How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[sburke]

14 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Yes. There must be battalion level workshops for quick repairs/modification and then there are rear areas workshops for rebuilding and extensive modification and finally production workshop/programmer studios.

and that compares to the support facility for any other military hardware how?  That is the question being asked.  Yeah Steve simplified it, maybe overly simplified it.  But that support infrastructure for these things has to be compared to other weapons systems and not dismissed because it does have a logistical tail.  Hell the soldiers have a logistical tail.  Food, water, etc etc.  The question is how much does that tail require.  Steve's contention is it is way smaller.

[Battlefront.com]

15 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Yes. There must be battalion level workshops for quick repairs/modification and then there are rear areas workshops for rebuilding and extensive modification and finally production workshop/programmer studios.

Absolutely.  However, stack that up against what it takes to keep an artillery or tank unit in the field and it still comes out way ahead.

This is the importance of looking at apples to apples.  4 men in a tank, 4 men in a SPG, 4 men in a drone team, etc. is really not the way to look at it.  Which, again, is why comments like Kofman's should not be taken very seriously even though he says them seriously.

Steve

[holoween]

46 minutes ago, kimbosbread said:

Spike launcher is 14kg, each missile is another 14kg. Wikipedia says more recent unit cost is $250k, though obviously like you said, that could decrease.

You are correct that you are trading rocket propulsion for battery pack and rotors (and possibly a rocket booster). I think for comms, everything is rapidly going autonomous so that’s a non-issue, so with that you get way more range than your stubby-finned missile that produces no lift. The ability to loiter and wait or hunt for targets is not to be underestimated.

That’s your tradeoff- slower but can go farther, and can loiter. Same tradeoff we make with cruise missiles vs ballistic missiles. Drone or not has nothing to do with it.

EDIT: I’m referring to fixed wing UAS here, but an FPV obviously gives us other tradeoffs.

 

Spike NLOS is not Spike LR2 so using the NLOS price really isnt valid.

And yea im mostly looking to FPVs.

Loitering munitions are an entirely different area. If we want to get into them youre really abandoning the super cheap especially if you want to have the ability to effectively engage armoured vehicles.

[Grigb]

4 minutes ago, sburke said:

and that compares to the support facility for any other military hardware how?  That is the question being asked.  Yeah Steve simplified it, maybe overly simplified it.  But that support infrastructure for these things has to be compared to other weapons systems and not dismissed because it does have a logistical tail.  Hell the soldiers have a logistical tail.  Food, water, etc etc.  The question is how much does that tail require.  Steve's contention is it is way smaller.

The thing is, you need these workshops regardless of drones. These are like REME workshops. They are the mostly the same workshops that service your communications equipment and other radio electronic equipment, including EW. The only issue is you need extra sappers for all ammunition handling. You do not want impatient youngster to explode himself and everybody around.

So the tail is really tiny. What's problematic is skill. It is extremely beneficial to have highly motivated, proficient radio electronic engineers. This is a major issue if you attempt to staff all battalion-level workshops. This is one of the reasons why a dedicated Force is needed: to pool talent resources.

[Grigb]

24 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Absolutely.  However, stack that up against what it takes to keep an artillery or tank unit in the field and it still comes out way ahead.

This is the importance of looking at apples to apples.  4 men in a tank, 4 men in a SPG, 4 men in a drone team, etc. is really not the way to look at it.  Which, again, is why comments like Kofman's should not be taken very seriously even though he says them seriously.

Steve

Yes, I looked at Kofman comment and I was like  - this guy really never misses opportunity to get confused. Name me other weapon system that can loiter above your assault team and within seconds take out fully fortified machine gun position by flying though the firing loophole.

Oh, well, not going waste my time on him. 

[The_Capt]

5 hours ago, Grigb said:

There was ISR blind spot that allowed RU to concentrate enough troops to swamp the area quickly instead of slowly grinding their way forward. It was so quick that UKR lost access to AKHZ plant (entrance to underground facilities was near the penetration and it was quickly captured). Avdiivka defense was hinged on AKHZ plant. Once it was lost there was no reason to defend Avdiivka and it was abandoned.  

There are no operational blind spots in this war and very few tactical ones.  Avdiivka was a surprise to no one. FFS the RA was pounding on it for months, the damn place took longer to “fall” than Bakhmut.

All domain ISR, even as glued together as it is in this war is probably the defining major shift.  I am not sure what the 114th went through with respect to data shortfalls etc but the US C4ISR architecture is all over this and it misses pretty much nothing.  There were call of “ISR has failed us” at Kharkiv too, but it turns out those troops were spotted well out. The problem was the UA was undermanned and caught flat-footed on that front.  Then everyone started drawing red lines all over the place because the RA was poised to encircle…and then the whole damned thing stalled..again.  In fact as I recall during Avdiivka the shortfalls in UA artillery ammo were already happening due the the whole US government lock up.

No blind spots, those shiny toys did their job just fine. I am sorry I do not accept for a second that drone ISR blind spots were somehow responsible for the loss of that town.  Based on how long it took them to take it alone.  Can tactical blind spots happen?  Say in a small 100m box…sure…and it sucks to be in that box.  Can they occur on a 1 x 1 km box…nope, or at least not under these conditions.

5 hours ago, Grigb said:

That crowd is mistaken. I am not part of that crowd. I've been reading for a years RU complains about Ukrainian drones.

Simple truths I got from reading UKR and RU sources.

• Drones are here to stay
• Drones fundamentally change the way we fight
• Classical mechanized warfare through concentration and mass of armor is obsolete

Then frankly I have no idea what we are debating here.  Your points here are the exact same ones I have been harping on for about a year.

[The_Capt]

4 hours ago, Grigb said:

Interestingly there was UKR tank but it also failed to stop RU assault. Why I do not know - we have very little information. However, given the description RU used several waves with several troop carries instead of one major assault. Hunting these carriers is not something lone tank in ambush can do effectively. They needed Brad to do it. It is job of Brad to maneuver in Grey zone and hunt all the troop carriers. 

So I keep coming back to something our last CHOD said - we are looking at a new “combined arms”.  Drones, artillery and ATGMs seem to be what did the deed here.  No single system is going to do it on its own but the culmination of their combined effects creates the denial effect.

Looking forward, I have to wonder if ATGMs and UAS are going to have some unholy baby.  So we basically have a long range long endurance loitering munition capable of over the horizon strike.  Further this system is fire and forget in the last mile once it is given a target…EW does not stop a Javelin.  

[Haiduk]

79th air-assault brigade has repelled today one of most heavy armored assault attempt. Russians in force of 11 tanks, 45 light armor and 1 BMPT "Terminator" tried to attack on Kurakhove direction. This is full combat core of BTG. Except this together with attackers 12 moto-bikers have driven, for recon and attampt of fast outflanking of forward positions. Enemy started attack at the morning from several directions 

This armada was timely spotted and was "processed" on approach initially with artillery, then FPV joined up, then ATGMs, then Russian armor started to blow up by mines. After enemy lost 6 tanks, 7 light armor and all 12 bikes, 40 KIA and 37 WIA they canceled attack and turned back

Despite this since the weather became more comfort for warfare, Russians rapidly intensified own attacks on Donbas. Absolute record for today was on Pokrovsk direction - 150 clashes. 

Heavy situation near small Prohress village. Russians in heavy assault overran units of 31st mech.briade - as always our command didn't find nothing better than to rotate a brigade, who succesfully defended this direction on "rested and replenished fresh force". Indeed as claimed RUMINT many soldiers of 31st brigade passed through Rivne training center - one of worst places for combat training, where whole month soldier gets only formal training (chiefs of this center even consider inappropriate to waste time to teach soldiers to zeroing of wepon), so on paper this was fres trained brigade, but in reality this was badly trained crowd. There was bad organized communication between positions, EW teams had no concerted action with FPV teams, so latter almost couldn't do own work properly, because their FPV were supressed by own EW assets in that time Russians could fly alsmost free. As result companies of two battalions suffered heavy losses and parially retreated. Part of troops of 1st and 3rd battalions still hold remaimed posiotions, but almost all company comamnders alrerady dead or wounded - combat control was almost disrupted. Soldiers demanded from brigade command to let them withraw, but brigade commander initially to give the order "hold positions", but then comletely stupid order "attack the enemy and renew positions". In conditions of Russians exeeded our forces in 10-15 times in was suicidical and some number of troops were lost in this useless attempts. Elements of 47th brigade as "fire team" were thrown into the battle, but they can't resque the situation - part of 31st brigade still in semi-encirclemement. Last news from there as if command has given the order to withdraw and simultainosly new forces try to throw back Russians on flanks. 

Prohress is important, because it makes Russians dangerously close to critical road Pokrovsk - Kostianntynivka. The cutting off this road threaten to stable defense of whole Ukrainian groupment on this direction 

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, holoween said:

3 for the arty piece, 2 for the supply truck for mlrs and himars and they can get their mines almost 40km far. We also know that ukraine already used them very successfully.

And the maintenance and logistics for that gun? Compared to 4 guys and a dozen FPVs?  C’Mon are we seriously debating pers resources for an FPV armed patrol an SPG?  I am not saying we are going to be replacing artillery with FPVs but Kofman is way off on his bizarre pers assessment.

1 hour ago, holoween said:

Compare a Spike LR2

Were looking at roughly 100k per missile, ir and daylight seeker, lock on after launch, 5.5km range, tandem warhead.

If youre running a proprietary drone youre essentially switching the propulsion from a rocket motor to a battery pack and rotors and the comms link from wire to radio. Sure it might be a bit cheaper but not an order of magnitude and getting the atgm mass produced for wartime is also going to drop the cost quite a bit.

See my post above.  Someone is going to mate Spike LR with a drone and welcome to hell.  The other way to go is to go smaller and put DPICM onto fully autonomous small drones in a swarm…essentially a smart cloud of cluster munitions.  Take that little monster and package it on a larger mother drone so you can get the distance.

My overall point is that Kofman completely missed the boat on that last one.

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, FancyCat said:

it's not just 4 guys in a team with a bunch of drones tho, isn't there a long supply line of programmers, production lines, companies, capital? a lot of drones is directly or indirectly western funded.

 https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/07/06/ukraine-drone-industry-russia-war-regulation/

Compared to an artillery gun?  People are assembling FPVs in garages from commercial parts.  Not a lot of people welding together self-propelled guns out back the house.  Saying that FPV production and employment is more pers intensive than major land platforms is just plain wrong.  The UA is notoriously under resourced on troops at the moment and are still putting hundreds of thousands of FPVs into the field.

[Haiduk]

10 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

Not that far: https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/07/24/7467163/

Torgashev was in charge of Satellite Unit in Russia, though not sure if this was the one deciding things. Perhaps revenge for Kyiv hospitals?

 

Mistake in idntification. Became knowingly this turned out other man - complete namesake of Andrey Torgashov - and he is a serviceman of GRU. It's a version of Budanov's revenge for poisoining of his wife and her security (all were in time hospitalized and survived). Budanov offered then "an my answer, about which everybody will know", probably this is it. 

 

Alas. GUR agent, citizen of Russia, who reportedly had time to fled to Turkey, was arrested in Bodrum by requestingh of Russia. GUR need to think about better ways of retreating for own agents.

[Haiduk]

414th separate UAV regiment "Magar birds" were moved to Pokrovsk direction from Vovchansk. This is another marker of critical importance of this direction in current time  

[The_Capt]

12 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

This armada was timely spotted and was "processed" on approach initially with artillery, then FPV joined up, then ATGMs, then Russian armor started to blow up by mines. After enemy lost 6 tanks, 7 light armor and all 12 bikes, 40 KIA and 37 WIA they canceled attack and turned back

This right here encapsulates what is happening in this entire war at the tactical level. Conventional military mass concentration spotted well out…processed…struck by artillery, FPV, ATGMs…add mines…mechanized manoeuvre stopped cold.

We can (and have) argued about tanks-no tanks, drones-not drones, mission command/training/NCOs, Russia sucks, not enough infantry…round and round the tree, but this right here is what we actually keep seeing.  This is the evidence right here…and this is not a “biased sampling” we have seen this same pattern many times.  This is the new normal as of at least last summer.

[kimbosbread]

56 minutes ago, holoween said:

Spike NLOS is not Spike LR2 so using the NLOS price really isnt valid.

And yea im mostly looking to FPVs.

Loitering munitions are an entirely different area. If we want to get into them youre really abandoning the super cheap especially if you want to have the ability to effectively engage armoured vehicles.

Are they? Fundamentally these are all airborne munitions, which have a few different axes of capabilities:

• Speed (1kmh to Mach-something)
• Range (1km to 20km)
• Loiter time
• Autonomy (autonomous vs semi vs manually guided)
• Boom
• Weight
• Crew
• Cost (including logistics tail)

I don’t see a big distinction between Javelin and Spike and an FPV as a category; the FPV simply has smaller boom but longer range and can fly for 10-30 minutes, and weighs less.

When we talk about a cluster-bomb drone-swarm, or autonomous loitering drones, it’s the same thing: Maybe more range, more loiter, maybe a little less boom or more weight?

 

Edited July 24 by kimbosbread

[holoween]

7 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

And the maintenance and logistics for that gun? Compared to 4 guys and a dozen FPVs?  C’Mon are we seriously debating pers resources for an FPV armed patrol an SPG?  I am not saying we are going to be replacing artillery with FPVs but Kofman is way off on his bizarre pers assessment.

Were looking at himars and mlrs doing the arty mining in ukraine and they are not exactly maintenance intensive.

And as said i dont disregard the drones for mining i just dont see them placing mines particularly far behind enemy lines. And i found it weird that you entirely forgot about arty deployed mines when they were quite a prominent feature in the winter offensive for closing breached minefields and placing new ones just ahead of assaults.

 

14 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

See my post above.  Someone is going to mate Spike LR with a drone and welcome to hell. 

Have you already forgotten the bayraktars? Because thats what youre describing and they have been entirely ineffective once aa got their act somewhat together.

[holoween]

4 minutes ago, kimbosbread said:

Are they? Fundamentally these are all airborne munitions, which have a few different axes of capabilities:

• Speed (1kmh to Mach-something)
• Range (1km to 20km)
• Loiter time
• Boom
• Weight
• Crew
• Cost (including logistics tail)

I don’t see a big distinction between Javelin and Spike and an FPV as a category; the FPV simply has smaller boom but longer range and can fly for 10-30 minutes, and weighs less.

When we talk about a cluster-bomb drone-swarm, or autonomous loitering drones, it’s the same thing: Maybe more range, more loiter, maybe a little less boom or more weight?

 

The Spike NLOS is a 70kg 30km range missile the Spike LR2 is a 13kg 5.5km range atgm. Putting them as interchangable sounds like you either dont know that they are different weapons or you think that these kind of differences dont matter.

[Haiduk]

On 7/23/2024 at 4:29 PM, cesmonkey said:

 

 

Video of this Su-25 crashed, filmed by our drone. Fighterbomber TG claimed the pilot was resqued.

Despite 110th brigade MANPAD teams for last two months claimed 8 downed Russian jets, this is a first evidence. In other two times were videos of MANPAD launches with unclear results and a video of something burned on horizon, as claimed downed jet.  

 

[hcrof]

40 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

See my post above.  Someone is going to mate Spike LR with a drone and welcome to hell.  

https://en.defence-ua.com/weapon_and_tech/seeking_to_make_a_flying_atgm_russian_mounted_9k111_fagot_on_a_drone_but_will_it_really_work_video-9309.html

See this article for the typical russian approach of welding an oversized weapon to an unstable firing platform and taking a video of it missing its target by a mile. 

But the article also shows a British drone doing it with a missile that theoretically has a chance of hitting its target...

[poesel]

17 hours ago, kimbosbread said:

A real asshole would fine the fun invasive species to bring in. My particular favorite is himalayan blackberries, which as far as I can tell are the honey badger of annoying weeds and shrubs.

I think that would be a fairly lucrative product, especially sexy panzer in japanese school girl outfit.

You are aware of this:

Everyone here knows this, right? Right?

9 hours ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

This reminds me of someone on the Internet (on this site or another, I forgot) recalling his service in the Bundeswehr during the Cold War, when the Unteroffizier was trying to make his soldiers accustomed to the necessary dispersion on the battlefield. Apparently, whenever the soldiers gathered in a group of three or more, he would roar "Atomziel!" and proceed to physically push them apart.

I can confirm this story

"Atomziel" - "target for nuclear attack". Isn't German beautiful?

Edited July 24 by poesel
picture

[ArmouredTopHat]

Perusing the latest updates, I have noticed a serious upsurge of Russian soldiers killing themselves this year (or being killed by their comrades), including one today where the poor bastard offed himself the moment he saw an FPV drone without even being attacked by it. (unless he was already wounded). I wont be posting these here just in case there is a forum rule about it. The majority are usually after being wounded, presumably because casevac is so fked in the frontlines that they know they dont have a chance in hell in surviving and they know it. 

Is there any potential explanation to this behaviour aside from the knowledge that the wounded are unlikely to survive? Alcohol abuse perhaps? (its been noted as pretty bad by some Russian sources) Its honestly downright disturbing to see it become increasingly prevalent. Was this something that already existed and we are just happening to get more footage of it or is it a new trend entirely. It certainly seems to be a uniquely Russian problem. 

Edited July 24 by ArmouredTopHat

[Letter from Prague]

25 minutes ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

Is there any potential explanation to this behaviour aside from the knowledge that the wounded are unlikely to survive? Alcohol abuse perhaps? (its been noted as pretty bad by some Russian sources) Its honestly downright disturbing to see it become increasingly prevalent. Was this something that already existed and we are just happening to get more footage of it or is it a new trend entirely. It certainly seems to be a uniquely Russian problem. 

I mean the drone footage might be misleading, but when you see Russian mechanized / vehicle using attack, it's like few vehicles doing a slalom between tens of other burned out vehicles.

When you see Russian infantry advancing and fighting, they tend to walk past piles of corpses, sometimes literal piles of corpses I think they just know.

edit: like the (probably apocryphal) habit of some Samurai to do kind of a funeral with their families and be considered dead before even going to war, I think they just realize their lives won't matter, there's nobody to help, no way out and it's just a matter of time.

Or course the irony is that it would probably be safer to attack Kremlin than Ukrainian lines. But they'd rather die than revolt. So they do.

Edited July 24 by Letter from Prague

[Sojourner]

36 minutes ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

It certainly seems to be a uniquely Russian problem.

Another factor could be that they know how they treat Ukrainian prisoners and expect they'd be treated the same, coupled with Russian propaganda on what the Ukrainians would do to them.

But it's all speculation unless someone holds a séance and asks them.

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

Looking forward, I have to wonder if ATGMs and UAS are going to have some unholy baby.  So we basically have a long range long endurance loitering munition capable of over the horizon strike.  Further this system is fire and forget in the last mile once it is given a target…EW does not stop a Javelin

 

Quote

 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IAI_Harop

The IAI Harop has a loiter (flying) time of 6 hours and a range of 200 km both ways. It is a larger version of the IAI Harpy and is launched from ground or sea-based canisters, but can be adapted for air launch.^[1] The Harop uses a man-in-the-loop mode, being controlled by a remote operator.^[2] The Harop operator can select static or moving targets detected by the aircraft's electro-optical sensor.^[1]

side view.

IAI developed a smaller version of the Harop for smaller applications called Mini-Harop or Green Dragon.^[3] The smaller Harop is one-fifth the size and has a lighter 3–4 kg (6.6–8.8 lb) warhead. It has a shorter endurance of 2–3 hours and is used tactically against time-critical targets or ones that hide and re-appear.^[4]

 

^Actually...

^{Edit: And if you believe they don't have a fire and forget mode I have this really nice T-90 in my garage for sale, Cheap!}

Edited July 24 by dan/california

[akd]

I did not foresee this serious escalation...

 

[dan/california]

 

Quote

 

https://www.amazon.com/Unit-Pentagon-Silicon-Valley-Transforming/dp/B0CSGZBG52/ref=tmm_aud_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&dib_tag=se&dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.KWWnM_ur_es1eJ4ZZbkF4UJjrXbLq3B_-4MXkZVXLjux1JVlWN5aN7VuEKq6dGfQc-ZNvmKaL8ElwUi8vfjKoNUFNfwnKjUS45laMbhQ3CYsOuUp6o-IdejE6VmYlcgf.0BJ_kNNjyjJC4ECQK9rIl3X3C0MrVdpEySc9Q1xx9k0&qid=1721863112&sr=1-1

Until recently, the Pentagon was known for its uncomfortable relationship with Silicon Valley and for slow-moving processes that acted as a brake on innovation. Unit X was specifically designed as a bridge to Valley technologists that would accelerate bringing state of the art software and hardware to the battle space. Given authority to cut through red tape and function almost as a venture capital firm, Shah, Kirchhoff, and others in the Unit who came after were tasked particularly with meeting immediate military needs with technology from Valley startups rather than from so-called “primes”—behemoth companies like Lockheed, Raytheon, and Boeing.

Taking us inside AI labs, drone workshops, and battle command centers—and, also, overseas to Ukraine’s frontlines—Shah and Kirchhoff paint a fascinating picture of what it takes to stay dominant in a fast-changing and often precarious geopolitical landscape.

 

The authors seem to understand that few and expensive is not a winning strategy anymore.