Recent historians on Prochorowka and the Great Patriotic War

[JasonC]

Thanks but no thanks. He can go to the library and look at the page. Or somebody else with the book and a working scanner can scan the map on page 213 and post it. I can't be bothered further to solve his desire for this map. I tried, the rest is his job.

[Zalgiris 1410]

You right Jason, I was being a little bit lazy, but since I don't have Glantz's book on Kursk I'll have to go looking for it. Actually I don't think I've ever seen a copy but anyway I'll eventually find a copy someday, hopefully soon.

I checked my own collection of Kursk related material but alas the best I've got is 2D black and white without terrain levels or features though it helped a bit. Still I need a good map though, I'm gonna have to get off my asre I guess!

Anyone got an analysis on JasonC's solution or one of their own out there, please post here, thanks. The best that I can do is to say that I believe that the Germans should have launched the attack on the Kursk Salient back in early May as orrigionally intended, jumping into it before the Russians built up and re-inforced their defences. This is more of an Operative-Strategic formulation but anyway I'm interested in what the CMers think on this also. :confused:

[Andreas]

The question of an earlier attack is also discussed by Töppel (op.cit.). He concludes that an attack in May would not have been possible, due to logistical constraints on the railway network feeding the staging area. At the time there was also a lack of heavy weapons, air support, and tanks.

In June, a whole Panzerkorps was busy fighting partisans in Operation 'Zigeunerbaron'. These forces were only back and ready on June 19th, which would therefore be the earliest possible attack.

All the best

Andreas

[Zalgiris 1410]

While I'm not entirely familiar with Toppel I did say early May, not mid-May as I think (suspect only really) such discussions / POV are based, since they mean a prepared assault. I mean a hasty mobile attack immediately just as soon as the Spring thaw set in enough to allow for the Germans to have continued from the capture of Beligorod with a jump from the mud.

AIUI the wheather and ground conditions started to seem right for or from about the 4th of May and definately fine enough by the 10th of May for this to have allowed for this to have taken place if they had of decided to do so. Well enough by this time Hoth had convinced Munstein the Operation Federicus II was not a good idea and the a Battle for and the destruction of the Kursk Salient was the decisive thing to do in order to stablize the Eastern Front enough to allow for the Germans to gain for themselves the time to rebuild a strategic reserve to deal with either the West or for another expected Red Winter offensive or both etc.

Also I have a good assesment of the logistics situation and evaluation for the interviening two month period that actually demonstrates that the Russians gain more through the waiting period than the Germans did both in total of course and relatively speaking also. And then there was the training and the defensive works the the Russians were able to carry out for two months which had exponential effects for them and the course of the Battle in July-August 43. The Russians needed the training more than the Germans did while the defensive works required the Germans to spend time on training for the full scale assault upon them. Apparently this was best and possibly only acchieved by the Raus Korps (later renamed the XI Korps to replace the orrigional lost at Stalingrad) for the whole Battle. Also the Germans still didn't manage to consentrate enough Infantry men and Divisions for the attack in July either, which partly explains why the attack from the South ended up being made with 3 Panzer Korps abreast which didn't help them either because they were not able to exploit developments while also being forced to batter away at the fortified defences etc.

This kind of attack with Panzer and Panzergrenadier Divisions in the van might have worked from a standing start in very early May OTOH IMHO, may be, at least better against the lesser defensive and probably still sludgy field works of the Russians!

The other thing to bear in mind is that the collapse of their own Oriel Salient possibly would not also have taken place simultaniously with the climax of the Battle of Kursk either...

While I'm no expert, any thoughts anyone on my arguement?

[ November 07, 2005, 07:15 AM: Message edited by: Zalgiris 1410 ]

[Andreas]

Manstein himself said that an attack in April was a non-starter, since AGC would not have been able to contribute, and AGS would not have been strong enough by itself. The early May attack was delayed after a meeting with Hitler on 4th May, at the request of Model, GOC 9.Armee, when he outlined that his army would not be able to make it through the fortification system in less than six days. This led to consideration by Hitler of further reinforcement prior to the attack to ensure a rapid progress.

According to Töppel, there were never any plans to concentrate more infantry, so the delay was not meant to bring more infantry forward.

[Zalgiris 1410]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Manstein himself said that an attack in April was a non-starter, since AGC would not have been able to contribute, and AGS would not have been strong enough by itself.

According to Töppel, there were never any plans to concentrate more infantry, so the delay was not meant to bring more infantry forward.

O.K. I'm not completely up to speed with all the debate about Kursk etc. However AIUI it was Hoth's assessment that will count here not Munstein's since he based his own appreciation on the situation on the advice of Hoth during this period, it's not for nothing that he has a reputation for being lazy and relying upon his subordinates and staff etc. I think that basically Hoth killed his earlier Fredericus II planning after their first meeting prior to this battle some time after the recapture of Beligorod.

On the subject of Infantry men, I am mainly refering to the large number of replacements for the Infantry type of units involved while OTOH there were plenty of complaints especially by senior German Officers and Stabsters in AGS about there being a lack of relieving Infantry Divisions availiable especially for both the III & XLVIII Panzer Korps on the flanks of the Schwerpunkt, the II SS Korps.