Where are my Russian masses?

[chashm]

I am currently reading "Fighting in Hell, the German Ordeal on the East Front" An excellant book, very informative. It got me wondering though, where are the masses of Soviet troops that are constantly refered to in the book.

I am playing a couple of QB's and it gives a differential of troop numbers based on the role (eg: defender/attacker, Assault/probe/ME), but it seems nowhere as numorous for the Reds as the book seems to indicate, or any book I have read on the issue for that matter.

Is this in order to maintain a playbalance? Is it a performance related issue? (too many troops on the board would slow things down). Are the scenarios balanced to reflect real OB's or to promote a fair game?

Just curious

[Andreas]

'Fighting in hell' is just slightly more realistic than Grimm's fairy-tales when it comes to assessing Soviet performance. It is the result of Marshall's history project, IIRC. In this project, German generals were asked to write up their experience on the eastern front for the benefit of the US Army.

There seems to have been little to no effort to corroborate the information provided by these officers. The view you get is the equivalent level of history to what you would expect from your grandfather talking to you over a beer, not serious military analysis. One contributor (Generaloberst Raus) to the project hailed by Peter Tsouras (who edited Fighting in Hell) in another book is quite suspect in my view for just making stuff up. Cracking read though. I think in Fightin in Hell he claims that the Soviets never achieved good air-ground co-ordination. Sure.

Most of those who encountered 'Russian masses' when the Soviets had become proficient at what they did, did not live to tell the tale - or if they lived, hung about in a Soviet POW camp while the stuff in the book was written (check on the recent thread by me on the topic, entitled 'The receiving end', IIRC). If you want to have the 'Russian masses' referred to there, you just buy early-war conscripts in a QB, since a lot of this stuff referred to the early war. From mid- to late-war onwards, the 'Russian masses' were most of the time the result of very careful operational planning, and had been trained quite well to perform their role. Which is why little is written about it.

Finally, I just have to ask that - does anyone else think the sub-title of the book is most inappropriate?

[flamingknives]

For QBs, the points are balanced to get an interesting game (Having a single company vs. the 9th Guards Tank army isn't quite as fun)

If you search through the forum, you may well find actual examples or accurate OOBs that you might find on the East front (Kipanderson and Andreas have both posted examples)

However, there were still evenly mathce battles on the east front, they just get drowned out across a front where a division was viewed as a disposable formation.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by chashm:

I am currently reading "Fighting in Hell, the German Ordeal on the East Front" An excellant book, very informative. It got me wondering though, where are the masses of Soviet troops that are constantly refered to in the book.

[snips]

Let me offer the following, quoted in PRO document WO 231/88, “Combat Tactics of the Red Army”, dated 1945-54, which in turn quotes Costa Borg, author of "The Red Army Mass Attack" (a book of which I have sadly failed to find any other trace ):

“The creep infantry is followed up by fire directors. These have at their disposal large artillery units, and in this way a couple of men from a ditch can direct a terrific onslaught on defending units that have not yet been able to fire a single bullet.”

“In order to form the right conclusions from the following combat description we must realise that the Soviet units did not adopt anything like a “cannon fodder” technique, in other words, any conscious sacrifice of mere bodies as a substitute for fire power. On the contrary, fire power, i.e. the concentrated shell fire, was the decisive element in the struggle. The riflemen were usually only employed in following up tactics.”

All the best,

John.

[Sergei]

If you'd like to defend against the "Red hordes" but also to have fun while doing it, I should recommend you the Vuosalmi Campaign. It is an historic series of battles from the Finnish Winter War of 1939-40. In many of the battles Finns have to defend against rather scary odds, but the low experience levels, difficult winter conditions and stupid AI make it into a fun, balanced experience.

[MikeyD]

If you want to fight an unbalanced QB (and why wouldn't you ) try using an imported map that's already got a mess of conscript Russian troops in place. I believe they get imported for FREE and won't offend the sensibilities of the automatic unit picker.

This is also a nifty way of getting around the AI's unwillingness to allot as much artillery and airpower as you want, too.

[PeterX]

You can duplicate a mass conscript attack in CMBB quite satisfactorily, but not in a QB setting. However, to my knowledge, the great Human Wave scenario has yet to be created.

Attacking with generic Cons can prove an arduous, patience testing ordeal requiring mucho micro-mngmnt. The trick is endowing the squads with +1,+2 morale leaders and ramping up the Fanatacism parameter in the editor to 50%. Then, you can induce the little microbuggers to move forward. They'll crash over the cowering defenders like a tsunami- theoretically.

The problem with the Yelnia demo scenario is that the Soviets weren't endowed with the right high-morale (NKVD backed?)leaders and requisite fanatical zeal. This is what rendered that battle such an exercise in frustration and a pain in the arse to play.

[ November 04, 2003, 08:07 PM: Message edited by: PeterX ]

[JasonC]

"The problem with the Yelnia demo scenario is that the Soviets weren't endowed with the right high-morale leaders and requisite fanatical zeal. This is what rendered that battle such an exercise in frustration and a pain in the arse to play."

Um, speak for yourself. I had no problem with it. I suspect those who did were CMBO vets for whom it was their first experience of the much more realistic behavior of infantry under fire, and of difficulty spotting distant shooters.

What should you do as the Russians in Yelna? Keep the conscripts back as the second wave. Send the other two companies forward, cover to cover, using "advance". Back them up with all the company HQs, commanding heavy weapons teams - the 50mms and the MMGs - and the tanks, which do not need to move forward initially. When you take fire, have those actually hit halt, sneaking to cover if right nearby. Press with the rest.

When you have lead infantry in cover 200m or so from the German positions, you will pick up full IDs, as opposed to sound contacts. Hit them with the mortars, in 2s and 3s per target. Hit them with HE from the tanks. Anyone who goes heads down put an MG on - it will keep them from rallying, and rout any who get up to run. Keep this up for several minutes, without trying to push infantry any closer.

Only after enemy fire has slackened should you resume the advance. Which should then take the form of individual platoons heading for specific bodies of cover - even brush is fine - close to but not on top of the enemy. You want 100 yards range or so. When any get that close, have then stop and shoot. Keep rallying everyone farther back - the forward guys will tend to draw the fire, letting the rear ones recover. Your infantry should "pool" opposite the defenders, whose numbers and fire should dwindle as particularly the tanks lay into them.

After you've got some close enough for IDs and shooting back, send forward the second wave. With conscripts, use "move" inside cover and "human wave" to reach the next body of cover across open ground. *Not* right on top of the defenders. They deal with enemies by fire, same as anybody. They just can't use "advance". Some will break each time you have to do this - that is fine. Just keep a company HQ or two behind to get some of them back. In addition to the conscript company, send forward the rattled guys who have rallied by now, out of the first wave.

The defenders don't have the firepower or ammo depth to break all of you, unless you push too hard too fast. If they are shooting into cover, and your men have time to rally, your morale will easily outlast their ammo. Especially if you cut the total firepower they put out in half, by progressively breaking them with your tanks and heavy weapons.

[PeterX]

JasonC posted:

After you've got some close enough for IDs and shooting back, send forward the second wave. With conscripts, use "move" inside cover and "human wave" to reach the next body of cover across open ground. *Not* right on top of the defenders. They deal with enemies by fire, same as anybody. They just can't use "advance". Some will break each time you have to do this - that is fine. Just keep a company HQ or two behind to get some of them back. In addition to the conscript company, send forward the rattled guys who have rallied by now, out of the first wave.

Like I said, more work than fun. Frankly, I'd rather work on my taxes or undergo a wisdom tooth extraction sans novacaine.

I no longer have the Yelnia scenario but, IIRC, the idea was to show the Russian recruits crashing into the outnumbered German line, causing the latter a few dicey moments. I question if even the most skilled Russian commander, fortified with CMBB experience, can pull this off and duplicate the historical battle. The grunts are too hopelessly brittle, they lack that jihad glaze in their eyes. Instead, the winning strategy was to use the infantry to ID the German defense points and pick them of with blasts of HE from the T34s. I won a Decisive victory employing this ahistorical strategy.

[Thin Red Line]

Try the scenario White Wave on the CD.

[Los]

"Finally, I just have to ask that - does anyone else think the sub-title of the book is most inappropriate?"

No. It's a book written from the German perspective, no mystery there. RE: the original series, at the time the US Army was looking for lessons learned re: fighting their new potential enemies. They weren't looking for balanced hsitory, but plain english assessments on a professional to professional level basis from guys that had been fighting them for four years. And that's what they got. It was not meant to be converted directly to US army doctine, nor was it. They got what they paid for.

BTW, I'll plug a good book to read. David M., Glantz' "Zhukov's Greatest Defeat." isbn 0-7006-0944-X. Glantz, is one of the foremeost Western experts and authors on the Russian side of WW2. He can by no stretch of the imagination be described as a german apologist.

It's about Operation Mars. Oh wait, never heard of it? Of course not. It was meant to be the main Soviet effort against the Germans in Dec 1942, striking against Army Group Center (Rzhev sailent under Model). Zhukov was vehemetly against the pincer operation at against Stailingrad and saw Stalingrad as a side show drawing resources away from the main effort against the bulge aimed at Moscow. The assault consisted of Seven Armies 660000 men and 2000 tranks awith followup forces (Op Jupiter which was cancelled on the heels of the Mars disaster) of another 415,000 men and 1400 tanks.(About 150000 were committed). In less than a month (Late Nov-Dec 1942) of heaving fighting the Soviet offensive was stopped cold. Checking recently released Sove loss data, casualties are put at approximately 335,000 killed! 1600 tanks were lost. The Germans suffered 40,000 casualties. Again. all this in a month's fighting.

There then followed a deliberate expunging of all records of the mars operation. Zhukov, (Mars was his personal baby) gives it a passing mention (not even by name) in his memoirs. It was not until five years ago that any Soviet historian even acknowledged the existence of the operation by name. With the success of the Stalingrad operation at the time drawing all attention, and with reputations to be maintained (Zhkov's), it was easy to bury such a catastrophe. It's a popular misconception that from end of 1942 on, The Russain front was an unbroken string was Soviet operational successes as they honed tehir operational art. Hogwash. I suppose if you bury all the dismal and bloody failures it could seem as such.

BTW lest we be too harsh on German sources I'll quote Glantz on Russian sources:

"It is therefor ironic that many military defeats and the tens of thousands of Soviet soldiers that died in them were in fact forgotten. A regime that in part was responsible for the carnage thought it in its own best interest to play down defeat and instead emphasize victory of the Soviet Nation and the socialism it personified....from 1942 to the war's end the Soviets portrayed their military experience as a constant march to victory. Misfortunes occured, operations ran out of steam and at times the Germans launched successful counterstrokes and counterattacks that achieved local successes...This military historical mosaic had few defeats only because the Soviets willed it so."

"The public face of Soviet historiography was at best a partially credible tale and at worst a combination of half truth and half lies....amid the seemingly inexorible Soviet march to victory form 1943-1945 the Soviets suffered many setbacks, many of them significant. Those that were not covered up were explained away as diversions, demonstrations or actions of far less significance than they really were. included amongst these failed operations were the first Kursk offensive of Feb-March 43, the Belorussian operations of fall 1943 and winter 1944, and the East Prussian operation of October 1944."

Anyway interesting stuff.

This book is full of great CMBB stuff, though mostly told from the Russian persepctive. Some great CMBB operations in there.

Los

[Grisha]

They weren't looking for balanced hsitory, but plain english assessments on a professional to professional level basis from guys that had been fighting them for four years. And that's what they got.

Not sure it could even be generally labelled "professional" as more than a few seemed to hold some strange opinions about Slavic genetic traits. I think what I find particularly interesting in those studies that focus on Soviet deception and camouflage is how the Germans never put it all together. Sure, the Soviets were extremely skilled (read: trained) at camouflage and concealment, but as part of a much larger enterprise: extensive deception that was coordinated eventually up to the strategic level.

Regarding Glantz, his work at exposing the Soviet failures and botched operations of WWII should give credence to his extensive work on Soviet operational art, as well as unique aspects of Soviet tactical maneuver, the detailed and coordinated use of deception, and their comprehensiveness in military intelligence. Basically, a country as technologically and economically disadvantaged as the Soviet Union, compounded with a serious culling of the Red Army officer corps, was in poor position to fight off an invasion from as formidible and ruthless a foe as Nazi Germany. If not for the pre-war military theories developed by Soviet military specialists in the 1920s and 1930s, the defeat of the USSR might very well have been a reality. So, while it would be ridiculous to claim the Red Army as some sort of elite entity, it would be equally frivolous to deny the very real developments and resulting refinements of a Red Army based on an excellent military theory that continues to be as relevant today as it was 70-80 years ago.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Los:

"Finally, I just have to ask that - does anyone else think the sub-title of the book is most inappropriate?"

No. It's a book written from the German perspective, no mystery there. RE: the original series, at the time the US Army was looking for lessons learned re: fighting their new potential enemies. They weren't looking for balanced hsitory, but plain english assessments on a professional to professional level basis from guys that had been fighting them for four years. And that's what they got. It was not meant to be converted directly to US army doctine, nor was it. They got what they paid for.

I don't agree that the US Army got what they paid for. They got a biased and flawed view that very much underestimated the Red Army, and as far as documents from that time go, the TM30-430 Manual is far far better - also assembled by Germans (in this case Gehlen), and basically for free. But it is good to see we at least agree it is not history then, and I assume you would agree that BFC would be wrong to base the modelling of the game on this book?

Originally posted by Los:

Checking recently released Sove loss data, casualties are put at approximately 335,000 killed! 1600 tanks were lost. The Germans suffered 40,000 casualties. Again. all this in a month's fighting.

In 'When Titan's clashed' Glantz gives the losses in the Rhzev-Sychevka Offensive (Mars) as 260,000 killed. I would assume that this includes the operations at Belyi. Haven't been able to dig out the number from 'Zhukov's Greatest Defeat', because I am in a bit of rush.

Originally posted by Los:

There then followed a deliberate expunging of all records of the mars operation. Zhukov, (Mars was his personal baby) gives it a passing mention (not even by name) in his memoirs. It was not until five years ago that any Soviet historian even acknowledged the existence of the operation by name.

Lt.Gen. Popjel, Commissar/Political Officer of Katokov's 1st Guards Tank Army mentions it, correctly identifying its significance as intended to destroy 9th Army, and its total failure, in his memoirs. He fought with Katukov in the Luchesa valley. You are right about the historical analysis.

Originally posted by Los:

It's a popular misconception that from end of 1942 on, The Russain front was an unbroken string was Soviet operational successes as they honed tehir operational art. Hogwash. I suppose if you bury all the dismal and bloody failures it could seem as such.

Well, just to make that clear, it maybe a popular misconception, but that is not what I said.

Originally posted by Los:

BTW lest we be too harsh on German sources I'll quote Glantz on Russian sources: [sNIPPED]

And? Does that in any way change the assessment of the German sources? I read a lot of primary Soviet sources - they are full of pitfalls, distortions, ideology and probably some downright lies. They are also full of good information inbetween that. Many primary sources written by individuals are like that. What seems to be forgotten is that the German officers in Marshall's project are no different - they had their own agenda, they had very much biased views, there was apparently a massive row between Halder and Guderian going on there, and in one case (Raus) it can be shown that he was not above making stuff up - probably to achieve what Tsouras so admired about him, the aforementioned cracking read.

Edit to correct the TM number.

[ November 06, 2003, 06:06 AM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

[Andreas]

Further to this, I just picked up Steven Newton's 'Retreat from Leningrad', which is an edited version of a study done under the Marshall project. In his introduction, he comments on the worth of the project, and I think that is the best treatment I have seen anywhere of the publications that come out of it.

Also, it struck me after my previous post that maybe I am labouring under the misapprehension that the US Army was actually interested in some solid data. Maybe it was just interested in the primary source data from the German officers, to support further analysis elsewhere. In which case your line that 'they got what they paid for' would becompletely correct.

[Keke]

Originally posted by Andreas:

In 'When Titan's clashed' Glantz gives the losses in the Rhzev-Sychevka Offensive (Mars) as 260,000 killed. I would assume that this includes the operations at Belyi. Haven't been able to dig out the number from 'Zhukov's Greatest Defeat', because I am in a bit of rush.

You should know that 'When Titan's Clashed' is an earlier publication, and don't concentrate on operation Mars...Anyway, Glantz' numbers are 120,000 higher than Krivosheev's current loss figure, and 140,000 lower than those estimated in German records.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Keke:

You should know that 'When Titan's Clashed' is an earlier publication, and don't concentrate on operation Mars...Anyway, Glantz' numbers are 120,000 higher than Krivosheev's current loss figure, and 140,000 lower than those estimated in German records.

Yeah, that's the comment I found in the back of ZGD, but it is not very helpful when you don't know what the 'current' number by Krivosheev is. Which I could not find when browsing the Appendix. That's why I went with the neat listing in WTC. So, what is the current loss figure then? 335,000? Does 'current loss' include all losses, or just irrecoverable? I am away from my library now until Tuesday, so can't answer it myself.

[Redwolf]

Originally posted by PeterX:

JasonC posted:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />After you've got some close enough for IDs and shooting back, send forward the second wave. With conscripts, use "move" inside cover and "human wave" to reach the next body of cover across open ground. *Not* right on top of the defenders. They deal with enemies by fire, same as anybody. They just can't use "advance". Some will break each time you have to do this - that is fine. Just keep a company HQ or two behind to get some of them back. In addition to the conscript company, send forward the rattled guys who have rallied by now, out of the first wave.

Like I said, more work than fun. Frankly, I'd rather work on my taxes or undergo a wisdom tooth extraction sans novacaine.

I no longer have the Yelnia scenario but, IIRC, the idea was to show the Russian recruits crashing into the outnumbered German line, causing the latter a few dicey moments. I question if even the most skilled Russian commander, fortified with CMBB experience, can pull this off and duplicate the historical battle. The grunts are too hopelessly brittle, they lack that jihad glaze in their eyes. Instead, the winning strategy was to use the infantry to ID the German defense points and pick them of with blasts of HE from the T34s. I won a Decisive victory employing this ahistorical strategy. </font>

[Keke]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Yeah, that's the comment I found in the back of ZGD, but it is not very helpful when you don't know what the 'current' number by Krivosheev is. Which I could not find when browsing the Appendix. That's why I went with the neat listing in WTC. So, what is the current loss figure then? 335,000? Does 'current loss' include all losses, or just irrecoverable? I am away from my library now until Tuesday, so can't answer it myself.

ZGD, p. 319

...During the three weeks of Operation Mars, Zhukov's forces lost about 100,000 killed and missing and 235,000 wounded. On the other hand, throughout the entire duration of his operations (19 November 1942 through 2 February 1943) Vasilevsky's fronts lost 154,885 killed and missing and 330,892 wounded. In addition, Zhukov's forces lost over 1,600 tanks, more than the total number of 1,400 tanks that Vasilevsky committed in Operation Uranus. Such catastrophic losses, which were matched by few Soviet offensive operations in the war, help explain why Soviet forces along the Western axis had such difficulty resuming succesful offensive operations in the future.

[Redwolf]

Andreas, can you elaborate a little about your findings about the Marshall project?

I assume this is S.L.A. Marshall. I ignored that dude so far after some irritating reads but I would be interested how much impact he had on doctrine-forming research in the U.S.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Keke:

ZGD, p. 319

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />...During the three weeks of Operation Mars, Zhukov's forces lost about 100,000 killed and missing and 235,000 wounded. On the other hand, throughout the entire duration of his operations (19 November 1942 through 2 February 1943) Vasilevsky's fronts lost 154,885 killed and missing and 330,892 wounded. In addition, Zhukov's forces lost over 1,600 tanks, more than the total number of 1,400 tanks that Vasilevsky committed in Operation Uranus. Such catastrophic losses, which were matched by few Soviet offensive operations in the war, help explain why Soviet forces along the Western axis had such difficulty resuming succesful offensive operations in the future.

</font>

[Grisha]

I assume this is S.L.A. Marshall. I ignored that dude so far after some irritating reads but I would be interested how much impact he had on doctrine-forming research in the U.S.

I don't think SLA Marshall had anything to do with these studies. Both the US Army and the US air force conducted such studies with German officers.

As for how much these studies influenced US military doctrine wrt the Soviets, I'd say that NATO was not much more informed than the Germans were in WWII. While the West didn't possess the sort of bias that resulted from Nazism, there was a tendency to see the Soviet Army as backward and overly reliant on quantity. Now, it wasn't that these assessments were necessarily entirely false, but that NATO had little understanding of how the Soviets compensated for these weaknesses. The West had heard of the Soviet term "operational art" since war's end, but it wasn't until the 1980s that the US Army took this term seriously. In the 1970s there was a push within the US Army to develop a new military theory based largely on WWII German military theory, supported by the fact that the Germans had exacted a grievous toll upon the Soviets in countless tactical engagements. This development, called "active defense," was eventually dropped when it was emphasized that while this was all well and good, the fact remained that the Germans had lost in WWII. In 1986, FM 100-5 Operations was the first instance of US operational art, and its development was the result of extensive research into Soviet operational art by the US Army's School of Advanced Military Studies.

[Keke]

Mannerheim didn't describe the Soviet conduct of the Karelian Isthmus offensive 1944 "skillful" for nothing...

[Los]

Whoa, typo on my part. Sorry. Glantz, in the Mars book, puts it as 335,000 "casualties" not 335,000 "killed". My aplogies for not picking up on the the misprint.

"Also, it struck me after my previous post that maybe I am labouring under the misapprehension that the US Army was actually interested in some solid data. Maybe it was just interested in the primary source data from the German officers, to support further analysis elsewhere. In which case your line that 'they got what they paid for' would becompletely correct."

This was the case. The Army was not intending to write doctrine or history off those interviews, it was simply trying to gain impressions from commanders who were fighting for years on that front. As for whether German officers had negative racist impressions as to Russian they fought, that is irrelevant. I can only imagine what US Army or Marine officers writing of their experience of the japanese after fighting them in the Pacific had to say. Or lest anyone makes the mistake of holding up whatever national culture they come from up to the same scrutiny, any army fighting any other army from another race or cultural is going to establish certain racial biases and generalities about their foes. (Or at least it's been that way since time immemorial maybe its different today?)

BTW our unit had the whole series which I've read a few times until some numbnuts in the process of cleaning out the unit library got rid of them. I almost held a public beheading when I found out! Anyways regarding what is written in those books, are they really are not out of line with the majority of other German personal accounts and impressions from General to Private,,as to the experience and nature of fighting on the Eastern front? Not really. I doubt they had time to all get together in some mass collusion and work out getting their stories straight for various postwar purposes.

None of that says that their view is 100% right but nor is it 100% wrong. And by the way some books on the series which recount tactical matters such as "German small unit tactics" or "operations in forests and swamps" or "operations in extreme cold weayther" or "Equipment maintenace in winter conditions" have had many parts extracted and put into doctrine. There's been plenty of US ARMY's own experience under these conditions to verify the veracity of the books and the "fixes" and shortcuts established or recommended within them. Only a few of the books in that series deal with the more controversial operational or larger matters.

Just to work off of Andreas' point (well...add an exclamation point to it) about historiography in general, does anyone, really think they are getting the exact unvarnished that's-exactly-what-happened-for-real truth when you are interviewing anyone particularly general officers? You are always seeing things through their eyes and through their filters and intents, often recounted to protect themselves or others from hitorical criticism and scrutiny from one degree or another.

Likewise do you really think you are getting the the exact unvarnished that's-exactly-what-happened-for-real truth when you are reading a unit after action report of official dispatches of what occured in a battle written right after? Again, in almost all cases where real careeers are immediately right on the line for actions recently taken, you can bet that this can very often influence how evcents are recanted: (I've seen it myself very often over the past 25 years.)

In both cases the answer swings between "maybe not" to "oh hell no! depending on the situation. Analyzing all these sources for relaibility and veracity are critical skils for historians. Sometimes the last source of the truth rather than the first, is the offical unit after action report.

BTW sidebar: There seems to be some misconception that the US Army somehow underestimated the Soviet Army. (Speaking as someone who was directly invlolved in preparing to fight it for a couple decades I believe we grossly overestimated the Soviet Army). Neither in doctrine, in training, or in preparation did I ever see any underestimation of the Red Army's capabilities. Any weakness in inherent in either their huiman material (e.g. having units with so many differnt langauge probelms) or physical materiel were clearly compensated for in their doctrine, trainig methodologies and war fighting preparations, clearly there for all to see, and little open to misinterpretation. They were always the big bad wolf.

Los

[Los]

In the light of our discussions I am poisting the forward from DA PAM No-20-269 "Small Unit Actions During the German Campaign in Russia" Department of the Army July 1953. All Pamphlets in the series had a similar forward:

"Department of the Army pamphlet No 269 Small Unit Actions During the German Campaign in Russia is published as an adjunct to existing training literature in the belief that much can be learned from other armies, particularly the vanquished. It does not embody official training doctrine. Although called a historical study, it is not such according to the precise interpretation of the term. It is rather a series of interesting and instructive small unit actions based on the personal experiences of Germans who actually took part in them.

Clausewitz wrote that, in the art of war, experience is worth more than all philoshphical truth. This pamphlet is published with that thought in mind, tempered with the truth that investigation, observation and analysis are necessary to give full meaning to the experience.

ORLANDO WAR

Major general, USA

Chief, Military History

Wahington DC

Januatry 1953"

[ November 07, 2003, 05:10 PM: Message edited by: Los ]

[Grisha]

There seems to be some misconception that the US Army somehow underestimated the Soviet Army. (Speaking as someone who was directly invlolved in preparing to fight it for a couple decades I believe we grossly overestimated the Soviet Army). Neither in doctrine, in training, or in preparation did I ever see any underestimation of the Red Army's capabilities. Any weakness in inherent in either their huiman material (e.g. having units with so many differnt langauge probelms) or physical materiel were clearly compensated for in their doctrine, trainig methodologies and war fighting preparations, clearly there for all to see, and little open to misinterpretation. They were always the big bad wolf.

Not sure how to respond to this. The Germans were also pretty certain of Red Army capabilities in WWII, despite being beaten. However, their viewpoint was biased toward the tactical which blinded them to very effective operational and strategic abilities possessed by the Red Army. Glantz served in the US Army, as an officer, from 1965 to 1993 and he also feels the US Army - at least until the 1980s - was largely ignorant of the more vital aspects of Soviet military art.