How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[billbindc]

1 minute ago, Battlefront.com said:

I've seen at least two different reports of mobilization papers.  No overt signs that they are faked, so assuming they are real...

Two things will likely happen right away:

1. existing conscripts (i.e. not the ones just called up) will be put into the frontlines as replacements.  This provides about 113,000 equipped and basic trained soldiers into the battlefield
2. an unknown number of reservists will get their basic kit and head to the front probably without any refresher training.  There is likely going to be a large callup of officers as Russia has lost so many already.  I'd guess they'd call up about 100,000 in order to minimize disruption to the economy.  They can always call up more later on and rush them to the front.  But then again, Putin might follow the "go big or go home" philosophy and call up significantly more than that. 

 

What is the immediate(ish) effect on the battlefield? 

[akd]

Those papers could just be standard call-ups for the Spring round of conscripts (which runs April-July).  At least one of them is dated from the end of March.

[Suleyman]

@sross112

I agree more or less. But if the UA had to withdraw from a major defense like that which lasted weeks then it is a sign that there was a breakthrough, the RU forces usually take some time to get ready to push forward, after a gain.

Even so, with how bad the Russian command is they tend to take losses, wasting capable equipment and soldiers by not having them in the right positions to avoid being exploited. I mean I remember in the first few weeks of the war they lost so much equipment because of their logistics issues.

There was a report years ago that I read, and it was from the Russian side about their logistics issues even in the Georgian war where they did pretty good against a less capable adversary. Crazy to think they never got that mess together by now even when they knew of this weakness. 

 

[LongLeftFlank]

54 minutes ago, Machor said:

 

 

Wait, he's supposed to find Buckaroo Banzai not John Whorfin! [/]

 

Edited May 9, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[Battlefront.com]

6 minutes ago, billbindc said:

What is the immediate(ish) effect on the battlefield? 

Well, I wish I hadn't accidentally deleted the post I was just working on   Here's version #2...

They can quickly replace personnel in both the units that have been withdrawn to Russia and those still in Ukraine.  They'll likely prioritize the reservists in traditional "elite" units and conscripts in the other units. 

I'm honestly not sure how Russia will handle it as so far they've been opting for the dumbest options over the smarter ones.  Assuming the really smart move (i.e. withdrawing forces back to Russia for rebuilding) is off the table, the next smartest move is to rebuild spent BTGs in the rear move them into the line.  The depleted units in the line would move to the rear and absorb replacements.  The dumbest move would be to send replacements directly into the frontline BTGs as well as the rearward ones.

All of this could be done fairly quickly.  Conscripts could be moved into place within days, the reservists within weeks.  But the units will suck worse than the ones that initially moved into Ukraine.  To make them even as bad as the original units they'd have to be withdrawn from Ukraine and spend months training together.  I think that option is off the table because their front is too weak to hold out for that long.  So they will rush this whole process just like they did for the Easter Offensive.

The new Russian force will be a defensive one.  At the very best the newly reconstituted Russian ground forces should make it more difficult for Ukraine to collapse any one sector of front.  Russia might simply have too many bodies in place for that to happen.  However, local collapses are even MORE likely because the reconstituted units are likely to be of even lower quality than the units that started the war.

Militarily, the interesting thing to me is how much damage can Ukraine do to the existing forces while Russia is getting the reservists back into uniform and to the battlefield.  The newly constituted units are going to suck at counter attacking, therefore if Ukraine is on a roll they might find it very difficult to stop an ongoing Ukrainian advance at the same time they are rebuilding units.  Now, if Russia still had some good mobile reserves available then things could be different, but they don't so they are stuck with what they have.

Politically... now this is the HUGE question that everybody is wondering about.  Putin has been holding off from making this call for nearly 3 months.  He must have very good reasons for it and they don't suddenly stop being good reasons on May 9th.  Which means he's gambling, likely with his life, that this will work.  I have absolutely no idea how quickly whatever he fears might manifest itself nor what form it will take nor how it will affect the strategic picture.  Which is why I'm so curious about it

Of course this could all be proven moot tomorrow if the call up doesn't happen tomorrow.  The only evidence I've seen today that suggests Russia is going to declare war on Ukraine tomorrow is that some guy from the Duma said absolutely it won't.  General rule of thumb is the stronger the Russian denial, the more likely it's true

Steve

[LongLeftFlank]

12 hours ago, sburke said:

Having formerly worked for McKinsey... I second this.  (McKinsey pulled out of Russia earlier this year).  How about we give every other one a rifle?

Yeah, 'pulled out' is pretty much appropriate. Since they 'service' clients in the way a bull services a cow.

Sure guys, your engagement can be on a time & materials basis, evergreen at rack rates (payable in rubles). Break out the Opus One!

... The UA will provide any required 'cap' on billings. Otherwise, we bring in ATKearney to provide the necessary blocking detachments. Fixed lump sum, payable on completion)

[Battlefront.com]

24 minutes ago, akd said:

Those papers could just be standard call-ups for the Spring round of conscripts (which runs April-July).  At least one of them is dated from the end of March.

Yup, I was thinking about this.  I missed the March date, so that one likely is for the Spring callup.

Also, technically, Russia could not legally post activation notices until war is declared.  So these would be premature.  However, there's other examples of Russia doing things out of order such as the invasion of Crimea.  Which means proceedure isn't something that can be counted on.

Steve

[MikeyD]

Its now 6:33 AM April 9 Moscow time. Anyone care to place bets about whether Putin makes a verified appearance for the parade?

[Suleyman]

Haha.. turns out there was no Putin for years, it was a hologram. 

[danfrodo]

1 hour ago, Machor said:

Previous flights were going through Hungarian airspace as well.

It isn't a TB2 delivery if you don't say that it is. 

AKA: 'Don't tell, don't ask.'

thanks for the excellent posts, Machor.  I appreciate it. 

[dan/california]

The only reason I don't believe this is that he has looked like bleep in his recent pictures.

[Battlefront.com]

18 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Wait, he's supposed to find Buckaroo Banzai not John Whorfin! [/]

 

For a long time my login password was "BigBooty", which is pronounced booTAY of course

That US wingnut that was posing for the cameras should have to stay there.  But sigh... so far there's been no blanket travel restriction by US citizens to Russia, so he's allowed to go there and come back without legal action against him.

Steve

[G.I. Joe]

1 hour ago, billbindc said:

The Russian ambassador's residence in DC tonight.

Love it! I hope there's a speaker system to play Oi u Luzi Chervona Kalyna...

(Actually, the last five pages have given me enough of a Ken Burns flashback to have Battle Cry of Freedom stuck in my head, but that works pretty well too...)

[billbindc]

8 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

The new Russian force will be a defensive one.  At the very best the newly reconstituted Russian ground forces should make it more difficult for Ukraine to collapse any one sector of front.  Russia might simply have too many bodies in place for that to happen.  However, local collapses are even MORE likely because the reconstituted units are likely to be of even lower quality than the units that started the war.

So essentially, mobilization allows Russia to freeze the conflict somewhat rather than potentially suffer an imminent collapse? If that is so, I can't see how Putin doesn't take the risk given what Soldatov and others are describing is going on in the Russian military. But yes, the risk is enormous. I keep hearing variations of "Putin has no idea...and realizes he has no idea...what he might be unleashing with this".

[danfrodo]

Can't wait to see what I wake up to Monday morning, pacific time.

Shoving a bunch of press-ganged soldiers into the lines could go either way, I'm w Steve on this.  Yeah, you got more bodies, but they are also more likely to make the herd stampede to the rear under fire.  What's Russian word for 'fragging'?

Ukrainian artillery should soon be plentiful enough to make anyone want to run.

And the airpower that Machor's videos showed -- seems like Ukraine has been holding back assets for a special surprise party, perhaps?

[dan/california]

 

41 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I've seen at least two different reports of mobilization papers.  No overt signs that they are faked, so assuming they are real...

Two things will likely happen right away:

1. existing conscripts (i.e. not the ones just called up) will be put into the frontlines as replacements.  This provides about 113,000 equipped and basic trained soldiers into the battlefield
2. an unknown number of reservists will get their basic kit and head to the front probably without any refresher training.  There is likely going to be a large callup of officers as Russia has lost so many already.  I'd guess they'd call up about 100,000 in order to minimize disruption to the economy.  They can always call up more later on and rush them to the front.  But then again, Putin might follow the "go big or go home" philosophy and call up significantly more than that. 

What about personal equipment?

It should be presumed that Russia has enough personal kit (firearms + field gear) to equip about 226,000 men at a minimum.  I'm making this estimate based on Russia's annual conscription needs which, theoretically, have not been put into combat.  That means they have enough uniforms, boots, small arms, etc. for all the ready conscripts and about 100,000 reservists minimum (which might be another reason the number might not be higher).

What Russia can do beyond about 225,000 immediate replacements is totally unknown from what I can tell.  Meaning, nobody I've read has come up with a good number for what Russia has in stock for uniforms and weapons.  As I said earlier, judging by what they've done with DLPR forces since the war started seems to indicate they've been struggling to keep up with demand.

What about vehicles?

This is the one that experts have been focused on and it doesn't look good for Russia.

There are ample signs that Russia has found it difficult to find replacements for all of its losses.  What we don't know is how many vehicles are in the next tier of readiness (i.e. months to get operational).  It could be that they are sitting on quite a large number of vehicles that could theoretically come onto the battlefield in the next 1-3 months.  Or maybe not!

Even if Russia is able to field a whole bunch more vehicles, they will likely be older and lacking lots of updated equipment.  For sure they are not going to easily find replacements for the higher tech stuff such as EW, radar, Buk, and other systems.  I very much doubt they had those sorts of thing sitting around in ready reserve status.

Steve

 

Do we actually know if they have been taking in as many conscripts as they say have been for the last few years? Or was this yet another opportunity for graft? The recruiter gets a bribe from the guy who didn't have to show, and the commanders of both the training unit, and the operational unit get to pocket the imaginary soldier's pay. Given the proven state of the Russian army is there ANY reason to think there hasn't been a fair bit of this going on? I can even envision a unit of Potemkin special soldiers the get moved around just in front of the inspectors s they make their rounds. Is this any crazier than seven or eight things we now know to be true?

 

[LongLeftFlank]

7 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

For a long time my login password was "BigBooty", which is pronounced booTAY of course

That US wingnut that was posing for the cameras should have to stay there.  But sigh... so far there's been no blanket travel restriction by US citizens to Russia, so he's allowed to go there and come back without legal action against him.

Steve

Being a 6'5 nerd and a southpaw (LongLeftFlank), I once went to a Halloween party as John Big Booté.  (I don't look enough like Lithgow to pull off Lizardo)

It being the 'best' kind of party, pretty much everyone got it. And I had wisely saved over a light gray early 1980s suit with a vest. The eyeglasses were the hardest part of the ensemble.

[Battlefront.com]

ISW says it is seeing signs that Russia is preparing for renewed offensive operations towards Zaporizhia and Kryvyi Rih, but they doubt Russia's ability to pull either of them off.  I don't know what they are planning on using for forces to advance and what they think they're going to do even if they get to those cities.  Because it is stupid and futile I'm inclined to think ISW has it wrong, however this is Russia we're talking about.

It could be that Russia intends on these attacks to be it's new way of keeping pressure on Ukraine as it firms up defenses along the Kharkiv-Donetsk axis.

Steve

[G.I. Joe]

1 hour ago, sross112 said:

Over the last week there seems to be a pretty significant uptick in videos of UAF activity. Lots of low flying planes, helos and of course the strike on the island. Anyone have any idea what has changed that we are seeing a lot more in air on the Ukrainian side?

My best guess is that's it's probably a sign they're shifting to the offensive. The Ukrainian Air Force is in a situation very similar to the Iranian Air Force in the Iran-Iraq War - the country that built their combat jets is straight up hostile (only much more so in this case), so replacement aircraft are...unlikely. Ukraine does at least have allies with MiG-29s and Su-25s, but the pool is still limited. And when it comes to the Su-24 and Su-27 they might not have a source (Vietnam might be the most plausible source for an Su-27 version that wouldn't require extensive retraining...and I would not set the probability of that happening higher than low single digits). So I don't doubt they will be very cautious about force preservation... Seeing more extensive air activity would make me assume that they're feeling more confident about the battlespace and consider the mission critically important.

Edited May 9, 2022 by G.I. Joe

[chrisl]

So if they don't have enough vehicles, how do they get everybody to the front lines?  Train to the nearest railhead and then march them in?  Right after UA got a bunch of new longer range, very accurate artillery and appears to have gotten some VT fuzes with it?

Are they taking "drown you in the blood of Russian soldiers" from many pages earlier in this thread literally?

[Ts4EVER]

7 minutes ago, chrisl said:

So if they don't have enough vehicles, how do they get everybody to the front lines?  Train to the nearest railhead and then march them in?  Right after UA got a bunch of new longer range, very accurate artillery and appears to have gotten some VT fuzes with it?

Are they taking "drown you in the blood of Russian soldiers" from many pages earlier in this thread literally?

Putin may actually be under the impression that the younger generation has grown soft and decadent and that this is just what the doctor ordered.

[Suleyman]

They might just mobilize a small portion for manpower to hold ground while bringing in other contract units from around Russia to buff up their offensives in Ukraine. My advice to them is to use older equipment because they really will lose all the new stuff in Ukraine at this rate. 

[Battlefront.com]

12 minutes ago, billbindc said:

So essentially, mobilization allows Russia to freeze the conflict somewhat rather than potentially suffer an imminent collapse?

That would be the sensible strategy for Russia to adopt at this point.  It could work for a while, too, because I'm not sure Ukraine is ready to deal with a body rich enemy.  So far Russia's been body poor, which might require Ukraine to adapt to a different method of fighting than what it's done for the past 3 months.  Personally, I think they are up for it.

Smashing into a section of front that is held by hastily rebuilt units sporting mostly conscripts should be a pushover even if they are numerically strong.  So I think Ukraine could hit specific areas hard and gain back ground.  But the body rich defenses will make it harder to exploit breakthroughs quickly.  It's akin to the difference between walking through light mud and heavy mud.  You might be able to do either, but the latter is slower and takes more energy.

12 minutes ago, billbindc said:

If that is so, I can't see how Putin doesn't take the risk given what Soldatov and others are describing is going on in the Russian military. But yes, the risk is enormous. I keep hearing variations of "Putin has no idea...and realizes he has no idea...what he might be unleashing with this".

Which is no doubt why Putin has been hesitating on pulling the emergency handle.  Putin does not strike me as a man who likes making massive decisions knowing he doesn't understand what might happen.  After all, he just made a massive decision thinking he knew what was going to happen and look how well that turned out for him

The bottom line here is Russia needs to toss in the conscripts and call up the reserves if it is going to survive the summer in Ukraine.  Has to.  The longer he waits the harder it is going to be to hang on and likely whatever conditions he fears will get worse.  He must know this.  Therefore, he has a lot of incentive to move ahead with "war" sooner rather than later and take the risk that it will work out OK.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

2 minutes ago, Suleyman said:

They might just mobilize a small portion for manpower to hold ground while bringing in other contract units from around Russia to buff up their offensives in Ukraine.

They've already done that and it didn't work.  Now there's nothing remaining of practical value to draw from without ending the unit's previous mission in that particular area as they are already weakened.

Steve

[danfrodo]

15 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

ISW says it is seeing signs that Russia is preparing for renewed offensive operations towards Zaporizhia and Kryvyi Rih, but they doubt Russia's ability to pull either of them off.  I don't know what they are planning on using for forces to advance and what they think they're going to do even if they get to those cities.  Because it is stupid and futile I'm inclined to think ISW has it wrong, however this is Russia we're talking about.

It could be that Russia intends on these attacks to be it's new way of keeping pressure on Ukraine as it firms up defenses along the Kharkiv-Donetsk axis.

Steve

with each of these I keep projecting Hitler looking a map.  "we'll counterattack here Mortain while the enemy is foolishly sweeping unhindered behind our lines!".  But maybe Putin is calling the shots, and thinks UA is weak in those areas, or he thinks he can do this a some kind of feint/spoiling attack.  It doesn't have to make military sense, it's all desperation at this point.