Too Many Strykers

[Battlefront.com]

In attempt to move on...

It is important for people reading this debate to understand that we've been researching Stryker Brigades since 2002. Probably before most of you had ever even heard of them (they weren't called Stryker at that time, of course). We've also had the privilege of talking with people behind the scenes who have first hand experience with not only Strykers, but Bradleys, Abrams, and other equipment as well. Some of them have experience with all three. On top of that we have extensive credentials with simulating modern mechanized warfare. Our record for "getting it" consists of three simulations that I'm sure most of you have played and have been "peer reviewed" by thousands.

And yet to some it as if we're just babes in the woods, hopelessly lost and clueless. Funny... then why are you here? If you think my arguments are wrong, then you should log off and never look back. Because here is a news flash... I am the primary brain behind the combat modeling. If I don't have a clue then the game won't be worth spit. If I do, then the game will be worth playing. You can't mix and match those two statements.

By all means challenge me on my points. But if you find yourself saying "Steve doesn't know what he is talking about", then you should probably just leave now. There is no point for you to waste your time on a Forum dedicated to a game that is destined to suck in your opinion. Otherwise, please consider the possibility that I do know at least a little about this topic and therefore should not be so easily dismissed as clueless.

To get back to the tactical implications that will be felt in CM:SF...

The basic argument comes down to how much faith one is willing to assign to armor vs. infantry. The more one thinks that armor is the solution, then the more important the composition of that armor is. The more someone thinks that infantry is the key, the less so. I don't think anybody is questioning the fundamental importance of artillery or air power, so we can skip that.

Someone asked about the war between Isreal and Hezbollah. There is a good report to be found here:

Preliminary "Lessons" of the Israeli-Hezbollah War

I have not read the other reports linked from this website (I only discovered the others tonight), but they are probably worth reading (I'm downloading them now).

The fact is that we have entered a new threat environment, and not over night either. World events, logistics, budgets, and enemy weaponry have been conspiring against the US style brute force, heavy armor mindset its military has had since Vietnam. This has been a difficult transition for the US military because, well, it liked heavy forces since it had a proven track record of doing well with them, and a fairly poor record with everything else for one reason or another. But with the Cold War suddenly over the case for a massive, heavy military became less and less viable to justify basing national security policy on (if it ever was necessary in the first place). So a slow and very painful change has been happening within the US military for the last 10 years, but especially within the last 5.

The current force structure (which is about to change) is designed around 42 Brigades. The transition to this new structure is incomplete, but currently it stands at:

</font>

• Heavy - 20 (though funding for the 20th isn't available IIRC)
  Airborne - 10
  Infantry - 8
  Stryker - 6 (the only Medium force)</font>

One can quickly see that Heavy Brigades currently make up less than 1/2 of the total Army force. From a dismount standpoint, the 6 Stryker Brigades alone have as much fighting infantry as 18 Heavy Brigades, while Infantry Brigades have about the equivalent of 16 Heavy Brigades worth of infantry. One should also add in the significant Marine formations, and of course the result is an even more lopsided disposition in favor of non-Heavy forces (on average I'd call the Marines Medium).

With the further expansion the Army wants to increase this gap between heavy armored forces and lighter ones even more. I've seen a request for as many as 34 additional Brigades (10 Heavy, 0 Airborne, 23 Infantry, 1 Stryker). Clearly it is US policy to greatly increase the ratio of light/medium armored infantry over heavily armored infantry and tanks.

This begs the question... if Heavy Brigades are the best solution to the threats that face the United States over the next 10 years, or so, then why are they a minority now and slated to become even more so in the future? Surly one can't argue that the US has enough heavy armor since it is having difficulty meeting the requirements of Iraq, which isn't even technically a war any more. The "pro armor" camp probably feels this direction is a HUGE mistake. As much as I have problems with the way the US military works, I think this is a rather far fetched possibility. The more likely possibility is that the military knows more about what its needs are than the people pounding keys on Forums or even those driving around in armor in Iraq. Those making the decisions are big picture thinkers, and in the big picture they see Heavy forces being important, but not as much as they once were. Why might that be?

The world's population is growing, and with it the enemies of the US are growing too. Wars between the haves and have nots now involve entire nations instead of just their ruling elites. The nationless threat posed by Fundamental Islam is obviously even a more difficult problem to tackle. Tanks can not pacify people, soldiers on foot must. And they must do so in significant numbers. If ever there were a lesson out of Iraq, it is that there is no substitute for boots on the ground. For whatever reason the military wasn't able to get that into the current Administration's head until long after things had gone from bad to terrible in Iraq and Afghanistan. And in many people's opinions they STILL don't get it.

The current "grind them in the dust with tanks" mentality certainly don't get the fact that one is not likely to beat an enemy that can repeatedly destroy multi-million Dollar vehicles (tanks, APCs, helos, etc.) with a variety of weapons costing $10 to a few hundred bucks. For example, it would take literally 100,000-200,000 complete misses against one Abrams to make it a cost effective defense against the RPG-7. And that is just looking at the purchase cost, not training, transportation, maintenance, upgrades, etc. So when I hear that an Abrams suffered 30 hits before being taken out of action, from a cost benefit standpoint I'm not very impressed.

Back to the combat aspect, the war in Iraq has shown the enemies of the West how to fight and potentially tactically defeat a heavy force. These lessons were applied very well against the IDF this past summer. In just a few weeks the IDF lost more heavy armored vehicles than the US lost in several years fighting in Iraq. Yet the scale of the two are not even in the same ballpark and the IDF retained no significant ground for the losses. Those who think heavy armor is the way to lead attacks and are the backbone of victory need to look very carefully at Lebanon's lessons. Many will not out of simple fear of what they might discover -> the initiative is quickly passing from heavy conventional forces to light, well armed, asymmetric forces. The only reason I can see why the US isn't getting this pounded into its head every day is that Iran and Syria have been extremely careful about which weapons it floods into Iraq. Mortars, IED materials, RPG-7V rockets, small arms, etc. are all flooding across the borders, yet the modern AT-3s and AT-4s, AT-13s, AT-14s, and RPG-29s that the IDF ran into are noticeably absent in Iraq. Ask yourself why?

There is a delicate balancing act in the ME. Syria and Iran do not want a failed Iraqi state, yet they don't want one hostile to themselves. They also do not want to pass up an opportunity to hit the US when it is already having troubles. Still, at the same time they relish the chance of hitting the US they don't want to do so too hard because of the consequences. Early withdrawal from Iraq, military intervention in their own affairs, blockade of their trade, Russia being pressured to behave differently as a supplier, etc. are all likely net negatives for Iran and Syria. So it is my thinking that Syria and Iran that the same weapons they are giving to Hezbollah in significant numbers are being purposefully kept out of Iraq for fear of upsetting the balance. A dozen burning Abrams and Bradleys each month would not go unnoticed, that is for sure. And like it or not, Syria and Iran could facilitate this happening if they so wished to.

Back to CM...

With the US invasion of Syria the gloves would be off from the Syrians' standpoint. The weaponry they have would be turned against the invaders instead of continuing to flow into Lebanon. And since these are the same weapons that plinked IDF Merkavas, considered one of the best defended tanks in the world, a few short months ago... the US would expect the same treatment if it behaved similarly to Israel. By similar I mean leading with heavy assets that were inadequately protected by infantry and combined arms will result in "unacceptable" losses of heavy assets. Those that think a repeat of OIF and Thunder Run are viable in this environment are welcome to try it in CM:SF. Personally, after seeing how quickly my $90 million Dollar tank platoon can go from functional to useless (even if temporarily) junk, I personally would recommend a backup plan

Steve

[Wisbech_lad]

Interesting stuff. From their report

"Later reporting produced very different numbers. According to work by Alon Ben-David,

the IDF concluded after the ceasefire that some 45% of the IDF main battle tanks that had

been hit by ATGMs during the war had some form of penetration. A total of some 500

Merkava were committed to battle. Roughly five were destroyed by underbelly mines and

tactics. Some 50 Merkava 2,3, and 4s were hit, and 21(22?) were penetrated. A total to 11

did not result in fatalities, but 10 other penetrations caused 23 crew casualties. ATGMs

also produced major infantry casualties, particularly when IDF reservists bunched inside

a building hit by an ATGM"

[Andreas]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Andreas - the enemy isn't light infantry with a few ATGs anymore. If it were (or when it is i.e. after the real fight has been won, and it is a matter of the diehards), light armor would be fine. But the Syrians instead of thousands of MBTs and dismounted ATGM systems. It is more like Kursk on a counterattack day than typical fighting against a rifle division position.

Except that there is no centralised control, and no ability to shift forces to crises points, or indeed to even carry out tactical maneuver while in contact with the enemy, and without any artillery support to speak of due to US Army CB.

But apart from that, I am sure it is just like Kursk. The problem for the defending side is that, once all the items above are removed, they would not have won at Kursk.

All the best

Andreas

[Andreas]

Originally posted by AdamL:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by AdamL:

Is that the process? Or what is it?

No. Try again. This time, don't focus on the Stugs - as I said, there were "some", i.e. not all VAs would have them. Imagine infantry, infantry guns, supported by 15cm howitzers. Then explain to me why these guys, without sensors, and without guaranteed air superiority, could do what you think Strykers can not.

All the best

Andreas </font>

[Capt. Toleran]

Steve, I'm with you -- the whole Israel conflict this past Summer showed that troops without armor support can go up against armor and inflict heavy losses with much cheaper weaponry.

What bothers me about the "Heavy conquers all" argument often mentioned in this thread is the assumption that the tanks will always have LOS to their weapon's max, instead of claustrophobic environments like urban areas or hills, where it is very easy for the enemy to pop up within range, let off a missle, and then dissolve back into the landscape. Considering Israel has some of the heaviest armored tanks in the world, their losses should serve as a warning that infantry are always needed to screen any armored force.

I could see that in the open, wide-view areas of desert, tanks would be premiere, but that is only a small fraction of the total landscape possibilities world-wide, and certainly not the only scenery in Syria.

BTW, a good example of this in "Arabs at War" (from the CMSF reading list) -- Libya's activities in Chad. They did well with Armor support helping GUNT early on, but later, the home forces, using nothing more than armored cars and ATGM's, were able to make devastating flank attacks on the Libyan force and inflict repeated defeats.

[ March 20, 2007, 10:14 AM: Message edited by: Capt. Toleran ]

[Battlefront.com]

Capt. Toleran,

What bothers me about the "Heavy conquers all" argument often mentioned in this thread is the assumption that the tanks will always have LOS to their weapon's max, instead of claustrophobic environments like urban areas or hills, where it is very easy for the enemy to pop up within range, let off a missle, and then dissolve back into the landscape.

This is, of course, the same argument that the "armor heavy" camp has been trying to avoid since WWII. Just think about the arguments about Panthers and King Tigers vs. Shermans and T-34/85s. When trying to assess which is best the assessor usually thinks billiard table flat engagements in perfect weather. The do not think of Kursk, where German armored formations were shreaded by infantry formations. They don't think of Normandy where the German losses were catastrophic and the Western Allies hardly slowed up by their own. So on and so forth.

The reasons are simple and I've outlined them many times over. Within ATGM range all vehicles are at serious risk of disablement or destruction. Depending on the weapon used, the differences between the vehicles may matter a lot or hardly at all. But the closer that range is, the less that difference becomes. To the point where certain threats at certain engagement ranges effectively make all armored vehicles equally vulnerable.

The issue that has open minded tank enthusiasts concerned is that the conditions that are least favorable for heavy armor are those that are most likely to be the norm for combat now and in the coming years. As I said above, heavy armor is artificially getting a bit of a free ride in Iraq right now. The Insurgents are not exactly fighting with one hand tied behind their back, but they are certainly not using the weaponry that is available to their fellow fighters on their eastern and western borders. And those weapons are the best non-Western weapons out there. So those who can look at things objectively have reason to be concerned about what might happen in a slightly different set of circumstances where those restrictions don't exist.

Considering Israel has some of the heaviest armored tanks in the world, their losses should serve as a warning that infantry are always needed to screen any armored force.

10% of their force might not seem like a lot, but considering how short the incursion was, what % of that force was actively engaged in combat, and how poorly the overall operation went... yeah, it was a lot.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Andreas,

All very well put. Again, the problems with Adam's arguments for Heavy and against Medium/Light is that his theories are not based on historical realities. Your description of how a far forward light element works to keep on the move is quite good. It basically is the same thing that any recon force does, but with a different desired effect. But according to Adam's way of thinking, what you described should be impossible to do with anything BUT Heavy. Your pointing out (for the umpteenth time) the vulnerability issues should be addressed head on too, since I can't recall a good counter argument to this rather straight forward x+y=z equation.

A recon element is usually tasked with facilitating the movement of its immediate parent formation (Company, Battalion... Division). A deep, operational force is there to facilitate the movement of much larger force (Corps, Army, or Front). The size and composition of that force would be proportional to its task and importance. But at the tactical level it is pretty much the same. Move towards your objective, identify threats, overcome them if they are easy, avoid them if they are tough, and stop only when it would seem that there is no way around. In the latter case someone else handles the problem and the deep penetration resumes its mission if possible. Surprise, speed, and good leadership count for more than inches of armor.

Steve

[ March 20, 2007, 11:58 AM: Message edited by: Battlefront.com ]

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[Michael Dorosh]

Northern France was against a panic stricken and thoroughly beaten German Army, though, so trucks and recce vehicles were not really at risk. And of the few German garrisons that were able to stay put, some stayed in place on the northern coast until May 1945 - I speak of the fortified channel ports which were deemed too costly to assault. First Canadian Army (with British and Polish troops under command) did mount operations at some of them - Dunkirk, Cap Griz Nes, Calais, Dieppe - with mixed successes.

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[Andreas]

Originally posted by AdamL:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr /> If the VA stops to defend a piece of key terrain, they will be difficult to dislodge, considering that your C&C has broken down, and you can most likely not mass the force required to dislodge them. But whether they are armoured or not, whether they bring tanks, armoured trucks, unarmoured trucks, or two-wheeled wooden carts towed by swine does not matter one bit in this instance. What makes it impossible for you to get them is that they are an infantry force defending, backed up by heavy artillery and ATGs, in defensible terrain, and that you are uncoordinated and under time pressure, since you know that this relatively small force is followed by a larger one in a time you are uncertain about. So you can not afford to tangle with them, and you continue to retreat.

Meatier. I'm just going to write my thoughts, correct or dispute wherever you see any problems.

Yes if the enemy is in fact intending to deny battle to your main body. That is an assumption, it must be a *stated* assumption - that the enemy will not fight. I don't think it is established truth yet, if it is true.</font>

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Northern France was against a panic stricken and thoroughly beaten German Army, though, so trucks and recce vehicles were not really at risk. And of the few German garrisons that were able to stay put, some stayed in place on the northern coast until May 1945 - I speak of the fortified channel ports which were deemed too costly to assault. First Canadian Army (with British and Polish troops under command) did mount operations at some of them - Dunkirk, Cap Griz Nes, Calais, Dieppe - with mixed successes.

That's not quite correct, since there was a, to me at least, surprising amount of fighting, if you start to look into it, mostly against what Jason would probably call "dead-enders". Most of it is simply glossed over in larger histories, since it was of course much lighter than the fighting west of the Seine. You need to dig quite deep into the unit histories to find it. I would however think that it was probably less on the Canadian flank.

All the best

Andreas

[Battlefront.com]

To add to the north west France thing... the Americans had a lot of problems with ambushes along their convoy routes between Normandy and the front. They bypassed so many small pockets of Germans who were motivated to fight that there were plenty of them roving around in small groups attacking the softskinned vehicles. Probably more trucks were destroyed by driving too fast to avoid being shot at than were lost to enemy action

The Germans also made quite a few good tactical stands to slow up the Allied forces. My knowledge is more of the American sector, though I know that the Germans were able to do better long the coast (as Michael pointed out).

Steve

[Michael Dorosh]

Good points from both Steve and Andreas - I should have prefaced my national bias and made it clear I was talking about First Canadian Army, but then again, I should have realized Andreas was talking about 2nd British Army which means I am at fault for changing the subject!

At any rate, good follow up from both of you.

[dan/california]

A tremendous amount of this discussion, like all of this game turns on what is considered to be acceptable collateral damage by the U.S. side. If the terrorist incident that launched the invasion was severe enough I would argue that that calculus could change, a lot.

[Moronic Max]

Good point. If the US gets to turn Damascus into Berlin circa 1945, it'll likely encounter fewer difficulties.

Scenario designers ought to have fun with that.

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[Battlefront.com]

You know... I recognized the author's name, so I'm sure I've seen him used as a source in other things I have read. But this is not a book on my shelf. Thanks for helping me correct that problem

Steve

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[Battlefront.com]

Never blame a man of ideas for the failures of someone who tries to put them into practice

Steve

[Andreas]

Originally posted by AdamL:

Are you guys a fan of this guy?

Don't know him, but probably would not be one were I to know him. I do look forward to your reply to my post though.

All the best

Andreas

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[Sgt Joch]

this may be of interest:

IDF applying lessons of war to improve use of tanks

After suffering heavy losses to Hizbullah anti-tank missiles during the second Lebanon war, the IDF Armored Corps has changed its mode of operations and now intends to defeat the enemy using its two major advantages - speed and firepower.

This week, Armored Brigade 401 took to the hills of the Golan Heights for its fifth week of training after completing a brigade-level exercise last week at the IDF Ground Forces Training Center in the Negev.

The brigade uses the most advanced tank in the IDF, the Merkava 4, and spent the entire war inside Lebanon. It participated in what has become known as the Battle of the Saluki - the last battle of the war, in which eight tank crew members were killed.

For the first time in close to a decade, the brigade - which is traditionally the first armored unit to be called up to fight on Israel's three fronts - is training for 12 weeks, spending time drilling urban warfare but mostly sharpening the skills needed for armored combat.

"Our advantage is our ability to move fast and our firepower," Brigade Commander Col. Itzik Turgeman told The Jerusalem Post Tuesday.

"The tanks are now driving faster and are using smokescreens - something they didn't use during the war - since we now understand that the threat of anti-tank missiles is 360 degrees."

According to Turgeman, a tank cannot sit "statically" inside enemy territory. The brigade sustained a number of casualties in the last days of the war as they waited for the government to decide whether to launch the last-ditch operation in southern Lebanon.

"If you sit and don't move, you are an easy target for the enemy," he said. "You need to know how to use the tank and the topography to your advantage."

[Battlefront.com]

Sounds like the IDF is making progress. Smoke is still a good defense against Soviet/Russian ATGM systems since they are optically or laser guided by the gunner. If the gunner does not have a thermal sight (which is very possible) then he's going to be out of luck. Even with a thermal sight smoke can give the tank enough of an edge to make a difference.

Still, this doesn't really address the main problems of the new threat. There is only so many times you can pop smoke or pull back before you might as well not have shown up with the tanks in the first place. This is why the field of Active Defenses is so critically important for armor survivability. Fortunately for the IDF, they have Rafael right there in Israel.

Passive and Reactive Defenses are becoming less and less effective each day. The TUSK kits going onto Abrams in the next 2 years are mostly a stopgap solution. Same with the new reactive armor packages going on Bradleys and Strykers (the latter might start next year?).

Which brings up another point that hasn't been mentioned yet. Obviously the US military feels the even the Abrams and Bradley aren't armored enough. And any "treadhead" that laughed at the Stryker's slat armor is going to have to shut up now that the Abrams and Bradleys will soon have their own

Steve

[panzermartin]

Damn..cant they think of a better looking protective armor? Not of importance to them and the troops but I dont want to see scores of moving cages running down the digital hills of CMSF