Recent historians on Prochorowka and the Great Patriotic War

[Andreas]

Hi George

I don't think his figures are wrong. Just his analysis based on the figures.

All the best

Andreas

[George MC]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Hi George

I don't think his figures are wrong. Just his analysis based on the figures.

All the best

Andreas

Hi Andreas

I agree - his sources of info are plausable, just not so sure as you say, his conclusions. Strange to think how the Prokhorovka myth has managed to endure for so long

Cheers fur noo

George

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by George Mc:

[snips] Strange to think how the Prokhorovka myth has managed to endure for so long

"It's not how well you do on the exercise, it's how you perform at the de-brief."

All the best,

John.

[Bigduke6]

This revisionist thinking - Prokhorovka was actually a German victory - is nothing more than narrow-minded bean counting. So what if, on that particular day, the Germans destroyed a couple of times more tanks than the Soviets?

If Rotmistrov's 5th Guards lost, say, 300 medium tanks at Prokhorovka, that was - wait for it - about ten days of the Soviet Union's total medium tank production. Ten days. 300 tanks in a day's fighting may have been a terrible, gutting loss from the German perspective. Had a Panzer Korps lost 300 of its spiffy Panthers and not-quite-so spiffy Mark IVs and IIIs, but including some ueber-spiffy Tigers and Ferdinands, that certainly would have been a serious defeat for said Panzer Korps, and worse, for the reputation of the von Whomever that was in charge.

But for the Soviets? They were cranking out tanks and crews by the hundreds, every week.

So if the Germans waste a couple of dozen tanks at the front edge of their panzerwedge, and more on the flanks, and back off long enough for the next echelon of Soviet forces still in the path of the German attack to lay mines and bring up more armor, then all in all that's a Soviet victory. Or at the very least, a clear step towards that victory. The results of the battle materially harm the German ability to sustain their war effort. The results of the battle do little to nothing, to harm the Soviet war effort.

The only way to turn a battle like Prokhorovka into a clear German victory is to look at it like a CM battle where all winning and losing points are determined on the battlefield, where losses of armored vehicles are the dominant definition of failure, and indeed where the value of German and Soviet armored vehicles is pretty close to the same. Then it is possible to point to a "kill ratio", and say "Oh look, the Germans won, see, they lost far fewer tanks."

What's more, in order to do that, one has to close one's eyes to all the other things that are going wrong for the Germans, so that they could get on the fat side of that kill ratio: the ridiculously high cost of German combat vehicles relative to the German economy, the same for the resources necessary to train crews well enough to use them, the German material and personnel losses in those sectors where they did not collect their panzers, and of course the panzer losses that didn't come from Soviet tanks: i.e., mines, AT guns, and panzers abandoned by the Germans because a week or a month down the line they couldn't get it parts or fuel. All that is ignored, and the only parameter is gunnery skill.

Which all in all is a very superficial approach, with little to do with responsible history.

Soviet military history is far from perfect, but it at minimum rarely goes in for the von Mellenthin style of defining battle success. Soviet military history - and Rotmistrov's memoirs (which are excellent in my opinion and miles beyond our buddy Mellenthin, and maybe even measures up to Gudarian or Manstein) keep to the basics: overall harm to the enemy war effort, overall harm to the friendly war effort, and operational results.

I certainly would caution any one about casting aspersions on the recollections of Rotmistrov, who after all was one of the top ten or so armored commanders of the 20th century, just because he drove his tank army into the teeth of a panzer corps in mid-1943, at the very height of German armored technical superiority. Of course 5th Guards was going to bleed. But Rotmistrov makes clear the point at Prokhovka was not casualties so much as what resulted from them. None of this is a secret, Rotimistrov's memoirs were published something like forty years ago.

Like JasonC said, the results of Prokhovka were clear. The German advance had just about run out of steam, while the Soviets clearly had the force and the will to shift to the offensive. With superior numbers and an entire Steppe Front in reserve, the Germans had to back off or be eventually surround themselves. The Soviet didn't need to fight it out, they could just drive around the concentrated German panzers. The only German counter was dispersing their panzers into fire brigades, and once you start doing that, you can't win the war.

The decisive shift here was that, as Glantz points out, for the first time the Soviets took the intiative away from the Germans in "normal" weather conditions. As far as that goes, it was the first time any one had stopped the Blitzkrieg under those conditions. And until Prokhorovka, German Blitzkrieg was an unstoppable method of warfare.

A couple of hundred T-34s was a cheap price for the Soviets to pay, to demonstrate to themselves and the Germans that Blitzkrieg no longer guaranteed German battlefield victory. That put the handwriting on the wall: without an effective ueber-doctrine, the Germans faced a war of attrition - and every one know how a war like that was going to end.

[PzKpfwIII]

Well stated, BigDuke6.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

Soviet military history is far from perfect, but it at minimum rarely goes in for the von Mellenthin style of defining battle success. Soviet military history - and Rotmistrov's memoirs (which are excellent in my opinion and miles beyond our buddy Mellenthin, and maybe even measures up to Gudarian or Manstein) keep to the basics: overall harm to the enemy war effort, overall harm to the friendly war effort, and operational results.

I certainly would caution any one about casting aspersions on the recollections of Rotmistrov, who after all was one of the top ten or so armored commanders of the 20th century, just because he drove his tank army into the teeth of a panzer corps in mid-1943, at the very height of German armored technical superiority. Of course 5th Guards was going to bleed. But Rotmistrov makes clear the point at Prokhovka was not casualties so much as what resulted from them. None of this is a secret, Rotimistrov's memoirs were published something like forty years ago.

I think you are going a bit too easy here on Comrade Rotmistrov. AIUI he was sacked when he put in a repeat performance at Minsk a year later (woops, sorry, I mean 'promoted' to Deputy Commander in Chief Soviet Mechanized & Tank Forces). Unfortunately I have not been able to find a German version of his memoirs yet, so I can not pass judgement on them.

But to say that sacrificing all those tanks got a desired result is a bit of a stretch - the same result may have been had if the tanks had not been sacrificed. After all, it is clear that it was not the losses at Prokhorovka, but the overall operational and strategic situation that led the German high command to call it off. They probably would have done so anyway within days, and the 5th Guards TA would have been around in force to support Polkovodets Rumyantsev in force, instead of half-strength. Konev in his memoirs is highly critical of committing 5 GTA at all during the defensive phase. He obviously believed that it made no positive difference (first volume of his memoirs), IIRC.

The charge at Prokhorovka achieved very little, if not nothing at all, that could not have been achieved, at much lower cost, by continued tenacious defense, and what was achieved was achieved at horrendous cost that stood in no relation to the gain. It was all harm to the friendly war effort, none to that of the enemy. In my view.

All the best

Andreas

[Corvidae]

Germany lost at kursk, get over it,,, they lost at kursk the moment they invaded russia in june of 41, but they lost at kursk,,,,,

its nice to think that they won some sort of lesser victory, but its only wishfull thinking,,

Its easy to want to give them something,,, A sexy german tavern wench brings you 8 tankards of beer and you realy want to give them credit for something,, but its aint kursk, You can drink that german beer,, and stare into that german cleavage ,, but it wont change a thing,,, germany lost at kursk,, prokhorovka is part of kursk,,,, germany lost at kursk.,,,

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by Corvidae:

You can drink that german beer,, and stare into that german cleavage ,, but it wont change a thing,,,

Oh yes it will

Never underestimate the power of beer and breasts. Enough of both and I'll have you believing Ecuador defeated Bangladesh at Kursk.

[ November 03, 2005, 04:36 PM: Message edited by: Kingfish ]

[JasonC]

II SS panzer corps before the operation

Operational Tigers - 35

Operational IV long + StuG - 246

Lesser Operational tanks - 141

90 Infantry type companies

21 Inf Hvy Weapons companies

II SS Panzer corps at nightfall on the 13th

Operational Tigers - 4

Operational IV long + StuG - 129

Lesser Operational tanks - 91

6000 casualties to date

The reduction in runners is about half, in armored combat power more than half. The infantry losses amount to around 50 per infantry type company, allowing some for tank crews, artillery, etc.

Rate of manpower losses through time

5-6 July 1000 per day

7-10 July 450 per day

11-13 July 700 per day

14-16 July 425 per day

17-20 July 55 per day

The 5th saw the highest losses from the breakthrough fighting, the 6th was still heavy. Then things got easier, though still heavy, for 4 days. Around the time of the Prok fight the loss rate climbs again to breakthrough fighting levels. It drops back to the easier but still heavy level for a few days after that, until the suspension of the offensive.

The moral is, they had to be breaking through into the deep operational rear on the 12th, for the whole operation to be sustainable. A week of fighting that tough to cut through, once, might be livable, if it results in a big operational win on a scale of months and armies. Instead the loss rate shot up again, unsustainably and without breakthrough, with the edge of the panzer force already dulled by losses.

As for Andreas' comments about tactical ineptitude on the Russian side in the use made of 5th Guards Tank, I basically agree. It was enough to put 600 tanks in front of II SS at that point, and fire on anything that advanced. No banzai was necessary or called for. Having a reserve Tank Army at that stage of the fight was the winning factor, not getting half of it killed to make a point about local initiative. I could have done better with it; many competent officers could have; anybody here probably could have. But as with so many such things, strategic factors outweigh tactical ones. What was at stake was not the battle but half a tank army to have around for exploitation and the like. The battle was in the bag.

[Grisha]

Yeah, Rotmistrov is a strange case. He was a great teacher and instructor of armored warfare, and did very well as a tank brigade and corps commander in the war. A good analytical mind. But, something went snap, mentally, from somewhere in 1943. And, it never came back.

[Bigduke6]

Andreas,

Hindsight is 20-20. At the time the Soviets had to force the Germans over to the defensive, and to halt the Panzerkeilen (spelling?). They knew the German formations attacking at Prokhorovka and they knew the general German intent, but they did not know past a general sense the degree to which the Germans had been hurt, and so the degree to which the Germans were capable of futher attack.

Prokhorovka first and foremost was an Soviet attempt to wrest intiative from the Germans. You and Jason are quite right it would have been more efficient, in a material sense, to wear down the German attack until it came apart at the seams.

But as you well know wars are not just about material but about perception. Rotmistrov's attack and the Steppe Front behind it made clear to every one Blitzkrieg was dead on the East Front as of July 1943. For every one, Marshals and privates alike, to believe in a change like that, it has to be demonstrated in a way all the participants can readily see. A charge by 400 tanks backed up by however thousand more in Steppe Front sends the message: "The Soviets have plenty of force in the pipeline, and they are ready and willing to expend it however it gets expended, to take the war to the enemy. And that effort will drain the enemy, no matter how tactically competent he is." That's what I'm getting at.

As to Comrade Rotmistrov, well, I differ with you there. The guy was a former enlisted, fought in the Civil war, graduated Frunze, and taught mechanized doctrine during the 1930s.

Prior to Kursk he got his Corps (3rd Mech)surrounded in June 1941, but on the other hand was able in June 1942 to at least give 11th Panzer a bit of a bloody nose at Yelnya. He was commanding 7th Tank Corps at that point. During Uranus he was one of the lead elements of the 6th Army encirclement. It's quite true his Tank Army got cut up at Kursk, but to be fair he achieved his mission: stop the German panzers.

During the rest of the war 5th Guards Tank did pretty much whatever it wanted wherever it wanted, as I recall. Rotmistrov was made commander of all mech/armor troops in the Red Army in late 1944: my take on that is that was recognition this was a guy who knew his mechanized warfare. He then got the same job for GSFG, which as you know was a pretty plum position. But you certainly could read that as a falling out with high command, I durno.

I'm not saying the guy was a Rokkosovsky or Konev, but Russian history considers Rotmistrov one of the top mobile warfare technicians produced by the Red Army during the war. Admittedly, that opinion is based on a lot more than just Prokhorovka.

P.S. to JasonC: Are you absolutely sure you would have done better in charge of 5th Guards Tank Army than Rotmistrov? After all, the guy had about 25 years of Red Army service under his belt, including five years' combat experience in two wars. And Zhukov was his boss, not a whole lot of room for clever manuevering there.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

As to Comrade Rotmistrov, well, I differ with you there. The guy was a former enlisted, fought in the Civil war, graduated Frunze, and taught mechanized doctrine during the 1930s.

Prior to Kursk he got his Corps (3rd Mech)surrounded in June 1941, but on the other hand was able in June 1942 to at least give 11th Panzer a bit of a bloody nose at Yelnya. He was commanding 7th Tank Corps at that point. During Uranus he was one of the lead elements of the 6th Army encirclement. It's quite true his Tank Army got cut up at Kursk, but to be fair he achieved his mission: stop the German panzers..

Could also be Peter principle - everybody gets promoted to one level above his potential. Maybe he was a great Corps commander, but out of his depth as Army commander? Just like Rommel, who was a great divisional commander, but we can argue about Corps, and there is no question that he was unsuited to command an Army Group.

As outlined above - the Panzers would have stopped anyway. To honour Prokhorovka with this achievement is giving it more than its fair due, in my view. As to whether the gesture of p*ssing 200 tanks away was required. Well, Konev disagreed.

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

During the rest of the war 5th Guards Tank did pretty much whatever it wanted wherever it wanted, as I recall. Rotmistrov was made commander of all mech/armor troops in the Red Army in late 1944: my take on that is that was recognition this was a guy who knew his mechanized warfare. He then got the same job for GSFG, which as you know was a pretty plum position. But you certainly could read that as a falling out with high command, I durno.

According to Generals.dk, he did not rise higher than Deputy Commander during the war:

Rotmistrov

1942 - 1943 Commanding Officer III Guards Tank Corps

1943 Commanding Officer 5th Tank Army

1943 - 1944 Commanding Officer 5th Guards Tank Army

1944 - 1945 Deputy Commander in Chief Soviet Mechanized & Tank Forces

1945 - 1948 Commanding Officer Mechanized & Tank Forces Soviet Group of Forces, East Germany

If that is wrong, Steen would be happy to be corrected.

And yes, I see this as a demotion/punishment appointment. He lost battlefield command of a key formation of the Red Army in exchange for a staff job without command responsibility. It basically says 'You are clearly bright and useful, but an able battlefield commander at Army level you are not, so we are going to use you in a position more suited to your abilities.' In my view.

All the best

Andreas

[JasonC]

BigDuke, yes I am absolutely sure I could have done a better job with 5th Guards Tank than the use actually made of it. I suspect my ten year old nephew could have. It is ridiculous apologetics, worthy of the long tradition of laughable communist agitprop, to pretend losing half of it in two days was intentional. The best that can be said is that he placed his ship alongside one of the enemy, to speak Nelson.

[Bigduke6]

Andreas,

I stand corrected on the mobile troops thing, deputy commander not commander. Still, I stick to my position.

Ok, here are some linkies to prove I'm not making it up:

http://wwii-soldat.narod.ru/MARSHALS/ARTICLES/rotmistrov.htm

http://220641.rkka.ru/biograf/r/rotmistrov-pn.htm

http://mechcorps.rkka.ru/files/mechcorps/pages/biograf_r.htm

Here's are a couple of partial translations, by me:

Rotmistrov, Pavel

Born 6.07.1901 in the village Skovorogo in the present Tver' province. Member member the RKKA from 1919. Participant in the Civil War, Soviet-Polish War, repression of the Kronstadt uprising. Commander a platoon and then a company of 31st Rifle Rgt of the 11th Rifle Division. In 1928 admitted to the Frunze Academy. After graduation served in Zabaikal province as staff officer in the 36th Rifle Division. Assistant staff chief of OKDVA (?). From June 1937 commander of 63rd Rifle Regiment, 21st Rifle Division. From October 1937 instructor at Moscow Higher Military Academy (my guess: a quick lateral to avoid the purges) in December 1940. From May 1941 staff chairman 3rd Mech Corps. Commander 8th Tank Brigade, then 7th Tank Corps 17.04.42-22.02.43. February 1943 took command of 5th Guards Tank Army.

Cut from another bio:

During the Great Patriotic War Rotmistrov fought on the Western, Northwest, Western, Kaliningrad, Voronezh, Steppe, South-West, 2nd Ukrainian, and 3rd Belorussian Fronts. Participated in border battles of 1941. As commander of 8th (in January 1942 3rd Guards) Tank Brigade, participated is fierce (упорные) battles in the region of Staraya Russa, near Kalinin (Tver'), fought for the city Klin, Rogachev, Dmitrov, participated in the Moscow counteroffensive. From April 1942 commanded the 7th Tank Corps (from Dec. 1942 3rd Guards Tank Corps) in the Elets battles, then at Stalingrad. (Note: another bio alleges his forces at Yelets destroyed either 11th or 21st Panzer, I forget which).

In January 1943 his Corps jointly with 2nd Guards Army defeated the forces of Field Marshal v. Manstein, which were attempting to relieve German forces surrounded at Stalingrad. Liberated the city Rostov-Na-Donu. In February 1943 P.A. Rotmistrov became commander of 5th Guards Tank Army. He distinguished himself in the Kursk battles.

Forces under his commend played a decisive role in battles in the Prokhorovka vicinity. Rotimistrov's army next successfully participated in the Belgorod-Kharkov and Belgorod-Boshtanskiy offensive operations, destroyed a powerful enemy force in the vicinity of Krivoi Rog (modern: Rih), liberated Kirovograd, and forced the encirclement and liquidation of enemy forces during the Korsun-Shevchenkovskiy operation.

In summer of 1944 Rotimistrov with his army participated in the Belorussian offensive (i.e., Bagratian) liberating the cities Borisov, Minsk, and Vilnius. In August of 1944 he was named to the position assistant commander of tank and mechanized forces of the Red Army.

(Andreas was right on the job title, I was wrong! I feel so...bovine.)

Still, I would emphasize: If I read the bios right this is a man that TWICE commanded armor units rating an upgrade to guards, at the brigade and the corps levels. That is not shabby performance.

As to the Peter Principle, Rotmistrov stayed in charge of 5th Guards Tank Army for a full year after Kursk, so it doesn't seem to me Zhukov or Stalin thought he was a dolt as a Tank Army commander.

So why did he leave active command after Bagratian? My theory is that, given Rotmistrov's somewhat academic bent, he figured he had done enough fighting. When he left 5th Guards, after all, he was invading Poland for the second time in his life. If you look at Rotmistrov's position from a career point of view, by the latter stages of the war he needed a job more responsible than Army Commander to advance in the Red Army, and with the Front jobs basically closed perhaps he viewed the "Armor Inspectorate" job was viewed as another route upward. This of course assumes the guy remained ambitious after reaching Army command.

My bet is he got told "hang out in armored troops command, do great stuff, and we'll get you something REALLy good after the war". That's how the Red Army worked, and that's how armies at the senior level work. But of course I don't know this.

What is for sure is that Mobile Troops Commander in CSFG is about as good as it got in post-war Red Army. The only thing better was commander CSFG (Rokkosovsky), or Minister of Defense (I fergit, but who wants Stalin for a boss?)

Finally, I think it is worth noting that Rotmistrov's replacement at 5th Guards Tank was another "brainy" officer, to wit, Mikhail Solomatin, whom some of us know as the unfortunate commander of 2nd Mech Corps during the Mars operation. Solomatin's memoirs (I haven't read them but Glantz has) are also relatively intelligent and professional, apparently.

If you look at Solomatin's bio and compare it to Rotmistrov's it looks like a replacement so the next guy can get some command time in slot, so to speak.

So all in all I stick to my guns. Rotmistrov based on his bios was one of the top Soviet mobile force commanders of the war, at absolute minimum quite competent. I'll reread my Konev on Rotmistrov's alleged failings during Bagratian that Andreas is talking about, but I have my doubts I'll find anything: Konev fought Army Group North Ukraine. But I'll check.

[ November 04, 2005, 07:46 AM: Message edited by: Bigduke6 ]

[Bigduke6]

Jason, What would you have done? Told Vatutin to his face you refuse to attack?

[Renaud]

I wouldn't have ordered the mad rush that seems to be described in the Soviet Official History of the battle:

"The tanks of the Fifth Guards Tank Army cut into the Nazi deployment at full speed. This attack was so fast that the enemy did not have time to meet it, and the leading ranks of the Soviet tanks passed right through the enemy's entire first echelon..."

I always assumed this was purely fictional propoganda, as who in their right mind would order this nonsense. It goes on like this, including heroic flaming suicide KV's ramming tigers, described in very purple prose. Ummm Yea.

According to what i've read, each side lost more than 300 tanks. Do I understand correctly that the original poster claims only a handful of german tanks were lost at Prokhorovka, or something of the sort?

Also, can you guys recommend any excellent CM scenarios on Prokhorovka? There's one on the CD I think...it's pretty generic. Huge random-looking map of high hills, tons of tanks, artificial as heck, not resembling the actual terrain in the least...

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by Renaud:

Also, can you guys recommend any excellent CM scenarios on Prokhorovka? There's one on the CD I think...it's pretty generic. Huge random-looking map of high hills, tons of tanks, artificial as heck, not resembling the actual terrain in the least...

Not a scenario, but you may want to try Tank Warning by Franko. A static Op, it depicts the Russian attack on the 1st SS Division's position on that day.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Renaud:

According to what i've read, each side lost more than 300 tanks. Do I understand correctly that the original poster claims only a handful of german tanks were lost at Prokhorovka, or something of the sort?

You understand correctly. Also, it is not just the original poster, but the documentary evidence that supports that. Neither side lost 300 tanks, and they almost certainly did not lose 300 tanks between them at Prokhorovka.

All the best

Andreas

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

I'll reread my Konev on Rotmistrov's alleged failings during Bagratian that Andreas is talking about, but I have my doubts I'll find anything: Konev fought Army Group North Ukraine. But I'll check.

Stefan

My point was relating to Konev comments on Kursk, not Bagration, where he commanded Steppe Front )IOW - lost 5th Guards Tanks Army thanks to Rotmistrov).

If you want to stick to your point, I think there is nothing else I can say except the following: I have no doubt that Rotmistrov was one of the top Soviet armoured commanders of the war (would not put him top two though, where does that leave Rybalko and Katiukov, who after all were never sacked?). I agree he performed very well before Zitadelle. But twice he screwed up royally, in my view. At Minsk, and at Kursk. The former cost him his job, the latter should have. I do not think the idea that he preferred a more academic job has much credibility, but then I have not read his memoirs - I can not think of a single formation commander wanting a different job in the circumstances. What can be more desirable than driving the key assault formation of your country on the road to victory to Berlin? And he did not get 'something really good' after the war. He got Commander of Mech forces in Germany and CiC Mech Forces Far East, each of which was another high-level staff job (formations would be commanded by army commanders) with a boss (Commander of Soviet Forces in Germany) on top of him. Even Malinovsky did better, fer Chris's sake.

I don't think he was a bad officer, or incompetent. Just out of his depth on those two occasions. And to be honest, my 4-year old nephew would have done as well at Prokhorovka. Ignore the tank ditch, charge into the superior German tanks. Die a lot. Have a nice day. It's the Russian revenge for the charge of the light brigade minus the cheesy poem.

All the best

Andreas

[JasonC]

BigDuke - I would have put a tank brigade on the reverse slope (NE) of hill 252 with another right behind it as a local reserve. Defensive stance on the west face opposite Das Reich. No stuffing multiple tank corps into the salient between LAH and T - instead center a full TC around Beregovoe as second echelon on that wing, facing south and south-south-west in the low ground.

Line the gully from Petrovk to Prokhorovka with ATGs up on the north slope, high enough for LOS southward, with tanks below (in front of) them in the low ground. Infantry down there too and on the reverse slope opposite. Invite the Germans in to the salient in other words, making it a kill sack.

Meanwhile, attack SS Totenkopf farther northwest, from east, north, and northwest. With the main weight of that offensive stance portion west of the axis Andreevka - Petrovk - Beregovoe. Objectives Polezhaev and hill 226, and south of 226 a bit to the natural break in the ground.

The second echelon TC back at Beregovoe - effectively, on the chord across the salient - swings right to aid the attack on T or left to aid the defense against LAH, as events warrant.

What I most certainly would not do is try to stuff 5 tank brigades into the gap between T and LAH.

Meanwhile, guns and arty hit everything east, northeast, and north of hill 241, without trying to charge in with tanks. Just send shells at that bulge, and flanking AT fire at any attempt to extend it. "Stoppered" also by armor behind hill 252 on reverse slopes to keep initial ranges low.

If the Germans want to pull back T and drive due east, let 'em. The ground is good for defense (seamed with low ground) and they aren't getting any closer to any link up with AG center. Live Russian armor north of them makes that impossible. If they send LAH into the salient, due north from hill 241, withdraw before them fighting and stand at the aforementioned Petrovk-Prokhorovka level. With the hill 252 force biting their right flank if they don't take it out first.

Send everyone as far forward as possible with attack orders isn't any operational art, it is buck passing to subordinates, spending their lives and equipment to look brave to superiors.

[Bigduke6]

Jason,

Great answer. I certainly agree with you that a mad tank charge, in light of the events, was not the ideal move for the Soviets at Prokhorovka. I am not pushing the line that 5th Guard Tank's assault was a tactical coup.

I am arguing alternatives, including your pretty much impeccable recommendation, may not have been available to the Soviets at the time.

1. Was Soviet intelligence at the time as good as yours is now? Speficially, did the 5th Guard Tank Army's staff have maps, enemy ob, and knowledge of enemy intention to the degree that we do know?

2. Would commitment of 2nd-echelon Tank Corps your example have been possible in a timely manner, given confusion, dust, etc. etc? The decision cue you suggest is a choice between defending against T or attacking LAH - was the Soviet battle intelligence system circa June 1943 capable of picking up on that fast enough for the Tank Army commander to make an informed decision?

3. As you are well aware, Soviet operational doctrine called for maximum massing of force in case of attack. What's more the idea of using one of the treasured Tank Armies in anything but an offensive role was close to anathma. Remember the flap the system gave to the idea of Katukov's 1st Guards Tank being set in a pure defensive role a few days earlier.

Now stick into the hopper the fact that this is the biggest single battle, in terms of men and machines, the Soviet high command has ever been involved in.

As I see it the Soviet command going into the battle in July 1943 had no precise precedents for a proper course of action. Almost any military will, under those circumstances, fall back on doctrine to figure out what to do. And the doctrine was shove maximum force at the chosen target, and accept the casualties.

What you are recommending is effectively an echeloned hasty defense requiring an at minimum competent battle intelligence system, fairly smooth coordination between tank and tank destroyer (gun) units in a mobile battle, and a command system confident (i.e., it was experienced enough) it could pull off a Tank Army-sized defensive/offensive action.

The solution you recommend was certainly feasable once the Red Army had hit its stride - containment of the Balaton offensive springs to mind as an "how to".

My opinion, the Red Army in July '43 was not capable of pulling off what you suggest, for reasons of experience, training, doctrine, equipment, stakes in the battle, and "mindset." It seems to me it is unreasonable to scapegoat Rotmistrov. I don't think he had the options you suggest.

[WineCape]

My opinion, the Red Army in July '43 was not capable of pulling off what you suggest, for reasons of experience, training, doctrine, equipment, stakes in the battle, and "mindset." It seems to me it is unreasonable to scapegoat Rotmistrov. I don't think he had the options you suggest.

That's my humble opinion too. Interesting discussion gentlemen.

[Zalgiris 1410]

JasonC or anyone else kind enough, could you post a linky to a good map of the relevent area of the Battle of Kursk for the 12th for me to follow precisely what JasonC has descibed as his solution, or better yet JasonC could you post an actual map to show what you are saying. Sorry if this sounds a bit much, but I'm not demanding it of you to be sure.

OTOH, while and because I'm no expert I second the question about the capapbilities of the Red Army's command and communications techniques to function up to the required level for such actions as JasonC would like to see it perform circa July 1943.

Wasn't it Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army that also charged into the waiting guns of Raus's XI Korps around Kharkov for 3 days during mid August, that is about a month later and again sufferred staggerring tank losses to the extent that it was written off as an armoured fighting formation until another refitting. Seems to me that he hadn't learn't his leason yet about what it was that he had done so wrong tactically at Prokharovka. By repeating such bad handling after the earlier result, that to me is worse than having made the mistake in the first place IMHO.

[JasonC]

The map I am looking at is on page 213 of Glantz & House "The Battle of Kursk", number 23 in his map list. I'd scan it for you but I get black-line covered gibberish - it would appear my scanner is shot. (Almost never use it, it has been sitting there for year, so not hard to believe).

[Santosdiablo]

Check the cables and reinstall the program and then check the cables again make sure you push themreal hard into the computer

And remember some scanners want you to have the cables go from computer to scanner to printer

And some want from computerto printer to scanner

And some want fromcopmuter to scanner

And from computer to printer