How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[billbindc]

12 minutes ago, Silentkilarz said:

Ahh, I must have missed that post waded through the quagmire lately. Their Logi is terrible compared to Western forces as they are still handloading Grad rockets into the launchers from what I've seen, along with ammo crates, ammo storage and even their MRE's.

Well its seems to be competing with the tanks on orbital launching capabilities. Im sure Russia will post BDA's for UKR like they always do lol.

 

[Butschi]

11 hours ago, chrisl said:

I'm distinguishing them by ML being something where I can use a lightweight algorithm for the tracking, even if it takes a lot of training. I also live in a world where ML is expected to be explainable.  Deterministic(-ish) once trained. I already do similar tracking with ML.

AI is a bucket of mystery that sucks energy and looks impressive on some problems and falls hard on its face on similar problems that aren't easily distinguished from the ones it can do.

I think you are going by your own definition, not the one that is generally used? Wikipedia says:

Quote

Machine learning (ML) is a field of study in artificial intelligence concerned with the development and study of statistical algorithms that can learn from data and generalize to unseen data and thus perform tasks without explicit instructions.

Merriam Webster has a similar definition if you don't like Wikipedia and I agree with both. Nowadays we usually mean Deep Learning when talking about AI but whatever. Anyway, no, ML is not the subset of methods that are "explainable".

Um, really, no offense meant but your last paragraph "AI is a mystery" is not a fact it is your opinion. And frankly it makes you sound like you don't like it because you don't understand it.

Lastly, I was talking about full autonomy, not just tracking. Of course you can do tracking good with classical(?) ML but that won't fly the drone, do detection, coordinate with other dtones, etc. You can do all of that with classical methods, too, but the more complex, coordinated, etc. you want the behaviour to be, the more effort it will take (for probably less performance).

 

[LongLeftFlank]

12 minutes ago, Eug85 said:

Unfortunately, Google Translate can't translate videos. So I have no idea what these people are talking about in the video.

 

And they say I'm no good at this.

[dan/california]

18 minutes ago, billbindc said:

 

That brings up several possibilities, and I admit they are only possibilities. The first is that it is supply chain week throughout the Axis of Evil. The second is the the U.S. is REALLY peeved about the North Korean missiles and quietly included just enough of something special to make them go away. Anybody else have a thought?

[Silentkilarz]

35 minutes ago, billbindc said:

 

Well, Putin better go buy a couple more horses for Kim.

[LongLeftFlank]

Breaking away from the meme bombing for a moment, I've also been scrutinising the daily maps.

Understanding that these are OSINT and not a full picture of the war, while there has been a great deal of action, especially RU bombardments and airstrikes (as well as UA counterbombardments along road axes, plus lots of drone strikes everywhere), there have been NO significant territorial changes in the last 10 days in the Donetsk operational direction. So barring a new buildup, that offensive seems to be culminating in front of what looks like a pretty solid barrier of streams and balkas, with towns behind them (i.e. plenty of concealment for fortifications and UA forces).

The Russians will likely secure a small salient of (heavily mined?) townless open country west of Donetsk, but that just brings them up against yet another Ukrainian fortified zone.

https://map.ukrdailyupdate.com/?lat=48.013812&lng=37.336006&z=12&d=19986&c=1&l=0

https://www.scribblemaps.com/maps/view/The-War-in-Ukraine/091194

****

....In the past (I'll try to dig up the links), some OSINT commentators (I think Tatarigami is one) have advanced the hypothesis that the further away the Russian assault battalions get from the Donetsk railhead and higher HQ area, the more clumsily they and their supporting assets perform.

1. Using 'meat' to locate UKR positions for intensive bombardment requires a certain level of coordination, even when drone assisted, and time is of the essence.

2. That 'last mile' (10-25kms, really) seems to be a real beotch for them to sustain and control, especially being under constant drone threat.

Extending hypothesis:  Self reliance and improvisation (with unfortunate exceptions in raw TD forces) has been a Ukrainian strong suit from the start of this war. Not too much on the RU side, if you set aside 'hold to the last man' type orders.

Edited 5 hours ago by LongLeftFlank

[sburke]

39 minutes ago, dan/california said:

That brings up several possibilities, and I admit they are only possibilities. The first is that it is supply chain week throughout the Axis of Evil. The second is the the U.S. is REALLY peeved about the North Korean missiles and quietly included just enough of something special to make them go away. Anybody else have a thought?

I don't think the UA necessarily needed the US at all for this op.  It is possible based on the earlier train hack that they knew exactly when the ideal time frame would be.  Didn't even need our C4ISR.  From the moment they knew Russia was bringing in tons of stuff by train from N Korea they were probably detailing possible actions.

Given the limited options for locations to unload, the knowledge that loading would likely be slow and leave lots of material in the open for some period of time even if they worked round the clock and the generally unstable nature of N Korea explosives it seems like it was probably inevitable.  

The other thing I really like is I am sure Putin does not consider Kim his equal.  If he has to go back for more because his logistics look inept you know he isn't gonna be thrilled.  It gives Kim more leverage in negotiating what he gets for it, which is not good for us.  Both Iran and N Korea are likely getting a lot of technology transfers in return for the aid they provide.

[chrisl]

1 hour ago, Butschi said:

I think you are going by your own definition, not the one that is generally used? Wikipedia says:

Merriam Webster has a similar definition if you don't like Wikipedia and I agree with both. Nowadays we usually mean Deep Learning when talking about AI but whatever. Anyway, no, ML is not the subset of methods that are "explainable".

Um, really, no offense meant but your last paragraph "AI is a mystery" is not a fact it is your opinion. And frankly it makes you sound like you don't like it because you don't understand it.

Lastly, I was talking about full autonomy, not just tracking. Of course you can do tracking good with classical(?) ML but that won't fly the drone, do detection, coordinate with other dtones, etc. You can do all of that with classical methods, too, but the more complex, coordinated, etc. you want the behaviour to be, the more effort it will take (for probably less performance).

 

ML is not a subset of methods that are explainable, but there are a subset of ML methods that are explainable.  At least in the sense that you can tie them back to specific parameters and physical models.  Not all ML methods are, but you can do ML within those constraints.  And you have to when you're trying to convince scientists that they should use ML to filter large data sets where they will likely never see the data that got filtered out.

You don't need the ML to do much besides identify the mines.  Flying is deterministic and doesn't need AI or ML (and isn't really a good application for them).  Even coordination can likely be done just fine with relatively simple deterministic methods without being demanding compute-wise.

As far as I've seen from most "AI" methods is that they're reducible to enormous multi-parameter fits, with similar pathology.  It's not a "mystery" but AI methods have bad habits of looking good on some data and terrible on other data that are only very slightly different (extrapolation outside the fitted space, rather than interpolation within it).  And because it doesn't really give you the details of how it came to that result, and it's hidden in the parameters of a giant fit, it's not particularly explainable.

[Battlefront.com]

11 hours ago, KoopCL said:

Hello everyone, long time lurker, wanted to drop my 2 cents when it comes to this quote in particular.

 

Two problems with the logic; the first may seem counterintuitive, but Russia's populace at large seems to be rather apathetic to politics in general (which, to be fair, seems to be by design: if your populace in not interested in politics they will not vote you out, or ask too many questions, or worry that all opposition seems to be in jail or exiled; we had a similar phenomenon with Pinochet eroding trust in "politicians" as their own separate class of people, better to leave it to the army, because an apathetic populace is a calmed populace). If suddenly you dedicate all your propaganda efforts to show the average Russian "looks how **** your life is! Looks how it compares to ours! Look how the mafia in charge takes advantage of you!" you may have the unintended consequence of having these people pushed further in denial or towards support for the regime because you force them to ask the very uncomfortable question of "why did we let it go this far? Why did we silently support ourselves being lied to?". Its easier to go further into denial than to admit that your life sucks because you haven't taken the steps to improve it and instead relied on the comfort of familiarity, its the same twisted train of thoughts that happens with conspiracy theorists faced with undeniable evidence that they are nuts, or with victims in abusive relationships. Add how proud of their nation the average Russian seems to be and its a recipe for disaster.

 

The second issue, is that it already happened. Post Yeltsin, arguably until 2022 and for sure until 2014, Russia was part of the world at large same as Poland, or Germany, or China. Russians could (and would, and still do) visit other countries, have expat communities, access to the internet, migrant family members living abroad, visitors and tourists coming to Russia, etc. They don't discredit stuff like "they have political participation!" and "there's opposition parties" and "there's international cooperation" and "everyone has indoor plumbing!" because they think it's a bunch of unbelievable lies; they have been able too see that with their own eyes; putting it as an ad on a hacked Russian TV channel wont do anything to "motivate the populace". There's no point to tell them "if you rebel against Putin, your living standards may reach those of the average German!" when you have a huge community of Russians living in Germany, enjoying their standards of living, and still fervently supporting Putin (if they express an opinion at all). 

 

You know what the West didn't do for all those years that they were "showing his people it shouldn't be like this"? "Play army". And what were the consequences? Putin felt emboldened to go to ever larger and larger military expeditions until the straw broke the camels back.

 

I always say "hi" to people who delurk, so "hi!"

What you covered in your post are examples of the failed policy of an open relationship with Russia leading to a better Russia.  Up until 2014, at least, many in the West had a theory that Russia would become a better place through exposure to alternatives.  The same theory has long been used with China as well.  I don't think many people think this worked out very well.  The only people that seem to keep up with this theory are either dreamers or those business interests that would be harmed by taking a less friendly approach to such regimes.

We must also keep in mind that most Russians understand how horrible their leaders are.  Navalny tried VERY HARD to show the levels of corruption and the population, basically, shrugged and said "well, it is what it is".

We've had several very long conversations about the nature of Russian culture and explored the possible reasons that exposure and inclusion didn't work.  The conclusion that outsiders can change Russian culture if they just try harder has no basis in fact.  Especially because insiders haven't had much success either.

Steve

 

[Kraft]

4 hours ago, Silentkilarz said:

So are these ammo dump explosions a result of Russian incompetence or UKR luck? Mass wave of drones to overwhelm AA? 

There are claims more than 100 drones were used against the Tver depot, including new Jet engine ones - I have however not seen any evidence of AA working or the drones flying by in someones video.

I doubt it would have been so successfull had the russians not stored ammo, probably against protocol, in large quantities above ground.

[dan/california]

58 minutes ago, sburke said:

I don't think the UA necessarily needed the US at all for this op.  It is possible based on the earlier train hack that they knew exactly when the ideal time frame would be.  Didn't even need our C4ISR.  From the moment they knew Russia was bringing in tons of stuff by train from N Korea they were probably detailing possible actions.

Given the limited options for locations to unload, the knowledge that loading would likely be slow and leave lots of material in the open for some period of time even if they worked round the clock and the generally unstable nature of N Korea explosives it seems like it was probably inevitable.  

The other thing I really like is I am sure Putin does not consider Kim his equal.  If he has to go back for more because his logistics look inept you know he isn't gonna be thrilled.  It gives Kim more leverage in negotiating what he gets for it, which is not good for us.  Both Iran and N Korea are likely getting a lot of technology transfers in return for the aid they provide.

We should quietly mention to the Kremlin that if they give anything TRULY destabilizing that  to North Koreans or Iranians, will result in us giving the Poles some things the Kremlin REALLY doesn't want them to have.

[Lethaface]

7 hours ago, CHARLIE43 said:

@danfrodo What you or I think, decide or talk about doesn't matter in the least. It's all talk on a cereal box as far as anyone of any importance is concerned.

BTW, don't put word in my mouth with you, you, and you spiel.

So just keep to your circle of influence and don't dare to try and be informed outside of it, let alone discuss it, because it doesn't matter at all. Why you even complain about this thread, as you don't have influence over whether people post stuff here or whether the thread is closed or not?

Might as well start lying in your box, nothing what you will change that outcome anyway so just begin with the end.
 

[Lethaface]

7 hours ago, CHARLIE43 said:

@LongLeftFlank I have nothing but goodwill towards Ukraine, but what happens when they run out of Ukrainians? That can't be good for anyone else, right?

Well that's for Ukrainians to decide, isn't it? 
They feel like fighting for their country, I think it's pretentious to entertain the line of thinking you are on. 

Think of it like this: you are fighting someone who is raping your sister. It is not an easy fight and you are taking as good as you are dealing. Suddenly people onlooking the fight start talking among themselves: 'what happens if he loses? that can't be good for anyone else?'

[sburke]

36 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

We must also keep in mind that most Russians understand how horrible their leaders are.  Navalny tried VERY HARD to show the levels of corruption and the population, basically, shrugged and said "well, it is what it is".

Steve

 

when you are crapping in an outhouse and the guys who invaded Ukraine are trying to mail home washing machines and sort of using indoor plumbing (i say sort of as the pics we have seen show that apparently these guys didn't realize the little handle was for flushing) they gotta know that things are better elsewhere.  Their response seems to be "I hate those guys for having toilets and washing machines!".

Basically the term vandals SHOULD have been coined from dealing with Russians.

[Battlefront.com]

When I returned here, after being away for the day, and saw a half dozen new pages I went through my usual hope/dread reaction.

1.  There's a lot of posts because Ukraine did something amazing

2.  There's a lot of inane, pointless, squabbling going on

After reading through all the posts I came to the conclusion that, this time, both situations were true.

And with that, let's keep focused on the first category (Ukraine did something amazing) and stop with the BS of the second (inane posts).  I don't want to be handling out vacations.

Steve

[Lethaface]

5 hours ago, CHARLIE43 said:

Straight to the chase? American boots on the ground. All the ammo and weapons will only last so long. Just like WWII, eventually that's what will have to happen. Mass invasion of either Russia or occupied Ukraine, or evenboth at the same time. We'll let @The_Capt figure out all the details.

Crazy enough for yaz?

Murican Meat assaults FTW!!

 

[The_Capt]

4 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Got it, fair enough.

As for US 'boots on the ground', they're pretty much already there in the most useful  capacity. For some definition of 'boots'.

But as has been noted elsewhere, BFC isn't going to do a CMBS update.

...If you must scratch that itch, modding CMSF might be more fruitful (in spite of dated ATGM, lack of drones, etc.).

Sniff….my first meme…I am speechless….for a little while…

[Battlefront.com]

My take on the very successful ammo depot strikes, with help from previous posts:

1.  This was a well planned, well resourced, well executed attack.

2.  This was a very SUCCESSFUL attack.  Not only massive quantities of munitions were blown up, but so far we've not heard of any failed ammo depot attacks as part of this operation.  That should scare the pee-pee out of anybody living near one of the surviving dumps.  Because from where I sit, Ukraine just scored 100% and that means they can do it again.

3.  I fully believe that sburke is correct that the rail network hacks helped this in some way.  Russians are very, very, very slow to change their habits even when they're shown to be vulnerable.  We all remember the large number of ammo dumps and HQs that Ukraine blew up in 2022 before Russia finally pulled things back.  We also know how horribly dysfunctional Russia is in terms of internal communications and translating them into action.  Kursk as an example.  The point is that I doubt that Russia changed much of its rail activities after the hack, even though sensibly they should have.

4.  The attacks were most likely coordinated to coincide with some identified vulnerability.  Loading/unloading trains/trucks is a very plausible theory, no matter how that information was obtained (the railroad hack, HUMINT, Western sat monitoring, rented sat monitoring, etc.)

5.  It's very plausible that NK and/or Iranian munitions were involved simply because we know from many other sources that Russia has been relying upon them for years now.  Whether it's some new munition type form either of these two nations... well... no way to know, but it's of course possible.

6.  It's entirely possible Ukraine did use a huge number of drones, but it's also possible it's BS.  Russians tend to over exaggerate Ukrainian attacks because, in their mind, it's more manly to be beat by a large number of something than a couple.  They then post to social media and Ukrainians then take the wild claims as true because, in most other people's mindset, being able to use a huge number of something in Russia shows how weak Russia is.  Especially given that Russia has been at this for 2.5 years and still can't defend itself properly.

7.  I have a feeling that we will see an impact on Donbas operations sooner rather than later.  It is improbable that Russia could lose so much in such a short period of time and have it not impact operations.  I'm sure they'll "shell starve" the rest of the front in order to favor Donbas, but the VOLUME of munitions lost makes it less likely that will be enough to make up for the shortfall (short term, of course).

8.  That said, I don't think this will have any significant impact on the war itself.  Even in 2022, when Ukraine was blowing up forward dumps left and right, Russia managed to keep things going even if not as intensely as it had before.

Steve

[Kraft]

Supposedly, russia tested a Sarmat ICBM and it failed - ww3 averted in any case since they cant exit silo without exploding?

 

 

Edited 3 hours ago by Kraft

[Offshoot]

5 hours ago, chrisl said:

Are they accumulating a lot of artillery shells that aren't getting fired for lack of tubes?  Rockets without launchers?  Kilotons of explosive stuff in reserve and they have to send in meat assaults seems like a major disconnect in operations.

Too many North Korean rockets pouring in...

The latest depot hit, Tikhoretsk, is mentioned in this long article about delivery and storage of NK ammo to Russia (it's from Feb/March but I don't recall it being linked before).

Major Munitions Transfers from North Korea to Russia

[Offshoot]

35 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

6.  It's entirely possible Ukraine did use a huge number of drones, but it's also possible it's BS.  Russians tend to over exaggerate Ukrainian attacks because, in their mind, it's more manly to be beat by a large number of something than a couple.  They then post to social media and Ukrainians then take the wild claims as true because, in most other people's mindset, being able to use a huge number of something in Russia shows how weak Russia is.  Especially given that Russia has been at this for 2.5 years and still can't defend itself properly.

The claim of 100s of drones being used was first reported by RBC-Ukraine citing sources in the Ukrainian MoD (https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/analytics/will-strike-on-russia-s-toropets-arsenal-1726679973.html)

[sburke]

32 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

 

8.  That said, I don't think this will have any significant impact on the war itself.  Even in 2022, when Ukraine was blowing up forward dumps left and right, Russia managed to keep things going even if not as intensely as it had before.

Steve

The one area I think it matters is timing.  Losing that much material that quickly likely means a lot of immediate plans just got whacked.  With the offensive in the Donbas seemingly at a low point at the moment one wonders how this will impact the immediate need around Kursk.  I'll assume for the moment (cause I don't really know) that the Kursk area is drawing from different depots and is not immediately affected.  However if Russia is still prioritizing the Donbas, would it mean a draw down in available artillery for Russia to counter the UA offensive?

Second item is a little more long term.  What is the effect given US politics and how that may or may not have influenced Russia thinking about what they needed to accomplish and by when from a purely political goals perspective?  The US election is now more in doubt than ever that Putin won't be facing a more hawkish US administration and a consequent aggressive leadership with NATO allies, the loss of some momentum in the short term could very well have longer term consequences.  For example, it is very possible that in November Russia could still be trying to retake the area around Kursk.  Permission for US and NATO weapons to strike targets deeper in Russia if not already given is likely soon.  The logistical strain Russia faces right now in trying to determine how many depots are in immediate risk and how to disperse them is something they will need to overcome.

Between Kursk and these strikes it seems like Ukraine has in the space of 6 weeks forced Russia to confront two very difficult issues that consume energy and time.  These are resources Russia doesn't really have much of to spare.  I doubt they were coordinated, but their combination does magnify the overall impact especially if it takes some of the pressure off in the Donbas to allow the UA flexibility about how long to commit around Kursk.

It may not change the overall trajectory of the war, but any slackening in Russia's war effort couldn't have come at a better time.  As you have noted before Steve, Russia has a poor track record of making hard decisions.  They tend to go for the middle choice and end up making 2 situations bad instead of just one.

[Blazing 88's]

1 hour ago, Offshoot said:

The claim of 100s of drones being used was first reported by RBC-Ukraine citing sources in the Ukrainian MoD (https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/analytics/will-strike-on-russia-s-toropets-arsenal-1726679973.html)

According to the latest from Ukraine Matters Youtube channel, the Palyanytsya missile drone was used.

Edited 1 hour ago by Blazing 88's

[sburke]

Was curious about what these strikes represent overall for Russia.  How many of these are there?  Is this 10%, 50%, 1%?  Had to leave bing cause it is freakin worthless and found this on google. The answer was, there aren't many.  It would seem this may very well have more of an effect on Russian logistics than we might have assumed. 

they listed within about 700 km

23rd Arsenal -
Just 16 km south of the destroyed 107th arsenal in Toropets, it is about half the size of the 107th. Its stored ammunition remains unknown, but its smaller area (2.6 sq km vs. 5 sq km) suggests less importance.

was struck after this article was printed.  The 23rd was identified as the site in Tikhoretsk so unclear what this means and if they misidentified a location.  They did not identify one in Tikhoretsk.  Also ISW in identifying locations in ATACMS range included the airfield in Tikhoretsk but not the ammo dump.  This would be at the extreme limit of ATACMS range so the US and NATO granting permission doesn't seem to make that much of a difference.  I would assume getting those missiles may give the UA the option to pull off something hitting multiple targets in one strike much more easily.)

13th Arsenal
Located 680 km from Ukraine's border in the Novgorod region, near Kotovo, with an area of about 3 sq km.

51st Arsenal
Situated 530 km away, east of Moscow near Kirzhach in the Vladimir region. It covers 3.5 sq km and is heavily protected by air defense.

73rd Arsenal
Also in the Vladimir region, near Ivanovo, Krutovo, and Eseno. Spanning 7 sq km, it underwent a comprehensive upgrade between 2018 and 2021. It may store valuable ammunition and is 650 km from the border.

67th Arsenal (I'm gonna go out on a limb here and say these guys are crapping their pants)
One of the closest at 114 km from Ukraine, near Karachev in the Bryansk region. Some ammunition is stored in the open, as observed in satellite images from 2021.

68th Arsenal
The farthest, about 700 km away, near Mozdok in North Ossetia. It spans 2.2 sq km and has been recently updated.

 

How many Russian arsenals are within Ukraine's reach? (espreso.tv)

After the explosions at a storage site in Toropets, a question arises: are there other large ammunition depots within the range of Ukraine's long-range weapons?

The recent attack did not just target a regular depot but one of the primary arsenals of the Russian Defense Ministry’s Main Missile and Artillery Directorate (GRAU), known as the 107th. This site stored tens of tons of ammunition, including ballistic missiles. 

Overall, there are only about twenty GRAU arsenals in Russia, most of which are historically situated in the central European part of the country. These locations align with Soviet-era Cold War strategies.

Although the weapon used in the strike remains uncertain, information about Palianytsia has surfaced. Within a 750-kilometer range from Ukraine, several GRAU arsenals exist:

 

 

[sburke]

interesting technology option.

Ukrainian Defense Tech Collaboration Unveils Aero Azimuth: A New Era in Countering Drone Warfare · TechUkraine

The primary objective of Aero Azimuth is to pinpoint the location of enemy drone operators, enabling swift and precise targeting to neutralize or disrupt their operations. This strategic approach not only eliminates the drone itself but also targets its most valuable and expensive asset: the external pilot and crew. The extensive training and expertise required for these roles make their elimination a significant blow to the enemy’s capabilities.

Innovative Technology and Strategic Deployment

Aero Azimuth is designed to be deployed 9 kilometers from the frontline, operating at varying altitudes. While this proximity might seem relatively close in the context of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war, the system’s passive nature makes it detectable only through optical reconnaissance, a challenging feat at such distances.

Kvertus representatives report that during testing at medium altitudes, Aero Azimuth successfully detected radio emissions from up to 60 kilometers away and triangulated their source within a 24-30 kilometer range.

 

New Ukrainian Aero Azimuth system targets drone crews, not just UAVs (espreso.tv)

What is Aero Azimuth?
The Aero Azimuth electronic surveillance system was introduced by the Ukrainian manufacturer Kvertus in September 2024. While ground-based versions of the Azimuth system were already in service with the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the latest version is now mounted on a flying platform. A balloon produced by the Ukrainian company Aerobavovna was used.

This detection system can locate drone controllers from several tens of kilometers away. 

"The main task of the complex, called Aero Azimuth, is to pinpoint the location of enemy drone crews for targeting and destruction," explains the Militarnyi portal.

Instead of focusing on shooting down drones, the Ukrainian military can now hunt more valuable targets - the drone operators and their crews. Properly training a drone operator is far more costly and time-consuming than replacing a drone, making this approach highly effective.

How balloons are used in war
During the Anti-Terrorist Operation in Donbas, the Ukrainian Armed Forces maintained a unit dedicated to ballooning, though the use of these devices was less common compared to other leading militaries, according to Yurii Vysoven, co-founder of the Aerobavovna project.

"Initially, the Defense Forces purchased British-made balloons for their needs, but they soon began developing their own. Aerobavovna now produces balloons that support surveillance (reconnaissance), relay signals for drone control, and enhance communication signals. They have also been used to deliver explosives," Vysoven explained.

As of early 2024, there were around a hundred different Ukrainian-made balloons, continuously evolving from basic models to high-tech designs. Aerobavovna developed a special shape for these devices, as conventional balloons would be grounded in strong winds. The company’s design merges the properties of a balloon and a kite to enhance stability.

“Larger models are powered through wires running upwards, allowing them to operate for up to two weeks with refueling or battery changes from below,” Vysoven added. The aerostats can withstand wind gusts of up to 15 m/s and can carry payloads ranging from 4 to 25 kilograms.

How Aero Azimuth works
The Aero Azimuth system includes a set of electronics, a balloon, a trailer with a winch for launching, a gas cylinder system for inflation, and tools for maintenance and repair. The system is recommended to be positioned about 9 kilometers from the front line, at low to medium altitudes. While this might seem close, the passive nature of the system makes it detectable only through optical reconnaissance, which is quite challenging at that distance.

“Aero Azimuth uses electromagnetic signal intelligence (SIGINT) to detect and locate radio frequency signals emitted by drone operators to control their aircraft. This includes signals for communication, telemetry, and data links,” explains Steve Brown, a former munitions specialist and bomb disposal officer. “The information collected by Azimuth can be relayed in real-time to units that can then take action against the drone operators.”

The optimal operating height for Aero Azimuth balloons is between 300 and 700 meters. At these altitudes, the system can detect targets up to 60 kilometers away and accurately triangulate positions at distances of 24-30 kilometers.

The combination of passive Azimuth equipment and the fabric of the balloon itself results in an extremely low radar signature. Additionally, because the Aero Azimuth remains relatively stationary, it’s difficult to detect through electronic means. However, enemy forces can still attempt to locate these systems using drones.

How Aero Azimuth will be used at the front
“The long flight time of balloons allows us to set up a relatively inexpensive and dense network for aerial electronic, radar, or optical reconnaissance and create signal repeater systems,” explains Militarnyi.

Using multiple Aero Azimuth systems alongside other sensors offers round-the-clock surveillance over a vast area. While Ukrainian forces can target individual drones, Russian forces still hold a numerical advantage in UAVs. By focusing on the drone operators or control hubs, Ukrainian forces can disrupt enemy tactics, forcing them to frequently change positions and limiting their drone operations.

Interestingly, the biggest threat to these balloons often comes from “friendly fire.” Due to the challenge of notifying all nearby units, Ukrainian balloons are sometimes mistakenly shot down by their own forces. However, Aerobavovna considers such incidents manageable, as the balloons lose pressure gradually and descend slowly, allowing the payload to be recovered. “If a drone crashes, it’s lost, but with a balloon, there’s a good chance of saving the equipment,” notes Yurii Vysoven, co-founder of Aerobavovna.