Recent historians on Prochorowka and the Great Patriotic War

[Krautman]

[This is basically a translation of parts of an article in the journal "Der Spiegel (Special)" 2/2005. Might be nothing new to most around here, though you should take a look at the Russian historians' view of the Prochorowka battle. Sorry in advance for any translation mistakes.]

Karl-Heinz Frieser, member of the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt der Bundeswehr [=MGFA; German army department of military history] has thoroughly scrutinized the German retreat in the east. To him, the war was definitively lost after the German attack froze to a halt in winter 1941. After the initial Unternehmen Barbarossa had failed and it turned out that Stalin's army was not an easy prey, the war -just like the first world war- was decided in the factories, were Stalin' organisers were superiour as well. Hitler's workers -both skilled labourers and captured slaves- produced an impressive amount of 61,700 tanks and assault guns until the end of the war, yet the Soviet armed forces could come up with 105,232. Soviet historiography has always emphasized the moral superiority of the defenders during the Great Patriotic War, thus stigmatizing those as unpatriotic dissidents who dared to ask for the price of victory.

It was not until the collapse of the system one and a half decades ago that a new generation of Russian historians began to dissect the aggrandizing legacy [hope this works in English] -carefully, in most cases, without blurring the elemental differences between a plundering war

[probably a lexical mistake here- the Germans did want to conquer; a plundering war would mean taking everything and then leaving the plundered country to itself. Yet some major German historians, most recently Götz Aly ("Hitlers Volksstaat"), classify Hitler's wars as plundering actions- the 3rd Reich was basically broke in 1939]

and a defensive war. The Soviet march to Berlin, formerly being described as a pure heroic epic, didn't have much to it that was commendable on the top leadership level [sorry, that was bumpy]. Assaults were ordered without consideration for own casualties, even in situation where they could have been avoided. The Russian historians Michail Heller and Alexander Nekritsch sum it up: "Human lives were utterly worthless in the SU".

Just like during the largest battle of the war, for the Kursk salient [...]. The most legendary encounter being the "Panzerbegegnungsschlacht" [~armor meeting engagement] at Prochorowka south-east of Kursk.

Was its outcome this "enormous triumph" which "enhanced the SU's reputation" -as Schukow's semi-official depiction, considered valid for decades, said? Or rather "careless evisceration of Soviet tank commanders" as nowadays Wjatscheslaw Krasikow, a military publicist, argues?

Frieser seconds that. The German offensive "Zitadelle" and the two Soviet counter-offensives between July 5 and August 23 1943 are "the most misconstrued conflicts of the war". Soviet historians have previously excellently "veiled the dimension of their own casualties and mistakes", especially when assessing the battle of Prochorowka.

More than 1500 tanks -700 German, 850 Soviet ones- are said to have clashed on July 12 near Prochorowka in a close-quarters-battle. The II. SS-Panzerkorps was reportedly defeated, 400 of its tanks damaged or destroyed- much of these being Tigers or Panthers. [...]

Sure enough, this engagement occured only in Soviet history books. In fact, Lt.Gen. Rotmistrow's newly formed 5th mechanized guard army , lead to the German lines almost unnoticed, suffered a vicious defeat. Rotmistrow's units attacked "one tank next to another, wave after wave" in "incomprehensible masses, racing forwards at maximum speed", as a German eyewitness reports.

But right in front of height 252,2, which they were attacking, runs [the author switches to praesens historicum here] a tank ditch at right angles to the front dug by own engineer troops. Despite the fact that it is visible on all operation maps, it has obviously simply been forgotten upon giving the assault order.

Thus, as another German witness reports, "the soviet T-34s come racing across the slope one by one, partially dashing down the slope, overturning in the tank ditch which we were positioned in front of."

Others [of the Soviet tanks] discover the single remaining bridge across the ditch, accumulate in front of it,

[like a traffic jam, I don't really know whether "accumulate" is the right word]

thus giving the two SS tank companies on the other side an opportunity to do "target practice at mobile targets". At least that is what company commander Rudolf von Ribbentrop, [son of Joachim], who for this receives the knight's cross, reports.

As Russian archives reveal nowadays, Rotmistrow loses at least 334 tanks and assault guns within 5 days of combat. 3597 of his men are dead ore missing in action. German records, on the other hand, mention only three total losses [=tank totally destroyed] for July 12 at Prochorowka.

Stalin considers having the dashing general court-martialed. But a "huggermugger cartel" (Frieser) saves him: The debacle becomes a "titanic duel" (marshal Wassilewski) and a "swansong" of the German Panzertruppe (Konjew). The legend prevails in the history books. The only true fact, however, is that Rotmistrow's men fought "heroically and undaunted by death", as the official Russian army account has it. Yet for internal use, a fact-finding commission states that "Prochorowka is an example of a badly conducted operation".

--

Greetings

Krautman

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Krautman:

a plundering war

[probably a lexical mistake here- the Germans did want to conquer; a plundering war would mean taking everything and then leaving the plundered country to itself. Yet some major German historians, most recently Götz Aly ("Hitlers Volksstaat"), classify Hitler's wars as plundering actions- the 3rd Reich was basically broke in 1939]

I think 'plunder' describes it quite well. Also check some of the detail in the plan here.

All the best

Andreas

[PzKpfwIII]

Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Krautman:

a plundering war

[probably a lexical mistake here- the Germans did want to conquer; a plundering war would mean taking everything and then leaving the plundered country to itself. Yet some major German historians, most recently Götz Aly ("Hitlers Volksstaat"), classify Hitler's wars as plundering actions- the 3rd Reich was basically broke in 1939]

I think 'plunder' describes it quite well. Also check some of the detail in the plan here.

All the best

Andreas </font>

[Krautman]

Hello!

Just quickly on the plundering war thing:

I thought i made that clear. A plundering war, as opposed to a war of conquest, would mean plundering the country by force and then leaving it. (At least that's how one of my professors defines it- opinions, thus definitions, vary) Yet Hitler wanted to conquer, making it a war of conquest by definition. Though with all the plunder, abduction, murder and torture you could imagine.

EDIT:

"To say that the war was solely for plunder, based on this definition, would seem to be inaccurate, given the plans to germanicize the conquered territories."

You are surely correct on that. A historian like Aly needs to make his stand against a dinosaur like Hans-Ulrich Wehler ("Der Führerstaat"), thus stressing that the war was FIRST AND FOREMOST a plundering war, while ALSO might've been better.

I gotta get up early tomorrow, that's why i'll leave now, but your post is surely interesting; i'll try and give a longer answer tomorrow.

Greetings + Good night,

Krautman

[ November 02, 2005, 02:02 PM: Message edited by: Krautman ]

[PzKpfwIII]

Originally posted by Krautman:

Hello,

I thought i made that clear. A plundering war, as opposed to a war of conquest, would mean plundering the country by force and then leaving it. (At least that's how one of my professors defines it- opinions vary) Yet Hitler wanted to conquer, making it a war of conquest by definition. Though with all the plunder, abduction murder and torture you could imagine.

Greetings,

Krautman

Andreas seems to be disassociating the act of plunder (technically, stealing) from the (in the case of the Germans in the USSR) associated acts of genocide, conquering territory, and germanicization. Perhaps his definition of plunder includes more than just theft. Or you and I are simply being too technical.

[Andreas]

I think that 'war of conquest' makes the whole thing sound to grand, as if it had something noble to it. Fact is that plunder played a major role (at all levels, from supplying the Wehrmacht up), and the ultimate aim (ethnic cleansing and re-population) were different from a conquest in that there was no aim of conquering the people, but only the land. In the same way that plunder is inadequate, since it does not capture the aim of not just stealing and then leaving, but stealing, killing, and staying. I prefer it though because it has nothing noble about it, and I think that is more fitting.

My guess is the original German was 'Raubzug'?

All the best

Andreas

[Krautman]

Please have a look at my new edit of my first post, if you haven't already. I'd love to, but its 11pm now! Sorry,

Krautman

[PzKpfwIII]

Originally posted by Krautman:

Please have a look at my new edit of my first post, if you haven't already. I'd love to, but its 11pm now! Sorry,

Krautman

Incidentally, "accumulate" is an acceptable word in this case, I think it adequately describes what is taking place.

[Krautman]

Oh, crap- i'm really tired + confused... I meant my 2nd post, and was talking of this:

Originally posted by Krautman:

"To say that the war was solely for plunder, based on this definition, would seem to be inaccurate, given the plans to germanicize the conquered territories."

You are surely correct on that. A historian like Aly needs to make his stand against a dinosaur like Hans-Ulrich Wehler ("Der Führerstaat"), thus stressing that the war was FIRST AND FOREMOST a plundering war, while ALSO might've been better.

I gotta get up early tomorrow, that's why i'll leave now, but your post is surely interesting; i'll try and give a longer answer tomorrow.

Greetings + Good night,

Krautman

Yea, me need sleep.

[Andreas]

con·quer P Pronunciation Key (kngkr)

v. con·quered, con·quer·ing, con·quers

v. tr.

1. To defeat or subdue by force, especially by force of arms.

2. To gain or secure control of by or as if by force of arms: scientists battling to conquer disease; a singer who conquered the operatic world.

3. To overcome or surmount by physical, mental, or moral force: I finally conquered my fear of heights. See Synonyms at defeat.

Russophile seems to be disassociating the act of conquest (technically, taking control by force) from the (in the case of the Germans in the USSR) associated acts of genocide, plunder, and germanicization. Perhaps his definition of conquest includes more than just taking control by force.

All the best

Andreas

[Andreas]

Or, we could just leave off trying to see whether anyone here is a Nazi apologist trying to soften what historically occurred, and think about better terms for the murderous, genocidal wars of aggression and plunder waged by Germany within Europe without using so many words.

All the best

Andreas

[PzKpfwIII]

Originally posted by Andreas:

con·quer P Pronunciation Key (kngkr)

v. con·quered, con·quer·ing, con·quers

v. tr.

1. To defeat or subdue by force, especially by force of arms.

2. To gain or secure control of by or as if by force of arms: scientists battling to conquer disease; a singer who conquered the operatic world.

3. To overcome or surmount by physical, mental, or moral force: I finally conquered my fear of heights. See Synonyms at defeat.

Russophile seems to be disassociating the act of conquest (technically, taking control by force) from the (in the case of the Germans in the USSR) associated acts of genocide, plunder, and germanicization. Perhaps his definition of conquest includes more than just taking control by force.

All the best

Andreas

I never gave my definition of "conquer" so am at a loss to understand why you felt the need to post this. The original poster felt that "plunder" was inadequate to the task of describing completely German strategic plans for, and military operations in, the Soviet Union. You first posted that you felt it was adequate for that task, then after a brief discussion, posted that you felt it actually inadequate but was the most apt word you could think of based on your interpretation of possible words and the amount of "nobility" those words suggested.

I happen to feel that - like you and Krautman - "plunder" is inadequate to singly describe what the Germans had planned. I also feel "conquer" is inadequate for that task, but then, I'm not disposed to find a single word to describe those plans and actions and feel it would be foolish to try.

I also feel this entire line of conversation is irrelevant to the Battle of Kursk, for what it is worth.

Apologies if I offended you in some way by questioning your understanding of the word plunder; you managed to clear up your thinking quite nicely with the next post. Your questioning of my own understanding of "conquer" was unnecessary, especially since I've still not given my definition, nor do I feel it particularly germaine either to the main post, or to this side-discussion.

Can you honestly say you do?

Originally posted by Andreas:

Or, we could just leave off trying to see whether anyone here is a Nazi apologist trying to soften what historically occurred, and think about better terms for the murderous, genocidal wars of aggression and plunder waged by Germany within Europe without using so many words.

All the best

Andreas

As I just stated, I think if one is inclined to try and describe it, more words would be considerably better than less words.

But not in a thread about Kursk. *L*

I hope this wasn't an invitation to Nazi-apologists, incidentally. Or an admission?

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Russophile:

[i never gave my definition of "conquer" so am at a loss to understand why you felt the need to post this. The original poster felt that "plunder" was inadequate to the task of describing completely German strategic plans for, and military operations in, the Soviet Union. You first posted that you felt it was adequate for that task, then after a brief discussion, posted that you felt it actually inadequate but was the most apt word you could think of based on your interpretation of possible words and the amount of "nobility" those words suggested.

I happen to feel that - like you and Krautman - "plunder" is inadequate to singly describe what the Germans had planned. I also feel "conquer" is inadequate for that task, but then, I'm not disposed to find a single word to describe those plans and actions and feel it would be foolish to try.

Krautman said the Germans 'did want to conquer' - that is what I reacted to. I think a war of plunder is a better way to describe it than a war of conquest, for reasons outlined above. I fully agree with you that finding a single term is probably not possible. At the same time, journalists (maybe particularly so in German) seem to feel the need to go for either 'Eroberungsfeldzug', 'Angriffskrieg', or maybe more often now 'Raubzug'. None of which is an adequate description.

I also feel this entire line of conversation is irrelevant to the Battle of Kursk, for what it is worth.

That goes without saying.

Apologies if I offended you in some way by questioning your understanding of the word plunder; you managed to clear up your thinking quite nicely with the next post. Your questioning of my own understanding of "conquer" was unnecessary, especially since I've still not given my definition, nor do I feel it particularly germaine either to the main post, or to this side-discussion.

That was done with tongue firmly in cheek, just to put on the record that your assumption was wrong.

Can you honestly say you do?

I think so, based on Krautman's questioning of the term 'plunder'. I get at least antsy (to use a JonS term) when the whole sordid undertaking is dressed up nicely by using kind language, even unintentionally, as Krautman has done.

As I just stated, I think if one is inclined to try and describe it, more words would be considerably better than less words.

Maybe, but less words, even if less accurate, have a tendency to win out over more, when it comes to describe things and events. Call it a linguistic version of Ockhjam's Razor.

But not in a thread about Kursk. *L*

Why not?

[Runyan99]

I came for a discussion on Kursk, and got a boring argument about the word 'plunder'.

Interesting to consider the possibility that the battle around Prokorovka was only big Soviet propaganda lie. Not really suprising, but interesting still.

Back to the point of the post, if 400 German tanks weren't knocked out around Prokorovka, it would be interesting to go through the German records and try to figure out when they actually were knocked out, and by what.

My guess is slow death by AT guns in successive defensive belts, but I don't know a great deal about Kursk.

[Andreas]

Up to you to bring the discussion back on topic instead of complaining.

Since the great work of Roman Töpppel 'Kursk - Mythen und Legenden einer Schlacht' (MSc thesis at Dresden University, available only in German directly from the author) the total German losses are known with some certainty for Prokhorovka, and with lesser but reasonable certainty for the Soviets. I believe I have previously quoted this on this forum.

Suffice to say they were nowhere near 400 for the Germans and probably also much less for the Soviets at Prokhorovka. In fact, they were nowhere near 400 for the total German offensive phase. TWOs (total write offs) for the Germans at Prokhorovka were 3 (three - not a typo). For the Soviets TWOs are estimated ca. 200. TWOs for the German offensive phase are 248 German (150 tanks and 11 Stug in AG South, where Prokhorovka was fought), 1,749 Soviet.

For the whole eastern front July and August TWOs number 1,331 German, 8,125 Soviet. So not only did Prokhorovka not happen as Paul Schmidt, aka Carell and Rotmistrov tell us (wow, there's a surprise), in fact the epic battle of Kursk that broke the German back in the east was nothing of the sort.

What the German tanks were lost to is not possible to say from the records used, which are AG level. I suggest that is another research project that someone can get a first degree on.

Do a search so that when you come to have a discussion about Kursk, you are at least prepared. *

All the best

Andreas

* In fairness, I did not post it in this much detail before.

[Andreas]

As additional information - the 3 TWOs of Prokhorovka include only LSSAH and DR divisions of II.SS-PzKp. SS-T was not involved directly in Prokhorovka according to Töppel.

What all this has to do with plunder is beyond me.

All the best

Andreas

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Krautman:

Karl-Heinz Frieser, member of the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt der Bundeswehr [=MGFA; German army department of military history] has thoroughly scrutinized the German retreat in the east. To him, the war was definitively lost after the German attack froze to a halt in winter 1941. After the initial Unternehmen Barbarossa had failed and it turned out that Stalin's army was not an easy prey, the war -just like the first world war- was decided in the factories, were Stalin' organisers were superiour as well.

The Soviet march to Berlin, formerly being described as a pure heroic epic, didn't have much to it that was commendable on the top leadership level [sorry, that was bumpy]. Assaults were ordered without consideration for own casualties, even in situation where they could have been avoided. The Russian historians Michail Heller and Alexander Nekritsch sum it up: "Human lives were utterly worthless in the SU".

While I have a lot of time for Colonel Frieser (who is not a mere member of the MGFA but the head of the WW2 section, and author of the formidable 'Blitzkrieg-Legende' which is now available in English at the USNI), I don't agree with this reduction, and I can only hope that it is due to journalistic license with a more comprehensive analysis of what Col. Frieser originally wrote.

It is quite clear that material superiority by itself did not help battlefield success. Col. Frieser has demonstrated that himself in his analysis of Fall Gelb in 'Blitzkrieg Legende'. Other examples of this abound, e.g. in Africa 1940 (UK/Italy), or Barbarossa. The contribution of high command in Soviet successes after 1943 is clearly immense, and very commendable. The organisation of strategic offensive operations throughout the summer of 1944 shows that quite clearly.

All the best

Andreas

[Krautman]

Probably I didn't get your message, but you obviously twisted the words in my mouth. In case anyone makes me a Nazi apologist for the reason of argueing the attack on the SU was a war of conquest (invading army moves in and stays) as opposed to a plundering war (invading army moves in, plunders, and leaves): The two definitions are not mine in origin, and both of them (intentionally) do not say anything about how the native populace was treated. I did not mention the genocide in an article concerning Kursk because any sane person already knows it to be a historical fact. I know in a forum like this you have to be aware of possible Nazi-friendly posters, but this is turning out like a witch hunt.

If someone would accuse me of having sexual relationships with sheep or so, I wouldn't even take the time and answer. But alluding to me as a Nazi apologist is rude to say the least. That really hurts.

Krautman

[ November 03, 2005, 04:29 AM: Message edited by: Krautman ]

[DEY]

I don't know how well know this article is but for those few that may have not seen it before.

http://historynet.com/wwii/blkursk/

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Krautman:

Probably I didn't get your message, but you obviously twisted the words in my mouth.

You did not get my message. I was just pointing out that war of conquest seems not a fitting term to me. Using it does not make you a Nazi apologist however, and I have no reason to believe you are one, or indeed any intention to call you one.

That term I used because it was how I read Russophile's comment on my willingness to use the term plunder (along the lines of 'He is willing to just talk about the plunder and ignore the genocide). Had nothing to do with you or what you wrote, and I apologise for the misunderstanding.

All the best

Andreas

[Andreas]

Originally posted by DEY:

I don't know how well know this article is but for those few that may have not seen it before.

http://historynet.com/wwii/blkursk/

With apologies to Mr. Nipe, but his conclusion is rubbish, and his view that sending armoured reserves to the Mius was 'misuse'is just nonsense. He also ignores the existence of the Steppe Front, and the fact that the break-in in the north had already failed, and that there the front around Orel was collapsing.

Discussion on Myths of Kursk on AHF

All the best

Andreas

[JasonC]

Quoting TWOs as 3 at Prok. is completely misleading. German repair accounting practices are every bit as fanciful as Russian propaganda.

Runners in 1SS declined 17 over two days, with no report on the evening of the fight itself. Runners in 3SS on its left flank, facing 5th Guards units, had its runners decline by 45. As some were continually coming out of repair and those are net draw-downs, the number sent to the shops is higher.

After it, the entire corps had 4 operational Tigers, 64 operational StuG, 65 operational Panzer IV long, and 11 operational T-34. There were 80 some lesser Panzers not dangerous to a T-34 at range. All other corps had already ceased attacking.

So the issue was, can less than 150 superior AFVs, essentially none of them "uber", just L48 with 80mm fronts, attack an entire reserve army group and expect operational results? And the answer is so obviously "noooo..." that even famously stubborn Germans noticed.

Kursk failed because tactical concentration of armor is sufficiently countered by systematic use of large reserves, layered in depth and slid in front of those concentrations to remove all local odds. It failed in the north first, then in the south. The south failed from the flanks inward, as the attack was pinched off. The last part to fail was the center of the southern attempt, as was natural - one side had to fail first and pinching in means the center prong will generally be the last still working.

An failed attack by two armies, employing 5 panzer corps and another breakthrough corps topped off with as many assault guns as a panzer corps, all at full strength, was not going to succeed with 1/12 that force in one narrow sector. Because it was the last stopped and therefore the high water mark of the last serious German attempt at operational attack in the east, it has been made a focal point of the whole battle, sometimes of the whole war.

But the new information that day that led the Germans to break off the last prong still attacking, was not the outcome of that day's tactical fight. It was the existence of an entire reserve army group on the Russian side, previously uncommitted. Which showed up at Prok in the form of 5th Tank Army, getting rid of the local superiority in armor the Germans had had up to that point, at their (dwindling) chosen points of attack.

It wasn't even the last German tactical attacks at Kursk - those continued for a few more days. But it was the place where the last force that had been on the tactical offensive continually since the start of the operation, went over to the tactical defense. It thus represented the loss of overall initiative.

The north had failed because Russian reserves from the front line army group successfully halted the attack, yielding expensive statemate. And because the Russians had a large scale riposte ready, planned, and then delivered, in the form of their counterattack opposite Orel. This diverted the 2nd line Panzer corps in the north to a defensive role before it was actually committed. It was waiting for frontage - the north tried a column rather than line attack formation for the armor -and about to enter combat when the Orel offensive hit.

That failure meant the reserve Russian army group was available for the southern front, exclusively. At the time of Prok, the reserves of the front line army group in the south were basically exhausted. It needed the help. The Russian success in the north and the start of the Orel attack, meant that help was available and could come en masse rather than piecemeal.

The force the Russians had, fresh, to throw into the fight at that point, was numerically about as strong as the whole German attack force. And it only had to deal with the southern portion, and with the center portion of that. (A little of the right side of the left wing, too, with help from front line forces still effective).

Pretending that fanciful "when do we give up on this chassis" accounting by German tank mechanics are a more reliable guide to the outcome of events of that magnitude, than the actual narrative of the events themselves; that counts of tanks in the 2 or 3 digits matter compared to failure of entire panzer corps or attacks by entire army groups, is pretending.

Nobody can possibly believe such things. The German commanders at the time did not believe such things. They knew Kursk was a defeat of epic proportions and that it probably meant they would lose the war. It was left to propagandists at the time, and especially to revisionist historians pouring over accounting forms long after the fact to pretend it was some kind of victory. The responsible commanders knew better.

So does everyone here. So why is this line continually re-peddled, when it is transparently nonsense of the same (lack of) quality as Soviet era propaganda? Some of us diagnosis nationalist sympathies at the most charitable, and readily detect much worse, because it is the natural explanation for such stubborness. The Germans lost the battle of Kursk. No amount of spin will ever change that fact. So give it up already.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Quoting TWOs as 3 at Prok. is completely misleading. German repair accounting practices are every bit as fanciful as Russian propaganda.

Probably still closer to the truth than Carell/Schmidt or Rotmistrov.

Just to make that clear, Töppel also sees Kursk as a defeat on the battlefield, not as a defeat in the Wolfschanze, i.e. a battle that could have been won if Hitler had kept his nerve or not 'misused' reserves. So while he is understating the effect of the battle by restricting the analysis to TWOs, he is not one of those peddling the line that Kursk was a lost victory.

All the best

Andreas

[Andreas]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Runners in 3SS on its left flank, facing 5th Guards units, had its runners decline by 45. As some were continually coming out of repair and those are net draw-downs, the number sent to the shops is higher.

After it, the entire corps had 4 operational Tigers, 64 operational StuG, 65 operational Panzer IV long, and 11 operational T-34. There were 80 some lesser Panzers not dangerous to a T-34 at range. All other corps had already ceased attacking.

Just noted this.

As I stated above, 3rd SS (SS-T) is not included by Töppel in the 3 TWO count, since they were not fighting directly at Prokhorovka. Neither are other Korps units not present on that battlefield. Only LSSAH and DR (1st, 2nd SS) are included. The others would be included in the 248 TWO count for the whole offensive though.

All the best

Andreas

[George MC]

I've been following this with interest. the article by george Nipe is of inreest as it is a summary of the argument he presents in "Decision In The Ukraine Summer 1943". In this he argues, as the above link states, that German armoured losses at Prokhorovka were nowhere near as great as has generally been made and cites new evidence of this.

I've a scenario, available below, called "Born Again At Prokhorovka" which covers the actual action where the Soviets charged straight into an AT ditch. As an aside there is a photo in the book "The SS Panzer Artillery Regiment 1..." which shows a T34 charging past the German battery positioned by the AT ditch.

Cheers fur noo

George Mc

edited;

to say I agree with you Andreas that casualties aside the Soviets still had huge reserves waiting. Even if the Germans decided to continue with Citadelle it would only have brought about arguably a more decisive outcome with the German forces mired deep in a Soviet defensive layer beign attacked by more armoured units. Nipe's conclusions may be wrong, but the figures he present do argue the case the action at Prkohorovka though immense was not the death nell for the German panzer forces engaged as is commonly believed.

[ November 03, 2005, 06:53 AM: Message edited by: George Mc ]