GAZ NZ

I wonder which way the politics will swing. Will this destroy Netanyahu or will this make him ruler for life?

In the first phase or two of the war, Kyiv and then the first Russian push in the Donbas, Javelins and other missiles were  a major component of of the casualties. Dumb artillery rounds probably accounted for most of the rest. Since the lines stabilized, and both side got mines out to restrict lanes of attack, various special artillery rounds, the mines themselves, and drones have done much more of the damage. By special rounds I mean artillery delivered mines, the nifty german round with with the top attack sub munition and Excalibur. there are probably more. Ideally you don't use an unless some leakers make it through everything I just listed, because it reveals your position. 

POLAND WILL NO LONGER ARM UKRAINE, after Ukraine complains to WTO over grain ban in Poland

In a series of recent developments, tensions have flared between Ukraine and several European Union member states, leading to significant economic and political repercussions.

On September 15th, the European Commission announced the termination of the import ban on grain from Ukraine. This decision marked the culmination of a previous agreement made in May by the European Union to impose restrictions on the import of Ukrainian grain, confining it to Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. The primary objective of these measures was to protect local farmers in these nations who attributed declining prices on their domestic markets to the inundation of Ukrainian grain. While the restrictions allowed Ukraine to transit its products through these five countries, they effectively prohibited their sale on local markets.

The European Commission justified its decision to end the import ban by citing the disappearance of market distortions in the five member states bordering Ukraine. Nevertheless, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia immediately contested the move, sparking controversy, especially in Poland, where elections were impending.

Subsequently, on September 19th, Ukraine filed a formal complaint with the World Trade Organization (WTO) against Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. This complaint was lodged in response to these countries imposing bans on the import of grain and other food products from Ukraine. Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal made the announcement, highlighting the ongoing discord within the agricultural sector and further deepening the rift between Ukraine—a major global food supplier—and three European Union member states. The EU has been a crucial supporter of Ukraine as it grapples with Russia’s invasion.

In a divergence from the broader EU stance, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Croatia (the latter joining later) implemented bans on Ukrainian food imports into their local markets. However, they decided to continue permitting these products to transit through their borders to regions where there was a demand for food. These decisions were prompted by the EU’s recent decision to lift restrictions on Ukrainian exports to five member states, including Romania and Bulgaria. Notably, Bulgaria’s government chose to reinstate Ukrainian imports, citing the surge in food costs, which had triggered farmer protests.

Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenkovic echoed the concerns of the other nations, expressing fears that importing cheaper Ukrainian grain could adversely affect local farmers. Nevertheless, Croatia extended an olive branch by offering its Adriatic Sea ports to facilitate the export of Ukrainian grain to other countries. In response, Ukraine’s Prime Minister criticized these actions as “unfriendly” and launched an investigation into potential discriminatory practices.

Finally, on September 21st, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki unveiled a policy shift concerning arms supplies to Ukraine. He declared that Poland would focus on strengthening its own defense capabilities and cease arming Ukraine. This decision followed the summoning of Kyiv’s ambassador by Warsaw amid the ongoing dispute over grain exports.

Poland, a major supplier of weapons to Ukraine and a steadfast supporter since Russia’s invasion in February 2022, has also provided assistance to approximately one million Ukrainian refugees. The decision to halt arms transfers to Ukraine underscores Poland’s changing priorities, emphasizing the modernization of its own defense capabilities. These interconnected developments exemplify the intricate web of economic, political, and security interests at play in the region.

 

POLAND WILL NO LONGER ARM UKRAINE, after Ukraine complains to WTO over grain ban in Poland

In a series of recent developments, tensions have flared between Ukraine and several European Union member states, leading to significant economic and political repercussions.

On September 15th, the European Commission announced the termination of the import ban on grain from Ukraine. This decision marked the culmination of a previous agreement made in May by the European Union to impose restrictions on the import of Ukrainian grain, confining it to Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. The primary objective of these measures was to protect local farmers in these nations who attributed declining prices on their domestic markets to the inundation of Ukrainian grain. While the restrictions allowed Ukraine to transit its products through these five countries, they effectively prohibited their sale on local markets.

The European Commission justified its decision to end the import ban by citing the disappearance of market distortions in the five member states bordering Ukraine. Nevertheless, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia immediately contested the move, sparking controversy, especially in Poland, where elections were impending.

Subsequently, on September 19th, Ukraine filed a formal complaint with the World Trade Organization (WTO) against Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. This complaint was lodged in response to these countries imposing bans on the import of grain and other food products from Ukraine. Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal made the announcement, highlighting the ongoing discord within the agricultural sector and further deepening the rift between Ukraine—a major global food supplier—and three European Union member states. The EU has been a crucial supporter of Ukraine as it grapples with Russia’s invasion.

In a divergence from the broader EU stance, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Croatia (the latter joining later) implemented bans on Ukrainian food imports into their local markets. However, they decided to continue permitting these products to transit through their borders to regions where there was a demand for food. These decisions were prompted by the EU’s recent decision to lift restrictions on Ukrainian exports to five member states, including Romania and Bulgaria. Notably, Bulgaria’s government chose to reinstate Ukrainian imports, citing the surge in food costs, which had triggered farmer protests.

Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenkovic echoed the concerns of the other nations, expressing fears that importing cheaper Ukrainian grain could adversely affect local farmers. Nevertheless, Croatia extended an olive branch by offering its Adriatic Sea ports to facilitate the export of Ukrainian grain to other countries. In response, Ukraine’s Prime Minister criticized these actions as “unfriendly” and launched an investigation into potential discriminatory practices.

Finally, on September 21st, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki unveiled a policy shift concerning arms supplies to Ukraine. He declared that Poland would focus on strengthening its own defense capabilities and cease arming Ukraine. This decision followed the summoning of Kyiv’s ambassador by Warsaw amid the ongoing dispute over grain exports.

Poland, a major supplier of weapons to Ukraine and a steadfast supporter since Russia’s invasion in February 2022, has also provided assistance to approximately one million Ukrainian refugees. The decision to halt arms transfers to Ukraine underscores Poland’s changing priorities, emphasizing the modernization of its own defense capabilities. These interconnected developments exemplify the intricate web of economic, political, and security interests at play in the region.

 

Morawiecki's words were misreported, as he did not declare a policy shift, but stated as a matter of fact that Poland at the moment is not supplying arms to Ukraine, because it needs to rearm itself. This is generally true because most of assets that Poland could spare have been donated already and the new deliveries have yet to be realised. The press being the press reported this in a way which both creates controversy and satsifies the biases of the writers and the readers.
Still what Morawiecki refers to is important to understand the present crisis in Polish-Ukrainian relations. Poland was determined to help from the beginning and had a significant stock of post-soviet stuff which blended relatively well with Ukrainian assets. This caused Polish aid to be hugely important in the first period of the war. By now, we have largely shot our bolt and do not have so much to give anymore. Western European aid is on the rise, and countries like e.g. Germany can help Ukraine in EU accession negotiations which Poland cannot. Therefore, our value as an ally has decreased, apparently to the extent that Zelenski decided to prioritise the profit marigins on the sale of grain over UKR-POL relations. As long as we do not close the border or the Jasionka airport - which is not going to happen - Ukrainians will continue to benefit from most of Poland's value as an ally in this war.  Also, he may be counting on currying favour with the EU commission and Western European governements by creating a difficult situation for the PiS govt shortly before the elections.
Conversely, most of Ukraine's value as an ally to Poland is realised via Ukraine defending itself and killing Russians. At this stage it seems they are capable of doing it without Polish aid deliveries, with Poland acting just as an airhead and land bridge to UKR, so I expect this will be the equilibrium on which the matters will settle: we will keep providing the passive support plus training, repair services and deliver under the existing contracts. Cheering for Ukraine's wins and enthusiasm for post-war close cooperation will decrease, money and asset collection among the general populace will fall away, etc. - but these have always been optional and had no impact on the general direction of the war.
BTW this is exactly the course of events which was predicted by many Polish political analysts of the "realist" persuasion.
 

A clear timeline, and explanation of the attacks on Crimea explaining success of Ukraine attacks 
Good footage as well
 

A clear timeline, and explanation of the attacks on Crimea explaining success of Ukraine attacks 
Good footage as well
 

The same as the one that can be seen in its entirity at 2:02, a Typhoon-VDV armored car armed with a 30mm RWS system.
https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2023/03/counting-down-list-of-russian-army.html
You can see this particular model listed on this list made by Oryx under the AFVs section.

https://rumble.com/v10dit9-scott-ritter-twitter-ban-update-ukraine-military-expert-.html
Scott Ritter: Twitter ban update - ( UKRAINE MILITARY EXPERT )
This is very interesting Scott Ritter UN weapons expert, intelligence analyst he's the guy who said no wmd in Iraq
Is this guy legit? 

Thanks, and Jomini also links via Osint to this short but important thread (albeit reconfirming what CM thread readers already know)
EDIT: Ya know what? this is just too on the nose not to quote in full here, given its concision, plus the very high cred of the source: 
(1) BTGs are simply battalion-sized, task organized combined arms teams. All major armies have done this since WWII.
(2) The Russian Army's current emphasis on BTGs (vice regiments/brigades) is due to a lack of available manpower - they were used an as expedient during the Chechen war that the Ministry of Defense adopted wholesale in 2013 as a manpower hedge.
(3) Russian Army BTGs and doctrine are built around firepower and mobility, at the expense of manpower.
(4) Western analysts believed that Russian BTGs were capable of networking long-range fires in real time (or near real time) i.e. the 2014 Zelenopillya strike
(5) It turns out the BTGs can't actually do this. They cannot even communicate via secure means, much less target and strike quickly and effectively at long range. This negates much of their supposed combat power advantage.
(6) The Russian BTGs appear unable to execute competent combined arms tactics. This is a fundamental failure as combined arms have been the sine qua non of modern fire and movement tactics since WWI.
(7) This shows up big in the lack of effective infantry support. BTG infantry cannot prevent Ukrainian mechanized and light infantry anti-tank hunter/killer teams from attriting their AFV, IFV, and SP artillery. This is the primary job of infantry in tank units.
(8) It is not clear if this is due to ineffective infantry forces or insufficient numbers of them in the BTGs; probably both are true.
(9) The net result is that the BTGs lack the mass (i.e. infantry) necessary to take defended urban terrain by assault. At least, not at a reasonable cost in combat losses.
(10) The leanness of the BTG manning (~ 1,000 troops) means that they cannot sustain much attrition without suffering a marked decline in combat power and effectiveness.
(11) It will take a thorough analysis to determine if the performance of the BTGs is due to inherent flaws in Russian Army personnel and training or flaws in their doctrinal approach. Again, both are probably culpable.
(12) In any case, these problems are not likely to be remedied in the short term. Fixing them will take a major reform effort.
....
My hot take:
So if I wuz the Russians, clutching at straws right now, I would be attaching a company of VDV paratroopers or naval infantry to beef up each BTG.  Operating on foot like the Ukes, with their own tracks tasked to run supplies/medevac (as much as they can). NOT as gun platforms, save in self-defence. That dog don't hunt no more.
....Except that those very formations have been heavily ground down in the early fights for Kiev, Cherniev, Nikolaev and the ongoing Stalingrad at Mariupol; witness the very heavy officer losses!
And that doesn't even come close to solving all the fire coordination problems, but right now I'm reading the above as BTGs are combat ineffective sitting ducks, being picked off at will by UA forces. They have to staunch the bleeding before they can even think about proper find+fix+kill offensive operations against the UA, as distinct from thrusting yet more all-hat-and-no-cattle mech columns down various roads....
I know 'macro guy' @JasonC has many nonfans on this board, but he is quite correct in this IMHO -- the Blitzkrieg stereotype of 'hit em where they ain't' maneuvering only takes you so far.  Sooner rather than later you have got to engage and kill the enemy forces, at a higher rate than they are killing you. Get a clue: they don't just curl up and die because you're 'behind them'.
Or, what damned good is a cauldron if you can't light the fire under it?

I did some digging on the stinger claim and only found a few things - a 1984 NYTimes article (may be paywalled, I have a sub) that refers to recommendations that a night sight be developed to make them more effective at night, but without explanation.  The best documentation I found was an  FAS document (probably old-ish) describing them and also describing the NV add-on sight.  So it sounds like it's just the lack of a night-vision system for initial acquisition by the operator, which is/was done optically in the visible spectrum (which is obviously more difficult at night), and that it's been corrected in the ~38 years since it was introduced.  I doubt there are any stingers that old being shipped to Ukraine.

Scott Ritter is yet another expert that has been on Russian TV over the years.
He was the WMD attack dog for the inspections in Iraq and leading the charge, until he was no longer leading the charge and resigned pointing fingers at everyone else for hindering his ability to uncover the WMDs. Then when he was no longer in charge he was suddenly convinced there weren't any. 
He's gone around the bend and don't think he can be considered as a good source for this board.
And on top of everything else he is, he is a twice convicted sex offender. So right at the baseline you are looking at someone without morals or ethics which makes them pretty hard to trust. Just saying.

Russia is more clued up now and using more co ordinated drone strikes over last two weeks apparently 
Bit late lol
Overall  link Talks about Russian Air capability vs taking out mobile Sam's with anti radiation missiles
Difficult for any country apparently 
Nato countries not doing much of this training if any so war is showing difficulties attacking layered mobile air defence - mobile Sam sites
Very detailed talk 
Gives greater clarity on Russian failure

I'm quoting from NY times 
It's your own news paper if you are US based
 
 

Ok, hey maybe they have got some people on staff but a few tours in the sand makes them experts at shooting people and maybe not so much on the invasion of an entire country.  Now if they were on the Corp staff back in 03 or SAMS grads with some NATO time, ok.  
Based on their resumes this is akin to getting municipal planning advice from two fire fighters.  Sure they are on the payroll but way out of their lane.
Live and let live but I would be cautious and weigh their opinions accordingly.

I don’t necessarily agree with this in total. CMBS takes place what, seven years ago? At that time the UKR military still consisted of older Soviet equipment and training, both of which were said to be inferior to the new, more superior equipment and training of the Russian military. Since that time, the Ukraine military has received what we would consider superior training and maintenance of equipment BECAUSE of the Russian invasion of Crimea. That drove the Ukraine to allow training from the West, and ensured better maintenance practices regardless of the bureaucratic corruption that seems to be endemic in the post-Soviet satellite countries. Russia, on the other hand, continued and expanded on the endemic corruption that would have earned a bullet to the back of the head under the Soviets (since the corrupted wern’t part of the Politburo). 

A well-written and cautious summary of developments (in Spanish)
https://www.revistaejercitos.com/2022/03/01/guerra-de-ucrania-dia-6/
of most interest for folks here are the three situation maps shown in the article: the first one which comes from a Russian source and looks very optimistic, another from the Institute for the Study of War which seems to underestimate the progress of the Russian Armed Forces along the coast of the Sea of Azov, and the third one, which neatly interpolates the 2nd with clear reports of Mariupol having been encircled (and fierce fighting around the city).
Also very useful to make sense of the stream of videos and photos is this website 
https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html
that works quite hard to geo locate videos/photos/claims and cross-reference all that data. A few days ago I was wondering about where was the "top-end" Russian kit, and it does seem that is starting to appear in the lists of confirmed destroyed vehicles.
I am with @LongLeftFlank and other OSINT people that these supply raids and interdiction may snowball and become a very important factor in how things play out over the next few days. What we're seeing is very much in line with the analysis of the article from War on the Rocks that I (and probably others, this thread is a monster) shared a few days ago. From that analysis the most sensible strategy was to avoid a "decisive" engagement in the frontiers and go for the supply lines, and it seems that is precisely what the UKR forces are doing for the moment.
The other very significative thing that many of you have raised is that there's seemingly a lot of open radio comms that are being snooped by radio aficionados from around the world. I look forward to see if someone can make sense out of all that Russian armed forces radio chatter. There are also several reports of equipment being just... abandoned.
I am also very much horrified by seeing the effects of Russian artillery on civilian areas, again, after what transpired in Aleppo (or with less means, in Sarajevo, going back in time). I have no words for that.
To all the Ukrainian friends here, please take care of yourselves if you have not already joined your army. To all the peace-loving, decent Russian friends here, I am not going to ask impossible stuff. I just remember this quote from One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich:
A genius doesn't adjust his treatment of a theme to a tyrant's taste

I've posted the same video above - this is not comms building, but old abandoned sport center near the tower. I live in Kyiv too

Some of the world isn't against it. Some of the older folks faintly remember the missile crisis with Cuba '62, where team B's weaponry was parked in team A's backyard. The missiles weren't ready at the time but the risk of that threat proximity was too great and the US got tough - they had to. Some people in the world, including folks in the US, see this current situation in the same light; the Ukraine is Russia's backyard and within the past year NATO inclusion has been Ok'd by the US administration. Now if, after Ukraine's been split in two, Putin moves on the Western portion, that's no longer a backyard issue and then you might see more people being willing to vote for a foreign war. Right now, not so much. Obviously the Western portion could subsequently be invited to join NATO; that could be the crux of complication in the next few weeks, there are arguments both sides about whether that's a good thing to do. Won't be a pleasant task for the peacemakers but they could make it work.

I just can't imagine that Putin didn't calculate all this. The sanctions can't be a surprise, perhaps the speed with which they were implemented, but not the scale of it. I'm sure his Chinese friends will help him to survive economically. For Putin this isn't just invading Ukraine. It's a holy crusade to restore the Russian empire to it's former glory and to be remembered as a second Peter the Great or Stalin. That that would bring him a storm of words and sanctions for the West, is a small price to pay in his eyes.
Nukes are just a means to put pressure on the West. He won't use them, why would he? When all dust and smoke is gone, he has exactly what he wants. And he doesn't mind another Cold War. He is a child of the Cold War and I bet he enjoys it. His own people? He doesn't give a damn and I'm sure most Russians are prepared to follow him in his crusade. Those who aren't will face a short and miserable existence.
I don't have the time, nor the brains to post deep analyses like some knowledgeable people here. But I do know that from the moment those Russian troop concentrations were spotted, I concluded that Putin was going to attack.
So what can we do? Well, as I see it, apart from risking a war that still might come but for which we are far from ready, thanks to our imbecile politicians and our own stupidity, we should support Ukraine with everything we can and make the Russians bleed as much as possible, because only that will convince the Russian people that they are following a very dangerous individual. I hope the Ukrainians can pull off a Finland 1939, but I have my doubts. Apart from that we, as Europeans, must prepare ourselves for a Cold/Hot war and re-arm like hell. The US won't be around much longer to hold our hand, especially when China attacks Taiwan, which they sooner or later will. We also must make sure we don't need Russian gas and oil anymore, which is going to hurt big time, but must be done. We have to start the long, bloody process of breaking the back of Russia economically and morally, like we did in 1989, so one day Ukraine can indeed join EU and NATO.
Apart from that we must realize that the US is our only real ally in this world. Not always the ideal ally and one that should not be able to influence our decisions (and don't give them your wallet 😄), but a valueable friend in a world of enemies nevertheless.
 

I am a bit reluctant to post this because really this is mostly idle amateur conjecture but while everybody seems to be focused on the capital and Kharkiv there are some interesting developments elsewhere. The wiki map while probably only a rough approximation at best looks a lot more realistic than the pro Russian maps that are circulating.
At first sight no major changes if you compare it to yesterday's situation. However a closer look could indicate that the Russians might achieve something in the south east along the coast of the sea of Azov, if they took or isolated Berdyansk as I have seen reported because it is only 60 kms or so from Mariupol and they might have already reached the south side of the Dnieper opposite Nikopol. It is all unconfirmed now however. But together with the Tokmak spearhead it would secure the northern flank of the push along the coast to some extent. I think this is a lot more likely to be the goal rather than a full encirclement of the the Ukrainian Donbas grouping. But the Ukrainian army is probably heavily dug in around Mariupol so it could be a tough nut to crack.
What's maybe strange is how the Donetsk and Luhansk separatists don't seem to participate much. Maybe they do but aren't achieving anything besides tying down Ukrainian forces?
And in the north east sector Russians are maybe making some significant progress too. It doesn't sound too far fetched that the two thrusts on each side of Kronotop might eventually link up with the new prong driving from the north toward Kyiv on the east side of the Dnieper.
But I don't see how Russians could take Kyiv and Kharkiv without some heavy shelling, something it appears they have been reluctant to do so far, in built up areas at least? Most likely because photos of building rubble wouldn't match too well with the narrative of a limited operation they have been spinning at home for internal Russian audience. Simply bypassing Kharkiv would make sense really.

Back in the day I would agree with this, but these days people, especially the younger generation post stuff on social media that in the past would be unthinkable.
The internet and social media is an intelligence goldmine. Back in the day millions/billions was spend gathering HUMINT.
Today you just scan the internet and social media.

Well if it makes you feel any better, I was mildly disturbed while watching the video as well, but only in the sense that I don't like to watch people die.  That should be a healthy and normal reaction.  I was hoping he would be taken prisoner as well, but he looked to be dead already by the time anyone else entered the video (as I said). 

Word to the wise as I've already seen comments recommending. No matter where you are, especially in a NATO country if you've not done any prepping for a cyber attack that takes down power grids you need to get to it. If youv'e not already exercised your 2nd amendment right I suggest that too. All these world leaders are controlled by bankers, and mega corporations. If you do not know who Klaus Schwab, head of The World Economic Forum, the Bilderberg Group, and Davos Group, is then it is in your interest to investigate who he is. In his arrogance he openly brags of infiltrating half of the cabinets of the world, including Canada's to name just one. You may not know of his connection to the pandemic in his book "Covid 19, and The Great Reset",and his round table war gaming of the pandemic 5 MONTHS before hand in Oct. 2019 along with The Gates Foundation which they called "Event 201". You can investigate these things for yourself
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Klaus_Schwab - Capture of democratic structures and institutions
He is now openly bragging of the possibility of a cyber attack on the power grid as a next phase of their "Great Reset". This war is convenient in the wanting to facilitate that desire. I normally do not get into these things on the forum, but I think this is important enough to post to inform especially if you have never heard of Klaus Schwab, The World Economic Forum, and the term "The Great Reset". Oh, and you may want to learn of his relationship with Putin. Prep and you will be wise. Seek and you shall find ....
Hear it from the Devil's mouth himself -
https://www.bitchute.com/video/JO0orNe6wbMN/

That video of the tank driving over the car is only one view. There was another angle of the same incident and it was on the same street as the above mentioned truck incident. 
That truck was ambushed and that tank also came under fire and swerved into the car. It was more than likely unintentional.  Both videos were also reviewed and commented on several hundred posts ago.