Semi-Automatic Rifle Firing Speeds Tested - Way too slow?

[Guest]

If you watch combat footage from WII (not staged) GI's seem to be firing at all the above suggested rates, sometimes a single squads ROF is a mixture of all the above. Given soldiers have to individually spot and engage is their ROF varied?

The decision regarding how many rounds to fire and when is down to each individual soldier. So yes, ROF may vary, even setting aside spotting differences.

[The_Capt]

:confused:

Let me ask you, do your troops serve drinks and hor d'oeuvres when entertaining?

Michael

Oh dear. My kingdom for a comma (or two). Well much more has been lost with less.....smart ass.

[Magpie_Oz]

Double taps for the carbine, very little recoil and a faster mechanism. watching youtube demo's of garand rapid shoots, seems the second shot of a double tap would be a miss with the recoil, and the bolt slide is a little slower too.

It might look like that but if you "set" yourself what you find is after the recoil of the first round you return to more or less the same target picture as the when you first fired. I can certainly put two rounds through a man sized target at 100m with a double tap.

What you do find as well is that at really close range, 20 metres or so you are going to be far more likely to miss, panic, having to move much farther to aim at the target, the target dashing about etc all go together to make it harder to hit them.This is why we have bayonets.

As for rate of fire, well if an enemy is 15yds away I want to make very sure that I hit him with at least 1 of my 8 rounds, don't want to be trying to reload with someone that close, so I would think your rate of fire would be less rather than spraying them about. But it would all depend on the situation.

[LemuelG]

You can see in this VAAR (I have linked to the specific time) that any complaints about the in-game M1 are not entirely justified by the actual, in-game results: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rhbIdXtYUyY&feature=player_detailpage#t=810s

Case closed.

[JasonC]

This falls under the usual category of civilians and wargamers expecting theoretical maximum ROFs to matter for anything whatever.

In WW II, American riflemen were typically issued and used about 90 rounds *per week* in combat. In the heaviest infantry fighting in close terrain it might hit double that figure.

They were emphatically not pulling triggers as fast as possible to send rounds downrange. Instead they only fired when they had a clear view of a fleeting visual target, which was extremely rare in actual combat, compared to anything we see in the games, let alone in firing range imaginary situations.

A 40% higher rate of fire at typical combat rifle ranges is quite generous to the M-1 over the K98. The reality is most of the time there would be no practical difference between them. And oh also, neither one inflicted appreciably losses on the enemy. Most infantry casualties were caused by artillery (including mortars), and most of the rest were caused by crew served machineguns, vehicle or infantry heavy weapons, and most of the rest were caused by SAWs. Rifle fire from scoped rifles from hiding were an effective additional weapon, but small as a cause of overall casualties (just also quite cheap to inflict).

Non-automatics of the ordinary squad riflemen? The average rifleman in this category on any side, whole war, never hit a single enemy over his entire combat career. Maybe one in ten did so once. We know this because the other causes of loss are causing most of the down riflemen, and all the riflemen weren't killed 10 times over.

[SlapHappy]

I guess the Marines were more trigger-happy:

http://www.ww2gyrene.org/role_ammo.htm

[PLM2]

Nobodies expecting theoretical ROF for a weapon.

American infantry squads didn't exactly have LMGs.... the BAR probably holds one of the lowest percentages of firepower of any modern infantry squad. OBviously the Garand is soemthing that compensated for the enemy LMGs. I remember in CM1 it was pretty useful to have the chart of firepower and ranges. The American squads typically had an advantage at close range, is it still the case?

American infantry divisions took pretty insane casualties in WWII compared to other wars and the majority of these were infantry. Even units that were only in the theater for six months lost 7/10ths of their total manpower. Others there longer lost 200%+ Sure you're average riflemen didn't kill anyone. But then again millions of troops never even made it to the party on time. My grandpa was a truck driver and he went still went through some serious ****.

As you close in on the enemy the necessity of dominating them through firepower increases exponentially. That's not anything that needs to be told and you've gotta be nuts to say it isn't the natural reaction. Its definitely what your NCO wants to see before the enemy get in grenade range, especially if the enemy is exposed in front of you. They certainly fired faster in CM 1.

Through all my training and experience in Iraq I can't imagine if I actually had seen the enemy and at a range where I could hit them that I wouldn't fire really really ****ing fast recoil or no recoil, they're gonna drop or change their mind about moving one way or another. I can understand if the guys were cowering. But they sit there exposed nonchalantly taking aim half the time. And its not just occasionally that they do that. I think its safe to say your average CM2 engagement is more intense than your average WWII firefight. So when the enemy's right in front of them they should at least pull their trigger with a purpose, some of them, some of the time.

[womble]

Nobodies expecting theoretical ROF for a weapon.

American infantry squads didn't exactly have LMGs.... the BAR probably holds one of the lowest percentages of firepower of any modern infantry squad. OBviously the Garand is soemthing that compensated for the enemy LMGs. I remember in CM1 it was pretty useful to have the chart of firepower and ranges. The American squads typically had an advantage at close range, is it still the case?

American infantry divisions took pretty insane casualties in WWII compared to other wars and the majority of these were infantry. Even units that were only in the theater for six months lost 7/10ths of their total manpower. Others there longer lost 200%+ Sure you're average riflemen didn't kill anyone. But then again millions of troops never even made it to the party on time. My grandpa was a truck driver and he went still went through some serious ****.

As you close in on the enemy the necessity of dominating them through firepower increases exponentially. That's not anything that needs to be told and you've gotta be nuts to say it isn't the natural reaction. Its definitely what your NCO wants to see before the enemy get in grenade range, especially if the enemy is exposed in front of you. They certainly fired faster in CM 1.

Through all my training and experience in Iraq I can't imagine if I actually had seen the enemy and at a range where I could hit them that I wouldn't fire really really ****ing fast recoil or no recoil, they're gonna drop or change their mind about moving one way or another. I can understand if the guys were cowering. But they sit there exposed nonchalantly taking aim half the time. And its not just occasionally that they do that. I think its safe to say your average CM2 engagement is more intense than your average WWII firefight. So when the enemy's right in front of them they should at least pull their trigger with a purpose, some of them, some of the time.

Look, you're arguing a non-point. It's been stated by the lead programmer that troops will fire faster than the area fire tests done in the beginning, when the situation demands. People have made 'witness statements' that they've seen this behaviour in-game. What's the problem? If area fire rates were any higher, you'd have to stop using it voluntarily, or you'd have to stop using it because you've no ammo left.

The area fire tests produce artefactual results that don't reflect behaviour IRL or in game.

[JasonC]

Slap Happy - on the contrary, those figures bear out what I said pretty exactly. The figures for the Marines at Tarawa and the ID are both within 15% of 90 per week - for shorter periods. Only the 165th Regiment figure is higher, and by a single factor of 2, for a short 3 day period. Yes the ammo expenditure per weapon is higher *for the machineguns*, that was part of my own point actually. But the squad riflemen are shooting 45 times in a 3-day invasion, not 45 times in 2 minutes. Even the BARs are firing maybe 4 clips a day.

The common saying is that combat is hours of boredom punctuated by moments of terror. Notice, the saying isn't "hours of firing punctuated by moments of reloading". Within a firefight, the most common experience if for a man to be pinned down and see no enemy, and the second most common experience is to see one or only a handful of enemy and to fire off one clip at them, then take cover.

Looking at the Makin example a little further, as the highest expenditure. Each 30 cal is firing 1150 rounds and each BAR is firing 520, and this is a regiment, so there are several hundred of those, combined. There are several thousand ordinary riflemen firing 87 times apiece, only about matching the BARs in total rounds fired therefore (assuming 2 per squad - later the Marines went up to 3 but this is 1943). The targets of those approximately 400,000 rounds of rifle-caliber ammunition? All of 400 Japanese.

In your next test, count the total ammo reduction of your firing units and count enemy hit by the end of the test. Is the ratio between them 1000 to 1? In the real deal it was significant more than that, since other weapons accounted for most of the enemy losses.

[Vark]

So why give infantry rifles? Surely they'd be better with a decent sidearm some grenades and plenty of ammo for all the real killers (belts, bombs etc). Also it would save greatly on training, not being facetious just asking, is a rifle mainly a psychological device or for suppression? If the later surely a well fed machine gun can do far better?

[dieseltaylor]

JC - your desire to spread statistics over periods that have no bearing on the game seems to gaining sway. Whilst you have the information to hand it is not directly relevant.

I have no interest in the average for a week in relation to a sharp piece of town fighting. It is an interesting fact for sure but really the point is how much may be used up in a 40 minute hard action.

[JonS]

I have no interest in the average for a week in relation to a sharp piece of town fighting. It is an interesting fact for sure but really the point is how much may be used up in a 40 minute hard action.

Well, by definition it can't be more than 90, can it?

[sburke]

JC - your desire to spread statistics over periods that have no bearing on the game seems to gaining sway. Whilst you have the information to hand it is not directly relevant.

I have no interest in the average for a week in relation to a sharp piece of town fighting. It is an interesting fact for sure but really the point is how much may be used up in a 40 minute hard action.

Can you define 40 minute hard action? As an example I am currently in a 70 minute battle. Very rarely have I had a turn where more than a few squads have a target and then even at that point not everyone in the squad. I would consider this battle very intense from my overall commander perspective, but for my individual units, they can go 10-15 minutes of not seeing anything at all before having a target and then maybe getting a couple rounds in.

Maybe once I finish it I can look back at individual ammo expenditure. My opponent (as the attacker) is expending far more than I am for sure, but a lot of that is consumed by prep fire which on a number of occasions has been on an area that I have already vacated all my units from. I think if they were to compare fire at actual targets, their numbers would be similar to mine.

[Vark]

Well, by definition it can't be more than 90, can it?

Yes, if "typically" means average, and yes if US soldiers recovered ammo from wounded/ fallen comrades (highly likely given all the accounts).

[womble]

...how much may be used up in a 40 minute hard action.

I can run my dogfaces out of ammo in about 10 minutes of bocage fighting. Maybe less.

[dieseltaylor]

I have two scenarios currently where ammo is a problem for my units. One is Platoon Patrol where we have been fighting for 35 minutes and two of my units are now conserving ammo with perhaps a minutes or two firing left. And two have plenty. But when you are defending it is not always easy to choose which units will bear the brunt of the fighting.

I do not have all the turns on the same computer but after 5 minutes fighting my 4 rifleman squad has 208 bullets, 30 minutes later my two remaining men have 23 with 8 minutes to go. If you believe they can fire at nearly 10 rounds a minute then it has always been a problem.

In the other La Valence it is also critical - but ongoing so no info.

[hoolaman]

But the squad riflemen are shooting 45 times in a 3-day invasion, not 45 times in 2 minutes. Even the BARs are firing maybe 4 clips a day.

Those 45 shots could easily have happened in two minutes out of those three days though. And logically they probably would have fired off their ammo in a couple of short sharp engagements, or more likely a handful of boring speculative area fires.

[JonS]

I do not have all the turns on the same computer but after 5 minutes fighting my 4 rifleman squad has 208 bullets, 30 minutes later my two remaining men have 23 with 8 minutes to go. If you believe they can fire at nearly 10 rounds a minute then it has always been a problem.

I think your maths is a little off there. I get an average expenditure of less than 2 rounds per man per minute from those numbers.

208 - 23 = 185 (rounds expended)

185 / 4 = 46.25 (rounds expended per man)

46.25 / 25 = 1.85 (rounds per man per minute)

That doesn't take into account the two men you lost, but I struggle to accept that'd make an order of magnitude difference.

[dieseltaylor]

There are two separate things here. The fact I could probably run out before the game end is a definite : )

The other one one is that without a minute by minute log there are no real conclusions to be drawn. The extra men could have died in turn 11 and I may have scavenged - or possibly not. The extra men may have dies in turn 30.

In the other scenario my MP40 at 61 metres at eight? troopers issuing from a door and running laterally to me I failed to down one of them - until one came running back by himself. Very disappointing for a veteran officer who had already hosed them down last time they decided to come out that door.

I could be wrong but 32 rounds in a theoretical 4 seconds at a group of men 60 metres away I miss then pick of a single man who runs back! Possibly its those dang walls giving added protection.!

[JasonC]

What the overall averages show is that actual combat differs in important ways from the tactical relationships we see in typical CM games. There are more opportunities to fire - mutual visibility of the men - in CM games than in reality. The men fire more often when possible mutual sighting exists, in CM than in reality (possibly they see each other more easily, very likely they also cower less than in reality). Fire hits the target more often in CM games than in reality, as is shown by the statistical relationship (order of magnitudes only) between rounds expended and men down.

Undoubtedly some of this is due to the modeling of units. In real combat, it is doubtless much more common that only single men are seen and those briefly, while CM units leave larger bodies of men alive in mutual LOS for longer periods.

The typical result of a tactical movement by a CM unit is that said unit and maybe others moves safely until in a position with mutual LOS with one or more whole enemy units. Fire will then be exchanged, sufficient to halt movement but not to eliminate either side of the exposed sighting dyad. Whole units will then remain in mutual LOS and blaze away at each other. One or more may suppress, or be ordered out of contact by a player, or by the tac AI after a morale break. But the most typical result is that fire continues for several minutes with many men hit on one side or both, until one of the units of the dyad breaks and runs, or is eliminated to the last man.

Now very few of those things happen that way in actual combat. Might things occasionally happen that way, sure, but it is not the normal result of tactical movement by infantry in the presence of an enemy force.

A more usual sequence would be, the first few men in LOS draw fire and few others proceed into mutual LOS. The men that are in mutual LOS take hits and remove themselves from the equation, or take cover and frequently thereby lose mutual LOS. The length of time bodies of men spend in mutual LOS is thus greatly reduced, in the real case. That is the first factor.

And it accounts for a typical infantry unit having fewer of its weapons firing for shorter periods of time, result significantly lower total ammo consumed per unit of time and unit of force.

In addition, large amounts of the fire that do occur in reality are directed at last seen locations rather than present "eyes on target" visible enemy. This would be like in a CM game, units using "area fire" for up to a minute at the icons depicting lost enemy sighting contacts.

This area fire is nothing like common enough to raise total rounds expended back up to the levels we see in CM games, per unit time and unit of engaged forces. But it is sufficient to drive the average achieved accuracy or hits per round expended into the basement. Such area fire at suspected locations or previous points of contact may occasionally hit people - concealment sufficient to block sight but insufficient to block a rifle caliber bullet is quite common. But the accuracy per round fired will clearly be way below that of aimed fire with a clearly visible enemy in the sight picture of the shooter's rifle. Instead it will "go" about as the exposed area of the targeted men divided by the total area on the field - a diffused "area danger" that can be minimized by staying low, on reverse slopes, behind solid walls etc, but remains non-zero whenever and wherever everyone can't stay so protected all the time. Which means it especially "bleeds" moving forces.

As for the question why issue men with rifles given their relative ineffectiveness, it is true that the most useful thing the average rifleman does is carry ammo for crew served weapons and obtain spots for heavy weapons - whether crew served, vehicular, or over the horizon. A less advertized function of ordinary riflemen is to "spot" enemy (expose them) by being shot at, frequently successfully. "Hey, walk over there and let somebody shoot you; then we here with this actually effective weapon will shoot them back" - isn't as morale-boosting a "line" as telling a man his M1 rifle is the greatest weapon in history - but it is tactically correct much of the time.

There is another reason infantry are all issued personal weapons and way they prove useful. They have tactical effects on enemy conduct beyond inflicting actual casualties. They prevent easy close approach to any large group of infantry that has "settled" into any sort of reasonable cover or terrain. Yes, this means if enemy infantry tried to just walk in on top of a body of riflemen those riflemen alone would suffice to shoot them to rags. But because of this, they don't do so. They send HE instead, or pin with MGs first and worm close enough for grenades, whatever. But in the meantime, the presence of numerous men with individual firearms suffices to "own" that piece of real estate and deny movement into it to the enemy. This is in fact infantry's primary tactical function.

Artillery does the killing, armor does the fighting, infantry does the dying - runs the adage. That is a bit overdrawn and the ground holding, spotting, and enemy exposing functions of infantry are a bit more essential to the whole affair than that let's on. But is not fundamentally misleading. Everything is dangerous to infantry, infantry is pretty much only dangerous to other infantry, and that danger comes mostly from its heavy weapons and SAWs, not its rifles.

In the grand scheme of things that means a man with an (unscoped) rifle, operating in a small group (not alone by stealth etc) against an entire modern army of all arms, is a pipsqueak facing an inhuman monster of unbelievable scale, and fresh meat for the ogre that is modern war. This isn't an edifying fact, so armies work hard to obscure it, with romanticism about individual prowess etc. But it is all too often the reality.

FWIW...

[slysniper]

What the overall averages show is that actual combat differs in important ways from the tactical relationships we see in typical CM games. There are more opportunities to fire - mutual visibility of the men - in CM games than in reality. The men fire more often when possible mutual sighting exists, in CM than in reality (possibly they see each other more easily, very likely they also cower less than in reality). Fire hits the target more often in CM games than in reality, as is shown by the statistical relationship (order of magnitudes only) between rounds expended and men down.

Undoubtedly some of this is due to the modeling of units. In real combat, it is doubtless much more common that only single men are seen and those briefly, while CM units leave larger bodies of men alive in mutual LOS for longer periods.

The typical result of a tactical movement by a CM unit is that said unit and maybe others moves safely until in a position with mutual LOS with one or more whole enemy units. Fire will then be exchanged, sufficient to halt movement but not to eliminate either side of the exposed sighting dyad. Whole units will then remain in mutual LOS and blaze away at each other. One or more may suppress, or be ordered out of contact by a player, or by the tac AI after a morale break. But the most typical result is that fire continues for several minutes with many men hit on one side or both, until one of the units of the dyad breaks and runs, or is eliminated to the last man.

Now very few of those things happen that way in actual combat. Might things occasionally happen that way, sure, but it is not the normal result of tactical movement by infantry in the presence of an enemy force.

A more usual sequence would be, the first few men in LOS draw fire and few others proceed into mutual LOS. The men that are in mutual LOS take hits and remove themselves from the equation, or take cover and frequently thereby lose mutual LOS. The length of time bodies of men spend in mutual LOS is thus greatly reduced, in the real case. That is the first factor.

And it accounts for a typical infantry unit having fewer of its weapons firing for shorter periods of time, result significantly lower total ammo consumed per unit of time and unit of force.

In addition, large amounts of the fire that do occur in reality are directed at last seen locations rather than present "eyes on target" visible enemy. This would be like in a CM game, units using "area fire" for up to a minute at the icons depicting lost enemy sighting contacts.

This area fire is nothing like common enough to raise total rounds expended back up to the levels we see in CM games, per unit time and unit of engaged forces. But it is sufficient to drive the average achieved accuracy or hits per round expended into the basement. Such area fire at suspected locations or previous points of contact may occasionally hit people - concealment sufficient to block sight but insufficient to block a rifle caliber bullet is quite common. But the accuracy per round fired will clearly be way below that of aimed fire with a clearly visible enemy in the sight picture of the shooter's rifle. Instead it will "go" about as the exposed area of the targeted men divided by the total area on the field - a diffused "area danger" that can be minimized by staying low, on reverse slopes, behind solid walls etc, but remains non-zero whenever and wherever everyone can't stay so protected all the time. Which means it especially "bleeds" moving forces.

As for the question why issue men with rifles given their relative ineffectiveness, it is true that the most useful thing the average rifleman does is carry ammo for crew served weapons and obtain spots for heavy weapons - whether crew served, vehicular, or over the horizon. A less advertized function of ordinary riflemen is to "spot" enemy (expose them) by being shot at, frequently successfully. "Hey, walk over there and let somebody shoot you; then we here with this actually effective weapon will shoot them back" - isn't as morale-boosting a "line" as telling a man his M1 rifle is the greatest weapon in history - but it is tactically correct much of the time.

There is another reason infantry are all issued personal weapons and way they prove useful. They have tactical effects on enemy conduct beyond inflicting actual casualties. They prevent easy close approach to any large group of infantry that has "settled" into any sort of reasonable cover or terrain. Yes, this means if enemy infantry tried to just walk in on top of a body of riflemen those riflemen alone would suffice to shoot them to rags. But because of this, they don't do so. They send HE instead, or pin with MGs first and worm close enough for grenades, whatever. But in the meantime, the presence of numerous men with individual firearms suffices to "own" that piece of real estate and deny movement into it to the enemy. This is in fact infantry's primary tactical function.

Artillery does the killing, armor does the fighting, infantry does the dying - runs the adage. That is a bit overdrawn and the ground holding, spotting, and enemy exposing functions of infantry are a bit more essential to the whole affair than that let's on. But is not fundamentally misleading. Everything is dangerous to infantry, infantry is pretty much only dangerous to other infantry, and that danger comes mostly from its heavy weapons and SAWs, not its rifles.

In the grand scheme of things that means a man with an (unscoped) rifle, operating in a small group (not alone by stealth etc) against an entire modern army of all arms, is a pipsqueak facing an inhuman monster of unbelievable scale, and fresh meat for the ogre that is modern war. This isn't an edifying fact, so armies work hard to obscure it, with romanticism about individual prowess etc. But it is all too often the reality.

FWIW...

very good points

The game will never really protray war as it really is, which Jason loves to point out at times.

I am just impressed with the fact, that my men have realistic ammo loads, I can control their use of it within the battle and now get them to share their ammo at times. I like the fact I am fighting at times to save ammo. And really could care less if the fire rate is just right or any of this bull as to how it is in real life, because at some point you have to try and stop thinking it needs to be just as it is in RL, because it would never be playable as a game. Just look how much slower it plays now than before. make it too real and it might take days to get a firefight completed.

A balence in all things, what more can one say.

[Guest]

Where do these numbers come from? I'd like to see them for myself.

Also - there are a whole heck of a lot of "riflemen" in a typical American infantry division, only a percentage of whom would have been placed in a position to fire his rifle at the enemy on a regular basis. Is this average based only on line companies? Or everybody that carried an M1?

CM simulates close contact with the enemy. I'll bet that in a situation where there was regular close contact with the enemy by a large percentage of a division's effectives (say, breakout / breakin periods at Anzio) rifle ammunition expenditure was much, much higher than 90 rounds per week.

[Sgt Schultz]

My rate of fire is fine in battle conditions.

The fact that I play as Germans and buy custom supertoons with scout teams may have some minor effect on my perceptions though.

Vaporizing a squad in a minute can be satisfying.

As far as the M1 question... the firing range and having folks in your face are two different things. The Jar Dweller has most likely built in so many variables over the years of coding that finding ROF for any weapon in the game is now a wonderful impposibilty.

Now the question of PERCEIVED ROF discrepencies is a horse of a different color. There can be no resolution of differing perceptions. Again, a win for BFC in my book for giving us enough nuance to perceive the sim in so many differing ways.

Can my Ami pixeltruppen slam 'em downrange as fast I can in RL ... nope. But when the cr@p hits the fan, I am confident that they will know what to do.

$.02 submitted

[hoolaman]

A more usual sequence would be, the first few men in LOS draw fire and few others proceed into mutual LOS. The men that are in mutual LOS take hits and remove themselves from the equation, or take cover and frequently thereby lose mutual LOS. The length of time bodies of men spend in mutual LOS is thus greatly reduced, in the real case. That is the first factor.

Yes I think this is a very important difference.

I have read accounts of some of the fiercest infantry firefights and a common theme is being pinned down for long periods of time. Not neccesarily taking casulaties unless they stick their necks out or mortar bombs start falling, but just sitting back being pinned down, maybe even having the luxury of digging in over a period of a couple of hours.

Properly spaced infantry might have a couple of scouts shot down and the rest of the platoon spend the next hour trying to work out where the shots came from while some other formation tries flanking and probing the line significantly further away.

I sometimes get a sense of this in CM too though, it is pretty easy to get tactically pinned down even while your individual troops don't have a "pinned" label. One thing I believe is a lot more difficult in CM than "IRL" is disengaging a squad from contact. Because they get into such full-frontal mutual exchanges of fire, moving out of there easily gets you cut down. I believe in reality infantry got a lot less tangled up than they do in CM.

[JonS]

In the other scenario my MP40 at 61 metres at eight? troopers issuing from a door and running laterally to me I failed to down one of them - until one came running back by himself. Very disappointing for a veteran officer who had already hosed them down last time they decided to come out that door.

I could be wrong but 32 rounds in a theoretical 4 seconds at a group of men 60 metres away I miss then pick of a single man who runs back! Possibly its those dang walls giving added protection.!

I don't find anything unusual about that anecdote, in the slightest.