How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[NamEndedAllen]

With Russia forced to shift significant forces to the north, have their units in more southern areas been thinned much, or even at all? I’m thinking about the lines along the land bridge and Crimea? I wouldn’t think Ukraine has an large uncommitted force remaining. And the mine fields are still where they were. But a reverse of the large feint at Kherson followed by the Kharkiv Romp would be oh so satisfying.

[dan/california]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

As a reminder, we still don't know what the Hell to call this operation.  I'm still of the opinion that it started off as a raid, but now that it's gone spectacularly well (probably exceeding expectations) there's every incentive for Ukraine to stay longer.  It seems like real Russian units, not the rabble we've seen so far, are soon going to be in the battle.  As expected, these units are coming from active combat duties within Ukraine.  Which means, if Ukraine's primary military goal of this operation was to draw Russian forces out of Ukraine (in particular the Donbas), then it's mission successful. 

At some point the amount of Russian forces arrayed against the Ukrainian units will turn this fight into a sort of mini-Bakhmut or mini-Avdiivka, with Russian units trying to use mass to take ground.  It's debatable if that is something Ukraine wants to engage in. 

A question I have is what might happen if Ukraine withdraws back onto home turf.  Are the defenses on the opposite side of the border sufficient to hold the line with relatively few troops, thus freeing up units to go back into the main front, for example the Donbas?  I suspect so, which means Ukraine does have an incentive to pull its forces back before they start getting bled white.

Related, any large scale battle of attrition will not play favorably for Ukraine.  So much of the kudos going to Ukraine now are precisely that this is NOT a battle of attrition.  Returning to that sort of fighting will be extra demoralizing after having such a successful attack that didn't involve burning out several brigades.

Steve

Ukraine should definitely do a fighting retreat to there own border when the Russians actually get combat units there and organized. Once that happens the Ukrainians should just give back ground at whatever speed lets them inflict the highest casualty ratio. Hopefully those 10,000 155 mine laying shells have been sent the Pentagon equivalent of Federal Express. Dropping those on on every narrow spot the Russians have to pass through, as they pass through it, would be a perfect way to exit the party.

[dan/california]

2 hours ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

The MRAPs have proved to be even more useful than previously in conflicts. No IEDS as such but they were designed to eat RPG-7 rockets all day and of course the crew can survive mines in them too. Can imagine they have saved a lot of lives. 

 

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Yup.  And this is Exhibit A as to what really is important on the battlefield going forward.  Which is, having the ability to move infantry and supplies using something that can withstand FPV type attacks.  The same money gets you a lot more MRAPS than it would any other IFV.

Steve

MRAPS are the minimum effective armored box for Ukrainian conditions. We should round up every single one the Pentagon still has and get them headed to Ukraine. This includes most , if not all of them sent to local police departments. Last but not least an analysis of how they have been used in Ukraine should be performed to help design a new version. That new version should be procured in QUANTITY.

[dan/california]

 

Quote

 

https://www.threads.net/?xmt=AQGz7jz71rX0-0gG9pppZVwM9W1DSsmeAM-vFUkK8_R8lvI

A Kadyrov’s mercenary was beating a stray cat near his position. This revealed his location, and a Ukrainian drone easily tracked him.

A few minutes later, the FPV drone struck the shelter of the animal abuser.

Belgorod Region, Russia.

 

I love it when bad things happen to terrible people.

[Kraft]

Update: the BTR was captured, so a result of the fighting not current UA presence

--------------

Quite deep BTR

 

 

A little optimistic for my taste but it for sure shows that the russians do not have sufficient forces to contain. Having ZSU BTRs cruising down the same streets russian soft skinned trucks filled with conscripts take cannot be good for their operations

Edited August 12 by Kraft

[Grigb]

Yes, we have confirmed sighting of UKR BTR in Giri village (51.091309, 35.573897). I believe this is part of UKR counter attack in to the flank of RU attack from Oboyan direction through Belitsa (51.123283, 35.551209) settlement (big village). We had credible claims that UKR first captured Plyokhovo, then claims that UKR were attacking toward Belya and Belitsa and now we see them in Giri.

My interpretation of Tea Leaves (aka Yandex Maps traffic) RU already retreated east and abandoned Belitsa.

Along the northern route (there is cross road in Belitsa) RU seems retreated to Sverdlovky settlement (51.147941, 35.658349) and along the southern route RU retreated to Belya settlement (51.055166, 35.708708).

Looks like indeed UKR's intent is to widen rather than deepen its foothold.

 

[EDIT] BTW my Tea Leaves hints that RU abandoned Kromskiye Byki and retreated closer to Lgov  - to Vasilyevka settlement (51.596652, 35.252377). Let's wait if it would be confirmed as well. 

 

Edited August 12 by Grigb

[Billy Ringo]

8 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

On this point Putin is consistent.  He feels he can't do a mobilization, he probably thinks declaring war is even worse, and so he is going out and rounding up whatever scrap can be hand.  And putting the FSB in charge of it ta'boot.  Yesh.

Steve

Over the past month we've seen a number or arrests and/or major Russian military officers removed from duty and, seemingly, the FSB becoming more powerful.  At what point could this create enough friction between the army and the FSB to cause significant problems.  Either start fighting with each other or the Army simply says fight no more.

 

[The_Capt]

ISW write up for yesterday:

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2024

This one highlights a strategic risk I did not consider.  Russia appears to have considered these sections of the frontline as “dormant” and manned accordingly.  This latest offensive will likely force them to reconsider.  Good news is that the RA will have to cover the full extent of the frontline along the border, which will draw resources and spread them thinner.  Bad news, so will the UA, and we have heard numerous reports of their pers shortages. This must have factored into UA planning but this action may very well result in a more frozen front than before.  The RA will have lost offensive initiative and without significant mobilization may not be able to try it again.  But the UA will also be spread thinner.  Of course this will force the RA into a situation with greatly extended LOCs and logistics burdens, while the UAs interior lines are tighter.  The outcome of this action as it relates to intent are pretty much in the air but it may be more complicated than we know.

Unless of course the UA has a rabbit in its hate somewhere to unleash down south once the RA has to re-set its lines.  I am still hoping for a shaping operation followed by a true breakthrough but not sure if the UA has the gas in the tank to pull it off.

[Beleg85]

https://x.com/Fitek69/status/1822945470085275792

Now, after taking the city of Sudzha, the UKR has a choice of further offensive. Road R 200 and in this direction, in my opinion, units not connected with the fight for the city will go, and there are such units. A free contingent from the city can calmly head towards the city of Belaya. Plus the southern grouping in the attack and we have comfort in this section.

Now the RUS must figure out how to stretch their defense, because they can only dream of an attack with the forces they have now. The longer it lasts, the more difficult it will be for the UKR though.

I can't write the same about Korenev, the situation here is still unfavorable for the UKR. I gathered some information from those who have already returned from Russia. Many wounded. It's not as rosy as I thought. RUS aviation and FPV drones sowed death among the attackers. They complained about the RUS attack helicopters. The downside in these cases was the lack of possibility to simply hide anywhere.

 

[Grigb]

Interesting quote from Sunday Milov (well known RU opposition economist) regarding UKR operation

Quote

Interviewer: Can you imagine mobilization in one form or another now?

Milov: Once again, from the point of view of how [badly] it affects the economic situation, I can't imagine [Putin calling mobilization] at all.

But you do understand that psychologically for Putin... what can happen now? A really likely scenario is that the AFU will gain a foothold [and stay] for a long time in some parts of the Russian territory. And well, this is a pipets [euphemism for pizdec - highest state of **** up].

That is, I think this will lead Putin to simply make any decisions in order to knock them out, including mobilization, of course. Moreover, this gives him a kind of patriotic cheer - we protect our land there and so on. That is, it is psychologically more difficult to declare mobilization for war somewhere else, in another state, nobody knows why. And here [in Kursk] - The enemy has come, we need to liberate our territory. It might be psychologically easier for him [to declare it].

But you [need to] understand that the consequences are not going to change because of that. That is, if he announces mobilization, this will be a catastrophic blow to the labor market and all [other] economic processes. So it may well be that this operation, which is relatively small, on a military scale, can have very, very serious consequences [for RU]. These events in the Kursk region, in my opinion, increase the scenario of the announcement of mobilization, its probability and, accordingly, [increase probability of] the entire subsequent negative economic spiral. Very interesting.

it's very interesting. Let's see [what is going to happen]. Hot weeks are coming, that is, the end of August and September will be super interesting and it's clear that the Putin game is getting more complicated right in front of our eyes. Yes, according to a variety of [game] variables.

Interviewer:  quite sharply [I need to say].

Milov: Yes, quite  abruptly and suddenly. But I would like to emphasize once again that September in this sense will be a super eventful month.

 

Well, it reminded me that, according to credible rumors, Putin sees himself as a Gatherer of Rus Lands, similar to medieval Tsars. He wants to be recognized as the Tsar who began the process of returning Rus Lands. That is why Crimea is so important to him (but not anybody else). The undefeated UKR incursion into RU ensures that he will be remembered at Tsar-Looser. A very awful legacy.

I think in September West will face crisis - we will run out of popcorn. 

[Eddy]

7 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Interesting quote from Sunday Milov (well known RU opposition economist) regarding UKR operation

 

Well, it reminded me that, according to credible rumors, Putin sees himself as a Gatherer of Rus Lands, similar to medieval Tsars. He wants to be recognized as the Tsar who began the process of returning Rus Lands. That is why Crimea is so important to him (but not anybody else). The undefeated UKR incursion into RU ensures that he will be remembered at Tsar-Looser. A very awful legacy.

I think in September West will face crisis - we will run out of popcorn. 

Quick question: Are the interviewer and the economist in Russia itself or are they in exile?

I watched the link you posted a couple of days ago. Auto-translate into English is good enough to understand the points being made. 

I ask not to undermine the arguments being made. The logic is sound and the conclusions are correct. I was just wondering about the level of censorship within Russia.

[Eddy]

Looks like trouble in paradise!

https://mastodon.social/@ChrisO_wiki/112948734253388702

Quote

1/ As Ukrainian forces advance in the Kursk region, law and order in frontline Russian-held areas is reported to have collapsed completely. "Rampant looting" is said have broken out – being done by the Russians themselves – while local residents say they feel abandoned.

2/ The VChK-OGPU Telegram channel reports that "in the border areas of the Kursk region, where fighting has been going on all week, there are no police, no firefighters, no doctors, no representatives of the administration."

"According to official information, more than 76,000 people left the settlements (most of them left on their own, since there was no organized evacuation, despite the statements of the authorities), but there are still people there, mostly elderly."

3/ The channel says that "the desertion of villages and towns has become a catalyst for rampant looting". The disorder is being carried out by the Russians themselves, though it isn't clear if opportunistic civilians or indisciplined soldiers are responsible.

4/ A local resident says: "They are robbing stores, there is a collapse in Korenevo, the “Magnit” [supermarket] was simply destroyed. There is no water, no gas, no electricity. There was no organized evacuation, and if there was, then why didn’t we hear anything about it in Lobanovka [an outlying area of Korenevo]?"

5/ According to VChK-OGPU, "A similar situation exists in other border municipalities. Kursk residents are sure that representatives of the [regional] administration, having abandoned people to their fate, themselves provoked the collapse in the border areas."

6/ "Currently, it is impossible to get through to the administration of the Korenevsky district of the Kursk region. People are forced to self-organise in order to protect themselves and their property and essentially perform the functions of state and law enforcement agencies."

 

[Grigb]

58 minutes ago, Eddy said:

Quick question: Are the interviewer and the economist in Russia itself or are they in exile?

Both are in exile. Both were sentenced in absantia to 8-10 years in jail.

 

1 hour ago, Eddy said:

I ask not to undermine the arguments being made. The logic is sound and the conclusions are correct. I was just wondering about the level of censorship within Russia.

Simply put you are not allowed to say anything like this. However RU state does not have resources to watch everyone. So, you can say a lot to a very small audience for a some time. However, when you reach certain level of popularity, FSB monitoring AI will prioritize your and you will get visit from comrade Major. Well, actually if they think you are agreeable enough you will get summons to FSB, where you will get offer you cannot refuse. Offer to become controlled blogger. Otherwise jail time for 8-10 years. 

[danfrodo]

2 hours ago, Grigb said:

think in September West will face crisis - we will run out of popcorn. 

I'm visiting minnesota right now.  A lot of rain this year.  Hundreds and hundreds of square miles of corn, and it looks great.  Very green, very tall, big ears already.  So the West looks to be able to continue the fight once this crop comes in, if we can just hold on until the October harvest.

[Grigb]

2 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

I can't write the same about Korenev, the situation here is still unfavorable for the UKR. I gathered some information from those who have already returned from Russia. Many wounded. It's not as rosy as I thought. 

I dispute that. Not that situation is difficult for UKR. If it would be easy Korenevo would already fall. However, I dispute that it is unfavorable only to UKR. Tea Leaves indicates that unlike Bolshoe Soldtaskoe where RU traffic is high and solid, Korenevo traffic is small and intermittent. So, RU does not really control road to Korenevo.

Most probably UKR are avoiding direct assault Korenevo (it has urban areas). Instead they are attriting vehicle fleet of RU local formation there. If successful if would force RU command to abandon Korenevo at the cost of time. 

On other hand there are rivers and lakes there. So, for UKR this location is good place to anchor flank as well. As such they do have time to out wait RU at Korenevo. 

 

2 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

RUS aviation and FPV drones sowed death among the attackers. They complained about the RUS attack helicopters. The downside in these cases was the lack of possibility to simply hide anywhere.

RU attack helicopters do suffer heavily for that.

Quote

A very powerful air defense is in the area, it should no longer be a secret to anyone that in 5 days we lost five attack helicopters [4, not 5, he corrected himself later but it could be that he slipped out unannounced loss] trying to slow down the advance in the first days...because it's hard to work there with aviation now...you happen to photograph them when they fly over you and they do not always fly back [over you] in the same numbers.

 

[Grigb]

I am watching RU Nat video above (the guy is there right now). This is how he commented that RU column destruction

Quote

I'm telling you right now, I just have the opportunity to assert this. The enemy columns, blyat, are moving in the Kursk border area in a columns, blyat. Just the distance between the vehicles, blyat for 150 m and they do not stop in columns, that is, they drive in a column together and where they reach the destination they begin to disperse...That is, there is no problem in riding in a column. There is a problem in standing in a column in the range of high-precision enemy weapon.

 

[kraze]

3 hours ago, Grigb said:

Interesting quote from Sunday Milov (well known RU opposition economist) regarding UKR operation

 

Well, it reminded me that, according to credible rumors, Putin sees himself as a Gatherer of Rus Lands, similar to medieval Tsars. He wants to be recognized as the Tsar who began the process of returning Rus Lands. That is why Crimea is so important to him (but not anybody else). The undefeated UKR incursion into RU ensures that he will be remembered at Tsar-Looser. A very awful legacy.

I think in September West will face crisis - we will run out of popcorn. 

The problem with that, of course, is that there is no such thing as "medieval Tzars" and muscovites first appeared on any core Rus lands in 15th century at the earliest and occupied all Rus lands only in 19th. So "gathering Rus lands" was a very recent development.

Also Crimea was never a Rus land even remotely, so all that mythology has very thin legs and suffers similar consequences via Russian empire constantly falling apart and having to wage non stop occupation wars to keep existing.

[hcrof]

Seems like there is still quite a bit of confusion amongst the Russians - a pretty bad friendly fire incident to add to the looting noted earlier. 

 

[dan/california]

3 hours ago, Grigb said:

Interesting quote from Sunday Milov (well known RU opposition economist) regarding UKR operation

 

Well, it reminded me that, according to credible rumors, Putin sees himself as a Gatherer of Rus Lands, similar to medieval Tsars. He wants to be recognized as the Tsar who began the process of returning Rus Lands. That is why Crimea is so important to him (but not anybody else). The undefeated UKR incursion into RU ensures that he will be remembered at Tsar-Looser. A very awful legacy.

I think in September West will face crisis - we will run out of popcorn. 

It will just amplify from there. On current trends, and the current part is important, Trump is on course to lose. So Russia is going to have a major crisis in the conduct of the war itself very probably followed by the crushing of the one real hope if Trump does in fact lose in the first week of November. Furthermore I think a Harris/Walz Administration will actually be somewhat stronger on Ukraine than Biden has been, doubly so if the Russians are showing real weakness on the battlefield and/or signs of a real economic breakdown. It could, and I emphasize COULD, be like having the pressure cooker start to whistle, and then someone responds by hitting it with a cutting torch. Yes this is optimistic, but I don't think it is crazy.

Edited August 12 by dan/california

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

ISW write up for yesterday:

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2024

This one highlights a strategic risk I did not consider.  Russia appears to have considered these sections of the frontline as “dormant” and manned accordingly.  This latest offensive will likely force them to reconsider.  Good news is that the RA will have to cover the full extent of the frontline along the border, which will draw resources and spread them thinner.  Bad news, so will the UA, and we have heard numerous reports of their pers shortages. This must have factored into UA planning but this action may very well result in a more frozen front than before.  The RA will have lost offensive initiative and without significant mobilization may not be able to try it again.  But the UA will also be spread thinner.  Of course this will force the RA into a situation with greatly extended LOCs and logistics burdens, while the UAs interior lines are tighter.  The outcome of this action as it relates to intent are pretty much in the air but it may be more complicated than we know.

Unless of course the UA has a rabbit in its hate somewhere to unleash down south once the RA has to re-set its lines.  I am still hoping for a shaping operation followed by a true breakthrough but not sure if the UA has the gas in the tank to pull it off.

I had thought about the "for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction" problem as you laid it out.  My thought is it's still a net benefit.

Russia also has personnel and equipment restrictions.  The thin border has allowed Russia to mass their resources in Ukraine without suffering for it because Ukraine also left their border thin.  The Russian Kharkiv offensive showed that Russia could change that equation whenever it wanted, now Ukraine has done the same thing.

The end result is that Russia will not be able to concentrate mass like it has before.  Since that is the ONLY reason it has been making headway in Ukraine, this will assure Russia's plans for taking the Donbas won't work.

Steve

[dan/california]

 

Quote

 

https://www.politico.eu/article/war-in-ukraine-ukrainian-refugees-russia/

Alone and unwanted: Millions of displaced Ukrainians hope to go home as the war rages

The Kyiv government is strapped for cash, but millions depend on aid to survive.

 

Due to thirty, if not eighty, years of long term trends and issues, there are a lot of things Ukraine needs that only the U.S. can do, this isn't one of them. The Europeans need to write whatever check it takes to keep the Ukrainian Governments doors open.

[The_Capt]

9 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I had thought about the "for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction" problem as you laid it out.  My thought is it's still a net benefit.

Russia also has personnel and equipment restrictions.  The thin border has allowed Russia to mass their resources in Ukraine without suffering for it because Ukraine also left their border thin.  The Russian Kharkiv offensive showed that Russia could change that equation whenever it wanted, now Ukraine has done the same thing.

The end result is that Russia will not be able to concentrate mass like it has before.  Since that is the ONLY reason it has been making headway in Ukraine, this will assure Russia's plans for taking the Donbas won't work.

Steve

I think it will definitely take away offensive initiative from the RA and likely leave it there.  UA will also lose that initiative, but that may be a win for them right now.  Or they know something we do not and have enough forces to try to punch through after the RA gets spread thinner. 

There is no real downside to an exhausted RA being spread thinner, beyond the fact that the UA will also be spread thinner to match. However, given the UAs C4ISR superiority they can likely manage it better than the RA can. This may force Putin into a second mobilization in order to be able to sustain any offensive actions...which may be the point of this whole thing.  If Putin does do another mobilization, he is facing no small risks.  We have debated if this action helps or hurts that, but regardless, Putin is clearly concerned about it so it is not without risk to him.

Lastly, there is no way this is not a political strategic win with allies.  We have been watching Ukraine on the back foot fending off grinding RA offensives for months - this changes the narrative completely.

The question is - what will stick?

[FancyCat]

Quote

Another rumor that turned out to be true.

AFU 3-4 armored vehicle column engaged in combat in Giri, Kursk Oblast
51.099237, 35.572807
destr. BTR-4? ~51.10063040 35.57087817
@UAControlMap @GeoConfirmed

 

[Beleg85]

4 hours ago, Grigb said:

Well, it reminded me that, according to credible rumors, Putin sees himself as a Gatherer of Rus Lands, similar to medieval Tsars. He wants to be recognized as the Tsar who began the process of returning Rus Lands. That is why Crimea is so important to him (but not anybody else). The undefeated UKR incursion into RU ensures that he will be remembered at Tsar-Looser. A very awful legacy.

I think in September West will face crisis - we will run out of popcorn. 

Amen to that.

Though to be honest I always perceived him as cynical and rational enough to hide one's ego on the shelf once real geopolitical troubles appear. He has something of a cat manner in a way he is handling politics; this is not simple mania grandiosa but more something like Gollum talking to his Precious Ring in the dark. At least it was like that till 2022.

2 hours ago, Grigb said:

A very powerful air defense is in the area, it should no longer be a secret to anyone that in 5 days we lost five attack helicopters [4, not 5, he corrected himself later but it could be that he slipped out unannounced loss] trying to slow down the advance in the first days...because it's hard to work there with aviation now...you happen to photograph them when they fly over you and they do not always fly back [over you] in the same numbers.

Yup, they tried to use helis like thay did in Zaporizhia in defence, as standoff weapons in some connected manner. This time they weren't prepared and coordinated with ground troops, though; from other Osint source they may had problems with actually seeing, identifying Ukrainians and dialing on them even if somehing is moving in the crosshairs. Still helis and drones did some carnage among Ukrianian troops.

PS. Due to 22nd Brigade (btw. lately I met a guy who trained Ukrainians in Pomerania- he was rather optimistic about capabilities of NATO training) and likely some Recons from Legion taking part in this, Russians are again seeing Poles attacking poor Mother Russia everywhere. Level of hillariousness in this respect is similar to anglophobia we discussed. Polish mercs riding on motobikes in Suzha while shooting Russian children in legs (why, da fook, in legs?) is one those beautiful cameos that was suffled lately on Russian channels.  When something unexpected hapens, many Russians react in this kind of collective histeria.

Edited August 12 by Beleg85

[dan/california]

44 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Amen to that.

Though to be honest I always perceived him as cynical and rational enough to hide one's ego on the shelf once real geopolitical troubles appear. He has something of a cat manner in a way he is handling politics; this is not simple mania grandiosa but more something like Gollum talking to his Precious Ring in the dark. At least it was like that till 2022.

Yup, they tried to use helis like thay did in Zaporizhia in defence, as standoff weapons in some connected manner. This time they weren't prepared and coordinated with ground troops, though; from other Osint source they may had problems with actually seeing, identifying Ukrainians and dialing on them even if somehing is moving in the crosshairs. Still helis and drones did some carnage among Ukrianian troops.

PS. Due to 22nd Brigade (btw. lately I met a guy who trained Ukrainians in Pomerania- he was rather optimistic about capabilities of NATO training) and likely some Recons from Legion taking part in this, Russians are again seeing Poles attacking poor Mother Russia everywhere. Level of hillariousness in this respect is similar to anglophobia we discussed. Polish mercs riding on motobikes in Suzha while shooting Russian children in legs (why, da fook, in legs?) is one those beautiful cameos that was suffled lately on Russian channels.  When something unexpected hapens, many Russians react in this kind of collective histeria.

So much of the Russian reaction to this war is driven by the perception among most Russians that everyone else is as amoral as they are. This is of course one of the thru lines of Putin's propaganda, "Of course I am corrupt, but so is everyone else". I also think the fact the Russians know how THEY treat POWs greatly influences there resistance to surrender. So when they say things like this it is because they can see, if not themselves, then the idiots at the end of the bar doing things like this.