How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Harmon Rabb]

I know Steve told us to cut back on the China related talk, but this is cool what the Republic of China otherwise known as Taiwan is doing.

Edited November 14, 2023 by Harmon Rabb

[dan/california]

 

[The_Capt]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

This video suggests that Ukrainian drone operators really, really, really wanted to make sure the TOR was destroyed.  Really, really destroyed.

You sank my Battleship!  That is a 25 million dollar system taken out by a $100k drone dropping $20 dollar munitions. 

[sburke]

pretty much totally off tangent other than being a guided vehicle of sorts, but this is what NASA developed to deflate the tires on the space shuttle.  The tires PSI was so high that it was the equivalent of 2.5 sticks of dynamite if it blew.  This engineer took a Tamiya Tiger II motorized model, stuck a DeWalt drill on it and Voila!  It actually served for a bit successfully deflating .. and surviving 9 tires.

[Sojourner]

Looks like the U.S is shifting from supporting Ukraine to supporting Russia.

US House passes spending bill without Ukraine aid.

Banned Russian oil flows into Pentagon supply chain.

[dan/california]

2 hours ago, Sojourner said:

Looks like the U.S is shifting from supporting Ukraine to supporting Russia.

US House passes spending bill without Ukraine aid.

Banned Russian oil flows into Pentagon supply chain.

The spending bill is obviously a problem, buy I still think it will get done. There may be a messy compromise on what the U.S. is doing at the Mexican border, but we can fix that in a year or two if Biden wins reelection, and if he doesn't, well that doesn't really bear thinking about.....

The oil sales quoted in the articles are an inevitable result of a decision at the beginning of the war to not try to truly cut off Russian oil sales. You can agree or disagree with that, but it is the decision everybody made. The fact that some of the Russian oil on the world market is squeezing into odd, and even embarrassing places is inevitable and not particularly remarkable. The two far more important numbers are the world price of oil, and the discount Russia has to give its buyers given the hassle of dealing the sanctions that do exists. Brent crude right now is ~$83 per barrel, considerably less than its peaks of the last couple of years. The price cut Russia has to give to move their oil is of course ot known exactly, but i would bet a lot of money it isn't zero.

Edited November 15, 2023 by dan/california

[chuckdyke]

Was watching this YouTube video about unmanned vehicles and I found it interesting.

It is Israel among others so my apologies if it is off topic. 

 

[Zeleban]

A new overview of the situation on the right bank of the Dnieper.

Probably, the command of the enemy grouping of forces "Dnepr" began to implement a plan to eliminate the tactical bridgeheads of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the left bank of the river. Dnieper.

General Teplinsky, apparently, quite logically decided to start with the most threatening one - the one located in the area of the village of Krynki.

As far as I understand, the idea is as follows..

Create an advantage in forces and means in the form of 3 tactical groups. And then, with two of them (flank), from the areas of the village of Korsunka and the village of Cossack Camps, respectively, to attack along the coastal road Oleshki - Novaya Kakhovka... near the general direction to the village Krynki.

While the third, frontal one will operate through the forest to the south of the village. Krynki...trying to push the advanced units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces out of the northern part of the forest, first into the village itself, and then into the floodplain of the river...

It is the frontal group that will begin, or rather has already begun, to operate... which apparently includes units of the 26th motorized rifle regiment of the 70th motorized rifle division and individual units of the 144th separate motorized rifle brigade... one and a half to two days ago, they managed to advance almost to the south-eastern outskirts of the village (near its central part)...

In the area of Cossack Camps, the enemy concentrated another tactical group in the form of:

- 1445th and 385th infantry regiments of territorial troops (a battalion from each)

- consolidated tactical detachment of the 10th separate special forces brigade

- battalion BARS-4

Well, in the direction of the village of Korsunka - the village of Krynki, they are deployed:

- at least 2 battalions of the 810th separate marine brigade, and most likely - all 3 of its battalions...

- to the battalion of the 205th separate motorized rifle brigade

- to the battalion of the 404th motorized rifle regiment of territorial troops

- consolidated tactical detachment "Storm - Z", of at least 2 assault companies of 110-120 prisoners each.

Judging by the volume and quantity of these forces and means, we can safely say that against only one Ukrainian bridgehead in the area of the village. In Krynki, the enemy concentrated almost 2 full-fledged “recruitment” brigades.

I won’t undertake to predict now whether they will succeed or not...

But, I must admit, General Teplinsky acts quite deliberately and logically, trying not to create a “pillar formation of troops” in front of the Ukrainian bridgehead in conditions of the advantage of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in matters of reconnaissance and the effectiveness of artillery operations, but by involving exactly as many troops (forces) in active actions against our bridgeheads - how much do you need.

That is, in order to have an obvious advantage in forces and means, but at the same time, not to expose (or try not to expose) your troops to the effective fire of Ukrainian artillery in the areas and at the lines of their concentration and deployment. This is a rather rare professional quality among Russian army commanders (chiefs) at the operational level... who, for the most part, tend to try to act impudently, massing their troops in the offensive beyond any reasonable norms... trying to “crush the enemy with mass.”

Edited November 15, 2023 by Zeleban

[Zeleban]

Now, a few general comments regarding the situation in the Crimean-Tavrian direction...

In my opinion, nevertheless, the decisive factor in this attempt by Teplinsky will not be his own decisions and steps, but rather the decisions and steps of his Ukrainian counterparts... The fact is that the decision of General Teplinsky himself in the specific conditions that have now developed in on the left bank, for the most part, are quite obvious and predictable. That is, exactly how Russian troops will act is mostly clear. Another thing is the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which will be forced to solve a whole range of rather complex tasks to retain and preserve their bridgeheads. To do this, they will have to demonstrate not only fairly high combat qualities, but most importantly - flexibility, efficiency and ingenuity at the command level.

Also, another factor is no less obvious and important - General Teplinsky will have to make do with a fairly limited amount of forces and means to solve the task assigned to him. Heavy and intense fighting in the Tokmak direction does not stop, near Avdeevka, Bakhmut and in the Kupyansk direction too. Therefore, for Teplinsky, the “upper” Russian command right now does not have not only a “lost” army or division, but even a regiment or brigade... it will be necessary to “scrape off like a battalion” here and there...

- And one more thing... Many of our military experts and analysts have a rather false idea of the REAL immediate tasks and the meaning of the actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the left bank of the Dnieper. For some reason, they mostly fall into some extremes from “PR on blood” to “prospects for a breakthrough towards Crimea.” Please come to your senses... At this stage, the main point is not this at all... but the desire to obtain a fairly wide front section of the Dnieper coast on the right bank of the river, where the bulk of enemy artillery will not reach...

We are not talking about anything more now...

Another question is why the Ukrainian troops need this...?

Finally, one reminder...

The distance from the village of Pervomaevka to the village of Pokrovskoye on the Kinburn Spit in a straight line is more than 206 km, and with all the twists and turns of the front - all 250-260 km.

Therefore, I recommend that you, my dear readers, think about... in whose favor exactly CAN this circumstance play...?

Especially in the context of the question - how many and what kind of troops are needed to hold such a sector “along the front” and secure it from active enemy actions in the “across the river” style?

Moreover, in conditions when you are significantly limited in organizing and using a mobile reserve...

Edited November 15, 2023 by Zeleban

[cesmonkey]

45 minutes ago, Zeleban said:

Now, a few general comments regarding the situation in the Crimean-Tavrian direction...

In my opinion, nevertheless, the decisive factor in this attempt by Teplinsky will not be his own decisions and steps, but rather the decisions and steps of his Ukrainian counterparts... The fact is that the decision of General Teplinsky himself in the specific conditions that have now developed in on the left bank, for the most part, are quite obvious and predictable. That is, exactly how Russian troops will act is mostly clear. Another thing is the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which will be forced to solve a whole range of rather complex tasks to retain and preserve their bridgeheads. To do this, they will have to demonstrate not only fairly high combat qualities, but most importantly - flexibility, efficiency and ingenuity at the command level.

Also, another factor is no less obvious and important - General Teplinsky will have to make do with a fairly limited amount of forces and means to solve the task assigned to him. Heavy and intense fighting in the Tokmak direction does not stop, near Avdeevka, Bakhmut and in the Kupyansk direction too. Therefore, for Teplinsky, the “upper” Russian command right now does not have not only a “lost” army or division, but even a regiment or brigade... it will be necessary to “scrape off like a battalion” here and there...

- And one more thing... Many of our military experts and analysts have a rather false idea of the REAL immediate tasks and the meaning of the actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the left bank of the Dnieper. For some reason, they mostly fall into some extremes from “PR on blood” to “prospects for a breakthrough towards Crimea.” Please come to your senses... At this stage, the main point is not this at all... but the desire to obtain a fairly wide front section of the Dnieper coast on the right bank of the river, where the bulk of enemy artillery will not reach...

We are not talking about anything more now...

Another question is why the Ukrainian troops need this...?

Finally, one reminder...

The distance from the village of Pervomaevka to the village of Pokrovskoye on the Kinburn Spit in a straight line is more than 206 km, and with all the twists and turns of the front - all 250-260 km.

Therefore, I recommend that you, my dear readers, think about... in whose favor exactly CAN this circumstance play...?

Especially in the context of the question - how many and what kind of troops are needed to hold such a sector “along the front” and secure it from active enemy actions in the “across the river” style?

Moreover, in conditions when you are significantly limited in organizing and using a mobile reserve...

To clarify to those that didn't know, the above  is the update today from the Ukrainian Konstantin Mashovets

[cesmonkey]

Interesting ... add target indicators to the heads-up-display of individual soldiers equipped with MANPADs. 
Any one aware if other militaries are doing this?

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2023

Quote

Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec stated on November 14 that Rostec subsidiary Roselectronics presented an updated automated control system for air defense units, including Russian air defenses, at the Dubai Airshow 2023.[93] Rostec claimed that the updated wearable version of the control system includes an automated control module that allows an anti-aircraft gunner unit commander to simultaneously command nine gunners or four platoons of MANPADS gunners. The system reportedly also includes an individual automation kit for individual fighters who are equipped with portable anti-aircraft systems or small arms. The individual automation kit reportedly includes safety glasses with a heads-up display showing targets received from the unit commander. Rostec claimed that the control system’s efficiency has been tested in combat conditions, presumably in Ukraine, and that the system can be sold to other countries and adapted to their air defense systems.

 

[LongLeftFlank]

Well over 2000 pages ago, around the time of the battles for Sieverdonetsk/ Lysichansk, somebody (Steve @Battlefront.com ?) observed that the Ukrainian command is quite adept at setting up the Russians to make costly mistakes and then forcing them to make them, even when their own commanders know full well what the trap is. Pure Sun Tzu.

This latest reversion to VDV kampfgruppen attacks (BTGs, but lower tech and more infantry) seems to call for UA to revert to the Jaeger tactics that worked well for them during the 'war of movement' in the north in 2022. Infiltrate and envelop the roadbound elements using small killer teams, not allowing them to form up for any coherent attack so they go off piecemeal, flail and fizzle.  I doubt Russian drone warfare is yet at a state where it can find and destroy these teams, and 2023 mobiks still seem to be pants and flank security and active patrolling, even if they wear VDV sailor shirts.

A mistake IMHO would be a 'NATO solution', i.e. trying to bomb these forces to smithereens using UA's very finite stocks of ranged PGMs as ersatz airpower. Depleting these stocks may be part of Teplinski's own plan, given that these actions seem to fall near the limit of UA conventional artillery sited on the north bank of the river.

Edited November 15, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[Kraft]

Quote

The German company Rheinmetal will deliver five light assault vehicles "Caracal" to Ukraine this winter

The ZSU will be the first operators of these maneuverable off-road vehicles

Meanwhile, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation signed a contract with a Chinese company for the supply of 2,000 Desertcross-1000-3 buggies in the next six months

Why is it so difficult to fix the demand for basic vehicles, not even armored ones.

Often I see donation posts for a simple jeep or van (that offers 0 protection for the medics/.. inside) having to be funded by generous donators.

As far as I know most European car manufacturers have declining orders, should not be impossible to get a large quantity contract for a simple offroad vehicle.

Edited November 15, 2023 by Kraft

[Zeleban]

 

Examples of the types of weapons that mobile groups use against Shahed UAVs. To be honest, I was surprised that S-60 guns are used for this purpose, the power of which is excessive for this purpose and the rate of fire is low

 

[Offshoot]

The Reporting from Ukraine (RfK) channel is saying that the Russians call the Ukrainian heavy "assault" drones Baba Yaga and dislike them so much they try to use their own drones to crash into them. An example is shown at 3:08 in the following video (it's from a Russian source so I couldn't find the original). The problem with this is that they would never know if it worked or not - RfK says usually not.

 

[Carolus]

I hope these aren't overengineered compared to what simple pressure-triggered mines are achieving in Ukraine at the moment (after the vital discussion that was had regarding "Who will win? The 1 billion laser AD system or the flying hand-genade with a propeller that goes brrrr? First round, set, match!").

But in any case, it seems like Ukraine will get some more DM22.

[The_Capt]

19 minutes ago, Carolus said:

I hope these aren't overengineered compared to what simple pressure-triggered mines are achieving in Ukraine at the moment (after the vital discussion that was had regarding "Who will win? The 1 billion laser AD system or the flying hand-genade with a propeller that goes brrrr? First round, set, match!").

But in any case, it seems like Ukraine will get some more DM22.

They aren’t bad:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PARM_1_mine

Upsides and down sides.  Better sensors, 100m range and nasty penetration.  But limited battery life (30 days).  Likely going to used in the c-moves/reserves or by SOF/Light for deep stuff.  Good old dumb mines will end up doing the heavy lifting.

Big problem for the RA right now is attacking back through their own minefields.  I am betting RA record keeping and safe lane sustainment are not very high quality right now.  So they will very likely have to breach their own obstacles while the UA drops explosives on their heads.

[Carolus]

Quote

Everybody can take out targets within a 1.5 km range. We try to teach them to hit Russian soldiers within 2 km. It’s very important that they shoot not only during daytime but also at night, when they can eliminate a lot of enemies.

Such a group of snipers is always protected by our special operations forces, and is accompanied by at least two reconnaissance drones, two sappers, and two grenade launcher operators. Such a group can actually do a lot of different work during the offensive on the front lines and in the Russian rear.

https://euromaidanpress.com/2023/07/25/stopping-the-modern-hitler-snipers-hold-the-line-in-ukraines-battle-for-survival/

 

Interview with a Ukrainian volunteer who specializes in fundraising for snipers.

Snipers are or were apparently responsible for the most casualties after artillery (Artillery being almost 90% and snipers being most of the rest).

Interesting troop composition he talks about. Also, every second high-tech scope west of Warsaw should be on the way to Ukraine. 

[Carolus]

And a development in the Russian side regarding drone-dropped munitions:

[Butschi]

1 hour ago, Kraft said:

Why is it so difficult to fix the demand for basic vehicles, not even armored ones.

Often I see donation posts for a simple jeep or van (that offers 0 protection for the medics/.. inside) having to be funded by generous donators.

As far as I know most European car manufacturers have declining orders, should not be impossible to get a large quantity contract for a simple offroad vehicle.

It still takes a lot of time between ordering and getting your new car. Anyway, if you just want an existing car model, manufacturers could possibly ramp up production (although you are probably better off just buying used cars). Developing something new? The development cycle for new models is around seven years. Even if you significantly decrease this by cutting corners there is no way you get something new within the next year(s).

[kimbosbread]

1 hour ago, Butschi said:

It still takes a lot of time between ordering and getting your new car. Anyway, if you just want an existing car model, manufacturers could possibly ramp up production (although you are probably better off just buying used cars).

Toyota produces enough Hiluxes and LC70s (and enough of them exist already) that someone would just have to open their checkbook.

However, Europe and US are not going to subsidize Toyota. That’s why pages ago I suggested we literally send all of the luxury pickups in the US that aren’t selling to Ukraine:

• Subsidize US industry? Check
• Subsidize US workers (or NAFTA ones)? Check
• American trucks towing weapons and looking badass? Check

I don’t think you realize how many pickup trucks exists in the US (or Latin America, or SE Asia). I bet even a medium size US city could spare a thousand plus between all the dealerships.

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Well over 2000 pages ago, around the time of the battles for Sieverdonetsk/ Lysichansk, somebody (Steve @Battlefront.com ?) observed that the Ukrainian command is quite adept at setting up the Russians to make costly mistakes and then forcing them to make them, even when their own commanders know full well what the trap is. Pure Sun Tzu.

Heh... sounds like something I would have said   Indeed, since this war started I'd say that Ukraine has had the upper hand when it comes to shaping operations.  Russia doesn't shape as much as it pounds. 

Regarding Zeleban's latest Mashovets' postings, it does seem like Ukraine is suckering the Russians into over extending themselves.

The Dnepr bridgehead is causing Russia to have to make more hard choices.  This has been part of Ukraine's strategy for most of the war and it has worked very well.  The biggest payoff of this was when Russia withdrew from northern Ukraine.

The primary means of forcing your enemy to make tough decisions is to present them with tough options.  Seems rather obvious, and it is, yet Russia has failed to do it even when it tries.  When Ukraine got ready for its southern counter offensive Russia launched its own offensive in Luhansk.  It did not have any noticeable impact.  In fact, Ukraine gained significant ground around Bakhmut, a place that Russians bled out 10s of thousands of its manpower taking.  There's likely many reasons for Ukraine's success, with dumb luck not being one of them.

At present Russia is trying to do too much with the forces it has.  Logically and rationally it should be rebuilding, not frittering them away in a pointless battle around Avdiivka while they continue to be under intense pressure in Bakhmut, multiple points on the Zaporizhzhia front, and numerous tactical points all the way up to Kupyansk.  Russia's holding, though consistently losing ground in the process (not a lot, but a loss is still a loss).

The bridgehead on the left bank of the Dnepr forces Russia to commit forces it wasn't anticipating would be needed in this area (evidence is Russia having siphoned forces away from there over the summer).  Ukraine is obligating Russia to make difficult choices and the evidence is that they've decided to build up a force, at the expense of other needs, to wipe out the bridgehead.  This is militarily significant and is exactly what Ukraine should be doing.  Critics of the bridgehead don't seem to understand how successful past actions like this have proven (this year's Bakhmut offensive as a shining example).

Where is this headed?  My guess...

Russia has one shot to steamroll the Ukrainians and force them to withdraw.  One.  If their primary attack fails it will most likely suffer massive casualties which it won't be able to immediately replace.  Based on standard Russian behavior, they will not wait for such replacements but instead continue fruitless attacks with whatever is left until it is utterly spent.  Russia's knack for reinforcing failure to the point of making their decisions more difficult than when they started is well established.

On the other hand, if Russia's initial attack has any significant success, Ukraine will likely have to withdraw.  Their positions are too tenuous and held by too few that are too difficult to reinforce quickly and/or under intense pressure.

Honestly, I have no idea which way this will go.  I have a feeling that Ukraine has what it needs to crush the initial attack, so I'm leaning towards Ukraine holding onto significant positions on the left bank of the Dnepr for some time to come.

Steve

[FlemFire]

6 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Well over 2000 pages ago, around the time of the battles for Sieverdonetsk/ Lysichansk, somebody (Steve @Battlefront.com ?) observed that the Ukrainian command is quite adept at setting up the Russians to make costly mistakes and then forcing them to make them, even when their own commanders know full well what the trap is. Pure Sun Tzu.

This latest reversion to VDV kampfgruppen attacks (BTGs, but lower tech and more infantry) seems to call for UA to revert to the Jaeger tactics that worked well for them during the 'war of movement' in the north in 2022. Infiltrate and envelop the roadbound elements using small killer teams, not allowing them to form up for any coherent attack so they go off piecemeal, flail and fizzle.  I doubt Russian drone warfare is yet at a state where it can find and destroy these teams, and 2023 mobiks still seem to be pants and flank security and active patrolling, even if they wear VDV sailor shirts.

A mistake IMHO would be a 'NATO solution', i.e. trying to bomb these forces to smithereens using UA's very finite stocks of ranged PGMs as ersatz airpower. Depleting these stocks may be part of Teplinski's own plan, given that these actions seem to fall near the limit of UA conventional artillery sited on the north bank of the river.

 

I imagine most people who haven't let emotions melt their brains have made this observation. The required effort here hinges largely on putting the ball in the Russians' court and letting the weaknesses of their military doctrines do the rest.

Quote

 

Russia can hang themselves in maneuver warfare. They can't hang themselves sitting in trenches bombing the hell out of you. If you roll the clocks back a bit and actually look at NATO's military doctrine, and more importantly the USA's back when Russia was their focus, there's a pretty vested interest in meeting the Soviets in open plains. There is not much interest in getting into artillery slugging matches with them. If you flip through old Cold War analyses, Russia's artillery stock comes up repeatedly. Now look at the equipment given to the Ukraine. All these items gain tactical advantages when used in open plains. I just saw a clip recently where a number of Russian tanks bumbled into a minefield. They just had a loss of what looked like two or three tanks. To mines. What do you think that looks like if Ukraine invites Russia into that sort of war?

Yes, you have to give up terrain to do this. As mentioned before, when you draw out Russia's advances they risk cohesion loss. I saw this myself in Georgia in 2008. Russians bumbling about everywhere against an almost nonexistent enemy. They just don't have the discipline and command of Western armies. But you don't need either of those things to put, as some people say, 40-year old artillery shells into a cannon. And, still granting this notion, I think even 40-year old shells exploding still do more or less the same thing to human bodies.

 

 

Engaging in offenses into the teeth of Russian defenses, or engaging them in attritional warfare are losing efforts. Maybe you'll lengthen the war, but you're going to lose in the end. Per a previous post, 90% of the casualties are committed by artillery. In another previous post, an analyst believes Russia is dumping 275+ artillery pieces onto the front every single month, compared to Ukraine's 20+. Let's throw in the 120+ monthly Russian T-55's/T-62's which are being used in support artillery roles. That's potentially up to a 20:1 firepower deficit, not including the massive firepower found in the form of missiles and drones which also tilts heavily in Russia's favor.

Ukraine should have given up territory to invite Russian advances and pounced on them in turn. The offensive Ukraine launched, though, ultimately does not surprise me. Attacking across open ground with zero air supremacy in this day and age? Just a little bit of criminal negligence, that's all. You have to understand, though, that in the West its military thinking hasn't been tied to winning wars for about 60+ years now. It's more focused on fighting them, which is a key difference, one heavily attached to the massive amounts of $$$ corrupting the armed forces. It says a lot that the Ukrainian armed forces would've done infinitely better under the thinking of some hardnosed Afghans than these corrupt generals who always have one foot in the door of the nearest Lockheed, GD, Boeing, etc., and who dedicate more resources to emotional propaganda than to tailoring their fighting forces to the realities arrayed before them.

 

 

[LongLeftFlank]

5 minutes ago, Khalerick said:

 

I imagine most people who haven't let emotions melt their brains have made this observation. The required effort here hinges largely on putting the ball in the Russians' court and letting the weaknesses of their military doctrines do the rest.

 

Engaging in offenses into the teeth of Russian defenses, or engaging them in attritional warfare are losing efforts. Maybe you'll lengthen the war, but you're going to lose in the end. Per a previous post, 90% of the casualties are committed by artillery. In another previous post, an analyst believes Russia is dumping 275+ artillery pieces onto the front every single month, compared to Ukraine's 20+. Let's throw in the 120+ monthly Russian T-55's/T-62's which are being used in support artillery roles. That's potentially up to a 20:1 firepower deficit, not including the massive firepower found in the form of missiles and drones which also tilts heavily in Russia's favor.

Ukraine should have given up territory to invite Russian advances and pounced on them in turn. The offensive Ukraine launched, though, ultimately does not surprise me. Attacking across open ground with zero air supremacy in this day and age? Just a little bit of criminal negligence, that's all. You have to understand, though, that in the West its military thinking hasn't been tied to winning wars for about 60+ years now. It's more focused on fighting them, which is a key difference, one heavily attached to the massive amounts of $$$ corrupting the armed forces. It says a lot that the Ukrainian armed forces would've done infinitely better under the thinking of some hardnosed Afghans than these corrupt generals who always have one foot in the door of the nearest Lockheed, GD, Boeing, etc., and who dedicate more resources to emotional propaganda than to tailoring their fighting forces to the realities arrayed before them.

 

 

Erich von Manstein, is that you?

Politically of course, it's not quite so easy to yield significant chunks of territory to this enemy.  But Ukraine did so, at Lyman and Sieverdonetsk/Lysychansk, and ultimately at Bakhmut. They also fell back from the the Svatove area, letting the Russians be the ones to flounder about in that no mans' land maze of balkas.

Edited November 15, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[Battlefront.com]

28 minutes ago, Khalerick said:

I imagine most people who haven't let emotions melt their brains have made this observation. The required effort here hinges largely on putting the ball in the Russians' court and letting the weaknesses of their military doctrines do the rest.

Very well put.  We've endlessly discussed last year how Russia *must* attack if it is to get anything it says it wants out of Ukraine.  It can't just sit in trenches and have Ukraine hand over everything else.  Which is why when Russia decides to attack (Bakhmut and Avdiivka for recent examples), it is important to NOT pack up and leave.  Russia still controls where and when it will attack, not Ukraine.  If Russia says it wants to die for a hill, then make them die for it even if it is a stupid choice of hills to die on.

 

28 minutes ago, Khalerick said:

The offensive Ukraine launched, though, ultimately does not surprise me. Attacking across open ground with zero air supremacy in this day and age? Just a little bit of criminal negligence, that's all.

Here I'll slightly disagree.  There were many good reasons to try a large counter-offensive this year and, despite the lack of air superiority and thin breaching resources, Ukraine came very close to achieving a breakthrough explicitly because Russia is barely competent even in defense.  The amount of forces Russia burned through trying to retake forward positions was, by all OSINT accounts, on a scale similar to their failed deliberate attacks.  I don't know if on the whole the counter-offensive was worth it, but I do think Ukraine came out ahead militarily in the end.

What went wrong was the Russians did a way better job with mines and covering them than was expected.  If someone knew how thick and dense the minefields were and still ordered the attacks, well... that's "a little bit of criminal negligence".  If Ukraine's leadership instead presumed them to be only slightly above Russian doctrinal levels, that's a different story.  The former is a failure in judgement, the latter is a failure in battlefield intel.

Steve