How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[danfrodo]

1 hour ago, Huba said:

 

whew, thanks for the update Huba.  I was a little nervous after your initial post on this.

[Haiduk]

@sburke @Kinophile

Lt.colonel Alexandr Blinov, senior officer of combat training of 150th motor-rifle division, Novoherkassk, Rostov oblast, 8th CAA, Southern military district. Got killed 18th of March

  

 

Edited May 9, 2022 by Haiduk

[Kinophile]

54 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

So it has been a awhile, time for another assessment signpost I think.

So as I have gone on about, I am a fan of Options Based Warfare, particularly as a tool at the strategic level; however, it links closely to the Operational level as well - although operational level is more obsessed with "decision", and tactical will always be about capability and effects.  These are inter-link concepts, another way to think about it:

Ref your Power-Point of Doom-worthy diagram (just kidding, its really interesting), looking at  the "Effects & Capabilities" - would those not lead to  "options and Decisions", rather than be below them in the hierarchy?

e.g.:

Spoken as a keyboard Lt, of course...

Edited May 9, 2022 by Kinophile

[Haiduk]

6 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

whew, thanks for the update Huba.  I was a little nervous after your initial post on this.

Reportedly Russians had a time to cross the river until bridge was destroyed with company size unit - about 80 of personnel, but with only "several" BTRs

[The_Capt]

3 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Ref your Power-Point of Doom-worthy diagram (just kidding, its really interesting), looking at  the "Effects & Capabilities" - would those not lead to  "options and Decisions", rather than be below them in the hierarchy?

Spoken as a keyboard Lt, of course...

This is modeled on the levels of warfare so there is a top down linkage: strategy plans and creates capability in long horizons, Operational projects, enables, sustains and commands those capabilities, Tactical employs capabilities to create effects - And then an bottom-up linkage: Effects, create tactical outcomes, which support operational decisions, which when linked via a Campaign Design influence Strategic Options, the interaction of which ultimately support the creation of Strategic Decisions (have not even scratched that one yet) and finally Political Outcomes...which is just code for "new certainties".  A Circle of Warfare kinda thing.

And Russia's is now in the palliative care stage of this war.

[photon]

57 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

So it has been a awhile, time for another assessment signpost I think.

So as I have gone on about, I am a fan of Options Based Warfare, particularly as a tool at the strategic level; however, it links closely to the Operational level as well - although operational level is more obsessed with "decision", and tactical will always be about capability and effects. 

Alway an interesting read. Out of curiosity, have you read the short book "Introduction to Strategy" by Andre Beaufre? He's a French military theorist who wrote a manual for western strategy in the face of the cold war (the book is 1963, so right after the Cuban Missle Crisis). He conceives of strategy in the broad decision-based framework that you do, and articulates a theory of interior and exterior maneuver to maximize one's freedom of action while minimizing one's adversary's freedom of action, leading to a psychological decision.

In his terms, Russia has failed at both interior (i.e. in theater) and exterior (i.e. on the global stage) maneuvers, deeply restricting their freedom of action. Ukraine has engaged in very effective interior maneuvers -- developing a high cohesion hybrid light infantry defense -- and very effective exterior maneuvers -- successfully courting and maintaining broad international support. Similarly, the NATO countries have not (publicly at any rate) engaged in any interior maneuvers, but have engaged in exterior maneuvers to both reduce the freedom of action of Russia and increase the freedom of action of Ukraine.

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, Machor said:

I too - quite literally - lost sleep over this. For beginners, Woodland pattern is omnipresent in the modern world, and could have been imported from anywhere: https://www.camopedia.org/index.php/Woodland

However, there seem to be two local candidates. The first one is the BDU of the Ukrainian Federal Border Guards: https://www.camopedia.org/index.php/Ukraine

The second one is the Russian MVD 'kirpichka' BDU: https://www.camopedia.org/index.php?title=Russia

At any rate, we're faced with the same question as the conscript's issued weapon: Why has he been issued a Mosin where Russia has ample supplies of AK-47/AKM, and why is he wearing an exotic BDU where there should be ample supplies of the non-digital Flora in Russia?

Russia is loaded with commercially produced camouflage uniforms.  They very often mimic/steal patterns familiar to the West.  US Woodland is a favorite for pretty much everybody, but you can see A-TACS and Multicam knockoffs all over the place with Russian forces in Ukraine.  Especially the Chechens.

It seems to me this guy in the Woodland uniform got whatever was handy to either him or to the local unit.

It's not just with Russians either.  The Ukrainian volunteer units wear a wide variety of surplus and commercial uniforms.  You might have seen a couple of videos with Ukrainians with Britain's variation of Multicam, complete with Union Jack on the sleeves (it's sewn on).  Some have said "ah, UK volunteer!", but really it is a Ukrainian with a $15 bit of surplus kit.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, Haiduk said:

On the video when TB2 hit Russian boat (color filming fragment), you can see a writing on its portside. Only one boat of both classes in BSF has own name except letter-digital number - this was P-345 "Buyevlianin" 03160 Raptor V2 class boat 

Total we have evidences of 5 Raptor/BK-16 hit - four near Zmiinyi island and one near Mariupol (hit by Fagot ATGM). Also our General Staff claimed two such boats were sunk in first days of war during attempt of landing near Ochakiv and as RUMINT one boat blew up on the mine, when tried to land recon group east from Odesa

In other words... they don't have many of either type left!  That's good news.

Thanks for the details.

Steve

[Kinophile]

1 hour ago, Kinophile said:

Absolutely. Still, I work in Film/Tv. That footage wasn't faked and threadmill walking is instantly recognizable to an experienced 1st A.D.

Actually, hold on, hold on...

I looked at a lower res version, where artifacting is very difficult to hide. There's some pixilation around him on his right shoulder, where shadowing cannot hide it. The shadowing from his arms as he walks is very consistent yet he's apparently walking in an arc, along a curving  street.

Also, his walk - its very even, his arm movements are very consistent and he is perfectly centered in frame the entire time (ie camera on a dolly/sticks, him on a thread mill).  This is the kind of thing I mentioned above, about threadmil walks being recognizable -  they are very "flat", in terms of walking performance.

Finally, The footage behind him is sometimes, for a frame or three, out of sync with his sway left/right (ie stablised footage using movi or similar).

He is also very evenly lit.

So...on balance, I would say Yes, @LongLeftFlank this could be easily be a composite image - bg footage of the empty street shot on a stablised rig (movi, maybe a ronin) along a simple path (e.g. the center line of the street, the operator walking backwards or the rig mounted on a dolly, camera car or other light vehicle), composited into bluescreen (because he's wearing green) footage of Zelensky on a thread mill. 

...

This would make sense from a security viewpoint, as a vip filmed in the middle of the day on an empty street requires, at minimum:

Street Lock up (no pedestrians or vehicles, so min 3-4 people)

Camera dept with their car/carts (min 2)

Lighting crew (min 2)

Director, 1AD, HMW, Sound Mixer, - min 4-5 people.

Then there's craft, package trucks, shuttles, etc.

Bottom line, its impossible to hide something being shot.

...

If I was a ruskie hit squad hanging around Kiev waiting for Zelensky to make an appearance, I absolutely would look out for him filming a staged street scene like this.

I don't mean "staged" in a negative way, I mean prepped, organised and shot professionally.

 

 

 

Edited May 9, 2022 by Kinophile

[The_Capt]

14 minutes ago, photon said:

Alway an interesting read. Out of curiosity, have you read the short book "Introduction to Strategy" by Andre Beaufre?

Maybe?  I have to be honest, I have read so much of this stuff that I can't even tell what is mine and what I have pilfered.  Decisions and Options are very closely linked but they are matter and anti-matter.  A Decision, is by-definition, a death of local-options.  Once it is made all other local-options die accept the one that is chosen, here the laws of physics are a harsh mistress and we cannot be in two places at once type of thing.  I say "local", because a decision has a limited area of influence in conceptual options spaces, again time.  For example, A Russian invasion to cut of Lviv is locally impossible; however, in 100 years it will once again be possibly viable - one has to think of these things as dynamic space.  However, a Decision can also lead to more Options, creating them out of the death of the others, how one manages this space is the art of strategy in my mind, but as you point out this is nothing new really.

I also argue that "Decision" is not a binary term.  As I mentioned before there are flavours of Decision (positive, negative, null and strange) which have been historically demonstrated.  I suspect that there are the same sort of concepts at play in Options (they are more than "good or bad") as well to be honest but I have thought that one through.  Another way to think of it, back to Options, is each is a road to that shining city on a hill.  If I have 100 possible roads, some bumpier than others, and you only have two this does not automatically guarantee victory for me but my probability is higher.  I need not only work to push down these roads, which will automatically close off others, I need to compress your roads and sustaining or creating new ones of my own.  This way as uncertainty and shock comes in from the future I can weather it much better than you...normally.

Edited May 9, 2022 by The_Capt

[LongLeftFlank]

1 minute ago, Kinophile said:

Actually, hold on, hold on...

I looked at a lower res version, where artifacting is very difficult to hide. There's some pixilation around him on his right shoulder, where shadowing cannot hide it. The shadowing from his arms as he walks is very consistent yet he's apparently walking in a arv, along the street.

Also, his walk - its very even, his arm movements are very consistent and he is perfectly centered in frame the entire time (ie camera on a dolly/sticks, him on a thread mill).  This is the kind of thing I mentioned above, about threadmil walks being recognizable -  they are very "flat", in terms of walking performance.

Finally, The footage behind him is sometimes, for a frame or three, out of sync with his sway left/right (ie stablised footage using movi or similar).

So...on balance, I would say Yes, @LongLeftFlank this could be easily be a composite image - bg footage of the empty street shot on a stablised rig (movi, maybe a ronin) along a simple path (e.g. the center line of the street, the operator walking backwards or the rig mounted on a dolly, camera car or other light vehicle), composited into bluescreen (because he's wearing green) footage of Zelensky on a thread mill. 

I'd naturally want the see the original file (impossible).

Great analysis, cheers. And prudent of him, as noted. A physical double would be tricky and lead to even more CTs. 

[Kinophile]

They could have used a double, or really a stand-in; this would help greatly with focus pulling as the rig moves along the path. Run it a couple of times with the SI, getting the pace and path correct, then run a few takes without the SI, maintaining speed and other variables.

A slightly shorter SI, but with the same stride length, would be ideal. Say someone his height but thinner, less bulked. This would help keep his shoulders clean in the bg footage.

Also, we never see his feet. This is also a flag, as feet are more work to "clean up" in bluescreen post. So frame them out and you drastically speed up your post work. 

Finally, as I scrub along there's further artifacting as he moves pas the trees:

That white vertical dot beside his ear appears/disappears. Its not a gap in the trees behind. 

Stuff like this.

Edited May 9, 2022 by Kinophile

[LongLeftFlank]

2 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Maybe?  I have to be honest, I have read so much of this stuff that I can't even tell what is honestly mine and what I have pilfered.  Decisions and Options are very closely linked but they are matter and anti-matter.  A Decision, is by-definition, a death of local-options.  Once it is made all other local-options die accept the one that is chosen, here the laws of physics are a harsh mistress and we cannot be in two places at once type of thing.  I say "local", because a decision has a limited area of influence in conceptual options spaces, again time.  For example, A Russian invasion to cut of Lviv is locally impossible; however, in 100 years it will once again be possibly viable - one has to think of these things as dynamic space.  However, a Decision can also lead to more Options, creating them out of the death of the others, how one manages this space is the art of strategy in my mind, but as you point out this is nothing new really.

I also argue that "Decision" is not a binary term.  As I mentioned before there are flavours of Decision (positive, negative, null and strange) which have been historically demonstrated.  I suspect that there are the same sort of concepts at play in Options (they are more than "good or bad") as well to be honest but I have thought that one through.  Another way to think of it, back to Options, is each is a road to that shining city on a hill.  If I have 100 possible roads, some bumpier than others, and you only have two this does not automatically guarantee victory for me but my probability is higher.  I need not only work to push down these roads, which will automatically close off others, I need to compress your roads and sustaining or creating new ones of my own.  This way as uncertainty and shock comes in from the future I can weather it much better than you...normally.

Augh!  I'll be seeing 2 x 2s next.

Be warned, @sburke and I 'decided' a few pages back that the entire global management consultant corps should be 'engaged' on the Donetsk front... with one bolt action rifle for every 2 empty suits (that's about as much real world technology as they could figure out how to use).

So congratulations, I think we just found the general to lead that legion of the damned into hell! 

 

 

 

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, billbindc said:

Well...I've read Putin's speech and whatever tea leaves exist therein escape me entirely. It looks like they aren't doing a general mobilization which I think is a surprise to most close observers and now I haven't the foggiest idea what Putin thinks he's doing at this point.

I'm not very surprised that the callup didn't happen today.  It would detract from the tradition too much.  What I am surprised by, actually quite shocked, is that the speech he gave did not lay the groundwork for mobilization.  So count me amongst the "I don't get it" crowd.

The only theory I have is that whatever pressure Putin is facing to avoid mobilization is a lot stronger than we think it is.  So much so that he's not ready to roll the dice even on laying the groundwork for it in fear that even setting the expectations for it could be problematic for him.

As I said a number of pages ago, Russia absolutely has to mobilize if they are going to hold onto what they have.  Ukraine now has more soldiers available to it than Russia does and is rapidly arming itself with superior weaponry.  Not to mention that Ukraine's smaller strength and Soviet based forces managed to not only thwart Russia's invasion but remain intact.

From a pragmatic standpoint every day that goes by without Russian mobilization is another day that the balance of power tips more in favor of Ukraine.  Here's some thinking on this...

ASSUMPTION 1 -> Putin understands that his forces are under strength and battered

ASSUMPTION 2 -> Putin understands that Ukraine isn't giving up and has, thus far, shown itself to be very capable of dealing Russia major pain

ASSUMPTION 3 -> Putin understands the rising imbalance of power favoring Ukraine

ASSUMPTION 4 -> Putin understands that in order to hold what Russia currently occupies requires the ability to defend it against the rising tide of capable Ukrainian forces

 

I find it difficult to believe that Putin hasn't figured out all four of these things by now.  Even if his underlings have tried to hide facts from him, the repeated inability of Russia's armed forces to take more ground and Ukraine's repeated ability to strike out (e.g. Muskova) are too obvious.

So why hadn't Putin gone for full mobilization?  I can think of three reasons, either singularly or in combination:

1. The pressure against mobilization is vastly stronger than anybody outside of the Kremlin understands.  This could be several interrelated things, not just one.  For example, workforce shortages, FSB warning it doesn't have the manpower to round up dodgers, lack of equipment on hand to equip them, rival powers looking to take advantage of discontent, etc.
2. Putin is so totally unprepared to make a regime life-or-death decision that he's putting it off.  Maybe he hopes something will change to make the decision easier.  Maybe he's so afraid of the decision that he's paralyzed by it. 
3. He's waiting for something we're not taking into consideration.  Maybe there's some strategic timing that he sees coming up and is biding his time.  Maybe he thinks he has an ace up his sleeve and needs to get it ready first.  Perhaps he's figured out a way to minimize the risk of mobilization but he's not been implemented yet.

Whatever is going on, he's only got a few weeks to make his play known.  The longer he waits the worse the military situation is going to get.

Steve

[Haiduk]

Heavy loss for Ukrainian aviation. Colonel Ihor Bezday, deputy commander of Naval aviation got lost in Mi-14 with 5 crewmen - helicopter was shot down by Russian fighter jet. 

In past he was a commander of 10th Maritime aviation brigade, in March 2014 he managed to organize dare escape of almost whole working helicopters and planes of brigade (Mi-14, Ka-27, An-26) from blocked Saky airfield in Crimea

I wonder, what was a need for such level and experience officer to participate in sortie... Submarine search? Or search&resque mission over the sea? This loss as such heavy for our aviation as the death on 25th of Feb of colonel Oleksandr Oksashchenko - brilliant pilot-instructor of Su-27, which taught whole generation of pilots. 

Edited May 9, 2022 by Haiduk

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, DesertFox said:

 

 

Well that settles any questions about the credibility of Ukr estimates of Russian casualties.

[Battlefront.com]

43 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Lt.colonel Alexandr Blinov, senior officer of combat training of 150th motor-rifle division, Novoherkassk, Rostov oblast, 8th CAA, Southern military district. Got killed 18th of March

I am going to read something into this based on the guy's position...

This appears to be more evidence that Russia is having to commit Human resources into the battle that are needed back at base to train up the Spring conscripts and/or mobilized reserves.  Short term needs are being prioritized at the expense of long term needs.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

3 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Heavy loss for Ukrainian aviation. Colonel Ihor Bezday, deputy commander of Naval aviation got lost in Mi-14 with 5 crewmen - helicopter was shot down by Russian fighter jet. 

In pasr he was commander of 10th Maritaime aviation brigade, in March 2014 he managed to organize dare escape of almost whole working helicopters and planes of brigade (Mi-14, Ka-27, An-26) from blocked Saky airfield in Crimea

I wonder, what was a need for such level and experience officer to participate in sortie... Submarine search? Or search&resque mission over the sea? This loss as such heavy for our aviation as the death on 25th of Feb of colonel Oleksandr Oksashchenko - brilliant pilot-instructor of Su-27, which taught whole generation of pilots. 

He might not have been on a mission but instead been moving as part of routine command duties.

Steve

[Haiduk]

4 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

He might not have been on a mission but instead been moving as part of routine command duties.

Steve

The source says "during combat mission"

[kraze]

4 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I'm not very surprised that the callup didn't happen today.  It would detract from the tradition too much.  What I am surprised by, actually quite shocked, is that the speech he gave did not lay the groundwork for mobilization.  So count me amongst the "I don't get it" crowd.

The only theory I have is that whatever pressure Putin is facing to avoid mobilization is a lot stronger than we think it is.  So much so that he's not ready to roll the dice even on laying the groundwork for it in fear that even setting the expectations for it could be problematic for him.

As I said a number of pages ago, Russia absolutely has to mobilize if they are going to hold onto what they have.  Ukraine now has more soldiers available to it than Russia does and is rapidly arming itself with superior weaponry.  Not to mention that Ukraine's smaller strength and Soviet based forces managed to not only thwart Russia's invasion but remain intact.

From a pragmatic standpoint every day that goes by without Russian mobilization is another day that the balance of power tips more in favor of Ukraine.  Here's some thinking on this...

ASSUMPTION 1 -> Putin understands that his forces are under strength and battered

ASSUMPTION 2 -> Putin understands that Ukraine isn't giving up and has, thus far, shown itself to be very capable of dealing Russia major pain

ASSUMPTION 3 -> Putin understands the rising imbalance of power favoring Ukraine

ASSUMPTION 4 -> Putin understands that in order to hold what Russia currently occupies requires the ability to defend it against the rising tide of capable Ukrainian forces

 

I find it difficult to believe that Putin hasn't figured out all four of these things by now.  Even if his underlings have tried to hide facts from him, the repeated inability of Russia's armed forces to take more ground and Ukraine's repeated ability to strike out (e.g. Muskova) are too obvious.

So why hadn't Putin gone for full mobilization?  I can think of three reasons, either singularly or in combination:

1. The pressure against mobilization is vastly stronger than anybody outside of the Kremlin understands.  This could be several interrelated things, not just one.  For example, workforce shortages, FSB warning it doesn't have the manpower to round up dodgers, lack of equipment on hand to equip them, rival powers looking to take advantage of discontent, etc.
2. Putin is so totally unprepared to make a regime life-or-death decision that he's putting it off.  Maybe he hopes something will change to make the decision easier.  Maybe he's so afraid of the decision that he's paralyzed by it. 
3. He's waiting for something we're not taking into consideration.  Maybe there's some strategic timing that he sees coming up and is biding his time.  Maybe he thinks he has an ace up his sleeve and needs to get it ready first.  Perhaps he's figured out a way to minimize the risk of mobilization but he's not been implemented yet.

Whatever is going on, he's only got a few weeks to make his play known.  The longer he waits the worse the military situation is going to get.

Steve

Let me put one notable thing into perspective here. Right now russian Kuzbass region is getting obliterated by fires. Yearly fires are a norm there (which speaks volumes about their fire safety as it is), but this time they are barely able to contain them, let alone put them out. They had to pull firefighters from areas they never had to pull them from before.

Because every previous year the army fought fires. Not only with soldiers but with choppers they had. None of which are present there this year.

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Haiduk said:

About month ago there was information we have in morgues about 8600 bodies of Russian soldiers (or even pointed the total weight of bodies and body fragments), whih Russian side doesn't want to take back. Even in present time locals and police continie to find bodies. Some part of Russians were burried in temporary graves after the combat actions in March - first half of April, when there is no firm frontline and situation was too changeable. 

I was watching a video from a recent press conference/ceremony at Gostomel airport where the narrator said they had just found 3 Russian bodies and this is a small area that has already been largely cleaned up.  The bodies were off to the sides in the brush that surrounds the large hanger.

This is just an anecdote about how many bodies there probably are still scattered all over Ukraine.  Not to mention how many were vaporized through explosions.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

5 minutes ago, kraze said:

Let me put one notable thing into perspective here. Right now russian Kuzbass region is getting obliterated by fires. Yearly fires are a norm there (which speaks volumes about their fire safety as it is), but this time they are barely able to contain them, let alone put them out. They had to pull firefighters from areas they never had to pull them from before.

Because every previous year the army fought fires. Not only with soldiers but with choppers they had. None of which are present there this year.

That's interesting.  For sure the Russians have gotten used to using the armed forces for internal uses.  I've seen that sort of thing mentioned in the Western media from time to time.  Now that they are obviously unavailable there will be consequences.  Especially because, like all things with this war, there was no plan in place to replace the soldiers with something else.

Steve

[Haiduk]

Who tracks the units - the elements of UKR 10th mountain-assault brigade are involved in actions near Kharkiv (SP-platoon commander has a chevron of this brigade)

 

[DesertFox]

3 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Not to mention how many were vaporized through explosions.

Steve

If I just think about all those "Jack in the Box" tank vids, there surely are a lot of MIAs without any chance to be identified.

[Battlefront.com]

6 minutes ago, DesertFox said:

If I just think about all those "Jack in the Box" tank vids, there surely are a lot of MIAs without any chance to be identified.

I'd hazard a guess that just with the videos shown in this thread we've probably seen 40-50 catastrophic explosions.  Averaging 3 men (no passengers) that's 120-150 right there.  And we know that's just the tip of the iceberg.  I'd not be surprised if the count is more like 400-500, which is 1200-1500.  Whatever the number is, it's significant.

Steve