How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

13 minutes ago, Fenris said:

Sorry if this is waaay OT but I think he's serious and it made me laugh

 

If Alex Jones wants to go to Russia to enjoy all those freedoms, I'm sure a GoFundMe would be very successful.  Plus, he'd also get out from under the oppressive thumb of the IRS and court system.  He could live the dream of freedom just like Sowden.

Seriously though, Putin knows his audience well.  He'll no doubt even get a couple of the whackiest of the whackjobs to take him up on his offer.  As with most extremists, there's a lot of talk but when it comes to giving up their comfortable lives there's not a lot of action.

Here's a fairly entertaining article in Newsweek about the Russian offer and Jones' hyping it:

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/other/putin-s-offer-of-conservative-sanctuary-piques-maga-interest/ar-AA1p8m6O

 

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Another article in the Western press about the Russian economy being fundamentally unsound and headed for some type of calamity (short term) and years worth of ill effects:

https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-economy-outlook-ukraine-war-inflation-growth-worker-shortage-wages-2024-8

Quote

"In conclusion, the apparent resilience of the Russian economy is largely illusory, built on a precarious foundation of unsustainable government spending and short-term market factors," the researchers wrote.

For the last few years we've had some people post their doubts about the negative impacts on the Russian economy from the war and Western sanctions.  The message from me, and others, has always been to have patience.  The math just doesn't work in Russia's favor.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

I don't know if this was reported here already or not.  More evidence of how thinly stretched Russian manpower is.  This article details an infantry unit that was made up of technicians previously employed manning critical, skilled positions such as early warning radar systems.  The unit was made a few months ago and was thrown into battle at Kursk.

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/russians-baffled-after-putin-s-space-troops-deployed-as-infantry-in-kursk/ar-AA1p6AtE?cvid=3dffa213d71d4d9db5a74373203fba13&ei=50

Several things to note here.  First is that they had to pull technicians away from what they were trained for to serve as infantrymen.  That is NEVER a good sign for a military force. 

Second, that even after gathering the men together they weren't able to equip it with hardly anything beyond rifles.

Third, they were thrown into the front because a poorly trained and equipped bunch of rear logistics guys was the best they could come up with on short notice.

Steve

[chrisl]

8 hours ago, Vanir Ausf B said:

I am consistently hearing that we really didn't know, although why they chose not to tell us is debatable.

 

"weren't told" and "didn't know" are two entirely different things, separated by plausible deniability.

[sburke]

2 hours ago, Fenris said:

Sorry if this is waaay OT but I think he's serious and it made me laugh

 

well that is certainly a creative way to get more fodder for the meat assaults.

[Offshoot]

3 hours ago, Fenris said:

Sorry if this is waaay OT but I think he's serious and it made me laugh

 

It's kind of strange that they are selling this as a lifestyle change but the visas will be for only 3 months. Sounds like a way for Russian bureaucracy to skirt current rules to get a temporary workforce that they can then kick out at some point in the future should they want to.

[Carolus]

1 hour ago, Offshoot said:

It's kind of strange that they are selling this as a lifestyle change but the visas will be for only 3 months. Sounds like a way for Russian bureaucracy to skirt current rules to get a temporary workforce that they can then kick out at some point in the future should they want to.

The visas last as long as the frontline service, so there is no issue.

[Carolus]

https://t.me/ukr_sof/1183

Quote

Where do Russian pontoons "disappear" in Kurshchyna?

 

Operators of the Special Operations Forces together with units of the Defense Forces of Ukraine accurately destroy them.

 

The video shows the effective impressions of SSO operators of enemy engineering equipment in the Kursk region, as well as the detection and correction of Hymars fire on bridges and pontoon crossings.

 

In addition, together with the Defense Forces of Ukraine, an accumulation of equipment, a field warehouse of B/K, PMM, an electronic warfare complex, and a 152-mm D-20 gun were struck and destroyed.

Video shows more Russian vehicles behind the frontline getting clapped, including some pontoons getting the DPICM cluster treatment. From channel of Ukrainian SSO.

[Kraft]

40 minutes ago, Carolus said:

https://t.me/ukr_sof/1183

Video shows more Russian vehicles behind the frontline getting clapped, including some pontoons getting the DPICM cluster treatment. From channel of Ukrainian SSO.

Is that DPICM? Its not a big ring around the target with a (dead)zone in the middle that doesnt get hit

Edited August 21 by Kraft

[Carolus]

1 hour ago, Kraft said:

Is that DPICM? Its not a big ring around the target with a (dead)zone in the middle that doesnt get hit

Maybe thats how ATCMS or GMLRS spreads its cluster payload? The whole circle seems significantly larger than the ring a 155mm shell would produce. 

Edited August 21 by Carolus

[Carolus]

 

Too soon to see a reliable longterm trend, but China seems to buy more oil from ME, reducing imports from RU.

[Tux]

1 hour ago, Kraft said:

Is that DPICM? Its not a big ring around the target with a (dead)zone in the middle that doesnt get hit

Thanks, Kraft.  I've been meaning to ask a question here for a while and your comment makes this as good a time as any:

What do we think the verdict is wrt DPICM ammunition in this war?

Obviously we had a lengthy discussion on this board when it was first provided in 155 calibre but ultimately agreed it was the right thing to do due to a lack of plain HE alternatives.  Since then, though, I haven't personally seen much (if any) evidence of its efficacy over that same plain HE.  In fact, if anything I've seen a significant number of comments like Kraft's above, as well as others claiming that a 155 HE round would almost always cause at least as much damage to enemy targets as DPICM does.

So, if I propose that this war has shown DPICM to be 'at most comparable in effect to (and therefore not worth the additional cost and risk complexity over) normal HE', has anyone seen any significant evidence to the contrary?

[The_Capt]

12 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

Tbh. I think we are hiting from wall to wall regarding this... look folks, while part of this scenario is remotely possible, truth is modern Russia is not a Mordor from the past where tribes only wait to eat each other once Tsar is dead. It is relatively coherent nation-state with institutions, division of competences, developed security culture and 10+ mln megalopollies. Such interconnectivitty will not simply vanish into pieces because 2-3 folks at the top will potentially struggle a little in power vacuum after Putin. It's not Somalia.

Knowing a one or two things about this country (still very amateurish level) I must admitt it is difficult to me to imagine how this mythical 'fall of Russia' that people at Washington are so afraid of could look like in reality. No trully moving ideologies, population that is almost fully blaise about who rule them and why, no ambitious politicians with charisma and vision...I just don't see potentiall for apocalyptic chaos people sometimes imagine. And historical analogies can only carry us this far...times are changing, even in muscovy.

A nation state that has had two revolutions in less than a century, and came dangerously close to a coup last year.

The an answer to your “what would it take?” question is very simple…for the lights to go out.  An economic collapse leading to infrastructure failure and shortages is about all 150 million slightly evolved primates need to go feral.  Macro-social structures are an illusion - “imagined community” Hararri called them. That illusion fractures and micro-social reality takes over.  We have seen this in enough places to understand it does not take much.  Russia can barely hold itself together on a good day - those eagles are pointing two heads in opposite directions for a reason.  Under the pressure of war, economic creaking and a tightly gripping autocracy we have all the factors of a brittle state.

My question is not “how could Russia ever fail?”  It is “how has it held it together so far?”

Edited August 21 by The_Capt

[ArmouredTopHat]

Specific footage of the bridges getting hammered. Clear the AFU have fire supremacy over the area, cant imagine the Russians being able to move much over them. 

Amazing to see the Ukrainians leverage so much firepower over this as well. Clearly a priority target!

Edited August 21 by ArmouredTopHat

[The_Capt]

56 minutes ago, Tux said:

Thanks, Kraft.  I've been meaning to ask a question here for a while and your comment makes this as good a time as any:

What do we think the verdict is wrt DPICM ammunition in this war?

Obviously we had a lengthy discussion on this board when it was first provided in 155 calibre but ultimately agreed it was the right thing to do due to a lack of plain HE alternatives.  Since then, though, I haven't personally seen much (if any) evidence of its efficacy over that same plain HE.  In fact, if anything I've seen a significant number of comments like Kraft's above, as well as others claiming that a 155 HE round would almost always cause at least as much damage to enemy targets as DPICM does.

So, if I propose that this war has shown DPICM to be 'at most comparable in effect to (and therefore not worth the additional cost and risk complexity over) normal HE', has anyone seen any significant evidence to the contrary?

I have not seen any examples of DPICM employed as designed in this war.  Quite a few videos show a shot or two tossed in like a salt sprinkle.  This may be due to shortages and controls, or that gunners don’t know how to use them because we have not really taught their employment for years.

DPICM was tested back in the day, but the shoots were massed.  Not one shell or two, but several rounds per gun in a dense cluster.  The results showed that DPICM was doing 50-100% more damage for fewer comparable HE.  The problem with DPICM back 40 years ago was cost, they were far more expensive to manufacture than dumb ol HE so no military ever had more than about 15% of their overall artillery ammunition inventories.

If someone has evidence of a mass DPICM shoot on targets in this war it may give a better view of what they can and cannot do.

[Carolus]

For what it's worth, some Russian milbloggers have complained bitterly about DPICM shells and the higher likelihood of shrapnel wounds they cause - imagined or real. Whenever they talk about it, it indicates that DPICM puts the fear of God into the Russki wherever it comes down.

That's not a systematic review, but there seems to be a psychological effect, especially when it was new.

[ArmouredTopHat]

7 minutes ago, Carolus said:

For what it's worth, some Russian milbloggers have complained bitterly about DPICM shells and the higher likelihood of shrapnel wounds they cause - imagined or real. Whenever they talk about it, it indicates that DPICM puts the fear of God into the Russki wherever it comes down.

That's not a systematic review, but there seems to be a psychological effect, especially when it was new.

DPICM undoubtedly had/ has a major impact, both due to it being in plentiful supply (Especially when initially supplied) and for its effect on target, even if it was not being used at its 'full potential' with 8 or so rounds on target as US doctrine demanded. It still proves more than lethal even with just 2-3 rounds on a column. 

Edited August 21 by ArmouredTopHat

[ArmouredTopHat]

I think we might see the demise of the attack helicopter sooner than tanks or armoured vehicles if this proves to be a trend. The former can never be very well protected against them. I suppose the mobility of the platform is so far preventing us from getting a juicy FPV cam slamming into a KA-52 guiding a missile on target, but it might just be a matter of time. 

Great news given the issues the Ka-52s have been giving due to stand off missiles in the last few years. 

Edited August 21 by ArmouredTopHat

[ArmouredTopHat]

I do love how 'Perfidious Albion' is always to blame in these posts. (Russians just cannot admit Ukrainians being the ones outdoing them in anything and keep blaming us Brits) I suppose I should feel proud!

[billbindc]

15 hours ago, Vanir Ausf B said:

I am consistently hearing that we really didn't know, although why they chose not to tell us is debatable.

 

I think the why they didn't tell the US officially is that they didn't want to be discouraged from doing it. There is clearly tension between US concerns about escalation and Ukrainian efforts to change the nature of the war. Both sides have a point and given the history of other military alliances during war (see WWI, WWII, etc), I would argue it's a pretty pedestrian problem. 

[Beleg85]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

A nations state that has had two revolutions in less than a century, and came dangerously close to a coup last year.

1905 and 1917 I presume; USSR was different state than Russia in '89 which indeed was brittle, artficial and additionally covered with thick coat of satellites where walls where painted with anti-Soviet jokes. Plus it had totally different socio- economical model than today, hence the shock in 90's. No potentiall for such collapse now, since everybody gets how modern "capitalism" (or whatever name normal economy one calls) works.

On sidenote, states like Germany, France and several others also experienced serious internal transformations over a century, yet nobody thinks they are unstable for this sole reason.

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

 Russia can barely hold itself together on a good day - those eagles are pointing two heads in opposite directions for a reason.  Under the pressure of war, economic creaking and a tightly gripping autocracy we have all the factors of a brittle state.

Nice metaphor with this eagle...but Is it in reality? Core Russian lands seem to be roughly the same for hundreds of years; it is peripheries and satellites that change allegiance. Just like with Roman empire, I would say this mass of land is surprisingly coherent over time; if contender for power appears, he fights for all of it. Why? Cause development of nationhood is one-way alley and guy from Tula or Moscow  is ultimatelly more or less the same Russian as the one from Vladivostok or Rostov. There are colourful minorities, but no serious potentiall for separation either.

I don't think to be honest, that macrostructers in this case are so brittle as Harrari wrote; informal lines of power and legitimacy at the top- sure, they can change. But entire industrialized state, with megacities connected by infrastructure and internet, developed economical and diplomatic ties with other countries, playing (successfull) global games in many of them etc..there is too much interconnectivity and complexity here for economical crisis (even if severe) to simply swept Russia away. It's XXIst century, not smutnoye vriemja; I mean genetic memory of these times exist and is used politically for sure, but it is more virtual scarecrow than reality.

It's true "imagined community" is a fantasy to some extent, but it really takes a lot to slide down onto gun-fighting postapocalypse. Not only economical collapse, but culture must also work for it basically for centuries (Middle East and Africa cases), while in Russia state-centered herding impulse is, at the end of the day, strong and stable. Definitelly more potentiall for instability than in Western countries, but no to the point of fracturing.

Edited August 21 by Beleg85

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

It's true "imagined community" is a fantasy to some extent, but it really takes a lot to slide down onto gun-fighting postapocalypse. Not only economical collapse, but culture must also work for it basically for centuries (Middle East and Africa cases), while in Russia state-centered herding impulse is, at the end of the day, strong and stable. Definitelly more potentiall for instability than in Western countries, but no to the point of fracturing.

Is this what they are teaching in liberal IR these days?  Why don't we pull some facts into this discussion as we are long on opinion here:

https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/states-of-fragility-2022_c7fedf5e-en/full-report.html

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fragile_States_Index

https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/

Factors used by the FFP (but are pretty well aligned with the OECD) are:

Security Apparatus
Factionalized Elites
Group Grievance
Economic Decline and Poverty
Uneven Economic Development
Human Flight and Brain Drain
State Legitimacy
Public Services
Human Rights and Rule of Law
Demographic Pressures
Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons
External Intervention

So you wanna tell us that Russia is not undergoing intense pressures in just about every one of these areas - some of which we are deliberately projecting upon them?  Strikes into Russia and a UA invasion sure sounds like "External Intervention" to me.

Russia is currently riding 81 on that index (out of 120), they have been higher in the past (see 2006) but not when it was losing the largest conventional war since WW2.  Their numbers are getting worse, and could get very worse very quickly...hence "brittle".

It really does not take "a lot" and we have plenty of evidence of this worldwide. Post-Katrina in New Orleans showed just who fast things can fall apart in the richest nation on the planet.  Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Soviet Union, 90s Russia itself came damned close. Iraq is a masterclass in how to unravel a society held together by a single strong arm dictator node.

Now, I do not accuse you here, but I detest starting with an assumption dressed as a conclusion - "Russia will not collapse...therefore we should push it harder."  Russia can definitely collapse and might not take much more. I agree that simply having Putin and a few elites take a dirt nap may not do it, but another year or two of grinding war, plus regime collapse, no judiciary backstop, unreliable security integration, plus an asymmetrically disenfranchised populace, economic equivalent of throwing up all over themselves, plus the fact that Priggy came within inches of freakin coup - FFS there is a "Russia Free Legion" that has been doing raids over the border for over a year now...?  States have fallen for less.

Finally, the major problem here is that humans are non-linear at scale. The Arab Spring (another classic) endured pressure for decades (centuries in some cases) and then shrugged for basically no reason.  Russia is not even close to homogeneous. How many times have we heard reports that the canon fodder are coming from everywhere but Moscow? So we really do not know what it will take for it to fail. This is why western powers are being so cautious.

 

 

Edited August 21 by The_Capt

[Kraft]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

I have not seen any examples of DPICM employed as designed in this war.  Quite a few videos show a shot or two tossed in like a salt sprinkle.  This may be due to shortages and controls, or that gunners don’t know how to use them because we have not really taught their employment for years.

DPICM was tested back in the day, but the shoots were massed.  Not one shell or two, but several rounds per gun in a dense cluster.  The results showed that DPICM was doing 50-100% more damage for fewer comparable HE.  The problem with DPICM back 40 years ago was cost, they were far more expensive to manufacture than dumb ol HE so no military ever had more than about 15% of their overall artillery ammunition inventories.

If someone has evidence of a mass DPICM shoot on targets in this war it may give a better view of what they can and cannot do.

I think the main issue is that it has to be used against mostly tiny formations.

If it were a dismounted company+ with BMPs going through a field one shot would do a lot more, if its just 3 guys attacking on the edge of the forest it takes a lot of gunnery skill to get the ring pattern on target to do any harm. As for the results, they do make a lot of holes in aftermath pictures but tend to not drop people on the spot as much as normal HE does.

Thats just from observing their use, I dont know of any interview of actual artillery units talking about it

[danfrodo]

2 hours ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

Specific footage of the bridges getting hammered. Clear the AFU have fire supremacy over the area, cant imagine the Russians being able to move much over them. 

Amazing to see the Ukrainians leverage so much firepower over this as well. Clearly a priority target!

Sounds like there's a couple thousand RU soldiers in the cut off region, and UKR seriously trying to keep them cut off.  Which gets back to the question of how does UKR leverage it's success?  Taking prisoners always a good thing.  Parents and family wanting them back adds another drop into pressure bucket that Putin faces.  They've got RU territory they can trade.  They've pulled at least some RU forces from other areas.  They've ambushed a good amount of those arriving forces.  They've humiliated Putin and given the RU public undeniable evidence that this whole UKR adventure is an epic disaster and that Putin is not the genius they were expecting, but an incompetent egomaniac fool.  

Can't say this incursion ends the war but it certainly does make the water hotter for the Putin-frog in the pot.

[LongLeftFlank]

Can anyone point me to a map showing  current RA frontline deployments?

It *seems* to me the VDV formations have been largely withdrawn from the front since springtime, presumably for replenishment and refit (there may also be political reasons, as they are a praetorian formation, one of several 'offsetting' ones based in the Moscow environs). Teplinski is a paratrooper.

Also, VDV would likely be the best Russian candidates for modernisation in terms of 'fighting like Ukrainians', i.e. fighting relatively light as ranger infantry, and drone-supported. (Sure, they still have inferior ISR, etc.)

...A nagging worry of mine is that such modernised VDV regiments could reappear on the southern front as exploitation forces behind the regular meat waves and deliver some very nasty surprises to stretched Ukrainian defenders. The Russians do learn, in time, and Teplinski is not by all accounts stupid.

Anyone better informed on this have a view?

Edited August 21 by LongLeftFlank