Greatest Commander of all time?

[HeinzBaby]

Dowding, Air Chief Marshall Sir Hugh.

If anyone changed the course of modern History by a single Individual Dowding must be up there.

Organising the air umbrella over Dunkirk with the RN so 330,000 evacuated Troops would fight another day - Middle East/FarEast (big dumb ar$ed blunder there for Hitler/Goering).

With Park during BoB, a real stategist, realising the Royal Air Force had to only survive not win it...and got no thanks for any of it.

Failing there, Hitler looked East.

...come to think of it no other Air Marshall 'won' an air campaign, not even Spatz or Harris..

..and yep, I'm a fanbois of WoV's BoB2, got to love the Spit 1a

[Krautman]

Originally posted by Philippe:

Jochen Bleicken ? If you appeal to authority (Classical Trope # 227 you have to make it to someone other people have heard of, so that they can take your authority seriously, or not, as the case may be.

You would have been much better off appealing to Theordore Mommsen. Except that nobody has heard of him, either.

Whether I have "authority" or not does not matter, because it is not my personal ideas I'm presenting, but someone else's. Citing sources is always good- would you disagree with JC without providing sources, as he does in most of his history-related posts?

If he cites Jentz or Glantz, that tells me nothing, because I've never read anything they wrote. But I'm happy whenever someone cites Jentz or Glantz- it shows the poster has read a respected historical work I could, if I wanted, check for the poster's interpretation. Just as you could go and get a Bleicken book.

Well, since you mentioned Theodor Mommsen: Jochen Bleicken is in contemporary Germany's ancient history almost what Theodor Mommsen had been (most respected writer of benchmark works read by all students of the subject), except for that he didn't win a Nobel price in literature. I didn't want to mention this, just wanted to give sources - I don't expect non-Germans to know either one, just as I wouldn't know e.g. which US historian is considered most important over there.

Basically, you completely agree with me and Bleicken in your post, and you obviously read a few books, so that tells me he isn't that bad.

Originally posted by Philippe:

And a damned good writer. The Gallic Wars is a masterpiece of propaganda and disinformation, and done all the more brilliantly because almost everything in it is probably true. It had to be, because back then everybody knew the facts, so he couldn't lie. But he could rearrange them to suit his purposes. What's astonishing is that even to this day most people swallow his presentation of the sequence of facts hook, line, and sinker and don't ask questions (probably because they're second year students and struggling with the Latin). If you read the entire text you'll notice that the embarassing political stuff is all in there, just scattered throughout later parts of the account so as not to call too much attention to itself. He had a daunting task -- explaining why he had invaded someone else's country and attacked an ally without provocation, and he manages to make it sound like self defense.

On the problem telling propaganda from truth in the Commentarii: Since there is no any other independent report on what happened in Gallia, not only those second-year latin students you mentioned have problems. Surely, he was brilliant as a propagandist, but his "daunting task" was made slightly easier by the facts that

a) there was no other report on Gallia than his available in Rome

the Romans were terribly afraid of Germans

c) the Senate had no clue of Gallia's geography and

d) did not know that the Rhine wasn't really dividing Germans from Gallii (Gallians?).

Originally posted by Philippe:

And his writing style, by the way, is unique, original, and astonishingly good. He may not have been Rome's greatest orator, but he was certainly Rome's smartest writer.

I don't study latin like you, but I'm currently translating de re publica as a hobby. Compared to the parts of the Commentarii I did before, Cicero is better by far. Caesar's language is clear and simple, but (or: thus) rather boring, don't you agree?

Greetings

Krautman

[Erik Springelkamp]

When we come down to 'decent' I would like to add Maurits of Oranje-Nassau and his brother Willem Frederik, for their 'scientific' operations and the first steps towards the introduction of fire-based linear infantry tactics, resulting in the establishment of a stable new republic in Europe.

[Erik Springelkamp]

And at sea Michiel Adriaenszoon de Ruijter successfully fought the combined French and Brittish fleets.

He established the tactics of large scale fighting in line that would dominate the sea-battles untill well after Napoleon.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by HeinzBaby:

Dowding, Air Chief Marshall Sir Hugh.

If anyone changed the course of modern History by a single Individual Dowding must be up there.

[snips]

Sir Hugh Caswell Tremenheere Dowding is certainly a name to conjour with, but I'd like to put in a nomination for Keith Park as the greatest air commander of all time. Not only did he lead 11 Group, which bore the brunt of the Battle of Britain, he then went on to lead the air defence of Malta, GC.

All the best,

John.

[David Chapuis]

Originally posted by Ardem:

BAH George washington,

Washington has to at least get a nod for relinquishing the sword.

[Wisbech_lad]

Though Asoka did the whole relinquishing sword thing too... (and conquered most of India beforehand)

[Carl Puppchen]

It is interesting -- this thread says greatest commander of all time. That means that it covers more than just tactical prowess, or how many battles won / lost. It also covers the LEGACY that the commander left behind.

George Washington ably led his men throughout even when the mood was dark and it seemed that there was little chance of success. His leadership was very strong, and this is a key element of command.

Another key element of command was political - clearly Washington left behind a democratic system of government when most of the rest here were despots that left behind little more than rape, pillage and destruction.

Also interesting to compare GIAP to Washington - I do think that GIAP was a great commander, he led the fight against foreign occupation of his country, and as occupier we were pretty much following in the footsteps of the French, unfortunately. In the end, however, GIAP will be a footnote as a commander, since Vietnam will just become another eastern mercantile state, they certainly aren't going to be communist forever.

Also interesting on this thread is the apparent lack of judgement from a moral perspective on these commanders. It is well known that the Mongols were brutal conquerers, as well as many of the rest, killing or enslaving their enemies and all non-combatants in their path. I guess that doesn't make someone a "bad" commander? Not my opinion.

Is the best judgement of a commander how effective a killing machine they were?

Certainly when farsightedness is linked in then Churchill, who was always way ahead of his people in fighting fascism, leaps to the top of the pack, as well, despite clearly having many military errors under his belt.

[Sergei]

Originally posted by Carl Puppchen:

Also interesting on this thread is the apparent lack of judgement from a moral perspective on these commanders.

Washington was a slaver, Churchill ruthless imperialist, so from moral perspective they don't rate too high either.

[Other Means]

Originally posted by David Chapuis:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Ardem:

BAH George washington,

Washington has to at least get a nod for relinquishing the sword. </font>

[Carl Puppchen]

Really... you think that judged against the other commanders on this list Churchill and Washington are in the mire to the same degree as the others. Who has cleaner hands than these 2 on the list?

[Sergei]

Originally posted by Carl Puppchen:

Really... you think that judged against the other commanders on this list Churchill and Washington are in the mire to the same degree as the others. Who has cleaner hands than these 2 on the list?

It's simpler than that. Either you abuse others, or you don't.

Besides, I already am on the list, and I certainly am both a better commander and morally superior than either of your nominees.

[Count D'Ten]

Let's try another tack. What commanders do you emulate? (Or if you were an actor, who would your peers type cast you as?)

I like to model on Belisarius, Tilly, Soult, or Bradley myself. Good mechanics, working with what they had.

And I rather liked what little I've read of Pavlov in WWII, it's just that you didn't get a second chance in that game.

But my opponents usually say I act more like Christian of Anhalt or the ACW's Pope. (Their jealousy knows no bounds).

[JasonC]

Krautman - I find general officers more credible judges of great captains than general historians, with specifically military historians in between. General historians are frequently judging by impressive externals without entering into the actual logic of strategy. If you want to understand some of Caesar's drawbacks as a strategist, as well as his undeniable strong points, read JFC Fuller's book on him.

Some examples - why land in Egypt with a few men and get besieged right away? Why the sideshow in the east before pursuing the senate's army after the death of Pompey? Why the unsupported landing in Africa followed by a desperate scramble for reinforcements after the Numidians come up? Audacity was his long suit, logical exploitation let alone preparation were not.

As for his mercy, some Gauls would quibble over it. Fuller's diagnosis is that he knew how to use mercy as a matter of policy in civil war, certainly a great asset. But he was personally capable of as cold blooded massacre as you please, and guilty of it on more than one occasion. Also, he may have pursued the opposite to a fault in the civil context - he was after all murdered by men he left in authority after defeating them.

[Grisha]

The problem with Caesar is that he, like many other candidates for this title, were also political leaders. Thus, they not only set strategic military direction, they also determined over-riding political aims. There are many times when military action is a bad idea politically. In the global political arena, intent, or lack thereof, is more important than pure military success. This was something the Prussians/Germans always had trouble with, too.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Count D'Ten:

[snips]

I like to model on Belisarius,

[snips]

Belisarius is a good choice.

I'm just waiting for someone to say "Narses, now, there was a commander who had balls..."

All the best,

John.

[Philippe]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Count D'Ten:

[snips]

I like to model on Belisarius,

[snips]

Belisarius is a good choice.

I'm just waiting for someone to say "Narses, now, there was a commander who had balls..."

All the best,

John. </font>

[JasonC]

As for the "who do you emulate" question, for me the answer is Blucher and Grant. You know, those artless straight ahead blunderers, the incarnations of stubborness and stupidity, who just happen not only to win but to smash the greatest heros in the maneuverist pantheon.

[SgtMuhammed]

Same here. My tactics are usually about as subtle as a 16lb sledge. They do tend to work though.

[Wisbech_lad]

As a political/military/cultural change agent, I would rate Ataturk higher than Washington.

The American Revolution was an evolution of many ideas already in place, and Washington was a first amongst equals - and much of the culture was in place (18th C American colonies weren't exactly tyrannical fiefdoms, there was flourishing local government, legal structures etc)

Ataturk, OTOH, not only defeated the Allies at Gallipoli, he radically changed his country, from the Ottoman Empire to Turkey. For good or ill (ethnic cleansing out the Greeks, romanising the language, destroying the power of the imams)

[Krautman]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Krautman - I find general officers more credible judges of great captains than general historians, with specifically military historians in between. General historians are frequently judging by impressive externals without entering into the actual logic of strategy.

Well, I'm not too comfortable with the term "general historian" (since such a person might have spent 10 years researching e.g. the social composition of ancient Athens), and I don't think these people judge by "impressive externals" - anyone, but not a historian - but I admit that a military historian is perhaps better at simply deciding who is a better strategist, so, you're probably correct on that one. A pure military historian, however, might be unaware of other factors.

I will admit that I'm not familiar with military history, with the exception of what CM taught me...

Originally posted by JasonC:

Some examples - why land in Egypt with a few men and get besieged right away?

You mean the landing in Alexandria, right? Well, as Caesar wrote in de Bello Civili, he relied on the psychological effects of his victory against Pompeius at Pharsalos. It was him Caesar wanted to fight in Egypt, and not the Egyptians, who anyway were, at least at the time of the landing, inclined towards the victorious Caesar. Judging from the military point of view, I can only guess, but as far as I know, battles of antiquity often weren't decided by numbers, as Caesar's experienced legions proved at Pharsalos. And if I recall J.G. Droysen's [well, not a military historian either] Alexander biography, Alexander won the battles at the river Granikos and at Gaugamela against overwhelming numbers, and later on fought his battles with an increasingly heterogeneous force, and still won against the odds. - Thus, Caesar might have relied on psychological effects and quality, instead of quantity. His involvement in Egyptian throne policy, however, was not really brilliant, there you are correct- but that doesn't make him a good or a bad strategist, just a bad politician!

Originally posted by JasonC:

Why the sideshow in the east before pursuing the senate's army after the death of Pompey?

I'm not sure on this one, but Caesar was made Dictator in 48, probably as soon as word of Pharsalos got to Rome. Many of those who previously followed Pompeius made peace with him (and benefited from the clementia Caesaris!). So why would he need to return if his political position was secure, at least for the moment? More urgent was the consolidation of Cleopatra's power, which he needed to re-establish his political credibility and his purse, and this is why he waged the Alexandrinian war. The war on Pharnakes (this is the "sideshow in the east" you mentioned, right?) was immediately necessary to defend the province Asia minor; he couldn't have gone somewhere else, I would think.

Originally posted by JasonC:

Why the unsupported landing in Africa followed by a desperate scramble for reinforcements after the Numidians come up?

He had returned to Italy to collect the necessary money for the war against the Pompeians and wanted to leave as quickly as possible, although upheaval in Rome and mutiny in Campania held him up. But after he just even restored order, he went for Africa. I would guess he feared any more time would make the Pompeians stronger, thus the unsupported landing. And, as history tells, the Numidians weren't always reliable as allies; probably (just a guess) Caesar did not expect them to fight that bravely.

Originally posted by JasonC:

Audacity was his long suit,

Yes. From a non-military point of view, his refusal of being divorced from his first wife Cornelia, Cinna's daughter [sulla himself ordered the divorce], was a first indicator of this dominating character trait- The Roman nobility were married and divorced quite frequently, thus it wouldn't have been a moral problem, but Caesar didn't like being ordered around, even as a teenager. Later, the reckless expense of money in his election campaigns was unique to him. Daring it all and knowing when one can do so- isn't that what made all great commanders/politicians/writers/musicians etc. great?

Originally posted by JasonC:

logical exploitation let alone preparation were not.

I disagree. Caesar had people doing preparatory research for him and collecting data, e.g. on political enemies. In Egypt though, he really blundered frequently.

Originally posted by JasonC:

As for his mercy, some Gauls would quibble over it. Fuller's diagnosis is that he knew how to use mercy as a matter of policy in civil war, certainly a great asset. But he was personally capable of as cold blooded massacre as you please, and guilty of it on more than one occasion.

As far as I know, you are fully correct there. The famous clementia was merely used as propaganda. Cato knew that and commited suicide before Caesar could amnesty him and make him an item of propaganda.

The Gallic wars killed ~1 million (Caesar: 1.2 m.) and enslaved another million (the whole population being estimated at approx. 10 million)

I hope this was not boring...

Greetings

Krautman

EDIT: Probably "general historian" is the generally used term for "historian primarily concerned with social and cultural history" in English. If so, I apologize.

[ November 29, 2005, 11:55 AM: Message edited by: Krautman ]

[JasonC]

Krautman - He landed in Egypt with only a modest bodyguard after he knew Pompey was already dead. That was reckless, and to recklessness he added arrogance. Which predictably had the immediate result of raising the city against him. He wound up besieged in the harbor, frantically calling for reinforcement from all over the eastern Med.

He had little reason for going, other than intriguing for money, which he undoubtedly needed but wasn't exactly unobtainable after conquering in Greece and holding Italy without challenge. If he intended that from the outset he could have arrived with the two legions he immediately sent for, and the navy he scrounged for the emergency. He didn't because it was all quite unplanned. He simply walked in and hoped the country would bow, and when it didn't that he would see what to do and master the situation. He nearly got killed as a result. A completely unforced error.

Fuller is scathing on the matter - "The conflict between him and Pompey was at an end; the purpose for which he had come to Egypt was accomplished. All that now remained to be done was to send a friendly envoy ashore, revictual his ships, stand out for Italy, and bring the civil war to its conclusion. Instead, he did nothing of the sort, and decided to land his minute army and impose his will on the Egyptians!"

After describing how he alienated the populace and got himself beseiged, and his scramble for reinforcements to save him from his previous folly (what if a single one of those he called had been ambitious, or bought?), Fuller quips "these frantic calls for aid are a just measure of his strategic blunder". He makes demands and asks the Egyptians for money, while besieged, and naturally is treated as a buffoon.

Nor is Fuller alone in the estimation. Suetonius calls it "a war of great difficulty, convenient neither to time nor to place, (with the enemy well supplied) while Caesar himself was without supplies of any kind and ill-prepared." Mommsen notes that at times it brought Caesar "a hair's breadth from destruction".

He had just dropped everything to pursue Pompey to make his previous victory complete and thereby end the civil war as rapidly as possible. That was rational pursuit. But its continuation as rational pursuit would have been to prevent any rallying of a senatorial army in the west, in North Africa. Which he could readily have done, staging to Italy and gathering troops for it. He was in every way better prepared than his enemies at that moment. He not only created a new enemy unnecessarily, starting the fight against them on the worst terms, but he also let the old set get away and have time to regroup.

It is silly to say he needed to conquer Egypt next when he could readily have done whatever political maneuvering he wanted to there, after disposing of the scattered remnants of the senate's forces. North Africa was the last place they had any real force. They had just lost their general, and before it their main army. He might have arrived hot on the heels of the announcement of Pompey's death.

Instead he gave them over a year (six months of it during the Egypt fight - longer than the campaign in Greece against Pompey himself) to get ready and gather both forces and allies. The "move order" is flat wrong, and the estimate of the task incorrect, empirically.

To win he called in the army from Syria - he would not have defeated the Egyptians without it. That helped denude Asia minor and gave Pharnaces the opening he exploited. (2 of the 3 legions for Asia minor proper had also been sent to Egypt). Pharnaces negotiated when Caesar arrived, knowing he needed to be elsewhere - indeed, should have been long since. Caesar might have garrisoned the province adequately and left it at that, but instead went clear to Armenia chasing him.

If Pharnaces had been a better general and had denied battle while retreating east and north, Caesar would have been in a pretty spot. Pursue forever and the senate raises Africa. Leave him to go west and he comes back. Instead Pharnaces was foolish enough to give him the battle he needed, and predictably lost it.

All of it following on the Egypt adventure and the lack of preparation, the schoolboy lark way it was entered into and initially conducted. By the time he got back to Italy the army with Antony was near mutiny, having not been paid despite the supposedly so necessary treasures of Egypt. Meanwhile the Senate's force had grown as large as Pompey's had been (if not as well led), plus a strong ally in the Numidians - 14 legions and 20,000 cavalry, created by delay.

So has he learned his lesson? Does he come prepared this time, preceded by scouts and spies telling him the real state of play, with a fleet sufficient to supply a serious army for an African landing against so large a force? No, this is Caesar, not George Marshall. He shows up with one legion of recent Italian recruits, 500 Roman cavalry, and his precious self. And he gets beseiged again.

When most of his army arrives he still has no counter to the Numidian cavalry and narrowly escaped destruction every time he shifts his camp. He gets out of it by digging, sending for missile troops from Italy and the fleet, recruits local auxiliaries etc.

So why didn't any of these measures occur to him before he landed? Because preparation was not his long suit. He improvised brilliancies on the spot, to get himself out of scrapes his cockiness pitch him into headlong, in the first place.

Any competent general could have won the remainder of the civil war after the defeat and death of Pompey. Only someone as brilliant as Caesar had the chance to lose it again four more times, without actually losing any of those four.

[Krautman]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Krautman - He landed in Egypt with only a modest bodyguard after he knew Pompey was already dead. That was reckless, and to recklessness he added arrogance. Which predictably had the immediate result of raising the city against him. He wound up besieged in the harbor, frantically calling for reinforcement from all over the eastern Med.

Well, I dare to disagree.

Caesar did not know that Pompeius was dead until he landed in Alexandria. But anyway, he was the victor of Pharsalos, so he probably didn't expect any serious opposition there. What was reckless was not the fact that he landed there, but rather his involvement in Egyptian throne policy (Ptolemaios was almost fully accepted before Caesar arrived and supported Cleopatra) and his demand for a monetary contribution and long forgotten debts from Egypt, which had supported Pompeius in the previous war. You are certainly correct about the arrogance Caesar displayed; I guess you were alluding to his march into Alexandria with the lictores in front.

But again, political blunders, and not military ones, started his problems there. From what little I know of the actual fighting, Caesar, although in some dire situation, did quite well; he managed to keep his drinking water clean, which his enemies tried to poison, and took and held Pharos until Mithradates arrived, then took Ptolemaios' stronghold. Even though the whole situation was born from various blunders, Caesar was able to solve it pretty nicely, from his perspective.

I furthermore disagree with your repeated assertion that Caesar was not into preparatory planning. You keep mentioning his faulty policy in Egypt to support this, and you also quoted Fuller.

All historians agree that what Caesar did in Egypt was probably unnecessary due to Pompeius' death, and astonishingly fault-ridden. In my previous post I emphasized that.

But you can't regard his performance in Egypt as a general indicator of what Caesar's policy and his whole character was like, it was the contrary. As I said, Caesar, while surely being audacious like few others, was known for his meticulous research and had a staff collecting all kinds of info.

Do you think he could have conquered Gallia without the best possible preparations? The way he exploited the oppositions within the Gallic tribes, the way he used Diviciacus, the way he made the Helvetii give him enough time to prepare his defences... What he was excellent at was logistics and planning; marching and living through the winter with an army wasn't easy in antiquity, considering the low agricultural production.

Caesar was much better at that kind of preparation and planning than his numerally superiour Gallic foes, who were familiar with the climate and the terrain. Do you think Caesar's initial withdrawal from Alesia was due to a loss of determination from Caesar's side? He just knew when it would become difficult to provide food for his troops.

I'm sure that Phillippe could go into more detail here, but I anyway guess he would second that Caesar won the Gallic wars mostly due to superiour planning + logistics. Apart from military issues, his whole cursus honorum was a masterpiece of planning and preparation.

You know, this is what I was alluding to when I said a military historian might be unaware of the larger picture. Fuller, judging from your posts, saw an overly audacious Caesar blundered with his military operations in Egypt -which I'm sure he is correct with- but then concluded that Caesar was a man who did not plan ahead in general. This is, in my opinion, a wrong conclusion, if you have a look at the rest of what Caesar did and how he did it.

I guess a better example of a military commander who is talented but overly audacious and does not plan ahead too well is Rommel; but he had his Westphal.

Do you remember the "Luftwaffe Infantry" thread? You claimed Goering accumulated more + more influence in the course of the war. I would guess you read this in a book focused on military history, or drew that conclusion yourself, after reading military history about how his Luftwaffe pilots admired, even adored, Goering up to the end of the war (I recall these air-to-air-kamikaze-squadrons).

But then, outside the military, and therefore perhaps outside of the focus of some military historians (sorry, no offense intended), there was another Goering. He was ridiculed by the populace (Hermann Meyer comes to mind), became increasingly infantile with his rituals and ways of dressing, was informed about Unternehmen Barbarossa comparatively late, took more and more morphine, and didn't even visit military meetings anymore. His bragging that the Luftwaffe would smash the Tommies at Dunkirk and easily support the 6th army was merely a sign of his increasing alienation from Hitler and the real political power.

Thus, drawing a conclusion by transferring military matters into general ones is perilous. In my opinion, and judging from my knowledge, you are wrong about the non-military aspects on both Goering and Caesar.

Again- no offense intended. I think this discussion is interesting, and I wish Phillippe would drop in again, his knowledge of the Commentarii could prove useful in the question whether Caesar conducted intense planning or not. Furthermore, even though I criticised military history in a way, I don't think its not a serious discipline. Amazon is currently packing "Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg", Band 4 (Germany in WWII, on the invasion in the east) for me- my entry into military history.

Greetings

Krautman

[JasonC]

Generals are responsible for their assessment of the correlation of forces, for tailoring means to the ends they envision, to planning ahead for contingencies rather than reacting to them as they arise. Caesar was frequently embarrassed on these counts. It was simply not part of what he knew about generalship.

Landing in Egypt with a tiny force was not just a political blunder, it was a military error of the first magnitude. The unnecessary second war was a mistake as large as turning to Russia before Britain was dealt with, with less excuse because the senate forces were wide open to being finished off rapidly. If he did intend it, then the force was hopelessly inadequate for the task. He needed immediate reinforcement, barely survived (in part due to poor "play" on the part of his opponents), exposed himself recklessly to any underling backstab at the critical juncture (e.g. if his Syrian force had negotiated rather than simply marched to his aid). He opened Asia minor to invasion.

It is quite simple - he nearly lost the civil war in Alexandria proper, later in the pitched battle that decided that campaign, later risked loss to Pharnaces in another major battle, and last nearly lost to the Numidians after landing in North Africa. And all four occasions(or five if you include the risks associated with his army's near mutiny when he got back from Asia) of possible defeat could have been avoided by the simpler, more direct, entirely sounder "move" of heading to North Africa via Italy immediately after learning of Pompey's death. It was an unforced error with dire consequences, retrieved with great difficulty by repeated brilliancies, all of which only got him back to what he could have had right after beating Pompey. Nothing you say can make that merely political, or good generalship, or a sign of making proper preparations before undertaking a military campaign.

Nor is it an isolated case. Audacity was Caesar's trademark and this was its downside - it could and did lead to unforced errors and failures of preparation. It was not calculated, it was a character trait. It had undeniable benefits in other cases but Caesar did not deploy it strategically and refrain when it was not called for, he simply always deployed it.

His first war in Gaul was spur of the moment and without a plan for its general conquest, which he was sucked into. His march into Italy was brilliant because of his political position at the time, but also because Pompey did not trust his troops' loyalty and fled before him. His crossing the Adriatic in winter with half his force, into the teeth of Pompey's army and superior navy, was audacious as all get out, but also nearly failed on several occasions, saved by underlings or enemy mistakes.

Try to imagine George Marshall approaching the invasion of western Europe in the spirit Caesar approached the invasion of Greece, or Egypt, or North Africa. And the contrast is immediately apparent. He did not do prep, he plunged in and worked out some patchwork solution to the resulting mess when he didn't catch the enemy with their pants down.

As for Goering, I am sure Himmler and other rivals were energetic in their slander and certainly the man himself was enough of a nutjob to merit most of it. But he did amass manpower, institutional responsibilities, technical means, wealth, etc, right through the war despite all this. Nowhere did I say he deserved a particle of it or use it well - on the contrary, I have explicitly called the diversion of resources from the army to Luftwaffe ground forces a mistake. Only the FJ got anything like full use out of its inputs. The tension between Goering's four year plan fiefdom and Speer's was not productive on the economic side, and Speer's part was far better run. On the police side, his interior ministry types were out and out goons, but so were their SS rivals.

But he had all of them. Using them poorly did not mean he did not have power, it meant he didn't make much of it. That was part of the political design of the regime, which allowed the capos to accumulate resources and compete with each other, leaving Hitler as mediator in their infighting.

[Andrew H.]

Originally posted by Philippe:

[snip] And it's hard to imagine Goethe writing Wallenstein [snip]

No more difficult than imagining Fitzgerald writing "A Farewell to Arms."