CMBB: Until late 42 the German panzers are gonna die like flies.

[jshandorf]

Just a thought but I have been reading a new book I picked up called "Panzer Aces" and it seems that the Germans were only able to overcome the Soviet heavies, KV-I and T-34, through superior command and skill, and this was magnified by the Russian lack of command and skill, atleast early on in the war.

Therefore any Russian player worth his salt in tank tactics is gonna have a field day in CMBB when he has a couple T-34s or KV-Is and all the German player is able to bring to the table are PzIIIs (longs and shorts) and possibly a few Pz-IVs with the short 75.

Is this just a spin with the allies in the west and the germans in early 1944 or are the Germans at a decided dis-advantage in CMBB from '41 to late '42?

I wonder if the rarity option can level the table a little here?

Just some thoughts...

Jeff

[Panzer Leader]

Shandorf I am reading that too! Bought it last wek, what an amazing book, I think I liked the "Bix" section best. I have a new respect for jagdpanthers after that. I wish the section on Wittman and his stug was longer though.

I totally agree with what you're saying, but hopefully the command radius and lack of radios will at least partially offset the disadvantages of the German tanks against those Russian beasts. Maybe we could just make a rule where Russian players have to bunch up, move slowly forwad in a straight line and immediately retreat and/or evacuate if one of their tanks is fired upon?

[Gen-x87H]

I believe there is a command & control structure in place to handle the lack of communication the Soviets generally had. It is true that head on the German Panzers would get smoked by those T-34s and KV1s. But couple the command issues and new morale state(like current inf) for each tank. A good German tank commander who hits the Soviet player should gain the upper hand just like a player who starts to route anothers infantry now.

Gen

[jshandorf]

Originally posted by Panzer Leader:

Shandorf I am reading that too! Bought it last wek, what an amazing book, I think I liked the "Bix" section best. I have a new respect for jagdpanthers after that. I wish the section on Wittman and his stug was longer though.

I just got to the "Bix" section. I am really liking that one also. I usually only read over lunch but I have snuck in some reading here and there at other times.

Jeff

[Sock Monkey]

There was a long thread maybe about a month back or so before the board crashed talking about whether or not BTS would sacrifice unit realism to balance the game since the Russian player would have a significant advantage in this regard. While others here can likely give a more detailed account of that thread, the upshot was that the Germans would have an advantage in aspects such as maneuver where the German army was historically more ept. BTS felt that they had done a good job of balancing play while keeping things historical and given their track record with that in CM:BO I'm sure that the end result won't be nearly as one-sided as it appears.

[ March 04, 2002, 06:45 PM: Message edited by: Sock Monkey ]

[Dittohead]

It will be interesting if they model the shortage of Russian 76.2 mm AP ammunition during the first few months of the war. I can see lots of KV and T-34 armed only with a few rounds of AP and people cussing at them for not shooting it. Just like the great tungsten crises in US Tanks.

[Andreas]

The rarity option won't help, because neither the KV-1 nor the T-34 were 'rare' on 22 June. They presumably were two months later, but that had other reasons.

[Skipper]

Compared to T-26 and BT series, they were. Three months later, any Soviet tank was sort of 'rare'...

[Kwazydog]

Dittohead, we would like to model that if that was the case! The problem is that the info you provided isnt quite enough for what we need. If you guys have any more info on this shortage, we would like to hear about it

Dan

[JasonC]

Yes, the period when the Germans were winning in Russia, the armor differential was the steepest in the war, against the Germans. The other two points when it was steep were the second half of 1943 against the Russians, and the Normandy period against the western Allies. Notice, the guys with the armor differential against them at each of the steepest points won at those times, despite the armor match up.

As for another fellow's comment that all Russian tanks were rare after a few months, it is not remotely true. The Russians still had 7700 AFVs in the fleet after the whole 1941 campaign, despite enourmous losses. Which means they still had more than twice as many tanks as the Germans. The numbers difference when the Germans invaded was about 7 to 1 in favor of the Russians, so 2 to 1 was down quite a ways.

By the end of 1942, the good Russian tanks - mostly T-34s, by far the largest production model from the day of the invasion right to the end - were more than half the Russian armor force. Which regained its pre-war size by then, while the German fleet size had expanded only marginally.

The Germans faced not only better Russian tanks but far more of them, unlike the situation at the other steep differential points, where the side with the inferior tanks in gun and armor terms at least had more of them. They had no edge in gun-armor specs, nor any edge in numbers, nor any edge in weight of fleet mix.

They just used the tanks they had better - for a while. When their doctrinal edge shrank, they got a technical one in its place in the form of Tigers and Panthers. But lost. Better use was decisive when it was really better. Greater numbers were decisive when there was no big doctrinal edge anymore. Technical tank specs, in gun armor terms, were never decisive at any stage of the war, for any side.

If CMBB players drive Pz IIIs around no better than they drive T-34s around, the Russians will win tactical fights a lot sooner than their historical counterparts did. And nobody using the German tanks in the period of the German offensive will have the tech-spec "training wheels" they get in the late-war west.

[Grisha]

The way I read various threads on Soviet tank command/control here, in the first period there will be a serious deficiency on being able to give orders to tanks in a timely manner. During a Soviet offensive, or with an impetuous Soviet commander on defense it could be a nightmare.

For example, I'm the Soviet commander on an offensive mission. Tanks need to be in sight with each other to stay within command. Soviet experience levels will generally be low, resulting on long delays before acting on orders even when in sight. Should any tanks lose sight during an order change, order delays skyrocket. If orders get too fancy, delays also skyrocket, so they must be simple. What this means to me is that should any unexpected situation arise the Soviet player will have great difficulty in responding in a timely manner. All it takes is a German player that knows how to feint left - go right really. Unless the Soviet player has reserves, the danger of being picked off in midstep will be great.

[newlife]

A great tactic just occured to me for use against soviet tanks without radios. Smoke missions on top of these tanks at crucial moments could be useful. Of course you give his tanks cover, so you would being doing this to take one group of tanks out of the action versus another sector of the field. Yes, I know you can already do this to any force, but the break down in communications amongst soviet tanks will worsen the problem for them.

Pete

[aka_tom_w]

Originally posted by newlife:

A great tactic just occured to me for use against soviet tanks without radios. Smoke missions on top of these tanks at crucial moments could be useful. Of course you give his tanks cover, so you would being doing this to take one group of tanks out of the action versus another sector of the field. Yes, I know you can already do this to any force, but the break down in communications amongst soviet tanks will worsen the problem for them.

Pete

Good QUESTION

Attention CMBB Beta testers

What is the effect of Communication and Control between Soviet Tanks when they are caught in a heavy smoke screen?

Will all those soviet tanks be all "out of Communication" when the smoke means they have no LOS to each other?

Then what?

you can't give them orders and they just sit there and wait for their own demise?

command and control of those Soviet tanks should be VERY interesting!

Especially in a smoke screen!

-tom w

[ March 05, 2002, 05:26 PM: Message edited by: aka_tom_w ]

[MikeyD]

I believe BTS's game engine plans are to go for historical accuracy and let play balance take care of itself (or leave it in the hands of the scenario designers).

German tanks might not be the 'meat-on-the-table' that you assume. There should be lots of paper-thin armored BT fast tanks to shoot up, and the 2 man T34-76 turret was practically blind when buttoned... and since the commander was also the gunner could only fire when buttoned! I wonder if BTS has included the option of ramming enemy tanks and AT guns, 'cause that's often what the half-blind T34s had to do!

[aka_tom_w]

My friend who I play CMBO with does not post here

but I sent him this thread and he comments:

"I agree tank to tank they (the German tanks) will get smoked. Russian T-34 and KV1 are far superior to anything the Germans had at the

time.

The Panzer IIIJ is the best tank the Germans had in '41. The IVD only had a

short 75mm.

There were still some good assault guns and the less mobile 88's.

There will need to be 2 things going for the Germans ... mostly crack crews

vs green Russians ( and superior German communication )

and most importantly a very effective Luftwaffe , the Germans had air

superiority on any front they wished to exert themselves in 41 and 42.

The Stukas were deadly accurate. German battles succeeded with closely

coordinated efforts between air , armor and Infantry.

unfortunately air is not controllable in Combat Mission"

How about CMBB and the CAS?

Will the Germans have the advanatage of early air superiority and how will it manifest on the CMBB battlefeild?

your comments?

-tom w

[ March 05, 2002, 12:00 PM: Message edited by: aka_tom_w ]

[Commissar]

Originally posted by jshandorf:

Just a thought but I have been reading a new book I picked up called "Panzer Aces" and it seems that the Germans were only able to overcome the Soviet heavies, KV-I and T-34, through superior command and skill, and this was magnified by the Russian lack of command and skill, atleast early on in the war.

Therefore any Russian player worth his salt in tank tactics is gonna have a field day in CMBB when he has a couple T-34s or KV-Is and all the German player is able to bring to the table are PzIIIs (longs and shorts) and possibly a few Pz-IVs with the short 75.

Is this just a spin with the allies in the west and the germans in early 1944 or are the Germans at a decided dis-advantage in CMBB from '41 to late '42?

I wonder if the rarity option can level the table a little here?

Just some thoughts...

Jeff

Not necessarily. CMBB will institute command restrictions on the Soviet player that the Germans won't have to worry about. Better communications allowed a degree of flexibilty the Soviets only wished they had. Early in the war, Soviet tank commanders had to give orders to the rest of their platoon through flags or hand signals. This obviously means the tank commander needs to be unbuttoned. Once he has to button up or is killed, there goes your command and control. The better equipment doesn't necessarily mean victory (remember Vietnam?). Without good, radio sets in all or most of the tanks (something that didn't happed for the Soviets until '43 or '44); the competent Soviet commander is going to have his hands full. If the German player happens to be someone who is also competent and knows how to minimize his weaknesses while exploiting the Soviet's, the Soviet player will most likely find life to be quite horrid.

[Marlow]

Originally posted by Commissar:

The better equipment doesn't necessarily mean victory (remember Vietnam?).

It did in Vietman at the tactical level, i.e. what we are dealing with in CM.

[Schatzi]

hmm I´ll let the T-34s and KV1s come storming into my positions without artillery and infantry support and i´ll kiss them good night with my hidden 88´s.

[Skipper]

Originally posted by Marlow:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Commissar:

The better equipment doesn't necessarily mean victory (remember Vietnam?).

It did in Vietman at the tactical level, i.e. what we are dealing with in CM.</font>

[Marlow]

Originally posted by Skipper:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Marlow:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Commissar:

The better equipment doesn't necessarily mean victory (remember Vietnam?).

It did in Vietman at the tactical level, i.e. what we are dealing with in CM.</font>

[JasonC]

On the Luftwaffe, it did get the Germans air superiority and quickly. But its total size was not very large, by later war standards, and the front was huge. The Luftwaffe was not remotely in full expansion, since the Germans did not go to full war economy footing until after Stalingrad. The result was a modest number of aircraft swallowed up in an enourmous war.

A few select points, ahead of the leading panzer groups, could receive significant air support at particularly critical times. Support for river crossings, cutting enemy lines of retreat as a pocket was closing, that sort of thing.

But on an ongoing, day to day basis, there was no way for the Luftwaffe to make a large difference in the ground combat. There just weren't enough planes. A hard push and high rate of sorties culd raise the level of support a few hundred aircraft could provide for a week or two, but damage and maintenance would rapidly deplete the air fleet whenever that was done.

To give a sense of scale, AG North had around 350 planes supporting it after the first few months. Less than 100 were fighters, with the rest split between medium bombers used for deep interdiction, and ground attack aircraft used for CAS, rail and road interdiction, and various forms of counterbattery and facilities strike.

If the sortie rate were pushed to several a day, the number of machines working could fall by half in less than 2 weeks. Logistical support for the air force was difficult, with few modern airfields, limited transportation "thruput" to areas close enough to the front to be useful bases, etc.

The sustainable level of CAS was therefore on the order of 100 planes a day, for an entire army group. That is more than an order of magnitude smaller than the level of air support the western Allies later received in western Europe.

The level of air support by the time of Kursk wasn't much better, even concentrating for a giant push. A factor of 3 better maybe, for the peak period, but the same order of magnitude. The Russians had a larger air force by then, though a lower sortie rate. There were only a few hundred operational German fighters to intercept them, in all of southern Russia.

The size of the Luftwaffe actually peaked in early 1944, with the overwhelming majority of the force fighter planes defending Germany proper. By then the Russian air force dwarfed the portion of the German one that could be spared for the east.

The Russians outproduced the Germans in aircraft on their own. The UK also outproduced the Germans on that score, while US aircraft production was nearly 3 times as high. Most of the German production came after full mobilization of the economy, when the western air offensive was already underway, and so was mostly directed at the defense of Germany.

The Germans still got some limited air support in the east, mostly because the Russian air force was not efficient enough to completely control the skies despite its numbers, but the weight of air support received certainly favored the Russians by 1944.

The idea that the air force explains the German success fails, along with all other technological explanations. It simply was not superior technology that enabled Germany to win for the first year and a half. It was strategic surprise, superior doctrine, and better handling of their forces by their operational staffs.

Their generals fought smarter, and their formations and use of combined arms were more up to date. The edge was "software" (or "wetware" - trained brains) not "hardware", in type or numbers. They proved only temporary. The German high command became increasingly rigid and made more unforced errors as the war went on (Stalingrad's open flanks, no withdrawl orders, the Kursk decision, etc), while the Russian staff system improved.

The Russians learned enough modern doctrine - by watching the Germans, by trial and error, and by promoting successful and sacking incompetent officers - to mostly neutralize that edge by mid 1943. By then they had a modern tank and mechanized corps system, working combined arms doctrine, competent staff officers, etc. Then they still had numbers while the Germans no longer had any big edge. So the Russians won.

[Commissar]

Originally posted by Marlow:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Commissar:

The better equipment doesn't necessarily mean victory (remember Vietnam?).

It did in Vietman at the tactical level, i.e. what we are dealing with in CM.</font>

[Michael Emrys]

The thought occurs to me that if BTS can accurately model the early Soviet difficulties with command & control, CM players accustomed to CM:BO are going to find it extremely frustrating to play as the Reds. At least until they become adjusted to the demands of a new way to play.

This could, I suppose, result in a more sympathetic appreciation for the position of Soviet corps and army commanders.

Michael

[gunnergoz]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

The thought occurs to me that if BTS can accurately model the early Soviet difficulties with command & control, CM players accustomed to CM:BO are going to find it extremely frustrating to play as the Reds. ...snip....Michael

Exactly...which is why CMBB is going to give scenario designers a wonderful playground in which to play balance games for us. The Soviets will get quantity, perhaps, or positioning on the battlefield, while the Germans get the leadership and cohesion edge. Alternately, the Germans might be severely handicapped in ammunition or by fatigue, while their opponents are on foot or may be raw recruits, or both.

Because of these broad variables, I think that CMBB has the potential to become a "classic" wargame in ways that CMBO did not approach. The see-saw nature of the war in the East gives us wonderful lattitude to design scenarios that have great variety, challenge and unique flavor.

[aka_tom_w]

I'm not real sure I shoud do this because it seems rather pointless to get in the middle fo flame war With Jason C and my old War game buddy Brian over stuff on the eastern front that I don't know too much about.

Brian does not post here (why I don't know I told him how, he is new to CMBO, but getting good at it quickly,,but he does not know who Jason C isI don't know who Jason C is either but I have read enought of his posts to know better than to debate WWII historical details with him, regrettably my friend has no such respect and cares not, throwing my cautions the wind the man who I know from years of waking up hung over with him only to hear

"pass me that weapon so I can put that (cherry, noisy squawking) bird out of my misery"

anyway

here it is from the wisdom of Brian...

Tom, please feel free to forward my long awaited response to Jason C

Member # 5490

Mr " C " has made a misguided attempt to dimiss the lufftewaffe as a non - entity in the tactical sphere on the Eastern Front. ( well it certainly wasn't a strategic airforce now was it ! )

The Eastern front was the largest theater of air operations in WWII , and had BY FAR the most sorties flown by the lufftewaffe. Tanks and artillery were destroyed in the thousands by the German airforce.

There are a few things wrong in Mr "C"s analysis. First , there was never

any attempt to say that the lufftewaffe was solely responsible for the success of the German army on the Eastern Front. The lufftewaffe was able to

substantially shift the odds at any place the WISHED ( yes Mr " C" , I know they couldn't be everywhere all the time ... but they could be wherever they WANTED ) during '41 , '42 and for the most part in '43 ( whether permitting of course ).

Secondly , the reason Army Group North had so few aircraft after the first few months of '41, was because nothing was going on there. The army was

getting ready to siege Leningrad, in essence the North had become a stalemate. The race was for Moscow and the lufftewaffe were there to support

and create the breakthroughs. Army Group North was stripped of much of its

fighters and Stuka's in order to bolster operation Typhoon.

Don't take it so serious , I just want to be able to someday look over

the cockpit of a Stuka ( tab # 1 or # 2 mode ) as it drops a few Dusseldorf

Daisies on the lid of a T34.

Great reference on the Russian airwar is "Black Cross-Red Star Air War Over

the Eastern Front"

----------------------

" hey Mr C , I need to borrow a wrench to work on my Folkewolf " ....

The Fonz

Originally posted by JasonC:

On the Luftwaffe, it did get the Germans air superiority and quickly. But its total size was not very large, by later war standards, and the front was huge. The Luftwaffe was not remotely in full expansion, since the Germans did not go to full war economy footing until after Stalingrad. The result was a modest number of aircraft swallowed up in an enourmous war.

A few select points, ahead of the leading panzer groups, could receive significant air support at particularly critical times. Support for river crossings, cutting enemy lines of retreat as a pocket was closing, that sort of thing.

But on an ongoing, day to day basis, there was no way for the Luftwaffe to make a large difference in the ground combat. There just weren't enough planes. A hard push and high rate of sorties culd raise the level of support a few hundred aircraft could provide for a week or two, but damage and maintenance would rapidly deplete the air fleet whenever that was done.

To give a sense of scale, AG North had around 350 planes supporting it after the first few months. Less than 100 were fighters, with the rest split between medium bombers used for deep interdiction, and ground attack aircraft used for CAS, rail and road interdiction, and various forms of counterbattery and facilities strike.

If the sortie rate were pushed to several a day, the number of machines working could fall by half in less than 2 weeks. Logistical support for the air force was difficult, with few modern airfields, limited transportation "thruput" to areas close enough to the front to be useful bases, etc.

The sustainable level of CAS was therefore on the order of 100 planes a day, for an entire army group. That is more than an order of magnitude smaller than the level of air support the western Allies later received in western Europe.

The level of air support by the time of Kursk wasn't much better, even concentrating for a giant push. A factor of 3 better maybe, for the peak period, but the same order of magnitude. The Russians had a larger air force by then, though a lower sortie rate. There were only a few hundred operational German fighters to intercept them, in all of southern Russia.

The size of the Luftwaffe actually peaked in early 1944, with the overwhelming majority of the force fighter planes defending Germany proper. By then the Russian air force dwarfed the portion of the German one that could be spared for the east.

The Russians outproduced the Germans in aircraft on their own. The UK also outproduced the Germans on that score, while US aircraft production was nearly 3 times as high. Most of the German production came after full mobilization of the economy, when the western air offensive was already underway, and so was mostly directed at the defense of Germany.

The Germans still got some limited air support in the east, mostly because the Russian air force was not efficient enough to completely control the skies despite its numbers, but the weight of air support received certainly favored the Russians by 1944.

The idea that the air force explains the German success fails, along with all other technological explanations. It simply was not superior technology that enabled Germany to win for the first year and a half. It was strategic surprise, superior doctrine, and better handling of their forces by their operational staffs.

Their generals fought smarter, and their formations and use of combined arms were more up to date. The edge was "software" (or "wetware" - trained brains) not "hardware", in type or numbers. They proved only temporary. The German high command became increasingly rigid and made more unforced errors as the war went on (Stalingrad's open flanks, no withdrawl orders, the Kursk decision, etc), while the Russian staff system improved.

The Russians learned enough modern doctrine - by watching the Germans, by trial and error, and by promoting successful and sacking incompetent officers - to mostly neutralize that edge by mid 1943. By then they had a modern tank and mechanized corps system, working combined arms doctrine, competent staff officers, etc. Then they still had numbers while the Germans no longer had any big edge. So the Russians won.