How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Teufel]

Too many posts of previous one.

Edited July 28, 2023 by Teufel

[Teufel]

Double post

Edited July 28, 2023 by Teufel

[Teufel]

Triple post

Edited July 28, 2023 by Teufel

[FancyCat]

Many stories have come out already of Western military veterans encountering the artillery heavy battlefield and ******* their bricks at operating at parity or even at a worse level than Russia, and it being a difficult transition.

As already stated, drop a western unit in place of a Ukrainian one, but don't give it air support, artillery parity, and the performance difference of the two is gonna be pretty much the same imo or worse decent chance.

Maybe certain units or nationalities might fare better, but different ballgame.

As for why Ukraine had to use newly raised units, I mean we won't know until the war ends how exactly manpower and equipment wise things were strained, now maybe the Ukrainian General Staff just chose wrongly, or the ability to pull whole formations off the line just wasn't possible without endangering and allowing Russian advances.

[danfrodo]

11 minutes ago, Teufel said:

A lone vehicle (probably unmanned) crosses the open ground, drives into the tank pit. The minefield is clearly missing and no Russians tried to destroy it upon approach. This confirms what I said earlier; the main line of defense is not as strong as the Russians claims.

yeah, remember when some folks were completely freaking because RU was digging trenches?  "OMG look at those defense line!!"  Of course, they aren't defense lines unless they are actually defended.  And if RU is taking heavy losses trying to hold every inch who is going to fall back to those lines?

meanwhile, post earlier today mentioned a unit refusing to fight near Verbove -- This is what I hope to hear more!  When RU soldiers turn their guns on the guys in the backline who are supposed to shoot those who retreat.  When groups of armed & angry men retreat and count on their own firepower to keep them safe, betting they have better chance there than against UKR attacks.  That's what I am hoping for.  That kind of thing can spread.

[FancyCat]

So I guess the main question is, does Ukraine have the ability to use deep maneuver and penetration into the enemy rear?

My answer is probably no. That means Kharkov was a unique one off enabled by extreme Russian inability or lack of foresight to reinforce the lines there. The fact that Ukraine was unable to extend the push further means Ukraine's reserves were not enough, or Russia's reserves were enough to stop their advance.

I think for now Ukraine is limited to engaging in moving town by town, attriting Russia long range and careful local pushes.

Nothing like Kharkov, Gulf War, more like WWI.

 

[Kinophile]

https://mil.in.ua/en/news/ukraine-receives-6-more-gepard-anti-aircraft-guns-and-ammunition-for-them/

Yet more gepards and other useful machines. 

[FancyCat]

Also if Ukraine is unable to move thru minefields with armored columns quickly, and needs infantry to lead the way and clear paths, this will be slow. Furthermore, if Ukraine is unable to ensure these armored columns won't get attacked by air power than there won't be any possibility of armored deep thrusts at all.

[Teufel]

1 hour ago, FancyCat said:

My answer is probably no. That means Kharkov was a unique one off enabled by extreme Russian inability or lack of foresight to reinforce the lines there. The fact that Ukraine was unable to extend the push further means Ukraine's reserves were not enough, or Russia's reserves were enough to stop their advance.

There is also the aspect of logistics in the direction of Svatove - lack of road/rail infrastructure in the west-east direction. Look at topographical maps of the area and the available north to south road/rail.

Russians could deploy half an army in matter of hours from across the Russian border thanks to such infrastructure. The Ukrainians had no chance to keep up with the the pace of the offensive. Very simplified aspect but not to be forgotten as the game changed upon arrival towards Svatove.

None of us here is more than an armchair general, ok armchair private, but let’s not be that pessimistic. We can have our opinions all we want as it won’t change the reality on the ground, but let’s not forget that this very discussion is what the Russians really want. Sow doubt and frustration at an offensive going nowhere, well nowhere in the eyes of us armchair privates, I mean Generals, gathered here from all across the Globe.

Edit: Speaking of, here is great piece on that very topic. Rail and logistics.

https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2023/7/27/2183573/-Quick-Explainer-Why-Russia-s-East-West-railway-matters

Edited July 28, 2023 by Teufel

[danfrodo]

15 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

So I guess the main question is, does Ukraine have the ability to use deep maneuver and penetration into the enemy rear?

My answer is probably no. That means Kharkov was a unique one off enabled by extreme Russian inability or lack of foresight to reinforce the lines there. The fact that Ukraine was unable to extend the push further means Ukraine's reserves were not enough, or Russia's reserves were enough to stop their advance.

I think for now Ukraine is limited to engaging in moving town by town, attriting Russia long range and careful local pushes.

Nothing like Kharkov, Gulf War, more like WWI.

 

I very much agree this is a possibility, and is the current situation.  The other possibility is that RU has fewer & fewer soldiers available & willing & able to fight as situation deteriorates.  The supply & command systems have been heavily degraded.  While UKR is just now putting larger forces into the fight.  We just don't know.  You might be right but I hope not.

[danfrodo]

Today's confirmation bias:

https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2023/7/28/2183827/-Ukraine-Update-Russian-officer-at-the-front-explains-why-Ukraine-is-winning

When I see all those RU defenses on a map, as points & lines, I still gotta wonder what is actually in those lines & whether they will fight.  There's 8-10 weeks of good weather left, so UKR has plenty of time.  They can pause and corrode more if they want once they find the going too tough in some sector.

[kevinkin]

7 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

They can pause and corrode more if they want once they find the going too tough in some sector.

Don't forget pausing is not good within the enemy's defensive network. The UA would be better off leaving any small tactical gains and returning to their own original lines if forced too. They need to break clear of those networks so their advantages can be brought to bear against the enemy in the open. That means operational gains where fully rested armed to the teeth exploitation formations can be directed beyond the Russian dug-in defenses into a pursuit toward a politically significant Russian holding. 

[danfrodo]

4 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

Don't forget pausing is not good within the enemy's defensive network. The UA would be better off leaving any small tactical gains and returning to their own original lines if forced too. They need to break clear of those networks so their advantages can be brought to bear against the enemy in the open. That means operational gains where fully rested armed to the teeth exploitation formations can be directed beyond the Russian dug-in defenses into a pursuit toward a politically significant Russian holding. 

good point, well said

[Vet 0369]

5 hours ago, dan/california said:

https://twitter.com/markito0171/status/1684794089659625472

Says 60 out of  500 man battalion left alive.

Perhaps the graft, theft, and incompetent maintenance isn’t unique to the Russian Army and Navy and aren’t limited to those Services? What does that say about their Strategic Missile and Nuke Service?

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, Vet 0369 said:

Perhaps the graft, theft, and incompetent maintenance isn’t unique to the Russian Army and Navy and aren’t limited to those Services? What does that say about their Strategic Missile and Nuke Service?

The answer sadly is that if only ten percent of them work, that it is probably enough.

[cesmonkey]

To add to the funk:

 

[FancyCat]

2 hours ago, kevinkin said:

Don't forget pausing is not good within the enemy's defensive network. The UA would be better off leaving any small tactical gains and returning to their own original lines if forced too. They need to break clear of those networks so their advantages can be brought to bear against the enemy in the open. That means operational gains where fully rested armed to the teeth exploitation formations can be directed beyond the Russian dug-in defenses into a pursuit toward a politically significant Russian holding. 

I don't think Ukraine has the ability to clearly break thru those defensive lines.

A slow grind, chunk by chunk out of the network, but nothing we have seen indicates a exploitation formation won't get turned into burning junk by a Ka-58 or etc.

[Butschi]

2 hours ago, Teufel said:

We can have our opinions all we want as it won’t change the reality on the ground, but let’s not forget that this very discussion is what the Russians really want. Sow doubt and frustration at an offensive going nowhere

I don't think that what the Russians want is a discussion. They want to manipulate and brainwash. They actually want what you propose: us censoring ourselves for fear that we might do their work by having the wrong thoughts.

A (meaningful) discussion? Nah, I actually think that's the very last thing they want. Yes, we might come to the conclusion that the Ukrainian offensive isn't going so well, doubt the Ukrainian ability to advance or whatever. If that would reflect reality then what do we gain by putting on our rose tinted glasses? What does Ukraine gain?

Sure, there is the very real risk that at some point the West will pull the plug. I don't think we are there, yet. On the other hand too much (unwarranted) optimism may make us blind for what kind of stuff would really help Ukraine.

Sure, what we discuss here has only a small impact on what is happening "on the ground". But not none! In a democracy public opinion is important and each little discussion contributes in shaping that opinion. Our politicians rarely say: "Oh, screw public opinion I'm just going to do whatever I please."

[keas66]

Interesting Discussion

https://warontherocks.com/2023/07/an-inflection-point-in-ukraines-counteroffensive/

[kevinkin]

13 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

I don't think Ukraine has the ability to clearly break thru those defensive lines.

I tend to agree. But I am reserving judgement since we don't have any idea of the losses suffered on either side. Nor do we know the state of either side's military nor civilian moral. This is an awful situation since neither Russia nor Ukraine will stop fighting until the the west and China take their ability to fight away. And that won't take place until late Fall. Fighting could extend into the 2024 US elections - yuck all around. I think we are staring a Korean-like situation in the face. A 2014 in the face, but with NATO on high alert. I think the US and the west have to take this kinetic war and turn it into a non-kinetic fight for Africa and South America and keep Russia at a distant arm's length. There is no growth in Russian or China. But plenty in Ukraine and the southern hemisphere. That's where my money would go. 

[FancyCat]

18 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

I think we are staring a Korean-like situation in the face.

Actually, i think Ukraine will be able to take territory, just not fast or with sweeping movements in the rear. 

[Sojourner]

47 minutes ago, Butschi said:

A (meaningful) discussion?

Sure, why not?

HIMARS and Storm Shadow are also good talkers.

[kevinkin]

32 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

Actually, i think Ukraine will be able to take territory, just not fast or with sweeping movements in the rear. 

Well it's more about killing Russians and punishing their regime so they don't attack Ukraine again for generations. An acre here or and acre there is peanuts if the UA losses put them at a long term disadvantage in the number of people who can hold border defenses that will be in place regardless of the diplomatic outcome. Seems to me Ukraine will not be able to cut off Crimea with the force structure the west has given them. Or if they do, hold the line they obtain. Like I said above in a previous post, this direction is obvious and the UA has to rethink what they have and what they can do with it. They might be better off letting an over confident RA attack them and screw the offensive that US and the western media ill prepared them for. Even the POTUS said they are running out of ammo for God's sake. I don't think that was a sophisticated disinformation campaign. 

[Vanir Ausf B]

2 hours ago, cesmonkey said:

To add to the funk:

 

That dovetails with what "the academics" (well, some of them at least) have been saying:

This war also reinforces the importance of experience. Ukraine’s army is now one of the most experienced in the world, but it still lacks experience co-ordinating offensive action on a large scale. What on paper is an attacking brigade of several thousand men is, in practice, a couple of reinforced companies of no more than a few hundred men each—a smaller force that struggles to establish superiority over entrenched defenders. Although Ukraine can conduct combined-arms assaults at the level of a platoon, this begins to come apart when attempting to scale up to the level of a company or battalion.

Ukraine’s armed forces remain uneven because of losses and several waves of mobilisation. Experienced brigades can correct artillery fire and conduct reconnaissance and suppress enemy positions in advance of an attack. Newer units are unable to put those pieces together even when provided with the best Western equipment.

https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2023/07/28/franz-stefan-gady-and-michael-kofman-on-what-ukraine-must-do-to-break-through-russian-defences

[Battlefront.com]

As quoted by Teufel:

5 hours ago, Teufel said:

A lone vehicle (probably unmanned) crosses the open ground, drives into the tank pit. The minefield is clearly missing and no Russians tried to destroy it upon approach. This confirms what I said earlier; the main line of defense is not as strong as the Russians claims. That is why we see so much resistance from Russians between the main line of defense and the front line itself. The quality of Russian' personal equipment is also shown by video footage from Staromaiorske itself; low quality and in many ways self-made. Even many attempts to design personal water purifiers show that they fall short of potable water. We can assume for probable reasons that the Russians holding the main line of defense will be retreating troops who are now fighting on the front line, troops that have not been allowed to rest for months.

I have suspected this for some time now.  For sure all the evidence points to Russia's MLR having next to nobody in it.  While it is possible to withdraw from positions in front of the MLR, it is difficult to do.  It also puts a lot of strain on logistics because the more you fight up front, the more stuff has to be put up front.  Put another way, the more you want to hold a position the more you have to invest to keep it.  The more stuff you put up front, the more stuff you have to bring with you when you withdraw OR you wind up leaving it behind.  Especially when withdrawal is not planned.

It is apparent that Russia has invested a large proportion of its available resources into holding the front most lines, not the MLR.  There's no way it would have been able to hold out this long if it hadn't.  Which begs the question... how much material is sitting in the MRL waiting for the manpower to be withdrawn from the forward positions?  If the answer is "not much", then Russia will experience a dual problem of a lack of men and a lack of material.  Trying to hold positions with too few men is bad enough, but too few men without adequate means of fighting will not work for very long.

I have also suspected the MLR and other rearward positions are not as good in reality as they are on paper.  What made me suspicious?  Because Ukraine reported that the forward positions are generally good quality in places, not great in others.  Ask yourself... has Russia ever demonstrated the ability to do something equally well in all ways/places, or has Russia established a long standing track record (going back well before this war) of half assing even critically important efforts?  Exactly

Therefore, I think it is quite likely that the MLR is of lower quality overall than the forward most positions.  If the forward positions are 80% good and 20% crap, then I'd say the MLR is probably more like 50% good an 50% crap and the third line 20% good and 80% crap.

Steve