Elmar Bijlsma

I don't care in what way Russians are killed, as long as they are killed. And I enjoy watching it. I 'm not a sadist, nor am I sick in the head, I just think they deserve to die.  And the more, the better.
 

Russian TG channel FighterBomber initially rejected any jet losses today and wrote "all Su-35 at home", but a hour later has written about "fu...g bad day" and some vessel was lost. Other source wrote as if the two-seater jet made sharp maneuver on extreme low altitude, launched flares and hit the ground. Nobody have seen any launches at it. Troopers of Russian 56th air-assault regiment could take the body of one pilot, where the body of second - unknown.


From our sources, Russian jet was shot down near Stepne village, Kherson oblast - this in 26 km SE from Davydiv Brid, where according to rumors our troops crossed Inhulets river and could advance toward Beryslav town. I have read the twitter of Kherson citizen, which wrote he called to own familiars from theese places, but they can't say anything about this breakthrough, but he wrote maybe really Russian aviation stopped our advance, but where now our troops - still near Davydiv Brod or retreated on western bank, he doesn't know. 
Other news:
- locals from Kherson reported about powerful detonartion in Chornobaivka area and work of Russian AD. Some sources claimed two ammunition storages were hit
- Tochka-U missile hit town administration building in Svatove town, Luhansk oblast, occupied in first days of war. Somebody writes this was Ukrainain missile, somebody this was Russian provocation, so still unclear. 
 

Caught the BMP by surprise.
No one expects the Spanish Instalaza.

After UKR troops came to the border in Ternova area, approached to the border in Starytsia area, after SOF crossed Siverskyi Donets river and took gound on the eastern bank between Zarichne and Khotimlia, Russian command at last felt the threat to Vovchansk - the border town and the gate of shortest logistic way Belgorod - Vovchansk - Kupiansk - Izium. So Russians moved there two more BTGs, artillery, MLRS and conducted counter strike with a goal to throw UKR forces back to the T2104 road Kharkiv - Staryi Saltiv. After about three days of fighting they managed to retake Starytsia and Rubizhne villages, Ternova now still contested. But Russians also havn't enough forces to push UKR troops further to south, so now we have position warfare with probes and artillery strikes. Russians also renewed shellings of Kharkiv (but in less number, than they deployed near circle road) and villages north from the city. 
Simultainously Russians started to shell border areas of Sumy oblast and even conducted attempt to attack theese areas with small forces. Obviously the goal of theese actions - to create appearance of the offensive threat and tie down our forces in this oblast in order they could be moved to Kharkiv oblast  

The greatest operational potential of the Kharkiv offensive was to turn due west and cut, or at least pressure the GLOCs that feed the Russians in the Izyum salient, and to a fair extent the whole Northern Donbas. These run through Vochansk, and Kupiasnk They attempted this and achieved at least some success. There is a major river obstacle that kept them from achieving more. They may have some ability to bring longer range artillery fire on Vovchansk from their current positions. But just the risk may be part of the reason the Russians shifted their major push to the southern Donbas. Unfortunately they found a weak spot there. 
This yet another reason the need HIMARS desperately. The could hammer the Russian staging area at Kupiansk from their current positions if they had it.

(As per Steve, above "dishonest or ill informed" -- the answer is "dishonest")
Meanwhile, NYTimes (full disclosure, I am subscriber) editorial board says Ukraine should negotiate away territory and it's bad to upset Putler and that UKR can't take back all it's territory anyway.  That is a disgraceful editorial.  UKR might, in the end, have to concede to some of Russia's thievery, but why would they do it before it becomes a necessity?   Would Putin negotiate away territory if he didn't have to -- hell no!
To those saying that we don't want to humiliate Russia w total defeat, I say that's absurd.  Have they learned nothing?  Letting Putin off the hook just means he will immediately start planning his next nefarious criminal adventures.  Small stuff like assassinating every critic and outspoken ex-pat who fled Russia.  Then bigger stuff, like stirring up fight in Moldova.  He'll use Russian minorities in Baltic states to ratchet up ethnic/political tensions.  Then maybe steal some more land from Georgia or wherever.  Politically/militarily annex Belarus.  Continue to poison the political processes in democracies.  Buying off powerful politicians and influencers in democracies. 
And that's not even mentioning the physical sabotage he might decide to perform against those that helped Ukraine, like  Cyber attacks, arson at critical infrastructure. 
Solidly defeating Russia matters to the future of the world's democracies a lot more than NYTimes editorial staff seems to understand.  He's a rabid dog and need to be as weakened as possible.  If Russia removes Putin, then they've got a chance to be part of the civilized world again, but that is the minimum step one.  And the worse they are defeated the better the chance he is removed.

In nearest 1-2 weeks we will see culmination of Russian offensive. Their pressure now is unprecedent. Lyman and Avdiivka today were shelled severly during several hours almost with all calibers and systems. Siverodonetsk and Bakhmut also under fire. Russian use own usual "burned earth" tactic. 
Russian penetrating around Popasna stabilized by elements of 80th air-assault brigade, but heavy clashes are ongoing. Villages Viktorivka, Oleksandropillia, western part of Komyshuvakha still a grey zone and arena of clashes. Russians are digging in Volodymyrivka and in 1,5..2 km south from Vasylivka - Lypove villages. Locals wrote in twitters - the endless stream of Russian armor and concentration of troops in Alchevsk, Kadiivka, Pervomaisk town. Reportedly at least 18 BTGs now on Popasna - Bakhmut axis
Russian commander of "Popasma group", mayor general Avdeev is relatively young general and he uses more flexible tactic, than direct assaults after artillery fire. He use HUGE amount of artillery and aviation support to supress resistsanse but instead direct assaults he uses outflanking and infiltrations of relativelly big number of small combat groups (1-2 reinforces platoons), consisting of mix of 76th VDV division  and PMC units. Our soldiers point that PMC have many experienced troopers, which passed many wars - they are dangerous enemy, which never surrender and never take prisoners. This actions and lack of troops on Popasna-Bakhmut axis (as well as retreating of some TD units) forced our command to pull our right flank. 
Today UKR troops on Svitlodarsk bulge destroyed the bridge through reservoir of Luhan' river and abandoned Myronivskyi settlement. Looks like we will retreat soon also from Svitlodarsk beyond the river and all efforts will be concentrate on defense of Bakhmut area. 
Destroyed bridge near Myronivskyi
Russian occupants (PMC?) in Myronivskyi

And hypothetical solution...

Gotta admire the skill! I mean, correcting for windage for a long drop is pretty hard, and they were spot on. Twice. Whereas I've never dropped anti-armor munitions from a drone, I have spit off the top of some pretty tall buildings. It never lands where you think it would...
 

So, some updates, based on analysys of Konstantin Mashovets, our military expert of "Information resistance" group. I would recommend it, but he writes in Russian in ironical and mockery way, so his texts will be too hard to understand for western reader. But his thoughts much deeper, than texts of Cooper and even ISW. 
So, Russians 2-3 days ago launched decisive phase of "plan F" (?) - encircling of UKR troops in agglomeration Rubizhne-Siverodonetsk-Lysychansk. Now their main efforts shifted again. But anout this later.
After Bilohorivka disaster, Russian troops took a pause on this direction, but tried to attack to Siveriodonetsk from NE and SE. In previous days UKR forces withdrew from southern part of Rubizhne and after about two days resistsnce in Voyavodivka - the village between Rubizne and Siverodonetsk, left and this village too, crossed the Borova river. Yoy could see the video of bridges demolish - this is that. Russians attack on the city were repelled by our artillery, so one day after their attack there was relatively quiet. Despite our troops left Voyevodivka, Russians to this time don't control it, because the village under fire control of UKR artillery. Now Russians shelled Siverodonetsk with artilelry and thinking about crossing the Borova river in the city vicinity.  
Most bad situation around Popasna. Initially Russian forces attacked north on Komyshuvakha, aiming on Vrubivka - Mylokaivka with coming to Bakhmut-Lysychansk road, but UKR forces repelled their atatcks so severly, that Russian coomand was forced to mix VDV troops, which suffered losses with PMC fighters and shift own efforts again. Russians and LPR still atatck in Komyshuvakha area, but main strike VDV+PMC+LPR forces conducted on Popasna - Soledar axis and, alas, their advance was successfull. This is not confirmed officially, but from reports of locals, enemy captured Novozvanivka, Pylypchate, Druzhba, Trypillia and even partially entered to Volodymyrivka village in 6-7 km from Soledar. Developing this sucess, Russian command threw in the battle here reserves - 3 new BTGs, at least two of them Russian VDV. Other analyst claims Russian already have on this direction 18 BTG - involved units of 5th CAA, Naval Infantry, VDV, PMC, LPR regulars/conscripts. Commander of "Popasna KampfGrupp" - lt.general Adveev, deputy of Southern military district comamnder.  Today, likely after new reserves arriving, Russians opened third axis of own attack from Popasna - SW. Reportedly they siezed Troitske (only one report, so RUMINT level) - large village, and the gate to Svitlodarsk bulge, which all this time was relatively calm place.  
Simultainously LPR forces, advancing from Novotoshkivske, seized Orikhove and Toshkivka villages and counduct fighting in Zolote and Hirs'ke areas, threating to come on southern outskirts of Lystchansk.
Obviously in interests of Popasna group, Russians changed own actions around Avdiivka. They rejected from senseless direct assaults from Yasynuvata to "promka", which cost huge number of DPR troops and shifted own efforts north along H-20 road toward Kostiantynivka town in 20 km SW form Bakhmut, which lays on the road Dnipro - Pavlohrad - Pokrovske - Bakhmut.
Thus, Russians now shifted own main actions on southern part of own encirclement. But on other axis they continue to atatck or regroup forces. Their "Izium group" now trying to advanse on direction Dovhen'ke - Krasnopillia and Dovhen'ke - Bohorodychne, assisting the "Lyman group" in own mission to cut UKR defense on several parts and to throw them to the river, maintaining wide accsess to Siverskyi Donets - reportedly they already gathered about 40 PMP pontoons sections to repeat crossing (part of this dtuff appointed for Borova crossing). Bakhmut now under MLRS and artillery fire. Russian aviation almost with unimpunity strike from the sky. Our soldiers say it's very hard to hit with MANPAD fast maneuvering target , flying on extreme low altitude. Also features of terrain not always allow to detect their attacks in time. 
But on other hand UKR troops are doing somethig near Izium - today appaerad a video with captured soldiers of 15th GMR of 2nd GMD from this area, so Russians moved some troops from Barvinkove- Sloviansk direction somewhere to Izium and even to Shevchenkove area, where Ukrainain troops are conducting probes in Kupiansk direction.
 
 

I think the diplomatic problem for Ukraine might be that the war seems to be going so well for them that people in EU stopped being afraid of the Russians. As they are pushed back, the feeling of crisis is passing, and EU politicians are no longer under pressure to do everything to help out.

😀

How did they kill 3 tanks in that kind flat pan, no cover country with a Panzerfaust?

Wraak voor MH17. From Amsterdam to Moscow with love...

I think most of the questions you had for me have already been broadly covered, and I don't have too much to add. JonS answered the quadcopters question with exactly what I had in mind - currently, they don't have the technical capabilities to produce effective and targetable data. Now granted, I have some bias myself, as I have spent the last two years observing training in a desert, and it's much harder to terrain associate you quadcopter footage with Google Maps in a barren wasteland, as opposed to Ukraine with it's clearly defined fields and villages. But adjustments become a problem as you don't have a firm grip on your observer direction, and then there is the vulnerability to small arms as you have to get much closer to produce more accurate data. You could certainly kit up a quadcopter to achieve those effects, but then you run into weight issues, and power issues, and size issues; is your quadcopter now something that you can hand off to an infantryman and have him stuff in a truck? I think it will be a useful tool for observation and mortar fire on enemy battle positions, but not something you can routinely use to target maneuvering formations.
I wouldn't describe a lot of opinions on drones as "pushback", but more along the lines of hesitancy. Militaries are quick to tout the capabilities of their new systems, but when the soldiers get a hold of them, reality rears its ugly head and the ground truth of their real capabilities becomes apparent. The US Army is full of such examples, some that you probably wouldn't even realize. Yes, at some point in the future we may be able to solve some or even most of these problems, but you also can't write doctrine based on a future capability that isn't even fully realized. Look at something like Nett Warrior, which has gone through many iterations and different equipment sets but has yet to be realized in the extent originally envisioned. The Army could probably dump a lot of time and effort on developing doctrine for an infantry platoon that has the capability to seamlessly network with every rifleman, but why would we, when we don't even have a system of record that can achieve that. You don't want to fight the previous war but you also can't pretend the next war is going to be fought with systems that haven't even been proven yet. Not saying the UAV isn't proven - clearly they are effective systems in the current operational environments - but more along the lines of things like micro UAVs or UGVs.
I'm not foolish enough to believe that war never changes and things will always be the same, but I'm also not going to buy off on having to completely change up our doctrine to counter threats that haven't even been fully realized. Drones  are dangerous and units will have to adapt their procedures to survive, but at the end of the day countering UAVs is about reducing the enemy's ability to observe you, and HEY, maybe you should figure out how to make the thing flying around and looking at you go away first, before completely changing up how we do things. Right now there is certainly an equipment gap when it comes to dealing with UAVs that is making things difficult, but a slow, poorly armored aircraft, with limited sensors and payloads, and a critical requirement to maintain comms to do its mission, and that has no effective means of cover or concealment and relies solely on a small signature and distance for survivability, certainly strikes me as system with vulnerabilities. Drones may be cheaper then manned aircraft but there is a limit on how many can be shot down before UAV operators have to start changing their tactics.
But I'm a pessimist I guess, and have burned by plenty of equipment that didn't hold up to what was promised. If you're gonna tout the next new thing that's going to change war, you need to prove to me that it's actually achievable first. I guess I won't be applying to Army Futures Command any time soon. 😁
In regards to a question I can't find anymore, about what I think potential solutions to the UAV problem may be:
I think there are a couple options out there. We can already target mid-size drones (think TB-2 or RQ-7 equivalents) fairly easily with current equipment, the main issue is probably range. So maybe we need a UAV specific missile that sacrifices speed and payload for range, as they aren't chasing down high performance jets at altitude anymore.
Where are the anti-UAV drones? We need a new Fokker Scourge, with drones swooping out of the sun to shoot buckshot at loitering quadcopters. I mean it sounds cool, right??
If we can track a small mortar round traveling hundreds of feet per second through the air with counterfire radars, how come we can't utilize similar technology to locate small UAVs? I am not a radar expert by any means, but it sounds feasible? Tie in a decentralized UAV finding radar with Avenger style systems operating down to the company level, and anytime a UAV comes within your bubble, rollout of cover and shoot it down with missiles or - even cheaper - proximity fuzed 20mm cannon rounds. Provide some sort of optical assistance and you can maybe even forgo the radar except for early warning.
Maybe some sort of weapon system that takes advantage of the noise a drone creates? Quadcopters have quite the unique sound profile, maybe there is some sort of way we can take advantage of that. I don't know, I'm just a dumb artilleryman.
Thank you for these insights! Good to see the mortar still has their traditional place on the battlefield. I imagine the infantry fight is much harder to turn into sexy Twitter videos and we won't see a lot of this on OSINT channels.
So honestly some of the hits do look like ATGM hits. The "B Roll" footage interspersed shows a much closer view of the convoy that seems to be well within ATGM range, you can clearly see the lead vehicles engaging something with their main gun, and (gonna channel my inner Trent here) some of the hits on the vehicles have a very distinctive "plume" of rising smoke I see with a lot of ATGM hits. And near the end, one of them definitely hits a mine. I think what we may be seeing is a perfect doctrinal example of an Engagement Area - artillery and mortars to disrupt movement and keep infantry in cover or in their vehicles; dismounted ATGM teams engaging lead vehicles of the convoy to stop forward movement; all in concert with an obstacle plan.
This is an excellent observation, and one I hadn't really internalized! I agree that this is probably due to survivability requirements. 
Digital Fire Control Systems are not so much about precision but rather speed. Digital systems greatly speed up the ability to lay and shoot howitzers. The howitzer is firing the same data that it would be if it were using optical systems, the difference is that the crew can just lay the howitzer faster and easier. If anything, I would argue that the digital FCS's greatest advantage is in fact the ability to mass even more. A wide range of howitzers unit could mass quickly on a single mission, displace and have the ability to conduct a quick "hip shoot" at any point during their survivability move - theoretically at least. Reality is, as always, more complicated.  But still, digital fire control systems have probably been the largest gain in capability for executing indirect fires in the last 100 years, I think even more so then the introduction of computing software to calculate firing data.
I'm sorry, but I don't buy the logistical issues. Army's have been firing unfathomably large amounts of howitzer rounds since World War I, with much worse logistical transportation equipment. I'm sure the invention of the machine gun and automatic rifle greatly increased small arms expenditures beyond what militaries were used to but I don't think the answer was reduce our ability to output small arms fire. You couldn't have replaced German machineguns at the Somme with snipers and achieved the same effects. Large volumes of artillery fires brings a certain suppressive effect that can't be matched with other systems. And mass isn't about blasting every treeline - it's about bringing all your available assets to bear at the same time to achieve a desired effect- sometimes that's a rear area command post, sometimes that's a platoon in a trench in a treeline. And a lot of times it's not even about killing the platoon in the trench - it's about keeping their heads down until my infantry can maneuver in and shoot them in the face.
In regards to GOs and obsession with precision, in 2014 the Field Artillery Commandant laid out a standard that 80% of targets acquired should have a Target Location Error within 10m to 5m

8 years later we didn't even come close to achieving this as an Army and the goal is long forgotten. Why? Because the ability to achieve that Category 1 and 2 TLE required cumbersome additional steps that are completely unfeasible for forward observers to accomplish in LSCO environment. You'd be hard pressed to make these requirements go away as well due to the physical and geographical nature of the target mensuration steps required to achieve CAT 1. Is it worth generating that CAT 1 grid for a command post? Absolutely, you wanna make that round count. But the infantry commander on the ground? He doesn't have time to wait on his FSO to mess around with his target mensuration software, squinting at a blurry satellite image and making sure that he is picking the right tree in the forest that's hiding the machine gun position. He needs suppressive fires now, and needs it for the next 30 minutes so he can organize his troops and maneuver on the enemy. Precision munitions are not as simple as point laser, shoot PGM - when you're dodging incoming small arms fire, you don't have time to make sure you have the right grid for the machine gun position, instead of the bush that's 50 meters in front of it that your laser clipped. For a precision round, that's enough distance to greatly limit your effectiveness, no matter how cheap they are.
 

That is a key angle.
In my estimation, if there's one country that would hate to see the use of nuclear weapons, it is China. They know that they aren't under any kind of conventional threat from anyone. As such, a lowering of the bar on the use of tac nukes would be distinctly to their disadvantage. Not only would they hate it on the principle of lowering the bar on nukes and possible escalation, they'd be no fan of a nuke flinging neighbour in and of itself.
I would not be surprised if they have already notified Putin that they wouldn't be a fan of their use in Ukraine. And right now, China is the only friend worth having that the Russian cannot afford to piss off.
 

Maybe he is a pro FPS-gamer. Everyone knows Mosins are always one shot kills while you need multiple hits with an AK 😎
More seriously, I guess properly scoped that would be a nice budget sniper rifle, but naked and with a bayonet...

Hi all, I am a new account on this forum, but I have been reading this thread every day for the past couple months after getting referred to it from elsewhere. This thread, the daily ISW reports and Perun's videos are my primary sources for keeping track of what's going on in this war and why. Thank you everyone for the great contributions.
My account took a couple days to get approved, so this comment is out-of-date relative to the comment I wanted to respond to, but there have been several times the topic of China came up so I thought it would be worth posting anyway. I hope it's still interesting to someone. If not, please scroll past, I don't want to distract too much from the excellent analysis you all are sharing.
This is an area where I have a personal interest and some first-hand experience, having lived in China for several years.
I don't think it is very helpful to describe China (or any authoritarian country) as merely left wing or right wing, in particular when that statement comes from partisans in a democratic country. All too often there is a cynical incentive to try to associate the policies of the authoritarian regime with opposing political factions in the democratic system. I think it's better to assess the policies on their own.
Xi has overseen several socially conservative policies - for example broadcast restrictions on media featuring tattoos, piercings, effeminate men, same-sex relations and so on. But this is only part of a larger scale censorship effort that has also seen arrests of local citizen reporters and foreign media not only blocked at the Great Firewall but also pushed out of reporting from inside the country at all. He also spearheaded a popular anti-corruption campaign that coincidentally targeted all the senior party officials that might stand against him. And, of course, he removed term limits and will likely get a third term in the upcoming national congress. These are suspiciously autocratic moves, which is worrying in a country that since Deng has at least made a pretense of winding back the power of figureheads and trying to build more of a loyalty to the party as an abstract entity.
Xi has also allowed a populist rise of nationalism, xenophobia and Islamophobia, and he has put a strong emphasis on increasing national security and modernizing the military. One aspect of this was a revision to the national defense law that expanded the justifications for military actions, and placed more power into a military commission headed up by Xi.
On the other hand, in the past few years the party has also strengthened government controls over business. Notably it halted the IPO of Ant Financial, often portrayed overseas as a punishment for Jack Ma (co-founder of Alibaba) commenting on excessive regulation, but more likely just because the party wasn't happy that some of these tech giants are a threat to its power. Since then it has also been using anti-monopoly guidelines and other means to regulate major players in industries such as finance, tech and education. It's also hit several high-profile individuals for tax evasion, and for a brief period the official messaging seemed to be that speculation on real estate and the pursuit of excessive wealth was inappropriate, although that seems to have been tempered somewhat due to the COVID-related economic slowdown.
But a key point running through all of these policies is this: 党政军民学，东西南北中，党是领导一切的 - government, military, society and education - east, west, south, north and center - the party leads everything. And who leads the party? Recently the phrase "with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core" has become more common in the state media. This political structure isn't comparable to democratic countries where there is no singular authority and it's normal to have spirited and open debates on the issues.
I think the main thing to take away from Chinese politics under Xi is not to figure out if he represents a version of the left or the right in a democratic country, but to understand that his primary motivation is to ensure that the party retains control over every aspect of society. All policies are designed with that goal in mind. In my opinion Xi does have generally nationalist and socially conservative views, but I think he is also mindful that wealth inequality can lead to unrest and the downfall of the party, and that would be the ultimate sin.
TLDR: what Steve said
On how this affects the war in Ukraine - both the state media apparatus and the prevailing chatter on social media (which is ultimately shaped by what the state chooses not to censor) is solidly in the camp of this war somehow being a result of NATO expansion and American hegemony. I don't think there is an easy way for the party to publicly roll back its support for Putin. The issue will probably just remain in the current limbo, with the party simply claiming to remain neutral or impartial.
On what it portends for Taiwan - it's definitely useful for the party to study and learn from this war, but I don't think it will have an impact on its timeline for taking Taiwan. The party has enough problems with zero-COVID and a teetering economy right now - I don't think it is in a position to fast-track any actions. I suspect we might see some more signaling after Xi is confirmed for a third term (second half of this year) and then after the 2024 presidential election in Taiwan, which is likely to be the first where 18-20 year olds can vote (referendum on that later this year). Either way, it's interesting to see how the party has built up the mythology of Taiwan as a wayward little brother who is temporarily misguided and will someday return to the fold. That has benefits in that it creates popular support for "unification", but it might also make a full-blown invasion unpopular. Annexation is surely off the table now, after the PR disaster of Hong Kong 2019. A naval blockade is often suggested as a way to strangle the island, but that might only strengthen its people's resolve. I think if the party is to succeed in its designs on Taiwan, it will need Putin's failed "take the capital in 3 days" strategy to actually work. I would be very interested in a wargame that tackles this scenario.
Anyway, back to my lurking hole, and thanks again for the fantastic thread.

Some of the conversation over the few pages have referenced the former Yugoslavia.  Which brings back... well, not so good memories.
I was a Canadian peacekeeper in Bosnia in latter half of '93.   During the Croatian offensive in the Medak in Sept of '93, I was with the 2 PPCLI when we went into the sh*tstorm to try to stop the ethnic cleansing going on.  The Croatian army attacked our unit during that operation, a thing that the Croatian government denies to this very day.  Despite us photographing the Croatian dead after the battle and collecting their ID, etc.    We had god damn evidence and to this day, the Croatian government position is that they never attacked us.
Part of our job, beside trying to keep the warring factions apart, was to document evidence of ethnic cleansing and I was in charge (I was an officer) of a evidence collection team.  So, literally thousands of photos, videos.  Transcripts of interviews with witnesses and victims.  Six months exposed to that living hell, day after f*n day....
So I had the evidence, because sometimes our official recording devices ran out film or tape and we used our personal recording devices to finish up at a site.
After I got out the military, I found myself sometimes on various military forms about games, such as this one.  Arma forums, military wargame forums... that sort of thing.  And as it happened, I ran into forum members from Croatia and Bosnia Serbs and we would get into it.
Universally, every Croatian or Bosnian Serb forum poster denied what happened there.  And I was called a liar on many occasions for telling them them the truth of that war as I was there and they weren't.  And I have evidence to back up my claims.  No one believed me and if I offered visual proof, they didn't want to see it or they disclaimed it as fake.
I remember a particular Bosnian Serb who was not in the war but we got deep into the weeds discussing what happened during that war.  Deny, deny, deny.  It never happened.  Until videos that the Bosnian Serbs took of them killing civilians and dumping them in mass graves what was recorded by the very soldiers who committed the atrocities surfaced and made it onto their local media and they couldn't deny it any longer.  Those videos were part of the process besides sanctions that resulted in some notable Bosnia Serb / Serbian leaders being turned over to the ICC for prosecution for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.  After the revelation came out, this individual on that forum who I had spent hours engaging with about the culpability of Serbs in the atrocities simply ignored me from that point onwards.  I will never know why.... was it that he discovered that I was right all a long and he was wrong and he was ashamed (as he would have been) or he simply wanted to hang onto his delusion of what narrative he wanted to believe was true and he knew that I would keep chipping away.   
Denial is a powerful thing.   I don't understand why it has such power but it does.  People can dismiss an outright objective reality because to accept the truth is to undermine what they think reality is or should be.   I don't get it and is beyond madding to see the denials in the face of objective reality happen over and over.
Sigh.   I don't know why the hell I rambled on with this.  Maybe it was a story I need to tell to remain sane in light of the same brutality I witnessed back in Bosnia happening in Ukraine now.  Or maybe I still am the greater fool for believing my experiences in Bosnia can be an object lesson to others about holding onto a narrative that is personally comfortable but runs counter to all the real evidence to the contrary.   DMS, I am looking at you....
The truth will come out after all this is over.  At least, I hope it does.  The truth of this war needs to be told and codified so generations that follow can know what really happend.
Now at the end of this and reviewing it, I feel that I should have deleted this or apologize for it.  
I am hitting post. It is my truth.  Let people accept it and learn something from it or ignore it.  I needed to say this for a long time.   
 
 

Have to get a reasonable measure of the area, but probably comparably low for a direct hit.
A few comments though:
1) That barrage looked like it was entirely airbursts, and if you scroll through slowly, there's a burst at 0:05 above the unit that explodes on the ground very shortly before the big explosion.  So it wasn't likely a direct hit from a round, but from one of the fragments from that round, which spread over a much larger area than a single round.  So the chances are that most of the vehicles got hit with shrapnel, and that one got hit with a piece with enough energy in the right place to set of a secondary explosion.
2) There's selection bias in the videos that get posted - a bunch of rounds blowing up without dramatic results is less likely to get posted (i.e. how many rounds a day are they firing and how many of those bangs get posted on twitter)
3) I think that's the first time I've seen a barrage of airbursts from either side.

Can't find the meme picture now, but the idea was roughly
(Russia, knocking on door) "Let me in"
(Finland) "Why?"
(Russia) "I'm going to protect you"
(Finland) "Protect me from what?"
(Russia) "From what I'm going to do to you if you don't let me in"

What I am quickly learning from this war is that if the average Russian reflexively screams something is fake, it is almost certainly real and likely to be later proven with evidence.
My favorite so far was the Russian trolls running around saying the videos of the civilians in the shelters under Azovstal were all fake because of the superficial resemblance of one older guy in one video to the actor in the Ukrainian propaganda video where a symbolic abused Ukrainian girl in traditional dress cuts the throat of a Russian soldier.  Then two days ago the girl with her baby standing next to the “actor” in the basement video shows up on a bus leaving Azovstal.
And that’s the thing.  Russians don’t even think about whether or not something could end up being proven real later.  Just reflexively call everything fake all the time and as long as everyone else in your culture does the same, soon group think takes over and anything that makes you uncomfortable has to be fake without even really thinking about it.  I mean everything is, right?
Nothing is real but Russian suffering.

Welcome to page 666 of the discussion, thus making this the thread of the beast.

About drone usage, there was interesting interview of Aerorozvidka volunteer UAV unit commader. There is no need to give all text here in Ukrainan, so main things:
- Ukrainan units have huge advantage in tactical drones of close and average zone. He says in some moments about half-dozen of DJI or AUTEL drones can fly over battelfield. Russians have small drones like Granat and Zala, but only in special units like recons, when UKR units sometime have commercial drones even on the level of mech.platoon (but most usual of course are recons, AT-teams, HQs, mortars etc). In avarage class we are using Leleka-100, Furia and PD-1, they all have about 50-100 km of range and 1,5-2 hours of endurance.
- But the main problem - Russia has huge advantage in operative level drones. This is about Orlan-10. It can fly 16 hours and sneak up to 600 km in autonomous mode (120 km in guiding mode). It can carry various equipment - optic, thermal, ELINT, SIGINT, EW. New modification, which was adopted since 2017 alraedy has 5500 m of ceiling instead 5000 m, its control lines became more stable for EW, so UKR forces have minimal chances to shot down or to hijack new version of Orlan-10 if the weather is clear and Orlan flies over 5000 m. Even our newest EW systems often can't do nothing. Our commander said Orlans is hovering like a bees over battlefield and monitoring situation on battlefierld almost all 24 hours. This caused many problems on open terrain, because Russian HQs get information and transmit it to artillery
- TB2 Bayraktars became to use mostly for recon missions and don't approach to frontline too close. Since the war became more positional, Russians deployed many AD assets like TOR and Pantsyr, which dangerous for TB2. Today's operation near Zmiinyi island became possible only after destroying of Moskva cruiser (huge floating SAM platform) and destroying of AD assets on the island. But on the other hand TB2 already several times used for strikes against facilities on Russian territory. 2 or 3 TB2 were shot down. 
- Other problem the same both of UKR and RUS - low integration level of drones to weapon systems and information systems of battle control, especially for close zone drones. For example, only Furia can make targeting and automatic fire adjustment. Other drones can maintain only visual adjustment and if you need to know coordinates with better accuracy than "on eye" from the screen, you should return drone back, take a memory card and visually match the image with a map.