentially be addressed. Your issue about broad area smokescreens is one long of interest to me, ever since I saw footage of pre WW II US wargames (Louisiana Maneuvers) in which aircraft with spray tanks put down screens running for considerable distances. Like this.
 

 
On a more recent note, when the Russians moved into Czechoslovakia in 1968 to crush the Prague Spring, they did it shielded by both heavy jamming and broadband obscurants (see Other Uses at link), making it effectively impossible to see what was going on across the border. While at Hughes, which made the TOW, my nightmare scenario as a Threat Analyst involved a screen of the stuff which would allow the Russian armor to avoid our critical to success long range TOW kills and wind up on our doorstep in almost full strength, at knife fight range, with huge numerical superiority. Offensive use! Where a defender would greatly benefit, though, would be to isolate and destroy successive batches of attackers, who would be unable to get support from their otherwise deadly fellows in trail. 
 
TOW 2, unless guidance implementation has been changed, substituted a heated metal honeycomb structure (we called it the waffle iron) for the former visible band only xenon tracking beacon, which could be defeated by smoke, dust and other things. The TOW 2 device operated in the 8-12 micron range and was unaffected by diesel and HC smoke, battlefield dust and such. Broadband obscurants are another matter entirely.
 
As for decoys, they don't have to perfect, just good enough, to cause all sorts of problems. During the US air campaign in Kosovo, it turned out that most of the ground attack sorties vs the Serbs hit dummies or were rendered ineffective by related means. I tried to warn the editor of the Journal of Electronic Defense, to whom I pitched an article idea, how things were going to play out, but he didn't listen. Instead he selected another writer, whose rosy predictions were shown to be completely unfounded.
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

Rinaldi,
 
I believe things are getting out of hand, for those two insist on ordering chaos (which staff school teaches that skill?). We can't have that. Besides, all this exposition of tactical planning and combat application is giving me some sort of CM inferiority complex. These two fight their battles much differently than I do, for my style, if you can call it that, is more intuitive. Bil's approach seems all but mathematically rigorous, where pnzrldr's seems more fluid and aggressive. Am learning from both, but dealing with all this information is intermittently overloading my brain. And nobody's shooting at me, I get reasonable rest, eat mostly good food, am warm and dry, so I don't want to think how overwhelming the real deal would be with information (often confused or even wrong) flooding in (presuming the info channels work) or maybe trickling in; mayhem and chaos everywhere, hot, parched and hungry (other settings in winter) , while bearing crushing responsibility for those you lead and must care for, deal with higher, keep complex equipment fully operating and in the fight--all with terrible wounds or death potentially coming in an instant. Am quite glad I'm a wargamer and not a warrior.
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

Michael Emrys,
 
I really don't get this whole thing about voting on posts. What's next? An on-camera interview in ball gowns in which we'll all answer "world peace" so that people will support our posts? I have enough to deal with just getting the actual posts coherent and out.
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

rocketman,
 
Maybe this will help. The Merville Battery account from over on the Pegasus Archive. Considerable text, a number of maps, and some good pics. Beware! You'll be placing a lot of craters!
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

JasonC,

Sadly, once again you signally failed to address T-34/85's request for assistance.

Turning now to your latest nonanswer, I note as follows:

The Beda Fomm tests pitted two different rounds, fired from the same gun type, at he same range, against an M13/40. It would appear that, since neither tank caught fire or exploded, that the vehicles weren't combat loaded. That the testers put filled sandbags on every crew seat tells me, as someone who did this kind of stuff very successfully for over 11 years and has a copy of what later became classified A-10 firing trials against a simulated, combat loaded, mannikin equipped Soviet tank company (engines running), that there was a real interest in looking at post penetration effects on crew from projectile penetration until the energy of whatever came through/was created was spent. The issue is neither ammunition stowage nor fuel, simply whether the round would penetrate (it did) and what happened to the crew as a result. I presented those results, which you promptly rejected. The APHE riddled the sandbags, but no such result was reported for the AP shot. What's so hard to understand? Yes, it penetrated the armor and cracked it , too, but there's absolutely no statement indicating it did diddly squat to the sandbags, as opposed to the APHE which "thoroughly riddled" them. It may not be obvious to you what the 2 RTR was testing at Beda Fomm, but it sure is to me.

I deliberately excluded ammunition and fuel from the discussion because I knew that your next rejoinder would be the British and Italians both had poor arrangements for both, thus biasing the test. Indeed, I find you have seized on what I didn't bring up in order to reject what I did! Meanwhile, you willfully ignore a plain statement supporting the lethality of APHE which detonated inside the fighting compartment.

"tests proved that the yellow painted explosive armour piercing projectile penetrates the armour at 900 yards and bursts inside with very destructive effect. Sand bags placed on the crew's seats were well riddled with splinters"

What part of "...and bursts inside with very destructive effect..." do you not get?

We now leave the realms of post combat lethality testing and enter the world of battle damage analysis. For the record, I have thoroughly read the classified JMEM on battle damage to tanks in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. This, unlike your cited analyses on Merkava damage in Lebanon in 1982, is directly relevant in that it's absolutely certain tank cannon from both sides were used, as was WW II type ammunition. No long rod penetrators, no Chobham armor (or better), no DU! So, I know what I'm talking about when I talk about damage to tanks by various weapons. I've seen what HEAT does (clean hit) and doesn't (hit any number of brackets and flanges outside the tank, triggering it prematurely and saving the tank). I've seen what the Centurion's 20 pdr firing APDS could do, and I've seen the awful spall effects from HESH on a T-55's turret (pie dish sized hole clean through the radio from the inside rear wall of the turret).

From the German report Jentz cited

"As a rule, this effect is of annihilating power when using armor-piercing shells with a high-explosive charge. When using hard core projectiles, steel or soft iron core projectiles, or hollow-charge projectiles, completely annihilating effect cannot always be expected with a single shot, because the crew, located in the dead space of the tank, cannot be hit under certain conditions."

From the above, which is based solely on cases of complete penetration, it should be transparently clear that only APHE possesses "annihilating power," a characterization NOT given to AP shot!

Now, turning to the case of German HE vs. British tank

"Penetration of a British tank by a German armor-piercing shell frequently resulted in crew members being wounded as well as destruction of the tank by causing irreparable damage or by setting it on fire. Not until 1942 did the British investigate the cause of fires in the tanks and began to install armored bins to protect the ammunition."

Then we have

"As recorded by Major G/B. Jarrett in May 1942: The German projectiles which have caused the greatest amount of damage to Allied tanks in the Western Desert campaigns have been the A. P. -H. E. type in 47 mm, 50 mm, 75 mm and 88 mm respectively. These projectiles at long ranges need only attain a partial penetration and the explosive charge can complete the destruction of at least the tank crew. At closer ranges the destructive effect is very great, where in many cases destruction of the tank is permanent."

The above is both good news and bad news for you. It explicitly talks about the partial penetration scenario you hate and what that means, but then goes on to reinforce the direct KE impact part of your argument.

Now, we'll look at the conclusions drawn when firing the turned down 7.5cm PzGr 39 at the German tanks. These converted APHE shells are the principal reason Major Jarrett, who was our Ordnance liaison to the British and had full access to their combat reports, damage assessments and latest war trophies (the 88 he found and shipped home), was decorated by them.

"When the 7.5 cm K.Gr.rot Pz. was fitted to an American casing and fired from the 75 mm M2 gun, in May 1942 Lt.Col. Gruver reported: Each German AP-HE round fired may safely be presumed to have put the tank out of action. In this connection it was noted that the fuze functioned perfectly, that is to say it functioned only after penetration and then always in the fighting compartment where the most damage is done. Parts also frequently penetrated into the engine compartment."

Gruver neglected to qualify that statement with "which hits the tank and penetrates the fighting compartment's armor," but you get the idea.

Jentz also provides this

"The Italian 47 mm armor-piercing round contained a high explosive filler with a delay fuze. Penetration of a British tank by a 47 mm Italian armor piercing shell frequently resulted in crew members being wounded as well as destruction of the tank by causing irreparable damage or by setting it on fire."

So, over and over again the various data support the killing power of APHE, so what happens when the British fire the 2-pdr AP shot into the Panzer III and Panzer IV?

"Penetration of a Pz.Kpfw.lll or IV by 2-pounder AP-Shot fired at 600 to 1500 yards range frequently resulted in crew members being wounded but infrequently resulted in destruction of the tank by causing irreparable damage or by setting it on fire."

Contrast that with what APHE is consistently reported doing to the British tanks and crews!

The Aero Armor series book on the DAK showed a Panzer IV/D(?) in which two closely spaced 2-pdr shot had come through the driver's plate in line with his face and just above his head. The result? Driver had a head bandage and was still driving! Not exactly an instant kill, is it? In turn, this picture independently confirms combat analyses.

"Of those Pz.Kpfw.lll and IV knocked out in combat by AP-Shot, fewer than 20 percent were destroyed by fire or damaged so severely that they couldn't be repaired."

So, at that time, at least, Axis APHE was markedly more lethal against both British tanks and crews than was AP shot fired by the British against the Germans. It's also clear, from remarks from both sides, that when the Germans were able to recover their tanks, far more of theirs were fixable and could return to combat.

The Beda Fomm tests showed any reasonable observer that 2-pdr APHE was far more destructive to the crew and the tank than was 2-pdr AP shot. The other results cited indicate that adding ammunition and fuel to the equation only worsened the gap. Recall that Playfair completely reversed himself in the third volume of the HMSO official history of the war in the Mediterranean, concluding the German short 5cm gun was markedly superior to the 2-pdr. And the 5cm generally fired what round in armored warfare? PzGr 39. APHE!

Regards,

John Kettler

JasonC,

Your ability to take a direct statement of fact and distort it beyond all recognition is simply extraordinary. What part of the conclusions from the direct comparison between 2-pdr shot and 2-pdr shell was unclear to you? This was an apples to apples comparison, with the only real difference being the projectiles. For the sake of the argument, let's ignore both fuel (which is an issue in that certain tanks, such as the T-34, didn't have engine compartments fully sealed off from the fighting compartment) and ammunition vulnerability issues. We're just looking at crew casualties. Quoting Jentz again from my post

"4.1.1.1 BRITISH GUNS AGAINST AXIS TANKS

Directly after the battle of Beda Fomm, the 2nd R.T.R. conducted tests to determine the vulnerability of the Italian M. 13-40 tanks. They reported on 14 February 1941: During the morning tests were carried of the effect of the two types of 2-pounder ammunition on Italian M13 tanks. These tests proved that the yellow painted explosive armour piercing projectile penetrates the armour at 900 yards and bursts inside with very destructive effect. Sand bags placed on the crew's seats were well riddled with splinters. The black painted solid A.P. projectile also penetrates at 900 yards and causes large cracks in the armor."

It says, to my best understanding of English, that the 2-pdr AP shell penetrated the Italian tank and, upon detonation inside the target tank, the splinters riddled the sandbags representing the crew. Signal by its absence is the lack of any similar result for the 2-pdr shot.

In case that was unclear, consider this

4.1.1.2 EFFECT AFTER PENETRATION

The destructive effect of the 2-pounder AP-Shot after penetration was based solely on whatever kinetic energy remained in the solid shot, shot fragments if it shattered, and/or fragments of armor plate broken off by the hit."

From that, follows this

"Penetration of a Pz.Kpfw.lll or IV by 2-pounder AP-Shot fired at 600 to 1500 yards range frequently resulted in crew members being wounded"

Now, contrast that with the riddling of ALL the sandbags when the 2-pdr HE shell exploded, as designed, in the fighting compartment of the M13 in the head-to-head Beda Fomm tests.

So, what you deride as a "firecracker" is surprisingly to you, unsurprisingly to me, devastating to the crew. From a debating standpoint, I'd argue you haven't legs left to stand upon!

You very carefully quote only those parts of the report which support you, while deflecting attention from the real issue, which is the lethality of even partially penetrating AP shell, which then detonates, to the crew.

Now, turning to various red herrings you've offered up, how is Israeli combat experience in Lebanon, with the super heavily protected and survivability engineered Merkava, relevant to the discussion at hand? Were the Merkavas hit even attacked by cannon fire?

Further confusing the isssue is that the design feature which gave the tank its name (Merkava, chariot, because the horses (engine) are in front) and has to be gotten through, together with its firewall, after the armored envelope is no longer in the way, drastically reduce the likelihood of any penetration of the crew compartment. So, the Israel design works in combat. Yawn.

As for the M1, recall first of all that U.S. firing tests in the mid 1980s, against an export model T-72, found that even our best 105mm round was tactically useless from the front. This led to the crash fielding of the 120 mm gun fired XM829 "Silver Bullet," which is profoundly different from WW II AP shot or shell. Not only is its roughly 40mm (2-pdr diameter) dart denser than even the tungsten which had preceded, it is pyrophoric! When it penetrates, it creates enormous showers of sparks. a huge and abrupt temperature rise, and highly energetic and dangerous flying particles from the long rod penetrator, not to mention being a toxic inhalation threat.

You also neglect to note the dramatic rise in muzzle velocities since WW II. That self same T-72 smoothbore 125mm gun fires its long rod penetrator at 1800 m/sec, versus 792 m/sec for the 2-pdr. As you know, the real driver in the KE equation is velocity squared, but the actual penetrator weight is also much higher for the Silver Bullet than its humble WW II predecessor. Thus, I think your basis for argument is codswallop, if that.

Frankly, I'm disappointed that, rather than exhibiting remarkable obduracy and intransigence in the face of hard fact you seem unable, for whatever reason, to accept, you didn't instead address the WW II terminal effectiveness issues for Russian ammunition that T-34/85 needs and with which you seem so familiar.

Regards,

John Kettler

T-34/85,

JasonC's view is correct provided the AP projectile actually significantly overmatches the armor. If it's AP shot, it can lose so much energy that it doesn't get through at all, and a partial penetration won't do much, as I've indicated. Whereas a partial penetration by AP shell can be disastrous, as seen in both the Beda Fomm tests and other evidences I cited, and in the Western Desert at the time, generally was.

From what I've seen, post penetration lethality of the PzGr 39 was more than adequate against the T-34, and the T-34/76 could certainly kill the Panzer IV, but JasonC knows far more than I do about the penetration performance of the Russian guns and ammunition. He's written at length on how the Russians got screwed in this area in CMBB. This, though, should help.

http://english.battlefield.ru/armor-penetration-curves.html

The T-34/76 in particular, even though diesel powered, suffered from very poor interior layout, which made it vulnerable to explosion following penetration.

This link will give you an idea of how the huge range advantage the T-34/76 enjoyed at the beginning of the war gradually shifted toward the Germans later on. It doesn't speak to terminal lethality, but it does give you some idea of what killing ranges were for targets engaged frontally.

http://english.battlefield.ru/t-34.html

In case the point made about the range was missed earlier, please see the combat range conclusions reached following Kursk here (third paragraph)

http://english.battlefield.ru/t-34-85.html

Here are Russian penetration figures, using different criteria than the Germans used.
Specifically included is the BR-350A. Please take note of Potapov's comment at the bottom of the second table regarding ammunition quality 1941-1943. He was a contributor to the data base for CMBB.

http://english.battlefield.ru/specification-and-armor-penetration.html

Hope the above help.

Regards,

John Kettler

T34/85,

I have a great deal of respect for the depth and breadth of JasonC's knowledge, but I must disagree with him.

He's free to "sincerely doubt" all he wants, but combat experience from both sides in North Africa, and firing trials conducted by the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment at Beda Fomm tell a different tale. APHE which penetrates even halfway into the fighting compartment and detonates is devastating to the crew--ignoring ammunition storage issues and other matters later corrected.

Long piece of my post here

http://www.battlefront.com/community/showthread.php?t=105933&page=2

I quote myself in an excerpt from a much longer post lamentably lost in the Great Server Meltdown. The combat lethality of even the German 37mm AP shell was high if even a partial penetration of the fighting compartment could be achieved.

"It was not until 1942 did the British investigate the high incidence of fires in British tanks post penetration. Major G.B. Jarrett in May 1942: “The German projectiles which have caused the greatest amount of damage to allied tank in the western desert campaigns have been the A.P.-H.E. type in 47mm, 50mm, 75mm and 88mm respectively. These projectiles at long range need only attain a partial penetration and the explosive charge can complete the destruction of at least the tank crew. At closer ranges the destructive effect is very great, where in many cases destruction of the tank is permanent.”……….. Of those mark III and IV knocked out in combat by AP-shot, fewer than 20 percent were destroyed by fire or damaged so severely that they couldn’t be repaired."
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Every now and then I get really lucky. Here is Jeff Duquette's detailed post to me with all the pertinent data. (Fair Use)

http://www.battlefront.com/community...ht=2pdr&page=4

Hey John K:

Some of what you maybe recalling might have been from your readings in Jentz. There is a reference by Jentz to G/B Jerratt (I have included it with the other scanned material below).

Best Regards
Jeff

From: Thomas Jentz “Tank Combat in North Africa, The Opening Rounds”. Schiffer Publishing Limited, 1998

From Page-44

4.1.1.1 BRITISH GUNS AGAINST AXIS TANKS

Directly after the battle of Beda Fomm, the 2nd R.T.R. conducted tests to determine the vulnerability of the Italian M. 13-40 tanks. They reported on 14 February 1941: During the morning tests were carried of the effect of the two types of 2-pounder ammunition on Italian M13 tanks. These tests proved that the yellow painted explosive armour piercing projectile penetrates the armour at 900 yards and bursts inside with very destructive effect. Sand bags placed on the crew's seats were well riddled with splinters. The black painted solid A.P. projectile also penetrates at 900 yards and causes large cracks in the armor.

From Pages 46-47

4.1.1.2 EFFECT AFTER PENETRATION

The destructive effect of the 2-pounder AP-Shot after penetration was based solely on whatever kinetic energy re¬mained in the solid shot, shot fragments if it shattered, and/or fragments of armor plate broken off by the hit. Starting with the design of the Pz.Kpfw.l, German designers had taken extra precautions to reduce the probability of fire as a result of penetration. Fuel tanks were separated from the crew com¬partment by a firewall (about 5 mm thick). In the case of the Pz.Kpfw.ll, the fuel tank, located on the right side of the crew i compartment, was isolated by 8 mm thick armor plate. As a further precaution, the main gun ammunition in the Pz.Kpfw.lll and IV was stowed in bins whose sides were 4 to 6 mm thick. In addition, main gun ammunition in the Pz.Kpfw.lll and IV was stored low in the hull. Thus, even when a 2-pounder AP-Shot managed to penetrate through the armor, it needed suf¬ficient residual kinetic energy to penetrate the firewall or am¬munition bins in order to destroy the tank by setting it on fire. Penetration of a Pz.Kpfw.lll or IV by 2-pounder AP-Shot fired at 600 to 1500 yards range frequently resulted in crew mem¬bers being wounded but infrequently resulted in destruction of the tank by causing irreparable damage or by setting it on fire. Of those Pz.Kpfw.lll and IV knocked out in combat by AP-Shot, fewer than 20 percent were destroyed by fire or damaged so severely that they couldn't be repaired.

====================================
Below is Jentz discussing German AP-HE projectiles – from pages 48-49.
====================================

As stated in a German report on armor-penetration curves: Basically all penetration data are valid for projectiles of good quality. The estimate of penetration for "worst" projectiles is possible only with great difficulty. The penetration can spread over a very large range below the given value. The regulations for acceptance of projectiles stipulate that a certain number of projectiles (1/2%) will be presented for inspection. Two-thirds of the projectiles which have been fired against armor plate, must satisfy the given conditions. Based on past experience, it can be stated that the largest part of the deliveries satisfy these conditions. 100% assurance is not given; it may always be expected that a small percentage do not achieve the specified penetrating ability, because of shattering prematurely. Also the explosive charge in these shattered projectiles will not detonate.

The effect of the projectile inside the tank and the probability of hitting the target are not considered in these graphical charts; thus only the complete penetration with the to¬tal effect inside the tank is considered. As a rule, this effect is of annihilating power when using armor-piercing shells with a high-explosive charge. When using hard core projec¬tiles, steel or soft iron core projectiles, or hollow-charge projectiles, completely annihilating effect cannot always be expected with a single shot, because the crew, located in the dead space of the tank, cannot be hit under certain conditions.
A limited effect, without piercing the tank by the projectile (effect produced by back-spalling of armor plate and punching holes (Stanzpfropfen) is frequently achieved with plates that are about 10% thicker than the thickness presented in the graphs.


AND from page 54

4.1.2.2 EFFECT AFTER PENETRATION

In all calibers of 3.7 cm and above, the normal armor-piercing round designed by the Germans contained a high explosive filler with a delay fuze. Penetration of a British tank by a German armor-piercing shell frequently resulted in crew members being wounded as well as destruction of the tank by causing irreparable damage or by setting it on fire. Not until 1942 did the British investigate the cause of fires in the tanks and began to install armored bins to protect the ammunition.

As recorded by Major G/B. Jarrett in May 1942: The German projectiles which have caused the greatest amount of damage to Allied tanks in the Western Desert campaigns have been the A. P. -H. E. type in 47 mm, 50 mm, 75 mm and 88 mm respectively. These projectiles at long ranges need only attain a partial penetration and the explosive charge can complete the destruction of at least the tank crew. At closer ranges the destructive effect is very great, where in many cases destruction of the tank is permanent.

When the 7.5 cm K.Gr.rot Pz. was fitted to an American casing and fired from the 75 mm M2 gun, in May 1942 Lt.Col. Gruver reported: Each German AP-HE round fired may safely be presumed to have put the tank out of action. In this con¬nection it was noted that the fuze functioned perfectly, that is to say it functioned only after penetration and then always in the fighting compartment where the most damage is done. Parts also frequently penetrated into the engine compartment.

The destructive effect of the Pzgr.40 after penetration was based solely on whatever kinetic energy remained in shot fragments when it shattered and/or fragments of armor plate broken off by the hit.


Jentz Refering to Italian AP-HE, page-57

4.1.3.2 EFFECT AFTER PENETRATION
The Italian 47 mm armor-piercing round contained a high explosive filler with a delay fuze. Penetration of a British tank by a 47 mm Italian armor piercing shell frequently resulted in crew members being wounded as well as destruction of the tank by causing irreparable damage or by setting it on fire.
__________________

End Post Excerpt

I went round and round with a whole bunch of people over this issue of APHE lethality over AP shot, and the Beda Fomm tests are conclusive, in my view, with regard to crew damage. The targets and other controllable parameters were identical, yet the results clearly showed that APHE trashed the sandbag crew simulators, whereas AP shot did not.

All the opinions and belief in the world can't reverse that fact, especially when the man who was decorated for saving the British butt at Gazala, by providing graze action fuzes for Grant HE shells lacking same and, more particularly, carefully extracting the 7.5cm PzGr 39 projectiles and machining down their driving bands on a lathe (on a spin armed shell) and fitting those to American cartridge cases, gave the Grant an effective tank killing round, says the same thing as the Beda Fomm tests showed. You have the quotes above. The story of the research is covered here on pages 23-33, with the decoration for Major Jarrett mentioned on page 31.

http://books.google.com/books?id=dJZ_3tBJUv4C&pg=PA24&lpg=PA24&dq=g.b.+jarrett,+ordnance&source=bl&ots=tXyePFqxVS&sig=pM6Kt0k3fEetkLQ1URUKs7UfcJk&hl=en#v=onepage&q=g.b.%20jarrett%2C%20ordnance&f=false

So, you now know, after reading the material at the link right above, the PzGr 39 was so good we converted it so we could use it. You also know the AP shell originally provided with the Grant lacked both a cap and a ballistic cap. It was AP, rather than APCBC--huge difference.

And here we have the BR350A, a strange duck of an AP shell if ever there was one.

http://208.84.116.223/forums/index.php?showtopic=31015

As you can see, it has no cap, but does have a ballistic cap, together with a remarkable appendage beneath that ballistic cap. In looking at the fuze, I can see what it would pop out during impact, for much of it is already out. Contrast that with the PzGr39, seen here in cutaway.

Note particularly the entire fuze body is inside the shell. Nothing's exposed except the base!

http://media.photobucket.com/image/pzgr39/sszza4/forums/88cmPzgr39-43.jpg

Hope this helps.

Regards,

John Kettler

Rinaldi,
 
I believe things are getting out of hand, for those two insist on ordering chaos (which staff school teaches that skill?). We can't have that. Besides, all this exposition of tactical planning and combat application is giving me some sort of CM inferiority complex. These two fight their battles much differently than I do, for my style, if you can call it that, is more intuitive. Bil's approach seems all but mathematically rigorous, where pnzrldr's seems more fluid and aggressive. Am learning from both, but dealing with all this information is intermittently overloading my brain. And nobody's shooting at me, I get reasonable rest, eat mostly good food, am warm and dry, so I don't want to think how overwhelming the real deal would be with information (often confused or even wrong) flooding in (presuming the info channels work) or maybe trickling in; mayhem and chaos everywhere, hot, parched and hungry (other settings in winter) , while bearing crushing responsibility for those you lead and must care for, deal with higher, keep complex equipment fully operating and in the fight--all with terrible wounds or death potentially coming in an instant. Am quite glad I'm a wargamer and not a warrior.
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

Was over at Half Price Books with brother Ed, and while there I saw Mountain Warriors (by Stackpole Publishers) which is specifically about the Goums in WW II. Since they very much figure in CMFI in general and GL especially, I thought you might like to know about this book. HPB had it for $5 or so.
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

BFC,

Regarding the Forum Rules, I feel trapped.

In seeking to comply with the Moon Dictum, it's a) hard to communicate effectively with my wargaming brethren, because I have to be ever careful to break links, so as not to clash with the "no commercial links," but this gets me numerous overt complaints on the Forums and even PEMs. Try as I might, I've so far found no viable solution.

Many have pointed out "BFC doesn't care about those kinds of (informational) links" and link without a second thought, but having gotten a Moon Rocket AKA Infraction, over just such an exercise, I don't feel safe in chancing another one. Moon takes an absolutist position on the matter, which is why I call it a dictum, but I'd like to request that the link policy be reviewed. Further, may I request that, once such a determination is made, it be notified to the Forumites and thereafter be consistently enforced? As things stand, some are linking with impunity, while others, who've stepped on a Rule mine as I have, are hobbling about and warily watching for tripwires and those little prongs! Now to that new vexed matter.

Recently, I was quite shocked to discover that, for unknown reasons, Search now requires an annoying Capcha type thing be done. It's hard to read (putting it mildly, and the replacement ones are often just as bad), and I pity the color blind. Why oh why do we have to deal with this IMO useless time wasting, er, feature? Were bots having their way with Search and consuming enormous bandwidth or what? I don't get it.

Thanks for your attention to these matters.

Regards,

John Kettler

Rinaldi,
 
I believe things are getting out of hand, for those two insist on ordering chaos (which staff school teaches that skill?). We can't have that. Besides, all this exposition of tactical planning and combat application is giving me some sort of CM inferiority complex. These two fight their battles much differently than I do, for my style, if you can call it that, is more intuitive. Bil's approach seems all but mathematically rigorous, where pnzrldr's seems more fluid and aggressive. Am learning from both, but dealing with all this information is intermittently overloading my brain. And nobody's shooting at me, I get reasonable rest, eat mostly good food, am warm and dry, so I don't want to think how overwhelming the real deal would be with information (often confused or even wrong) flooding in (presuming the info channels work) or maybe trickling in; mayhem and chaos everywhere, hot, parched and hungry (other settings in winter) , while bearing crushing responsibility for those you lead and must care for, deal with higher, keep complex equipment fully operating and in the fight--all with terrible wounds or death potentially coming in an instant. Am quite glad I'm a wargamer and not a warrior.
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

CNN does have its uses at times, and this is a good one. I know many of you are dying for the coming CM BoB game, so consider this photo set an appetite whetter.
 
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

Bil,
 
You would appear to follow the "reports of my death are greatly exaggerated" model. You've taken some serious lumps, but from what I can tell, this is in no way stopping you from continuing offensive ops. I don't see why losing the FSV wouldn't be a major hit on pnzrldr's FS capability. After all, not only are the specialists there, but so, too, the technical gear. Are you positing he has either a JFO or a JTAC (same link)? My understanding is that you both are operating in a pretty heavy ECM environment. Is this correct, or are you the only one handing out annoying electron gifts? Your pic of the spotting of the Javelin team confused me, for my brain perceived US infantry in the foreground, since my brain isn't used to seeing Russians in digicam, body armor and such. Considering your BMP-2K was a dedicated command vehicle, I'm astounded that it had so many men aboard (11?). Don't all those map boards and computer displays take up a lot of room? On a lighter note, except to the crew, the demise of 1 MRC's BMP-3 is clearly traceable to getting hung up on a birch while hastily reversing! In fact, the reversing was so forcefully done that the tree partially embedded itself in the vehicle, fouling it long enough to allow the fatal event to occur. Eight turns left until the Su-25 and two attack helos show up, eh? Wonder where pnzrldr's force will be by then? Am surprised the BMP-2 you engaged from that splendid keyhole position simply sat there through two complete RPG firings and didn't either move or shoot back. Decidedly odd behavior. 
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler