WORST Generals of WWII?

[winkelried]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Well, what was the alternative? While some serious mistakes were made by the commanders, in particular the failure to correctly identify the key objectives, i.e. the dams, it seems pretty clear to me that the battle needed to be fought, and the losses would probably not have been much less even if the objectives had been clearly ID'd. The Scheldt debacle has to rate a lot higher than this on the balls-up scale.

There are some people who feel, that there would have been significantly lower losses if the battle would have been fought properly (taking the dams e.g.) or not be fought at all (what was the operational or strategic value of this terrain anyway?).

[Andreas]

Originally posted by winkelried:

There are some people who feel, that there would have been significantly lower losses if the battle would have been fought properly (taking the dams e.g.) or not be fought at all (what was the operational or strategic value of this terrain anyway?).

I can't answer the first one, but the second one is pretty clear. Without control of the dams, no crossing of the Roer river until Spring. That means no access to the Cologne plain that lies behind Aachen. Without control of the Huertgen, no control of the dams. Even when the Ardennes offensive had failed, the dams needed to be controlled before the Roer could be crossed, IIRC.

[winkelried]

Originally posted by Andreas:

That means no access to the Cologne plain that lies behind Aachen. Without control of the Huertgen, no control of the dams.

You are right, when Cologne was a valid target in itself. To me Eisenhower's careful "the whole front moves together" plan is questionable per se. I believe that a strong left wing (e.g. Monty's push) to the Ruhr and then through Northern Germany would have been the better plan. But maybe Ike was too aware of the limited competences of his generals where hardly one would have been found who would have been able to execute such a strong left flank push.

[CombinedArms]

I think we're many, many miles away from the WORST generals of WWII at this point. We're talking about a campaign that pushed from Normandy deep into the heart of Germany in eleven months, through extremely determined and experienced opposition, and with loss rates that are, curiously enough, vastly less than those experienced by the operationally superior Russians. During much of this time, Allied and German divisions were at rough parity in number and German troops were more experience, had the advantage of dug in defensive positions, and equipment that was at least as good, if not better.

There were definitely miscalculations and misjudgments along the way, but we're talking, here, about an extraordinarily successful campaign. Mostly when their operations are criticized, we're talking about a few too many casualties here, a few too many enemy escaped from encirclement there, and a somewhat too extended delay over yonder. Yet the same generals who made these acknowleged mistakes--Monty, Bradley, Hodges, Simpson, Patton, et al, under the oversight of Ike--also somehow won a string of victories that destroyed the German army in the west. Cobra was a catastrophe, indeed, but a catastrophe for the German army, not the American.

There are plenty of generals and leaders whose eggregious mistakes led to catastrophic defeat. These are the ones who seem to me to deserve the label of "worst." Generals who make a few mistakes in the context of careers that are otherwise enormously successful are in a different category. Their mistakes attract our attention in large part because they stand out from a larger pattern of success. They're worth careful study in part because they show that even highly capable leaders can err.

[Marlow]

I cannot believe that this thread has gone on for 52 posts, while calling a number of generals that actually fought (albeit not always well) the worst, and NOBODY has mentioned Arthur Percival.

[JonS]

take a look at the 8th post on the first page.

[Kanonier Reichmann]

He was mentioned earlier but only in passing as a possibility.

Regards

Jim R.

[i.i.koshkin]

Originally posted by CombinedArms:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by flamingknives:

I think my vote has to go to Maj.-Gen. Fredendall.

Fredendall definitely stank and was a corps level commander at a time when the US Army had just that one corps in the field. He made a dogs breakfast of his command in just about every possible way. </font>

[Derfel]

Interesting issue actually, what constitutes a bad commanding general?

My attempt at definition:

"One who snatches defeat from the jaws of victory"

i.e a leader that has:

adequate forces (quantity and quality)

a defined task

good logistics

a functioning staff

good communications

and STILL manages to lose a battle or fail a given task.

Anybody comes to mind?

-Derfel

[Colonel Warden]

I'm surprised that no one mentioned MacArthur. His troops knew the Japs were coming (in the Phillipines) yet they were woefully unprepared when they did. Then he went to Australia to make an nusance for the next three years. The fighting in New Guinea was a slugfest that didn't have to be. The reconquest of the Phillipines was a disaster. He had Yama****a outgunned, outnumbered, outsupplied, outeverything except for brains. He was vain, stupid and a politician more than a general.

[Xenophile]

I know this thread happened a long time ago but I'm not sure that anyone can compare with Marshal Budenny. Paulus only lost a maximum of 200,000 men. Budenny seems to have lost over half a million around Kiev in 1941. Agreed that he was operating under restrictions from Moscow and that no-one in the Soviet command expected Guderian to be diverted from Moscow, but the accounts I've read put him at best amongst the most incompetent commanders of all time. It almost seems that if the Germans had let him he would have put even more forces into the encirclement.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Colonel Warden:

I'm surprised that no one mentioned MacArthur. His troops knew the Japs were coming (in the Phillipines) yet they were woefully unprepared when they did. Then he went to Australia to make an nusance for the next three years. The fighting in New Guinea was a slugfest that didn't have to be. The reconquest of the Phillipines was a disaster. He had Yama****a outgunned, outnumbered, outsupplied, outeverything except for brains. He was vain, stupid and a politician more than a general.

Was Peleliu also his decision?

[melb_will]

My my wasn't this resurected.

Well I'm all for voting MacArthur his perfomance in Australia during the New Guinea campaign was criminal.

I'll also throw in a vote for Blamey from Greece onwards. A brilliant WW1 staff officer downhill from there.

I'd be interested to know what the current feeling in the Australian Army towards commanders like Blamey who after the war was regarded as somthing of a hero, even became a field marshal.

cheers

Will

[Bigduke6]

Melkhis Melkhis Melkhis!

Lazar Melkhis, a Communist party hack and one of the nastiest men of the latter half of the 20th century, got his first important taste of things military as the top legwork man for the Red Army purges in 1937, which arguably were the single biggest cause of the amazing German successes during the early phases of Barbarossa.

Effectively Stalin and Beria said "purge the Army", and Melkhis job was picking and rounding the officers up, and shooting or exiling them at his discretion.

Melkhis' next big assignment was identifying and punishing scapegoats for the Red Army's fiasco in Finland 1939.

After the encirclement of 44th Division (Battle of Suomussali) by the Finns, Melkhis' solution to the situation was to have the 44th Division commander shot. It didn't help, the Finns still cut 44th Division to bits and destoyed it. Melkhis avoided reponsibility by convincing Stalin the 44th surviving officers (the previous ones had been captured or killed by the Finns, or sacked or shot by Melkhis) were traitors so it wasn't Melkhis' fault.

German invasion allowed Melkhis to pull off a coup of sorts, as on 23 June - one day after the invasion - Melkhis got Stalin to sign off on orders making Melkhis head of the Red Army's main political administration (i.e., the commissar structure). The story is that Stalin at that point was in mild shock and willing to sign off on anything that might put backbone into Soviet troops.

After a month or so making a nuisance of himself on the Leningrad Front, Melkhis received his first command as the effective Crimea Front commander in Autumn 1941 as a Stavka representative. There was a field commander (forgot who), but Melkhis outranked him and was responsible to the Kremlin for making sure the Crimea Front was fought effectively.

Bringing zero military experience to the job, Melkhis lost the peninsula to v. Manstein in a short campaign (like, a month) considered today one of the German operational masterpieces of the entire war. Among other things, Melkhis managed to piss away a 2-1 superiority in personnel and equipment, control of the sea, air parity, AND the advantage of defending on just about the narrowest frontage anywhere between the Black Sea and the Gulf of Finland.

It was just about the only place on the entire East Front, at that point in time, where Soviet lines had continuous fortifications and solid flanks. Melkhis still lost.

That performance, among other things, was just about the first contribution to v. Manstein's reputation as not just a boffo planner, but an operational field commander of genius.

Melkhis tried to blame the field commanders for the Crimea disaster but Stalin wasn't having any of it, by that time Stalin was beginning to weed out the bad generals and Melkhis was yanked back to Moscow by 1942. He avoided getting shot, supposedly, because he was a Stalin crony from the 1920s.

Melkhis reverted to the top commissar job for the remainder of the war. As a result he was, Hitler included, probably the single most hated man by the Red Army officer corps.

Melkhis used his position to promote toadies and to undermine the careers of independent and talented officers - prior to the war Melkhis was the guy who got Rokkosovsky arrested. In 1944 right after Bagratian, when one of Rokkosovsky's best Army commanders, a guy by the name of Petrov, came up for Front command Melkhis convinced Stalin Petrov was "tired", depriving the Red Army of potentially an outstanding Front commander.

I think it is fair to say that no person, the entire Third Reich included, did more to weaken the Red Army than Lazar Melkhis. He lived to a ripe old age, of course.

One note on Budenny - as I understand it he got relieved for telling Stalin Kiev needed evacuating in September 1941. Stalin disagreed, replaced Budenny with Timoshenko, who attempted to hold the Kiev pocket and as we know became the loser in the single worst defeat in military history.

Seeing as Timoshenko also had a big role to play in the "Kharkov Miracle" battles of late 1942 (again contributing mightily to v. Manstein's reputation), if I can't pick Melkhis because he was a party hack, then my top boob award might well go to Timoshenko.

Although, Percival was a pretty big loser as well.

[WineCape]

The Bad:

Melkhis springs to mind.

The Good:

IMHO German General Heinrici was one of the most underrated.

EDIT:

Thanks BigDuke. Posted after reading only first page here and saw your post at the end.

[ August 02, 2005, 10:32 AM: Message edited by: WineCape ]

[The_Enigma]

well from what ive read of the crete campaign that new zealand? chap who was put in charge of the allied forces. he was a general wasnt he? anyhoo from what ive read he really balls up his job there.

ignoring intel, where the drop zones would be, the targets, how they where getting there etc etc

btw is winkelried comment againt patton a bit unfair ... you can put more shermans on a transporter then pershings thus continuing to have the numermical advantage the play book called for?

[RCHRD]

Mehklis. Mek-lis. I second Paulus for most unfortunate man in out of his depth.

[The_Enigma]

didnt the dude, sorry cant remember his name at the momment, who wrote Stalingrad state it was Paulus 2inc who gave most of the orders out and basically buggered everything up ... not stating that paulus didnt do any harm but the whole kessel situation and the loss of the army isnt all to blame on him?

[Matthias]

which ever italian general earned the famous quote of

"Never has so much been surrendered, by so many, to so few".

also another intresting quote

"All right, they're on our left, they're on our right, they're in front of us, they're behind us... they can't get away this time."

- Lieutenant General Lewis B."Chesty" Puller (when surrounded by 8 enemy divisions)

i am not saying hes the worst, but its a bad sign when your commander sends that

[Wallybob]

My vote is for "Dugout Doug" MacArthur. A lot of folks love him, but 2 aged gentlemen I respected greatly in my younger times would gladly have spat on him. One had been in Burma-China-India theater, one had been on Bataan.

[Foreigner]

I would second the "nomination" of Gen. Pavlov as one of the worst generals of WWII for his mishandling of Soviet defenses in the opening stages of "Barbarossa" - sticking with the same deployment that had already been proven ineffective months before (in exercises).

I also believe that character can make or break even the most intellectually gifted commander; as such, the combination of mediocre ability and cynical opportunism clinches my "worst" vote for Gen. Andrey Vlasov, probably the highest ranking "active turncoat" in WWII (note that while both Petain and Paulus "outranked" him, none actually lead armed forces agains their homeland, like Vlasov did).

Now, some sources try to present him as a sworn enemy of Stalinism/Bolshevism; but before his luck turned he apparently had no problem enjoying the benefits of the system he was supposed to hate, and had excelled in igratiating himself with Stalin. He certainly didn't mind being called "one of Stalin's generals". He rose during the purges when many unquestionably talented leaders fell into disfavor. After he switched sides, he didn't remain loyal to his new cause for long, but instead tried to cut a deal the moment he thought he could get away with it.

Opinions also differ about his military abilities. Many point out his role in the defence of Moscow in 1941; however, there are some indications that he commenced the counter-attack prematurely, against direct orders, and thus deprived the Soviets of a more decisive victory. What is often missed is his role in the disastrous defense of Kiev, which he had bragged to Stalin he would be able to hold. He slipped away while his army was being encircled.

After the 1942 disaster at the Volkhov front, some say he let himself be captured by driving westwards, towards the enemy lines. In any case, it didn't take much time or effort to convince him to lead an active military formation against his countrymen. And the argument for a "principled" fight against Stalin, in my opinion, is seriously undermined by the fact that most of the time the "Russian volunteers" were employed not against Stalin's army, but partisans and the civilian population in the German-occupied territories.

Well, Hitler and Himmler didn't trust Vlasov and his men, and apparently for a good reason - when the going got tough, they attempted to negotiate clemency with the Allies in exchange for a sneak attack at the Germans. By and large, that didn't work; Vlasov was captured without a fight, and ended his life on the gallows. In my mind, a fitting inglorious end to a conniving weasel.

[Wallybob]

They missed one rule "beware of airspeed, lest the ground reach up and smite thee."

[von Nev]

Hands down the WORST was General Arthur Percival the commander of British forces in Singapore. He was soundly crushed in a humiliating defest by a smaller Japanese army that was short on supply and far from their bases. In fact the Japanese survived by living off of the abandoned British supplies.

On 25th January 1942, General Arthur Percival gave orders for a general retreat across the Johore Strait to the island of Singapore. The island was difficult to defend and on 8th February, 13,000 Japanese troops landed on the northwest corner of the island. The next day another 17,000 arrived in the west. Percival, moved his soldiers to the southern tip of the island but on 15th February he admitted defeat and surrendered his 138,000 soldiers to the Japanese.

[Turnberry]

Could these men have gone on to be revered and lionized and Montgomery forgotten instead?

"Yes" has to be the answer here.

... and if Montgomery had been sent to Malaya, do you think he'd have held it?

[ozi_digger]

Originally posted by melb_will:

I'd be interested to know what the current feeling in the Australian Army towards commanders like Blamey who after the war was regarded as somthing of a hero, even became a field marshal.

I'm not an army meathead but it would depend on how 'edumacated' you are. Any high opinion of Blamey is sure to change after reading 'Bastard of a Place' or similar history of the campaign in New Guinea.