How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Rokko]

1 hour ago, Zeleban said:

I have always considered Tatarigami one of the most valuable sources of information about this war. Until I read his statement that Bakhmut did not need to be held, but instead had to retreat to more “advantageous positions.” If it were not for the retention of Bakhmut, then who knows where our positions would be now. Near Slovyansk or to the west of it?

Now the opposition to Zelensky media is promoting the assertion that the reason for the failure of the Zaporozhye offensive lies in the retention of Bakhmut. They say the reserves necessary for the summer offensive were spent there. Based on this logic, in March 2022 we needed to leave Kharkov, Kiev, Chernigov and Sumi. After all, the defense of these cities was also very bloody.

Ultimately I don't know, of course. But I do have a hunch that if the Russians had gotten to Slavyansk it would have taken them all Summer (~40km) and every month would have been another Avdiivka/Vuhledar, with loss rates more like these:

 

... rather than the 1:1 rate (at least for vehicles, but I am afraid we can roughly extrapolate personell losess from that) we had to witness for the Southern offensive. Needless to say that the recent developments and news have rather reinforced my belief that going on the offensive this year at all has been, sadly, a grave mistake for Ukraine.

Now, and in hindsight, it strikes me as odd that we always talk about it as the Ukrainian "counter offensive", when, in fact, it was actually just a "regular" offensive, against well prepared defensives in a sector of the line that had been mostly static for well over a year at that point. I think its quite possible that an actual counter offensive, i.e., an operation in response to a culminated Russian offensive against weakened and exhausted forces would have been more successful. Basically, right now or a couple of weeks from now, at Avdiivka. But, alas, I suspect the Ukrainian army is too worn down for that from their own summer offensive, at least at this time.

 

[Rokko]

4 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

This was not the expected result from the summer counter offensive, not even for those (like me) that had far more modest goals (Melitopol) than others (Crimea).  I really thought Ukraine could kill Russians fast enough to matter, but Russia's ability to get volunteers sufficient to avoid another conscription was a shock to me.  It was a very high risk gamble that Russia took, but it looks like it paid off in the end.

This is another thought that has bothered me lately: We saw over the course of the summer that Ukraine is able to effectively organize and synchronize actions in a given sector on a company to batallion scale, but not really larger than that. This has been first noted (and criticized) by Kofman et al, I believe. So for every day of the offensive there are at most a couple of company/batallion sized engagements. The Russians are mobilizing between 20,000 (UA/OSINT estimates) to 35,000 (Russian claims) men every month, though. Under these circumstances, can attriting the RU army through offensive action ever even be realistic possibility?

[chrisl]

4 hours ago, kimbosbread said:

What is preventing the breakthrough? ISR, small drones, artillery, minefields and infantry manning fortifications. If it was possible to step 3 of these things, in order of hardest to easiest, I think a breakthrough would have a chance:

• FPV drone operators
• Artillery
• Trucks
• Locomotives (and trains in general)

I submit that a single autonomous loitering munition platform is the near-term solution for all of these, and that it could be designed, tested and built at scale in a year’s time:

• Gas-powered, so that it can loiter for 12+ hours
• Thermal + optical plus some zoom
• Substantial onboard processing power (equivalent to a modern smartphone)
• Autonomous, so it goes to a designated area and hunts in that space, or along a route
• Similar or smaller size to Lancet
• Similar or lower cost wrt to Lancet

Except for the “Autonomous” bullet point, one of these capabilities are anything special. Everything exists. And for the “autonomous” part, I think most of it is pretty simple image recognition tasks that could be run on an Nvidia Jetson or similar. Now that my big work project is done, I’ll see if I can toss together a poc and put it on github as demonstration for train hunting over the next few weekends.

 

To hit FPV drone operators you probably need something that triangulates on an RF signal, but applies geo-constraints - the source would need to be in a geofenced area so you don't hit your own operators and would have to be within some distance of the surface of the earth so you aren't chasing the drone.  If you have a stationary reference, you might also require that the target be stationary or slow moving so you don't chase a drone that's skimming the grass.

[Zeleban]

25 minutes ago, Rokko said:

Ultimately I don't know, of course. But I do have a hunch that if the Russians had gotten to Slavyansk it would have taken them all Summer (~40km) and every month would have been another Avdiivka/Vuhledar, with loss rates more like these:

 

... rather than the 1:1 rate (at least for vehicles, but I am afraid we can roughly extrapolate personell losess from that) we had to witness for the Southern offensive. Needless to say that the recent developments and news have rather reinforced my belief that going on the offensive this year at all has been, sadly, a grave mistake for Ukraine.

Now, and in hindsight, it strikes me as odd that we always talk about it as the Ukrainian "counter offensive", when, in fact, it was actually just a "regular" offensive, against well prepared defensives in a sector of the line that had been mostly static for well over a year at that point. I think its quite possible that an actual counter offensive, i.e., an operation in response to a culminated Russian offensive against weakened and exhausted forces would have been more successful. Basically, right now or a couple of weeks from now, at Avdiivka. But, alas, I suspect the Ukrainian army is too worn down for that from their own summer offensive, at least at this time.

 

Unfortunately, “counter offensive” is just a PR move designed to demonstrate to Ukraine’s Western allies the weakness of Russia and Ukraine’s imminent victory in the war. Our president comes from show business, where PR is given special importance. The counter-offensive was very widely advertised in various media, just like a concert by revered pop stars. However, it turned out that the military operation had nothing to do with the concert.

It is very stupid to do exactly what the enemy expects from you. History teaches us a lesson again

[Haiduk]

21 minutes ago, Zeleban said:

However, it turned out that the military operation had nothing to do with the concert.

In 2022 Kherson operation also was widely announced - this was most expected by Ukrainians. I think, Zaporizhzhia front operation was also mostly expected both by Ukrainians and Russians, so it's wasn't any secret about direction of our strike. All questions to our General Staff why they choose more expected way through Tokmak and Melitopol, where Russians prepared most heavy defense. 

Maybe after the war we will know more about foiled winter offensive, unill Russians dug up own "Surovikin line", when we expected weapon and personnel training, but received lot of discussions instead. And why allies adviced "to delay with offensive", but in May, when Russians already bult own fiortifications they became to advice "to hurry up with offensive"

Also I hope, after the war we will receive an answer, why in Autumn of 2022 we conducted offensive on Kherson instead to strike on Tokmak - Melitopol, which automatically could put Russians on right bank  of Dnipro and in Kherson on the edge of cutting of supply. 

Edited November 4, 2023 by Haiduk

[Homo_Ferricus]

4 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

I really thought Ukraine could kill Russians fast enough to matter, but Russia's ability to get volunteers sufficient to avoid another conscription was a shock to me.

Having been born in Moscow and raised in the culture, this is where my message is coming from; we on this forum have been taking a very logical and almost mathematical approach to calculating Russia's damage and preconcluding it's fate. We need to understand that, while certainly not limitless nor supernatural, there is a certain character of stubborn will and seemingly senseless perseverance in the face of opposition that can be conjured in the collective "Russian" when the circumstances are right. We've talked about it here before. As the war has continued Putin and the state are doing a fair job of galvanizing the public to rally around their identity, but its not all "master strategist Putin" pulling the strings. Microeconomies are popping up, local Russians are manufacturing their own cheese to replace imports, companies are cleverly outmaneuvering sanctions, entrepreneurs are exploiting openings, industries are slowly, painfully adapting and gaining confidence. And as all that goes on the average Russian begins to settle into the "us against them" mentality of besiegement. Early in the war western media called this "Putin's war" and blamed the Russian government. Slowly the messaging has changed, and now we believe every Russian to be responsible for what is happening. While I agree that this is true in a spiritual and philosophical sense, it also drives Russians deeper inward, hardening their resolve and pushing people to close ranks. Unfortunately the more defensive ordinary Russians feel, the more difficult it will be for them to mentally separate the state from the greater identity.

Young people are not excluded from this phenomena, including the bright minds. I can imagine some of the brights coming back home to Russia after living in an undignified mode of "otherness" and "humiliation" in places like Georgia, Armenia, Germany, Turkey, Kazakhstan etc. Having heard the call to return to family and rodina, sprung by the excitement of building something new at home while affirming their identities and standing up with dignity against their opponents.

Your reply to my points on Russian economic recovery make sense, though it's worth pointing out that macroeconomics is one of the lesser precise "sciences". I leave room for fated chance, unintended consequences and human ingenuity to change what looks like a logical outcome to us at the moment.

Of course we've discussed Russia being a pressure cooker and how everything can come crashing quite dramatically, but that's not the feeling in the air that I'm catching at this moment. Excuse me for this post that was less factual and more like pseudo-shamanic reading of my own tea leaves.

Slava Ukraini

 

[Zeleban]

55 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

In 2022 Kherson operation also was widely announced - this was most expected by Ukrainians. I think, Zaporizhzhia front operation was also mostly expected both by Ukrainians and Russians, so it's wasn't any secret about direction of our strike. All questions to our General Staff why they choose more expected way through Tokmak and Melitopol, where Russians prepared most heavy defense. 

Maybe after the war we will know more about foiled winter offensive, unill Russians dug up own "Surovikin line", when we expected weapon and personnel training, but received lot of discussions instead. And why allies adviced "to delay with offensive", but in May, when Russians already bult own fiortifications they became to advice "to hurry up with offensive"

Also I hope, after the war we will receive an answer, why in Autumn of 2022 we conducted offensive on Kherson instead to strike on Tokmak - Melitopol, which automatically could put Russians on right bank  of Dnipro and in Kherson on the edge of cutting of supply. 

Then it’s better to start from the very beginning and find out how the Russians ended up near Vasilyevka and Tokmak. Why, as it recently became clear, there was no plan for defense on the part of Crimea.

There was only a plan for “deterrent measures” - countering small groups of saboteurs

[kimbosbread]

1 hour ago, chrisl said:

To hit FPV drone operators you probably need something that triangulates on an RF signal, but applies geo-constraints - the source would need to be in a geofenced area so you don't hit your own operators and would have to be within some distance of the surface of the earth so you aren't chasing the drone.  If you have a stationary reference, you might also require that the target be stationary or slow moving so you don't chase a drone that's skimming the grass.

Yeah, you’d need to basically triangulate the control signal, and then figure out roughly where it is (with 100m radius) , and then use optical/thermal to look for operators, or call in an artillery strike.

EDIT: The nice thing is, once you know where they are approximately, if you have a few hours of loiter time, you can just circle and wait for them to show their heads if you don’t see them.

Edited November 4, 2023 by kimbosbread

[Offshoot]

A long, recent and good interview with Lt General Ben Hodges that seems appropriate given the current discussions on stalemate in Ukraine. Check the chapters for topics covered.

 

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, Zeleban said:

I have always considered Tatarigami one of the most valuable sources of information about this war. Until I read his statement that Bakhmut did not need to be held, but instead had to retreat to more “advantageous positions.” If it were not for the retention of Bakhmut, then who knows where our positions would be now. Near Slovyansk or to the west of it?

Now the opposition to Zelensky media is promoting the assertion that the reason for the failure of the Zaporozhye offensive lies in the retention of Bakhmut. They say the reserves necessary for the summer offensive were spent there. Based on this logic, in March 2022 we needed to leave Kharkov, Kiev, Chernigov and Sumi. After all, the defense of these cities was also very bloody.

Yeah, that was my reaction to Tatarigami's post as well.  I've seen this sort of thing from him before. 

If Ukraine had not stubbornly held onto Bakhmut, but instead retreated, Russia would have had a lot more bodies to throw into the war this Spring and Summer.  Wagner might have remained intact as well.  In fact, it might have been more powerful than ever.  Just imagine 20,000 Wagnerites being transferred to Kupyansk or Kreminna prior to the start of the southern counter offensive, or perhaps being sent to stop the counter offensive. 

Sometimes the right decision is to fight and die for some otherwise unimportant piece of territory.  The outcome of Bakhmut was decidedly favorable for Ukraine overall even though the cost was very high.

4 hours ago, Zeleban said:

Many Ukrainians criticize our generals. However, our military leadership is only capable of conducting operations at the level at which it is possible for them

1. Training of their subordinate officers and soldiers.

2 Possibilities for the exchange and processing of information by headquarters

3. And of course, the level of supply with everything necessary

Criticizing leadership is the favorite pastime of the Ukrainian people. There is a funny opinion that fate is unfair to Ukrainians and constantly appoints cunning and self-interested leaders to govern them. But my opinion is that every nation has exactly the leaders it deserves. Ukrainian commanders have exactly the level of competence, material support and communications that they were able to provide during 8 years of preparation for a big war. We have had enough time to carry out reforms...

Criticizing higher levels of leadership is standard everywhere.  It happens in the private sector all the time.  When someone says "X business is dumb for not doing Y thing that I want them to" I point out things like "they have been in business for 30 years in this location.  I presume they already tried that and found it didn't work".  Also, the critic is rarely someone who has run their own business of any sort, not to mention the type they are being critical of.  That matters.

In the case of Ukraine's military leadership, for sure I have questions about why they are not doing certain things.  However, I have seen Ukraine perform brilliant actions that will go down in military history books as inspired and well executed.  This does NOT happen if the military leadership is incompetent.  Just look at the Russians for confirmation

Therefore, I presume that I do not have the information or expertise to correctly judge why Ukraine isn't doing some of the things I think it should be doing.  My assumption is that I'm missing information to explain this, not that Ukraine's leadership are missing brains or bravery.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Zeleban said:

Unfortunately, “counter offensive” is just a PR move designed to demonstrate to Ukraine’s Western allies the weakness of Russia and Ukraine’s imminent victory in the war. Our president comes from show business, where PR is given special importance. The counter-offensive was very widely advertised in various media, just like a concert by revered pop stars. However, it turned out that the military operation had nothing to do with the concert.

It is very stupid to do exactly what the enemy expects from you. History teaches us a lesson again

I feel this has some hindsight to it.  First, the counter offensive was necessary for a number of good reasons, especially to show the West that the war is winnable.  As you know, there are many (some very pro-Ukrainian too!) who think that Russia can't be beat.  Second, it was not clear to ANYBODY that Russia's defenses were as good as they turned out to be.  Unfortunately, that is the sort of thing that could only be tested on a large scale.  Third, it was reasonable to think that the newly equipped brigades had the right combination of equipment and manpower to breach the line.

I think Ukraine came very close to wearing out Russia's ability to defend.  Unfortunately, close enough is not good enough (as we say in English).  Therefore, with hindsight, I think a different offensive plan might have produced better results.  But offensive operations were necessary to some extent.

As for Haiduk's question about the choice of the Kherson offensive over a Tokmak offensive, I've given this some thought in the past week.  I think Ukraine made some assumptions last year that it would be easier to take out a fairly small and isolated pocket of Russian forces than it would to conduct a deep penetration with all the risks that come with it.  I do not think it was wrong, however it turned out that Russia's forces in Kherson were able to defend themselves far better than I think Ukraine expected, which in hindsight makes the push towards Tokmak in Fall of 2022 more attractive than it looked in the Spring of 2022.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, Butschi said:

Are you certain about this? For all the strain this war puts on Russian economy I doubt it is very healthy for the Ukrainian economy, either.

Yes, I am very certain of what I said, but not what you thought I said   Here is my quote again but with a key word highlighted:

No matter how you examine the details, fundamentally Ukraine has every INCENTIVE to keep it going and Russia has just about none other than ego. 

Incentive ≠ Capability

The point I was making is that both countries are going to endure hardships by keeping this war going, even in stalemate. It's a very long list and it's not the same for both Ukraine and Russia.  However, Ukraine has INCENTIVE to keep it going far more than Russia does.  This theoretically means the will of each population to keep the war going is inherently different.

Put another way, Ukraine knows that if it loses the war then it ceases to exist.  There is no similar argument that Russia can make with any degree of honesty.  Not even about NATO expansion, because NATO just expanded because of the war not in spite of it. 

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Homo_Ferricus said:

Having been born in Moscow and raised in the culture, this is where my message is coming from; we on this forum have been taking a very logical and almost mathematical approach to calculating Russia's damage and preconcluding it's fate. We need to understand that, while certainly not limitless nor supernatural, there is a certain character of stubborn will and seemingly senseless perseverance in the face of opposition that can be conjured in the collective "Russian" when the circumstances are right. We've talked about it here before. As the war has continued Putin and the state are doing a fair job of galvanizing the public to rally around their identity, but its not all "master strategist Putin" pulling the strings. Microeconomies are popping up, local Russians are manufacturing their own cheese to replace imports, companies are cleverly outmaneuvering sanctions, entrepreneurs are exploiting openings, industries are slowly, painfully adapting and gaining confidence. And as all that goes on the average Russian begins to settle into the "us against them" mentality of besiegement. Early in the war western media called this "Putin's war" and blamed the Russian government. Slowly the messaging has changed, and now we believe every Russian to be responsible for what is happening. While I agree that this is true in a spiritual and philosophical sense, it also drives Russians deeper inward, hardening their resolve and pushing people to close ranks. Unfortunately the more defensive ordinary Russians feel, the more difficult it will be for them to mentally separate the state from the greater identity.

Young people are not excluded from this phenomena, including the bright minds. I can imagine some of the brights coming back home to Russia after living in an undignified mode of "otherness" and "humiliation" in places like Georgia, Armenia, Germany, Turkey, Kazakhstan etc. Having heard the call to return to family and rodina, sprung by the excitement of building something new at home while affirming their identities and standing up with dignity against their opponents.

Your reply to my points on Russian economic recovery make sense, though it's worth pointing out that macroeconomics is one of the lesser precise "sciences". I leave room for fated chance, unintended consequences and human ingenuity to change what looks like a logical outcome to us at the moment.

Of course we've discussed Russia being a pressure cooker and how everything can come crashing quite dramatically, but that's not the feeling in the air that I'm catching at this moment. Excuse me for this post that was less factual and more like pseudo-shamanic reading of my own tea leaves.

Slava Ukraini

 

Thank you for this post and the thought you put into it.  I don't see anything I disagree with.

I know I've said many, many times in this thread that one of the things I got most wrong about this war was how the Russian people would react to massive casualties and military humiliation.  I thought, or perhaps just hoped, that the urban Russians (who everybody assesses are the real deciders of Russia's fate) had a better balanced view of the world and/or valued Western culture/goods more than they did.  I wasn't expecting massive street protests, but I was expecting enough people within the Russian leadership would be opposed to having so much lost for the pursuit of something only a few wanted.  I was very wrong.  A large number fled and the security apparatus silenced the rest.  A few high profile "murder suicides" kept the oligarchs in line as well.

Somewhat related, I had hoped that the Russians were advanced enough to be concerned by a government willing to throw so many lives away for nothing.  It seems that they don't really mind as long as it isn't them doing the dying.

Now Putin has had time to tap into the Russian inferiority complex and false pride.  He was trying to do this even before the war started and it didn't seem to gain much traction.  It didn't in the first part of last year either, but now?  I think it's working, despite all the logic that it should not be. 

I also understand that Russians are clever and given the incentives to work around the problems with being cut off from their previous foreign trade that they will adapt.  Cheese production after 2014 is a great example, labels for food in 2022 is another.  But as you say, this is microeconomics that are compensating for fairly small sectors of the economy.  Cheese production and food labels are tiny slices of the Russian economy.  Energy and chemical exports are the majority by far.  The thing is, it doesn't matter if you are able to put out the fire in your car if the house surrounding it is on fire.

As you correctly say, Russia's ability to withstand stress is not endless.  I have always said that no one thing would bring Russia to the negotiating table or cause the government to fall.  It must be a combination of things and they have to happen too fast and too strongly to come up with solutions.  Otherwise things will grind on and on and on.  Even if that does happen, Russia being a "basket case" economically, politically, and militarily for the next 5-10 years is pretty much a given.  That isn't to say that the West is guaranteed to remain strong or stronger relative to Russia (let's see how the 2024 elections go in the US!), but a betting man would not bet on Russia coming out ahead even though the possibility exists.

Steve

[Butschi]

29 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Incentive ≠ Capability

While I'm a not a native speaker and therefore prone to miss some nuances, I am aware of the difference.

I didn't talk about capability (but please do point me to where you think I confused both concepts). I fully agree that Ukrainians have a lot of reasons to stay in the fight and endure hardship in order to do so. That doesn't mean they have zero incentive to stop at some point. What are Ukrainians fighting for if not for their future? So this is certainly some kind of trade off between fighting on to ensure their survival and security (including liberating those still under Russian yoke) and ensuring (future) economic well-being and prosperity. For sure, only the Ukrainians themselves can decide how to balance this.

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Put another way, Ukraine knows that if it loses the war then it ceases to exist.

True but there is a lot in between total defeat and total victory. As Mr. Combat Mission you know best, of course.

[Kinophile]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Yeah, that was my reaction to Tatarigami's post as well.  I've seen this sort of thing from him before. 

If Ukraine had not stubbornly held onto Bakhmut, but instead retreated, Russia would have had a lot more bodies to throw into the war this Spring and Summer.  Wagner might have remained intact as well.  In fact, it might have been more powerful than ever.  Just imagine 20,000 Wagnerites being transferred to Kupyansk or Kreminna prior to the start of the southern counter offensive, or perhaps being sent to stop the counter offensive. 

Sometimes the right decision is to fight and die for some otherwise unimportant piece of territory.  The outcome of Bakhmut was decidedly favorable for Ukraine overall even though the cost was very high.

Criticizing higher levels of leadership is standard everywhere.  It happens in the private sector all the time.  When someone says "X business is dumb for not doing Y thing that I want them to" I point out things like "they have been in business for 30 years in this location.  I presume they already tried that and found it didn't work".  Also, the critic is rarely someone who has run their own business of any sort, not to mention the type they are being critical of.  That matters.

In the case of Ukraine's military leadership, for sure I have questions about why they are not doing certain things.  However, I have seen Ukraine perform brilliant actions that will go down in military history books as inspired and well executed.  This does NOT happen if the military leadership is incompetent.  Just look at the Russians for confirmation

Therefore, I presume that I do not have the information or expertise to correctly judge why Ukraine isn't doing some of the things I think it should be doing.  My assumption is that I'm missing information to explain this, not that Ukraine's leadership are missing brains or bravery.

Steve

I've read Tat for a while; my impression ref his opinion on Bakhmut was that while the strategic defence had certain value, the chosen defensive positions and terrain negated that benefit.

The cost for Ukraine was increased because Bakhmut was not a defence-favourable area -  the ridges West of it provided far better defensive value and far too many Ukrainians were killed defending useless terrain with low tactical value. 

The kill ratio was not as favourable as it could (and should) have been.  Even as high as it was, there was better terrain very close by. 

I've tended to agree with him,  albeit also agreeing with Crunching any Russian advance. Any topological survey of Bakhmut highlights what a bad place it is to defend. It was no Verdun. 

 

Edited November 5, 2023 by Kinophile

[Elmar Bijlsma]

1 hour ago, Kinophile said:

I've read Tat for a while; my impression ref his opinion on Bakhmut was that while the strategic defence had certain value, the chosen defensive positions and terrain negated that benefit.

The cost for Ukraine was increased because Bakhmut was not a defence-favourable area -  the ridges West of it provided far better defensive value and far too many Ukrainians were killed defending useless terrain with low tactical value. 

The kill ratio was not as favourable as it could (and should) have been.  Even as high as it was, there was better terrain very close by. 

I've tended to agree with him,  albeit also agreeing with Crunching any Russian advance. Any topological survey of Bakhmut highlights what a bad place it is to defend. It was no Verdun. 

 

Just because you decline to fight the enemy in a unfavourable place, does not mean you get to fight him in a favourable place.

The whole draw to Bakhmut was that Putin needed that headline beyond all reason. It was the place that crippled the Russian army's offensive operations elsewhere. Let Putin have Bakhmut, and the headlines he craved, and his commanders might just have been able to pick their next spot to attack. And it wouldn't have been the easily defended hills west of Bakhmut, I can all but guarantee you that.

And there's the political angle. The long fight over Bakhmut was wildly damaging to Putin's regime internationally and within Russia. There was a pseudo-coup attempt! That's a pretty good result for Ukraine fighting for Bakhmut.

 

To me, fighting in Bakhmut is a no brainer.

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Kinophile said:

I've read Tat for a while; my impression ref his opinion on Bakhmut was that while the strategic defence had certain value, the chosen defensive positions and terrain negated that benefit.

The cost for Ukraine was increased because Bakhmut was not a defence-favourable area -  the ridges West of it provided far better defensive value and far too many Ukrainians were killed defending useless terrain with low tactical value. 

The kill ratio was not as favourable as it could (and should) have been.  Even as high as it was, there was better terrain very close by. 

I've tended to agree with him,  albeit also agreeing with Crunching any Russian advance. Any topological survey of Bakhmut highlights what a bad place it is to defend. It was no Verdun. 

 

Elmar hit the nail on the head.  The issue is that Russia chose Bakhmut as its priority, not Ukraine.  Therefore, Ukraine had the option to fight there or to retreat to a more sensible line.  It did NOT have the option to choose another place for Russia to die in droves fighting for.  Any alternative uses of the Russian forces not killed at Bakhmut would have been Russia's decision to make, not Ukraine's.

What would Russia have done with all that freed up combat power?  Launched a different ill conceived offensive somewhere more favorable to Ukraine?  Less favorable?  Would it have instead reinforced the south ahead of Ukraine's obvious counter offensive?  How about making Kupyansk a much bigger priority?

The thing is that losing Bakhmut itself wasn't a problem for Ukraine as there was no major advantage for Russia gaining it.  But there are other places that do have significant strategic value to hold that Russia could have gone after.  I mentioned Kupyansk because if Ukraine loses that it puts quite a bit of their Kharkiv gains at risk.  For sure Russia did launch a half-arsed offensive there this summer and got chewed up.  But what if there were 20,000 Wagnernites with 40,000 prisoners thrown into the mix?  Would Ukraine have held out?  I don't know, but it would have been obligated to try.  Bakhmut was voluntary and could have been abandoned at any time.

And so we have the difference between the soldier's view of the battlefield and the strategic command's view.  Each perspective has value and each one can be correct while also being wrong in other ways simultaneously.

Bakhmut was a painful battle for Ukraine, but I firmly believe it was the correct call.  If for no other reason than to have been the primary reason for Wagner's implosion.

Steve

[dan/california]

58 minutes ago, Elmar Bijlsma said:

Just because you decline to fight the enemy in a unfavourable place, does not mean you get to fight him in a favourable place.

The whole draw to Bakhmut was that Putin needed that headline beyond all reason. It was the place that crippled the Russian army's offensive operations elsewhere. Let Putin have Bakhmut, and the headlines he craved, and his commanders might just have been able to pick their next spot to attack. And it wouldn't have been the easily defended hills west of Bakhmut, I can all but guarantee you that.

And there's the political angle. The long fight over Bakhmut was wildly damaging to Putin's regime internationally and within Russia. There was a pseudo-coup attempt! That's a pretty good result for Ukraine fighting for Bakhmut.

 

To me, fighting in Bakhmut is a no brainer.

Exactly this!

Edit: cross posted

 

Edited November 5, 2023 by dan/california

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, Butschi said:

While I'm a not a native speaker and therefore prone to miss some nuances, I am aware of the difference.

I didn't talk about capability (but please do point me to where you think I confused both concepts). I fully agree that Ukrainians have a lot of reasons to stay in the fight and endure hardship in order to do so. That doesn't mean they have zero incentive to stop at some point. What are Ukrainians fighting for if not for their future? So this is certainly some kind of trade off between fighting on to ensure their survival and security (including liberating those still under Russian yoke) and ensuring (future) economic well-being and prosperity. For sure, only the Ukrainians themselves can decide how to balance this.

True but there is a lot in between total defeat and total victory. As Mr. Combat Mission you know best, of course.

OK, I understand you better now.  I interpreted your previous post as pointing out that Ukraine might not be able to (capacity) keep the war going, but what you meant was it might not want to (incentive).  For sure there could come a time when Ukraine views giving up something is better than continuing the fight.  It made that sort of decision in 2015 and Russia has been counting on it making it again. 

You still seem to be glossing over my point.  Fundamentally Ukraine has a lot of real incentives to fight, Russia has practically none.  As the long term costs/stresses of war build up, Ukraine has more incentive to say "this sucks, but let's keep going" than Russia does.  This is not about breaking points, it's about starting points.  Ukraine is starting from the position that fighting is a matter of survival, Russia is starting from a house of lies built upon a flimsy foundation of ego.  The two are not the same.

Steve

[Harmon Rabb]

The Netherlands promises Ukraine ammunition worth €500 million (Yahoo.com)

God bless The Netherlands.

Ammo is expensive, until it is Priceless.

[chuckdyke]

I understand the Ukraine sunk one of them. Seems to be a modern ship.

Project 22800 Karakurt-Class Corvettes (naval-technology.com)

[dan/california]

 

Quote

 

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/04/world/europe/zelensky-rebuke-general-zaluzhny.html

Zelensky Rebuke of Top General Signals Rift in Ukrainian Leadership

The presidential office said Gen. Valery Zaluzhny’s declaration that the war is at a stalemate was helpful to the Russians.

 

Not good....

[cesmonkey]

58 minutes ago, dan/california said:

 

Not good....

Read this thread ... or ISW's November 4th Russian campain report:

 

 

[cesmonkey]

The Ukrainian Konstantin Mashovets offers this highly-favorable note on Ukraine's recent actions across the Dnieper river:
https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1380

Quote

No matter how the events in the Crimean-Tavrian direction end, in the lower reaches of the Dnieper, the Ukrainian Marines and Special Forces have ALREADY written new chapters and provisions into textbooks on the art of war.

This is one of the best “alloys” of high moral and psychological qualities with a high level of professional training and preparation.

 

[Kraft]

The russian mind. Dmitriy, follower of mother earth, now rests in it. His wife: