Foreigner

Actually, I've read in some memoirs (IIRC at the iremember.ru site) about a case of an ATR being fired from the shoulder standing - what is more, standing on a fellow soldier's shoulders! Apparently, they were in a ditch about 2m deep, and that was the only way to reach over the edge. Of course, it was a risky, strictly one-shot-at-a-time affair, as the recoil simply knocked the shooter (possibly the fellow standing below him, as well) back into the ditch. Then they had to dust off, and repeat the whole climbing-then-shooting-then-falling back exercise again. The memoir claimed they did score a couple of knock-outs... Then there was a video of 2 Germans shooting a MG-34 (I believe) from a standing position by resting the barrel on the shoulder of one of them... Never underestimate the toughness and ingenuity in battlefield expedients!

I've read there were two versions of 85-mm tank guns that competed for approval - D-5T and S-53 - and two turret versions - 2-men and 3-men. S-53 won the trials, but could not be fitted to the 2-men turret, which was ready for production earlier. Apparently, in the rush to get an upgunned T-34 to the front, for a couple of months one plant produced a T-34-85 version with a 2-men turret with the D-5T gun with a run of several hundred. By March 1944, though, the 3-men turret with the S-53 gun was in regular production. I think Battlefront can be excused for ignoring a stopgap version that was a very small fraction of total numbers produced, and discontinued some time before "Bagration" started.

Going back to the point how IS-2 was so much "lighter" than comparable German designs. IS-2 had both the engine and the transmission/final drive at the back. German WWII tanks (at least from PzKpfw III on up) had the transmission/final drive in front. That means you have a heavy driveshaft running the length of the vehicle. On heavier tanks, just that adds several tons. But this also results in the need for a taller profile, and larger armored volume, adding additional weight, which in turn requires a more powerful engine and stronger suspension ... Coupled with the German weapon designers' tendency to overengineer everything you get the vicious circle idea. Granted, the German approach has its benefits. The turret can be placed more in the middle (see how forward IS-2's turret is). The middle placement reduces crew compartment "travel" especially over rough terrain, creating more comfortable crew conditions. The chance to stick the gun in the mud in an unexpected "dive" is also lower. You spread the weight of the turret more evenly on the suspension. And you don't have to turn the gun back during transport. I am less certain about the claimed degree of additional protection forward transmission placement gives to the crew. On one hand, there's more iron/steel between the incoming round and the crew. On the other hand, it doesn't cover the whole front - moreover, it is fairly low in the hull, where the chances of hit are not big to begin with. Also, now there is a greater chance that even a non-penetrating hit might disable the transmission and immobilize the tank, which greatly increases the vulnerability. In the end, I believe history has provided the verdict - to the best of my knowledge, no modern main battle tank has the engine and transmission/final drive at opposite ends of the vehicle...

Purpheart23, I'd say that these forums are nothing short of Hair-splitter Central. :-) In all seriousness, though, the Soviets themselves never called it (at least in official documents, to my best knowledge) anything other than "пушка", i.e. "gun", as opposed to "гаубица" ("howitzer"). The Wiki article was just the most conveniently available source, but hardly the only one. Unfortunately, most of the cited sources are in print, not online; and those that are available online will probably not pass the "higher-than-Wikipedia" standard. I did find some places online where it was labeled as a howitzer, but mostly on pictures, not in source texts. Some of these mentions were actually for modeling, so they have to be considered secondary, IMHO. A-19 does have some "howitzer-like" features such as high maximum elevation and separate loading ammunition, but its design and battle application in my opinion firmly put it in the gun category. To compare it with the 122 mm M-30 howitzer just below it in the manual, the A-19's barrel length is 45 calibers, giving it a reported max muzzle velocity of about 800 m/s, while for the M-30 the barrel length is 18.7 calibers giving it a max muzzle velocity of just 515 m/s.

On page 31 of the PDF file (page 84 of the manual), the Russian A-19 M1931/37 gun is mislabeled as a howitzer... http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A-19_122mm_gun

LukeFF, Soviet use of captured PF was recorded on film and in memoirs, although most often in urban fighting, not in PF's intended antitank role. I think the amounts they captured was one of the reasons they did not rush to produce their own version until after the war ended.

Sequoia, I think that partly can be attributed to the fact that, at least initially, a series of Hitler's crazy bets paid off big time, which made their otherwise reasonable objections seem weak, cowardly, and stupid in comparison. Afterwards, there was an element of "groupthink" - once enough people (at least publicly) profess their belief in something - no matter how wrong it was, such as the infallibility of the Fuhrer kissed by Providence and selected by Destiny - even the best people would subconsciously start to question their better judgement. There are interesting tests where a roomful of paid actors giving the same wrong answer most often force the unsuspecting test subject to repeat it (regardless of the obvious truth). Of course, it didn't help that often disagreeing with Hitler was disagreeable to one's health, freedom, and life... ... or it may be a banal case of a lot of the high-ranking officers missing a spine.

John Kettler, Thanks for the description! But I think it can be argued that French (and possibly British) intervention was less likely in 1936, even if the odds were more in their favor than in 1938. The re-militarization was clearly a violation of the Versailles treaty, but not an outright threat of war with another nation. After all, that was indisputably German territory. So in the Rhineland case, an intervention would be harder to justify than in 1938 if Hitler had indeed attacked Czechoslovakia. After all, in 1923 - 25 the French and Belgians did occupy the Ruhr as Germany failed to make their reparation payments (a clear Treaty violation), but drew international condemnation in the process (in part for using "colonial" troops). So it seems there was a tacit understanding that the Versailles treaty would not be kept anywhere near to the letter without grave consequences. Still I believe that if not the Anschluss, then at least the threats surrounding the Sudetenland should have been "whistled" for crossing the line.

I believe there was an author who claimed that while in 1939 Britain and France would not be a match for Germany, in 1938 they had a decent chance of winning a conflict (if they had not gone to accommodate Hitler in Munich). Britain and France were ill-prepared, but according to the author in 1938 German preparedness and overall strength were even worse. Surprisingly, Hitler seemed to think of the Munich agreement as a defeat of his. He reportedly complained that his war was stolen from him.

Regarding the very high octane gas, I think I remember reading (in memoirs or studies) that the lend-lease supply was primarily (or almost exclusively) going to lend-lease planes. Soviet-made planes seemed to have been fine with the local gas (after all, that was what they had been designed for). Of all the lend-lease supplies, my impression is that the most frequently and fondly noted by the Soviets themselves was Spam. Trucks were recognized, as well, although it seems they've only relatively recently began to admit widely that from a certain point all new "Katyushas" had been mounted on US-provided chassis. P-39s were also celebrated frequently due to their association with Pokryshkin, but also because they had proven themselves capable German bomber killers. One had to dig in more specialized sources to find recognition of supplies of aircraft-grade aluminum alloys and rubber, Hurricanes (protecting Murmansk and Archangel), and Spitfires for high-altitude protection of Moscow). They didn't much like the M3 Grant/Lee, calling it (loosely translated) a "7-seat coffin".

Well, the final medal count is in. What was that about quantity vs quality?

Sailor Malan2, Thanks for your reply. You raise valid points, but I feel that, depending on the implementation, the problems can be avoided or mitigated. For example, a higher "undiscounted" rarity level of the "uber" stuff should discourage use in situations where its appearance was less likely, while discounts may make them more "affordable" only in the "right" situation. Alternatively, discounts on the "less uber", but still "rare" equipment could make it relatively more attractive than the ""super uber" units. This discount principle need not be applied just to assault and/or towed guns alone. Technically, it can be done for any unit with a non-zero rarity "cost", so it really is not limited to units only at army-level control. Of course, it need not apply to all units with rarity, either. Getting it right is going to take some work which might not be worth it at this stage (or ever), but then at some point 1:1 representation might had looked the same. Just wanted to start the argument rolling.

Gentlemen, I am under the impression that currently whether a player is on attack or defense, the point/rarity "cost" of any item (unit or piece of equipment) is the same. The limitation of this approach is that by necessity these values are averages. And I would argue that an attacking formation will have a more-than-average likelihood to get "rare" assault guns, for example; by the same token, an assaulting formation will be more-than-average likely to get heavier assault guns than an attacking one, etc. Conversely, a defending formation will have a more-than-average likelihood to get towed guns; if defending in an assault scenario, then there would be a more-than-average likelihood of trenches and bunkers vs foxholes. Of course, a lot of players are likely following these guidelines even in the current system, so any potential benefit might simply end up not worth the trouble. However, it seems to me there is some value in applying at least a "rarity" "discount" for some "appropriate" items depending on whether a player is attacking or defending; or in a Probe, Attack, or Assault scenario. I would like to read your opinion on the matter!

Gentlemen, I think the discussion is starting to veer in an "alternate history" direction, and while I enjoy it thoroughly, I feel somewhat responsible for helping "hijack" the thread from its original theme. Maybe it will be more appropriate to move the discussion into a thread of its own - here or in the general forum - if there isn't one already. Just a suggestion...

On Hitler declaring war on the US... I'm not sure I remember it correctly, but didn't the U-boat arm press for just that? Someone more knowledgeable may correct me, but my impression is that as far as the U-boat captains were concerned the US had already been in the war for some time, escorting convoys and attacking U-boats, while they had had to "restrain" themselves from attacking US warships and American-flagged transports ("Reuben James"? What "Reuben James"?). After the declaration of war, it was no holds barred, and the initial period of attacks in American coastal waters were called "the second happy times" by the German submariners. And, if the recently discovered typed pages are indeed authentic and have been correctly identified as the dictated second volume of "Mein Kampf", Hitler considered a war with the US eventually inevitable, anyway. To him, the moment must have felt right.