A ramble....might be worth reading!

[von Lucke]

OK --- the Cow Fetcher talked me out of it.

[ September 06, 2002, 07:26 AM: Message edited by: von Lucke ]

[Panzer76]

The way I see it, it's two different things that is brought up here. As far as I know of, the Germans didnt send theor soldiers without weapons assualting enemy lines, the Soviets did. And then, there is the killing of deserters, real ones or otherwise. Both Germans and Soviets did this, and alot. But only the soviets employed unarmed soldiers, which I think is Hortlunds point. Then one can argue about which of the sides "cared" the most/less for their soldiers. Which is a pretty silly discussion if you ask me...

[Fetchez la Vache]

Nice. I see things degrade into personal insults and stuffy rhetoric faster than they used to. Whatever happen to nice impartial discussions with lots of grognard cross-referencing?

That story about E. Slovik is very sad. Poor guy was probably terrified and said what he did because of it. Probably trying to play on the sympathies of the court, misplaced hope.

[ September 06, 2002, 06:40 AM: Message edited by: Fetchez la Vache ]

[von Lucke]

Originally posted by Fetchez la Vache:

That story about E. Slovik is very sad. Poor guy was probably terrified and said what he did because of it. Probably trying to play on the sympathies of the court, misplaced hope.

Actually, the court was very sympathetic. The five judges (no jury in a military court martial) were as suprised as anyone at the unanimous death sentence verdict.

Some years later, one of the judges said he spoke to the others after the trial, and they all admitted that they had voted for death (secret ballot, by the way) because each had expected one of the others not to. One vote would have been enough to send Slovik to the stockade, instead of the stake. I guess the political pressure not to be the one who cast that not-guilty vote overcame all their consciences.

Slovik was a runty 4-F who got swept up in the scramble to replace the heavy American losses in manpower of late '44. He told just about everyone who would listen that he couldn't hack it as a combat troop, long before he saw any --- and then did the same afterwards. Wouldn't it have made more sense to assign the guy as a cook, or supply clerk, or truck driver? Anything but an infantryman.

[Grisha]

Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:

Regarding the Red Army.

I think it would be wrong to talk about "the red army in world war two", since the difference between the early red army (1939-1942/43) and the late army (1943-1945) is enormous.

I agree. The Soviets divided the Soviet-German War into three periods for analytical purposes: </font>

• 1st Period - From the beginning of Barbarossa to November 1942. </font>
• 2nd Period - December 1942 to December 1943. </font>
• 3rd Period - 1944-45.
  </font>

I'd say each period does a much better job of defining the state and effectiveness of Soviet forces in WWII.

You talk about the Soviet operational art of war. And I must agree that this is an area where the Soviets were brilliant. I disagree that the Russians were the only ones who mastered this concept though, since I am of the opinion that the Germans too had more than a rudimentary understanding of the concept. I would hold the Soviets first, followed by the Germans, and then a huge gap down to the rest of the combatants in ww2.

The Germans did only have a rudimentary understanding of operational art. There was no theory in German military art that formally addressed the study and conduct of operations as a level of military art, and how it related to strategy on the one end and tactics on the other. There was an understanding of operations, insomuch as they were methods of focusing tactical actions within an overall objective, but the details for this were pretty much left to the operational commander to figure out for himself. Thus, while some German commanders, most notably von Manstein, showed a high level of skill for the operational level, this was purely dependent on a commander by commander basis. And the German combined arms concept known generally as blitzkrieg was just that - a combined arms concept, nothing more. It's application in the tactical realm were formidible, but at the operational level it was nothing more than a means to an end - a tool that could be used with great effectiveness at the operational level.

There was a thoroughness to Soviet operational theory that by 1944 manifested itself in operations that displayed amazing complexity, yet because of the degree of centralization could exhibit surprising flexibility at the operational level. Another thing is that Soviet tactics and tactical questions were generally determined by operational objectives and priorities. When Soviet tactical commanders were given authority to act freely within their assigned orders (as in forward detachments) they performed with great effectiveness at that level. And the reason Soviet tactical commanders weren't generally given such freedom of action was because the thoroughness of operational planning had already done a lot of their work for them. For example, operational intelligence plans generally insured that German defensive positions were mostly detected and identified at the tactical level, and most German tactical and operational reserves, as well as artillery positions, were located.

I would like to talk about an aspect of this that might explain a lot about the apparent discrepancy between German first hand accounts and post-war research.

One of the key factors in all successful soviet operations were the combination of undetected concentration of forces in a narrow area of the front, followed by an attack on the German positions. The undetected concentration of forces led to a huge numerical superiority for the Russians in that small sector of the front. But that does not translate to a huge numerical superiority for the Russians in the entire sector, or entire front. So while the statistics show that in various periods of time, the total Soviet numerical superiority was as low as 1.5-1 or 2-1 on the whole front, the numerical superiority at the point of attack could be as high as 10 or 20-1 in infantry and 10-1 in tanks.

I think the above has alot to do with German soldiers (or Generals) telling stories about masses of men and tanks charging across no mans land.

A proper discussion of Soviet operational theory encompasses a number of fairly extensive military fields of study, such as intelligence/reconnaissance, operational planning and manuever, and deception. There are whole books on each of these three areas, and with some friends I'm still delving into it all. Also, because operational art was placed between strategy and tactics, it created two new relationships that must be understood: the tactical-operational and the operational-strategic. It's an amazing subject of study, and one I'll be immersed on for years to come.

Your comments on deception, or maskirovka, are accurate. However, in order for an operation to plunge 600km into the German rear in 2 weeks requires more than a sound penetration of German defenses. Quite a bit more, and Soviet operational theory was the foundation for conducting such a feat.

[Andreas]

A good example of what Greg talks about can be found here.

[Andrew H.]

Originally posted by Panzer76:

The way I see it, it's two different things that is brought up here. As far as I know of, the Germans didnt send theor soldiers without weapons assualting enemy lines, the Soviets did. And then, there is the killing of deserters, real ones or otherwise. Both Germans and Soviets did this, and alot. But only the soviets employed unarmed soldiers, which I think is Hortlunds point. Then one can argue about which of the sides "cared" the most/less for their soldiers. Which is a pretty silly discussion if you ask me...

I would be happy to know of contradictory evidence, but I've come to the conclusion that the soviet "unarmed soldiers" thing is pretty much just a myth.

I've run across one documented instance of soviets sending unarmed troops into battle, and this only happened when newly mobilized troops (i.e., basically civilians) arrived by train at their marshalling point (i.e., the place where they were to be given equipment and assigned to units) just as the rail depot was being attacked by German units. (Obviously, the Sovs weren't expecting the Germans to be there). In this one case, the recruits were sent into battle without weapons.

I'd be interested to know if there are any other documented instances of this happening, but as far as I can tell, it only happened this once. It was not a regular part of soviet military practice, and it's not proof of any general soviet indifference to the lives of their own men.

[Battlefront.com]

I haven't read much of this thread, but I have to agree with Andrew Hedges. The Soviets employing unarmed men is largely a myth. I am sure it happened during the Summer of 1941 in cases, but more by accident than anything else.

The Soviet replacement system totally colapsed after the initial German attacks. Raw conscripts were often marched to the front, over long distances, and ordered to be equipped by the division they were assigned to WHEN THEY GOT THERE. Unfortunately, Soviet planning at the time was horribly thrown off by the speed and distances of the German advances, and therefore these poor sods were often marched not to a depot but right into a combat zone! There were some cases of replacements being sent forward to units that had been overrun days before and dozens of kilometers further West. In short, it was chaos and therefore some really bad things happened. But they were not planned on.

It is also interesting to note that the Hungarians had a similar thing happen to them with 2nd Hungarian Army. In the Fall of 1942 the Hungarians marched, on foot, about 30,000 replacements (in replacement batallions) to the front from railheads WAY in the rear (I think some units had to march 2000 kms from what I recall!). The problem was that by the time these poor bastards got near the front, the front was NOT where it was supposed to be. These 30,000 men didn't even have rifles, not to mention heavy weapons. They were supposed to be kitted out at 2nd Army Depots, which were now overrun. The losses suffered by the replacement battalions were almost 100%. The Germans share the most responsibility for this disaster for a bunch of reasons.

Steve

[Guest Mike]

I wonder if it comes from WW1, where unarmed Russian replacements at the front were a definite reality sometimes - expected, literally, to take weapons from casualties.

[Battlefront.com]

Mike,

I think that is probably it. That and the general negative stereotypes that have been tagged onto "backwards" and "unGodly" nations like Russia/SU. Generally there is a kernal of truth, but like stereotypes in general... it falls apart after that.

Steve

[Tripps]

i'm just happy Lt Hortlund and Andreas have figured out they were arguing 2 different things.

Although the side swipes at Lt H. cos he was new were a bit uncalled for, maybe he was treated as a new recruit into the front lines of BF forum eh?

[Juha Ahoniemi]

I just finished watching first episode of taped document from BBC which was shown here in Finland a while ago. It was made 1999 and was brodcasted here under name "Hitler vs. Stalin".

There were many veteran interviews from both sides. The first part was about German advance in summer -41. In Kiev, (and in several other cities)the Russians were told by Stalin to hold the cities as long as possible - he didn't give permission to retreat. This caused encirclements and massive amounts of casualties to Soviets. The same thing happend in Vyazma, 200km West of Moscow. Viktor Strazdovski from 18th infantry division tells: "There were rifles, but not for everyone(unlike in a Russian propaganda film showed before the interview). There were 1 rifle and 100 rounds for 5 men. We thought we will get more after the training was complete, or when we would go to the front. But no."

Then the German point of view: Wolfgang Horn from 10th armoured division tells "We had surroundered the Russians. They were desperate as they tried to break free. The first line had weapons, but the second didn't. When a man with weapon died, they got a weapon from the dead. Our MG's mowed them down. We were amazed. A German soldier would never attack without a weapon."

This happened during the Vyazma battle, because Stalin had ordered to hold it as long as possible. The coming of the Germans wasn't a surprise there.

I don't know what is original name of this document series, but here is something from the ending credits:

Historical and script consultant for the series

Professor Ian Kershaw

Additional historical consultants

Professor John Erickson

Colonel David Glanz

Professor Vladimir Naumov

DR Volker Riess

Seems to me there isn't much room for bias.

-Juha

[John Kettler]

Juha,

I saw the same program, as part of a series (forget title; on History Channel?), here in the States. I confirm that the veteran interviewed specifically and clearly stated his surprise and consternation that everyone wasn't given a rifle and that the scale of such issue was one per every five men. It hadn't bothered him in training because the needs of the front came first, but he was obviously still deeply affected by the memory of the rifle shortage, let alone the Battle of Vyazma. His isn't the first such account I've come across, merely the first one on videotape. Absent ironclad evidence to the contrary, I'll believe this guy over the academics.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Grisha]

Juha Ahoniemi and John Kettler,

I don't believe anyone's discounting the fact that this occurred. But, it must be seen in context. 1941 was a very chaotic time for the Soviets for a number of reasons, and that's not including the German invasion. When militia divisions were hastily formed along the Moscow direction in summer-fall of 1941, they were generally nothing more than untrained men with a paucity of weaponry. If sufficient equipment could've been appropriated for them in a timely manner they would've done it, but such were those chaotic days that it didn't happen. The fact that the Soviets were forming entire units out of untrained civilians should be enough indication of that.

However, one shouldn't think this was a TOE practice. Even shtraf(incidently, a borrowing from a German military term) units had weapons on hand for all during the war. By spring-summer 1942, stories of unarmed Soviets was gone.

[John Kettler]

Grisha,

I take your point, but would also point out that the veteran Juha and I mention specifically said that he went through regular military training but got very few opportunities to handle a weapon during that training, because the weapons were desperately needed for the battles already raging and were hence scarce while he trained.

That is not the same as simply press ganging (to use an old nautical term) a bunch of hapless young men and sending them straightaway into battle, with no training at all. That probably happened, too, but that wasn't what the veteran Juha and I saw was describing. He was describing being in a trained unit in which only every fifth man was issued a rifle and in which every man was issued 20 rounds. My memory's fuzzy thereafter, but I believe the others had farm tools. I do remember that the unarmed men were to arm themselves with rifles taken from their fallen comrades.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Grisha]

John,

Understood, and that could have been equally as probable. With the amount of confusion and hard decisions that needed to be made in 1941 (while all this was going on, decisions also had to be made about moving heavy industry to the Urals as well - knowing full well this would impact production in terms of quantity and quality for months to come) it's not surprising to me in the least.

To be honest, I don't think the Red Army had much choice in the matter. They just had to make the best of a very, very bad situation.

[gunnergoz]

The Soviets did pretty well, considering they'd cut themselves off at the knees with Stalin's officer corps purges (actually incited by clever German deception measures meant to feed Stalin's paranoi).

One thing that also contributed to the "no or few weapons" issue was the tendency of Soviets to let units melt away to near nothingness, at least in the opening months of the war.

The chaos of those days must be unimaginable to us, even those of us who have read much and have seen what documentaries as there are.

I respect the people greatly, and the professional officer corps as well. We don't often give them the credit they are due.

BTW, as an example of one family's sacrifice, my wife's Ukrainian kin sent 9 men of various ages to war and saw only two come back alive. I've also read that upwards of 90 per cent of the Soviet men who were 16 years old in 1941, did not live through the war years.

[Juha Ahoniemi]

As John said, they were trained and didn't just happen to come fresh out from a train car straight to battle. No, the Germans encircled them. Stalin's orders were to hold the city as long as possible. But I think that kind of thing wasn't common. But it also isn't myth from world war I.

Another impressive thing in those interviews IMO was the veterans telling exactly how they felt - Germans thought that they were far better that Soviets, almost invincible in the art of war. They believed they were saving the Europe from communism (well, I think Stalin was about to come and spread that disease to West in some time soon. His first attempt was -39...My sincere thanks to our veterans for saving our way of life) and therefore their war, and methods, were justified. But that German said it was what he felt THEN. Not any more.

Something about chaotic state of the Soviets back then tells the story from former NKVD-officer from Moscow. As the Germans were closing and people started to panic and flee, they were given the order to get rid of the panic any means necessary and to not let anyone leave Moscow any more. As he said it was a tough assignment but they knew what to do. It wasn't pretty story. And that NKVD guy was still proud of what they did (I wonder if it doesn't hound them at all - yelling "stoi!" once for warning and then...well You know what it was about).

All in all, it was quite good document IMO. Looking forward to watch the rest of it, about Ukrainian partisans who ended up fighting against the Germans AND the Soviet partisans etc.

-Juha

[Battlefront.com]

The examples seen by Juha and John don't contradict my understanding of the early period of the war (outlined briefly above). A lot of things happened during this period that were not planned for and certainly not usefull in military terms. There are stories of tanks going into combat without ammo for example because central supply system broke down. And for sure the first wave of mobilization went quite poorly and resulted in many large scale wastes of life.

But I disagree that it was "normal" or even "common" to have waves of unarmed Soviets charging and picking up the weapons of the dead along the way. I am sure this is happened and could probably find a couple documented cases. But on average, for the whole front? Not common. If it were every German veteran from that time period would have mentioned it due to the sheer horror of slaughter and the reinforcement that the Slavs were üntermensch. Germans wasted no time or words when describing the failings (both real and fictional) of the Red Army, so if this was a common event it would be at the forefront of the largely German based documentation available in the West. Since it isn't, the obvious conclusion should be reached that it wasn't all that common.

Steve

[Juha Ahoniemi]

Yep, it definitely was UNCOMMON. But my point was that it isn't a MYTH either. I'm sure peple will dig out every kind of amazing stuff about the Eastern front, but that doesn't mean they are seriously demanding those things to CMBB. But this Forum is excellent source to learn new things about WWII. And maybe a place where people can even educate themselves about REAL history instead of propaganda.

-Juha

[Andreas]

Reading Soviet accounts of the battle for Moscow (including Vyazma), one really gets a sense of the desperation and chaos that reigned after the Germans took up their assault on the capital again (e.g. Zhukov's memoirs and 'The great battle for Moscow', a German language abridged version of the official Soviet history). Cadet school classes thrown in to hold on to the last man, anything really to delay the German advance. It was quite clearly the nadir for the Soviets, and one should not draw any conclusions from these battles on what happened later. That would be the same as basing an analysis of the performance of the Wehrmacht in 1941 on stories from the fighting on the approaches to Berlin in 1945.

[Foxbat]

Originally posted by Juha Ahoniemi:

Yep, it definitely was UNCOMMON. But my point was that it isn't a MYTH either.

But did it happen because the Roeski's were untermenschen who sent unarmed people to charge HMG positions? because that would show the moral superiority of the germans invaders...[/sARCASM]

On a more serious note I think that the oft reported unaarmed soldiers attacking was either sheer desperation (being surrounded, cut of from supplies and having to little ammo would probably qualify), penal battalions -depending on type these were generally given weapons upon entering combat or had to pick them up from the first wave, generally done by another penal battalion- and honest scrounging (with supplies of even the most basic items short early in the war it made sense to have people retrieve the weapons that were lost.

But this Forum is excellent source to learn new things about WWII. And maybe a place where people can even educate themselves about REAL history instead of propaganda.

Amen to that.

[ September 12, 2002, 06:54 AM: Message edited by: Foxbat ]

[Spook]

I'd like to now take up something with Grisha on a different tangent:

Originally posted by Grisha:

The Germans did only have a rudimentary understanding of operational art. There was no theory in German military art that formally addressed the study and conduct of operations as a level of military art, and how it related to strategy on the one end and tactics on the other. There was an understanding of operations, insomuch as they were methods of focusing tactical actions within an overall objective, but the details for this were pretty much left to the operational commander to figure out for himself. Thus, while some German commanders, most notably von Manstein, showed a high level of skill for the operational level, this was purely dependent on a commander by commander basis. And the German combined arms concept known generally as blitzkrieg was just that - a combined arms concept, nothing more. It's application in the tactical realm were formidible, but at the operational level it was nothing more than a means to an end - a tool that could be used with great effectiveness at the operational level.

There was a thoroughness to Soviet operational theory that by 1944 manifested itself in operations that displayed amazing complexity, yet because of the degree of centralization could exhibit surprising flexibility at the operational level. Another thing is that Soviet tactics and tactical questions were generally determined by operational objectives and priorities. When Soviet tactical commanders were given authority to act freely within their assigned orders (as in forward detachments) they performed with great effectiveness at that level. And the reason Soviet tactical commanders weren't generally given such freedom of action was because the thoroughness of operational planning had already done a lot of their work for them. For example, operational intelligence plans generally insured that German defensive positions were mostly detected and identified at the tactical level, and most German tactical and operational reserves, as well as artillery positions, were located.

As a disclaimer, I must state that my present study of East Front actions, on the operational level, has been very cursory by even the most generous measure. And for now, I am predisposed to concur that the Soviets in the latter half of WWII had the most "refined" understanding of operational warfare.

(It must also be remembered, however, that in spite of enhanced operational practice, the Soviets could still make missteps. Operation Mars, and the ambush of Zhukov's initial thrust for Berlin in 1945, are but two examples, further pronounced as that both happened under Zhukov's watch.)

My issue of contention instead is that of the western Allies (UK/US) never developing "operational art" in WWII at a comparable level to the Soviets (or even the Germans, argued by some). My frame of reference concerning the UK/US is of the final campaigns in NW Europe, from Normandy onwards.

The case might be validly presented as that the US/UK did not practice operational thinking in a consistent way, even in the final year of the war. And to be certain, in this same timeframe, the western Allies had their own missteps too. But when studying actions like the isolation of the Contenin Peninsula, "Cobra," the Lorraine in Sept. 1944, or select actions in the Ardennes or getting over the Rhine, the case could just as validly be argued as that the UK/US had picked up quite a bit in their own operational practices. Further, artillery fire control and air support, as utilized in the command chains of the UK/US on the grand-tactical and operational level in the last year, probably led past that practiced by any other nation.

(How well this was understood & practiced in postwar military study & doctrine of the UK/US is probably another matter.)

Was all of this due mainly to the proficiency of specific UK/US commanders? Or even allowing the improved abilities of the western Allies in some regards, were they still inconsistent, or even deficient, in other matters like intelligence or just defining operational objectives?

Again, while I allow that the Soviets probably had the most consistent application of "operational art" in WWII, my concern is that of stock dismissals to what the western Allies picked up on or improved in their own operational methods during the last war years. Perhaps it's better for another topic thread, but I'd welcome a more earnest comparison of operational practices, and learning some more along the way. (Recommendations of reference material also welcome! )

[ham]

gunnergoz wrote:

The Soviets did pretty well, considering they'd cut themselves off at the knees with Stalin's officer corps purges (actually incited by clever German deception measures meant to feed Stalin's paranoi).

Haven't heard about German deception inciting the purges, could you tell a bit more ?

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Spook:

(It must also be remembered, however, that in spite of enhanced operational practice, the Soviets could still make missteps. Operation Mars, and the ambush of Zhukov's initial thrust for Berlin in 1945, are but two examples, further pronounced as that both happened under Zhukov's watch.)

Small point - Mars was very early (Autumn/Winter 42), before the Soviet operational art matured. Which thrust are you talking about re: Berlin?

Comparing the Allied performance in Northern France, I fail to see the integration in operational thinking that the Soviets seemed to possess. There was a lot more opportunism, and while individual operations (e.g. Cobra) went well, their integration (e.g. with Totalize/Tractable/Bluecoat) left a lot to be desired. My understanding of Grisha's line of argument is that in the Soviet case, they would have been properly integrated, with some idea of what to do next - which the western allies certainly failed at, and quite miserably. Just look at the clusterf*ck that was opening Antwerp.