SS - supermen or just mama's boys with lots of toys?

[GhostRider3/3]

Killing goat herders for being in their OWN country and doing NOTHING apart from being in the way ? Sure. Some kind of Special forces that get themseves compromised by goat herders .....

This discussion clearly shows why it is so hard for the US to win hearts and minds anywhere in the world ..... because it breaks down to OUR boys are allowed to do everything because you know it's war, right ?

The other side however should let themselves get killed easily and can get slaughtered for daring to fire their MGs on OUR boys ....... but some of you guys do know better and that gives the world hope ......

Adapt, improvise and overcome any obstacle to get the mission done. IN my own humble opinion. Its just not the US but any Allied group fighting overseas. Getting tired of the stereotype from countries that are not even in the fight.... which in my eyes have no right to say anything negative, as they do not contribute anything. I think this thread went way off topic and needs to be closed as reading some of these threads is begining to get the blood boiling.

[Yeknodathon]

muppets

Utterly cool, We're going to get 39th SS Grenadier Division Gonzo the Great!

[GhostRider3/3]

For a long time the SS were equipped with captured foreign kit that the Army didn't want despite being desperately short of materiel themselves. That kinda puts the lie to the hostess with the mostess meme.

Proportionately, quite a few of the SS divisions were Pz or PzGren. Like, maybe 33%? Compare that to the army were it was down around 10%. But as far as the Western Allies were concerned, every SS division they encountered in Italy and Normandy and France and BeNeLux and Germany (well, except for 6th SS Mtn, but that was late in the campaign) was either a Pz or PzGren div, which would tend to give a distorted view. The Western Allies didn't come across the hopelessly incompetent muppets like the Florian Geyer, Handschar, or Lützow divisions.

Not sure that really applied to all German Waffen SS division. Clearly the Corp Waffen SS divisions in the early days were nothing more then Regimental size and had to fight with their Heer Comrades to get equipment.. thats why Eicke (3rd SS Totenkopf) had his men steal their equipment from the Heer. I know for a fact that the 7th SS Prinz Eugen used captured French Tanks. But you could say all the divisions wether Waffen SS or Heer used captured equipment as they waited for replacements for those that were destroyed or broke down. Later on the Tip of the spear formations were equiped with the best Germany had to offer, but you could bet that if they needed a transport, krad, or more tanks to replace loses they suffered...

[Fetchez la Vache]

Well this discussion reinforces to me, once again, the principle that there is very little in this world that can be described in purely black-white terms.

SS massacre GI's in Malmedy. Canadians use AT grenades on sleeping Germans. Tactically a SEAL team should have killed goat herders. There's a line between them somewhere, but it's damn hard to find in my opinion. The Banality of Evil...

[Wiggum]

The American WW2 experience with "elite" units was mixed. Certainly, the army deliberately created units that were "special" and unique, such as the paratroopers, rangers, 1st Special Service Force and a few others. Generally these units performed an an above standard level, but there was some feeling in the army leadership that said that the extra attention, time, training and effort that went into these units could have been better used to even out the overall force. This was particularly true when infantry losses in the ETO made it clear that they couldn't keep on sending the dregs to the infantry while the best and smartest soldiers went to the air corps, airborne, officer schools, tech schools, etc. The infantry had its own need for bright, capable soldiers and this was only learned fairly late in the war.

In a draftee army, there was little patience with prima donna outfits, as they were seen by some at the time. There was a real need for ordinary footsoldiers and it sometimes seemed that there were never enough bodies to go around, at least of the better qualified ones.

There is no question, though, that these special units did perform well and were in the end worth the effort to raise and maintain them. They were not always appreciated by the line units alongside them, at least until they proved their worth in battle.

The Marines were a special case of course. They were unique in that the whole lot of them felt themselves to be better than the army, or anyone else for that matter. For that reason, they were used as a battering ram in the Pacific, which was by and large run by the navy as opposed to the army. Army units did participate, but it seemed that the Marines were the ones usually selected for the toughest jobs and accordingly took the highest casualties.

That was true until Okinawa, when we began to comprehend what a battle for mainland Japan might be like. By then it was clear to all that the Marines would not be enough and the Army had to be there in numbers if Japan was ever to be invaded. Fortunately, many Army units in the Pacific had become quite battle hardened and nearly as capable as the Marines at amphibious warfare, so experience in part made up for those Army units, what elan provided for the Marines.

There is, then, a real balancing act to the creation of armies in wartime. If you create elite units, you may find them beneficial, but you have to be aware of what those units are costing in terms of the efficiency of your overall force. It seems to me that the Germans, in creating the SS, gained some benefits, but also paid a big price in that they diminished their regular army to get and maintain those elite units.

Great post gunnergoz !

Looking at the late-war german concept of "Volks-Grenadier" divisions can also be interesting:

Himmler himselfe (as commander of the ersatzheer) adopt that concept.

The title "Volk" should be something of an honor for the soldiers, giving them the idea to be something special in there own way.

And they were special, a hole new organisation with other weapons (less MG42 and more MP-44 but there was never enough ammunition). The officers should be politically reliable at least in theory...

What was meant to be a new kind of "elite" unit was nothing more then the last try to mobilize every men that could hold a gun (wounded, ill, guys from the Luftwaffe and Marine, young boys and "ethnic germans" from Poland or Romania that sometimes spoke only little german).

They relied greatly on horses (a infantry regiment had 9 motorised vehicles but over 400 horses !) and communication equipment was rare.

So, they were special and somehow were meant to be a new kind of "elite" but in the end they were ordinary or worse.

It is really suprising that such divisions with so many issues (low quality men, lack of training, low on ammunition, totally relied on horses, ect.) put up such a fight against superior allied forces.

Interesting to note that US targeted them with special surrender leaflets that pointed out those issues of the Volks-Grenadier formations.

[gunnergoz]

Well this discussion reinforces to me, once again, the principle that there is very little in this world that can be described in purely black-white terms.

SS massacre GI's in Malmedy. Canadians use AT grenades on sleeping Germans. Tactically a SEAL team should have killed goat herders. There's a line between them somewhere, but it's damn hard to find in my opinion. The Banality of Evil...

...vs the Sanctity of Life. Yes, you summed it up pretty well. War does that supremely, turning everything on its head. Survival becomes primary, everything else, secondary. Unless, of course, you have a "mission." Then your survival may not matter as much as that duty. And when others get in the way of your mission, then they too may be sacrificed in the name of that objective. The whole deck of cards keeps building and building, until there seems precious little logic to it.

Maybe that's why I prefer killing photons and electrons in my little war games...

[Sgt Joch]

Well this discussion reinforces to me, once again, the principle that there is very little in this world that can be described in purely black-white terms.

SS massacre GI's in Malmedy. Canadians use AT grenades on sleeping Germans. Tactically a SEAL team should have killed goat herders. There's a line between them somewhere, but it's damn hard to find in my opinion. The Banality of Evil...

Interesting juxtaposition, but I don't see how you can equate the two.

At Malmedy, and there actually 4-5 separate such incident, a total of 140 unarmed allied POWs were murdered in cold blood.

In the other incident, which is actuaaly the British at El Alamein, a commander comes upon trenches full of supposedly sleeping, but presumably armed enemy troops on the battlefield. He has various options:1) leave and hope the germans dont pop up and gun down his men; 2) announce his presence and intention to take them prisoner, and hope they dont pop up and gun down his men; 3) take them prisoner and hope that while taking that noisy bunch back to his lines, other troops dont pop up and gun down his men, or 4)toss in grenades and neutralise the enemy. His actions were perfectly legitimate within the rules of war, those soldiers were legitimate military targets.

There is a disturbing trend in popular culture, especially since the vietnam war, to try to create a moral equivalency between the actions of the Western Allies and those of Nazi Germany, to try to argue that our actions to win the war were as bad as theirs. But if you study history, real books written by serious historians, not what passes as history on the internet or movies, you realize that our actions, harsh as they may appear on the surface were not any where close to the evil perpetrated by the Nazis.

To me the "banality of evil" is the 6 millions jews killed in extermination camps, the 2.5 million Soviet POWs killed in German POW camps in 1941-42, the killing of crippled/ retarded children in German orphanages, the medical experiments carried out on prisoners, the 1 million+ who were worked to death in the slave labour program, etc., etc. Each a horrible crime in and of itself, but there were so many crimes committed by the Nazis that they tend to get lost in the shuffle.

[Loaf]

I can't remember the name of the book now (wanna' say Panzer Leader/Commander, but the author talked about this. He mentions that the SS were generally disliked by regular army and that many good officers were being transferred into it against their desires to pump up SS performance. IIRC, he also mentions that a few didn't mind, as they thought it would advance their career, but that most really did not want to go (an offer you can't refuse?).

Does anybody know that book? The second half covers his time as a POW in the USSR. -Don't know how much is true, but he talks a lot about how valuable the German POWs were to the Russians who ran the camps, as they made a lot of money and/or earned favors with their superiors by putting the Germans, who often had good skills, to work on projects.

One story almost sounds like Hogan's Heroes. I believe at a time when his group was in the Ukraine, they were often out working with only one guard, who they got along well with (Schuuuultz!!!). They used to play tricks on him for fun and one time they hid his rifle from him for awhile.

Anyway, that's the only detailed account of life as a Russian-front POW that has drifted my way over the years. It's a good read. Oh, and I just remembered that I think the author later became a coffee merchant, if that helps anybody peg the book title.

Macisle

Macisle, the name of the book you are referring to is "Panzer Commander" by Hans von Luck.

[Erwin]

The Nazis had a policy of mass extermination of pretty much anyone they didn't like. They simply hadn't gotten around to many other races due to too many resources going to fighting the Allies.

Gypsies, Gays, mentally ill, disabled, Poles, Russians etc etc were all going to be eliminated or turned into permanent untermensch race slaves with no education so they could never rebel due to no understanding of how the world works.

All the slaves would be required to do is learn a series of obedient grunts.

http://histclo.com/essay/war/ww2/dc/cou/pol/no-sch.html

Actually if you look around today you may see how we have implemented some of those ideas in our education system today.

[Rokko]

Btw, what did the allies have against German paratroopers? Whenever you read orders or accounts about killing German POWs it's directed against Waffen-SS and paratroopers. I haven't ever read about war crimes committed by them, though?

[sburke]

Adapt, improvise and overcome any obstacle to get the mission done. IN my own humble opinion. Its just not the US but any Allied group fighting overseas. Getting tired of the stereotype from countries that are not even in the fight.... which in my eyes have no right to say anything negative, as they do not contribute anything. I think this thread went way off topic and needs to be closed as reading some of these threads is begining to get the blood boiling.

I would agree that our troops deserve better than a flip response on a thread. There is usually more to the story than any of us know. However the point of the mission those Seals were on was to defend exactly that, the right of people to say things we might not necessarily agree with. As an American I do not believe it helps our cause when we assume civilians are acceptable casualties to accomplish a mission. However I think the grey line here is in irregular warfare, the insurgent deliberately blurs the line between combatant and civilian.

There is a certain relationship of trust here. If we are going to put our troops in these impossible situations then we all own responsibility for the decision issues they are forced to confront and the consequences. If we can't live with that, then we should not be asking them to be there.

I don't think anyone here has gone so far with any issue to call for closing the thread. Yes it has gone off topic, but the subject matter is definitely of interest. I would in fact argue that the this debate over the Seals reflects exactly what Burnett was getting at. We have this unrealistic expectation of the tidiness of combat based on a incorrect assessment of what combat in WW 2 was like. Once you cross the line of normal civil discourse and accept you have no alternative but to go to war, the lines become a lot less clear. Would I prefer the Seals not kill some poor goat herder in some far off country, hell yeah. Am I willing to say I know for sure that is the right decision, hell no. I do not know that the individual is an "innocent", for all I know he could be a Taliban militant and his AK is 40 meters away hidden in a copse. That the Seal team risked their lives on that decision not to kill them is why I can in fact take so much pride in them and mourn their loss all that much more. If you look back at what the Soviets were capable of doing in that same country 30 years ago, yes we are being held to a higher standard. That is a good thing.

[Erik Springelkamp]

Btw, what did the allies have against German paratroopers? Whenever you read orders or accounts about killing German POWs it's directed against Waffen-SS and paratroopers. I haven't ever read about war crimes committed by them, though?

Well, minor ones, like they used captured Dutch soldiers as human shields during the air assault on Holland in May, 1940.

[sburke]

Killing goat herders for being in their OWN country and doing NOTHING apart from being in the way ? Sure. Some kind of Special forces that get themseves compromised by goat herders .....

This discussion clearly shows why it is so hard for the US to win hearts and minds anywhere in the world ..... because it breaks down to OUR boys are allowed to do everything because you know it's war, right ?

The other side however should let themselves get killed easily and can get slaughtered for daring to fire their MGs on OUR boys ....... but some of you guys do know better and that gives the world hope ......

Well first off the Seal team didn't "get themselves compromised" the statement is inflammatory and serves no purpose other than to try and portray them as inept.

Second, despite the risk that they were almost certainly releasing guys who would report their presence, they did so anyway. Note they also said whatever the decision it would have to be reported is pretty incredible. They could simply have said let's kill em and not say a word. However these men knew they had a difficult life threatening decision to make and they were not going to try and hide it. In retrospect it was a bad decision, but they made it and I love them for it. Were there alternatives? Maybe, but not having any other details I don't know that there were.

As to it being so hard to win hearts and minds .. well they made this decision it cost them their lives and yet they still get disparaged like this. If this incident doesn't earn them something then perhaps the whole argument about winning hearts and minds is simply so much smoke. I don't believe that it is, but whatever your feelings about others comments on the thread these guys deserve better.

[Sgt Joch]

Btw, what did the allies have against German paratroopers? Whenever you read orders or accounts about killing German POWs it's directed against Waffen-SS and paratroopers. I haven't ever read about war crimes committed by them, though?

Link?

Note that much of what you find on the internet, even Wikipedia, about alleged Allied War Crimes is highly suspect. A lot of it is posted by neo-Nazis trying to justify Nazi policies.

For example, the so called "Chenogne Massacre" of German POWs which has appeared on the net over the past few years as a counterpoint to Malmedy appears to be a made up event. No credible evidence that it ever occurred has been presented.

[sburke]

Link?

Note that much of what you find on the internet, even Wikipedia, about alleged Allied War Crimes is highly suspect. A lot of it is posted by neo-Nazis trying to justify Nazi policies.

For example, the so called "Chenogne Massacre" of German POWs which has appeared on the net over the past few years as a counterpoint to Malmedy appears to be a made up event. No credible evidence that it ever occurred has been presented.

There is apparently one official order from the HQ 328th Inf Reg in response to the Malmedy massacre. I would assume it included paratroopers due to the presence of the 3rd FJ Division with 1st SS. That is the only incident I have come across and the logic of why the FJ are included is self evident.

Thus Fragmentary Order 27, issued by Headquarters, 328th Infantry, on 21 December for the attack scheduled the following day says: “No SS

troops or paratroopers will be taken prisoners but will be shot on sight.” -page 264 US Army offical history The Ardennes:Battle of the Bulge by Hugh Cole.

[Rokko]

That and I remember having read in Kurt Meyer's "Grenadiere" that both Waffen-SS and Fallschirmjägers were quite likely to be shot when they tried to surrender (that was in Normandy!). Now I'm aware that "Grenadiere" was written with a certain intention and that Meyer is definately the most reliable source, but since I've had seen other accounts as well I considered it credible.

[sburke]

That and I remember having read in Kurt Meyer's "Grenadiere" that both Waffen-SS and Fallschirmjägers were quite likely to be shot when they tried to surrender (that was in Normandy!). Now I'm aware that "Grenadiere" was written with a certain intention and that Meyer is definately the most reliable source, but since I've had seen other accounts as well I considered it credible.

I think the experience with the Waffen SS has been described earlier. Their own history of executing prisoners going back as far as May 26th 1940 on the western front and the 12th SS was executing prisoners already on June 7th probably had a lot to do with their chances of survival upon surrender. The 17th SS and the 266th ID were both suspect in the murder of Americans POWS from the 501st and 507th Airborne regiments at Graignes.

As to the FJ if we are speaking of the area around St Lo, they were committed to some very intense hedgerow fighting. I don't know of any official orders of any type, but with the nature of the fighting, the sniping of medics etc it would be disingenuous to expect the GIs didn't retaliate.

[Michael Emrys]

I can't remember the name of the book now (wanna' say Panzer Leader/Commander...

Panzer Commander, Hans von Luck. I read that too about 20 years ago. Very good and interesting book, both in his wartime reminiscences and after the war. He saw a lot of interesting service.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

BTW, the attempt to compare the fighting power of parachute and other special forces to more conventional forces is a little disingenuous. They had a different TO&E establishment with much less in the way of artillery and other support elements. They really weren't designed to go toe to toe with standard infantry let alone armored divisions, even though in practice they often had to do so.

For instance, the airborne forces were designed to seize critical objectives by coup de main and only hold them until they could be relieved/reinforced by conventional forces. If they weren't relieved within 24-48 hours, they were usually in big trouble. It was the absence of heavy firepower that led to the emphasis on individual initiative, skill, and determination. The airborne often fought in situations where average soldiers might have been inclined to surrender rather more quickly. But in doing so, they might also suffer heavy casualties, as witness the 1st. Airbourne in Arnhem.

Michael

[Sgt Joch]

There is apparently one official order from the HQ 328th Inf Reg in response to the Malmedy massacre. I would assume it included paratroopers due to the presence of the 3rd FJ Division with 1st SS. That is the only incident I have come across and the logic of why the FJ are included is self evident.

Thus Fragmentary Order 27, issued by Headquarters, 328th Infantry, on 21 December for the attack scheduled the following day says: “No SS

troops or paratroopers will be taken prisoners but will be shot on sight.” -page 264 US Army offical history The Ardennes:Battle of the Bulge by Hugh Cole.

I am aware of that order, which is also the only one that I am aware of on the NWE front from the Allied side. It was issued in reaction to Malmedy and rescinded a few weeks later after tempers cooled down. There is no evidence that it was ever acted upon.

[Sgt Joch]

That and I remember having read in Kurt Meyer's "Grenadiere" that both Waffen-SS and Fallschirmjägers were quite likely to be shot when they tried to surrender (that was in Normandy!). Now I'm aware that "Grenadiere" was written with a certain intention and that Meyer is definately the most reliable source, but since I've had seen other accounts as well I considered it credible.

Meyer was directly responsible for the massacre of canadian troops in normandy and was convicted after the war for it. Why he did not hang for what he did is beyond me. His book "Grenadier" was an attempt to whitewash his reputation. Most serious historians who have looked at it say a lot of his excuses were made up after the war to justify his actions.

Having said that, he was a great combat leader.

[Rokko]

That and I remember having read in Kurt Meyer's "Grenadiere" that both Waffen-SS and Fallschirmjägers were quite likely to be shot when they tried to surrender (that was in Normandy!). Now I'm aware that "Grenadiere" was written with a certain intention and that Meyer is definately NOT the most reliable source, but since I've had seen other accounts as well I considered it credible.

Yep, I just saw I made a mistake there, thats what I actually wanted to write.

Yes I am aware that it was Meyer's intention to whitewash himself and his men, but since I had read about that "no Waffen-SS and paratroopers" thingee elsewhere, too, I considered it kinda credible

[JasonC]

Since others have already address the misconception about the SS in general, notably JonS, Joch, and Rokko (their comments on that subject are seconded), I can touch on that subject just briefly. The SS was as varied as the Heer, with a small number of best equipped panzer divisions, a 2nd tier meant in theory to be as good but in practice making do, then a vanilla body of less select, less experienced, and less well equipped formations, and then a big tail about as large as all of the above combined, of second rate formations of dubious motivation, personnel quality, and equipment.

In the SS, lots of that second half of the force mix were units formed from non Germans in the broad net that crackpot SS race theory threw over occupied Europe trying to drum up recruits. There were Bosnia Muslim formations, Baltic formations, various "volksdeutch" nationals from conquered states often much more loyal to those states than to the mythical Aryan race, etc. Most of those formations fought in the east, when they fought at all, rather than running away as soon as they safely could.

But that aside, I thought the item that needs serious addressing is specifically the SS formations that fought in Normandy. Some have the impression that those at least were all a veteran or elite corps, laviously equipped, etc. This isn't the case. Basically only 1SS fits that description at the division level (and even that point needs to be qualified by noting that heavy losses in the east meant a fair portion of the ranks were fresh replacements), plus the two SS Tiger battalions 101SS and 102SS. Which no doubt are the origin of the general impression. But this impression is then extended to 2SS, 9SS, 10SS, 12SS, and 17SS, amounting to half the mobile divisions that fought in Normandy - and that just isn't accurate.

2SS comes closest; it was at least a veteran division with long service in Russia. However, it was rebuilding in southern France at the time of the invasion, having lost half its manpower strength in the east. 9000 men in the division for the Normandy fighting were raw recruits. In addition, the division was desperately short of transport, and it arrive in Normandy piecemeal because it could not lift the whole formation with its available trucks, while its armor, sent by rail over a networks cut in thousands of places by allied airpower and by partisans, took weeks to cross half of France, and a third of the tanks arrived needing repair.

2SS was sent enough tanks to be a full strength PD by 1944 standards, with a total of 208 full AFVs used in Normandy, including 80 Panthers. But it never had a running AFV strength higher than 112. It basically fought at half armor strength, as its vehicles arrived piecemeal. Its first formation managed to reach the field in time to fight the British in Operation Epsom, June 25-28, but lacked any armored vehicles. That KG was a basically a 2 battalion motorized infantry regiment with only infantry gun artillery support; nothing else had reached the theater yet. After that the division fought the Americans, at about half strength (armor included) for the push to St Lo period, the other half arriving in time to take part in the Mortain attempt. By 11 August the armor was gone, 11 runners remained.

Understand, this is the SS formation that besides 1SS comes closest to the usual story. Its cadre were veterans and originally volunteers, and it was a 200 AFV panzer division with 80 heavies that could stop a short 75 round from the front. But half the men were recent recruits who had never seen action before, it fought at half strength due to piecemeal commitment and transport shortages etc.

Next there is 12SS. It was well equipped with armor, again a 200 AFV division with a full Panther battalion, and it arrived early and intact and fought for the whole campaign. But while its cadre included officers and some NCOs from 1SS who were east front veterans, the manpower was entirely green. It also had only 1/2 its required number of officers and NCOs. The personnel were 17 and 18 year olds from the Hitler Youth, which meant some political selection, but was not a volunteer formation, nor were they veterans, nor were they elite in the correct sense of "selected for ability out of a larger pool".

Next come 9th and 10th SS. Some seem to put them in the same category as the earlier SS formation with long experience in Russia (1-3SS, 5SS), but this is not an accurate impression. Both were formed in 1943 from conscipted personnel, not volunteers as with the earlier SS formations. Most of the personnel were taken from the German Labor Service, the mandatory paramilitary construction outfit that Germans reaching draft age first entered. At most 30% of the personnel were cadre, transfers from earlier formations from the volunteer era, or contemporary volunteers.

These formations had seen action in Russia, but not long service there. They first fought in early April 1944, in about 2 weeks of counterattack fighting to free 1st Panzer Army (cut off in a Russian offensive, and successfully extracted) and to reach trapped German infantry formations cut off deeper in Tarnapol, unsuccessfully. Between April 16 when that fight basically concluded, and their being ordered west on 12 June a week after the invasion, they were refitting off the line while still in the east, or in static and not very active defensive positions along the Bug river.

That is enough to say they had seen the elephant and were not completely green in that sense. But they were not long service veterans of the campaigns in the east, nor volunteers, nor elite in the sense of selected. They also arrive in the west understrength in manpower by 25% (9th SS) and 11% (10th SS) as a result of losses sustained in the east. It might also be pointed out that the performance of their commanders in armored operations in particular left something to be desired in their first fight, enough so that Heer officers of longer experience were put in charge of the KGs they fought within, sidelining their own divisional commanders.

Next, these formations were not lavishly equipped. On the contrary. When they first arrived in the west, both were missing their Panther battalions, and the 10th SS never received theirs in the Normandy campaign. The authorized divisional Panzerjaeger battalions were likewise missing for both. The single panzer battalion arriving with each was in each case half equipped with StuGs in place of turreted Panzer IVs - 9th SS had 46 Panzer IV and 40 StuG, 10th SS had 39 Panzer IV and 38 StuG.

During the fighting, 9th SS Panther battalion eventually did arrive, with 79 Panthers total, though never more than 50 runners at any one time. And 102SS Tiger battalion was seconded to 10th SS once it arrived (early-mid July, too late for Epsom), but arrived in piecemeal fashion - 45 all told, but not more than 25 runners at a time, since the 3rd company arrived in late July after losses etc.

For their well known counterattack in Epsom, they "borrowed" the Panther battalion from 2nd Panzer division stationed to their west just across the Brit-US army boundary, lacking their own "heavies" to that point.

Counting that Heer addition, the corps fielded 225 AFVs around the time of Epsom, 82 of them heavy (all from 2nd Panzer), and 171 in early-mid July, 75 of them heavy. That means they had a total armor complement equal to a single full strength PD like 2nd Panzer or Panzer Lehr or 1SS or 12SS when those first arrived - but for the whole corps, not "each" - while having twice as much infantry (losses included).

Last comes 17th SS. It was another purely green formation, recently formed and never having seen action before. It wasn't formed from even semi-volunteers as with 12SS. The cadre had some veterans, best that can be said. When they first "saw the elephant" in their Caretan counterattack attempt against US airborne, they did not perform terribly well. They did fight better later in the campaign as the men became more experienced. For armor support they had only a single StuG formation of 31 AFVs, and they lost a third of them in their first engagement.

Hardly a uniform body of east front veterans fully decked out to TOE. Nor even a volunteer formation, as a whole.

FWIW...

[LongLeftFlank]

Good info, thanks, and definitely helps put that "weary but experienced German" meme into context. To paraphrase the great GI cartoonist Bill Mauldin, front line veterans in all armies "are fugitives from th' law of averages".

Many of us tend to forget that even though Operation Bagration (aka "The Destruction of AG Center") was contemporaneous with Normandy, that was only the latest (and largest) in a series of catastrophic defeats the Red Army had inflicted on the Germans over the prior 18 months.

Between December 1942 and June 1944, the German armed forces (SS included) had already been "bled white" , as they were systematically driven out of the Ukraine and the Volkhov by highly motivated and increasingly skillful Soviet forces and commanders.

Many of us are tainted by German-slanted Cold War memoirs, Tamiya dioramas and PanzerBlitz / ASL. So when we think of this "middle passage", we only know about either German tactical victories, or "glorious" defeats where the faceless Bolshevik hordes paid dearly for their gains, e.g. Third Kharkov, Prokhorovka, Kanev, Nikopol, Krivoy Rog, Zhitomir.

But the vastly more significant battles were (among many others) Orel, Bukrin, Crimea, Brusilov, Novgorod, Korsun and Tarnopol. And the Germans best placed to recall these defeats mostly didn't survive to tell the tale, while the Russian accounts weren't deemed interesting until after 1989.

Bottom line: by June 1944, many of the highly skilled and veteran officers and men from the years of Blitzkrieg had been killed, maimed or captured (also, losses in North Africa and Italy were not insignificant). And while the belated mobilization of Nazi Germany for total war did put higher quality weapons in the hands of their replacements, neither that nor fanaticism could offset the irreplaceable loss of experience (or the exhaustive individual and unit training that had once been the norm).