How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[RandomCommenter]

14 hours ago, Twisk said:

Could Ukraine (or any nation?) divest itself of a geographic area? Like say Russia holds onto Donetsk, which, is officially annexed by Russia. Could Ukraine then pass a law saying "Donetsk is no longer part of Ukraine" in order to gain NATO access?

There is in fact precedent for this (not that I am advocating it as a policy, I believe Ukraine should restore its territorial integrity).

Finland springs to mind. Russia occupies about 10% of Finland but Finland has made it clear that it no longer considers those occupied territories disputed and it has just joined NATO.

Germany too. They no longer consider Königsberg disputed. And they are in NATO.

So I would say that Ukraine has full freedom of maneuver to determine how it wants to handle its occupied territories. Maybe it wants to retake Crimea and the land bridge (to make clear that Russia is defeated, to remove the dagger pointed at the heart of Ukraine that Crimea would always be and to control the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea and remove the threat from Odesa). But maybe it is not too pushed about certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk where the population would be hostile and the economy is thoroughly ruined. Those decisions will be up to the Ukrainian people and government to take.

But as to whether they could join NATO without recapturing all their territory, if they came out and said (with societal consensus) that they no longer dispute those territories, then, yes, clearly they should be allowed join NATO.

[The_Capt]

7 hours ago, dan/california said:

 

The above is just half of the bullet points, there is a vast amount of detail if you want to read it all. The really short version is the Putin's incompetence, combined with the Russian MOD's incompetence, and the echoes of Prig's coup are just about to break the Russian chain of command. People all the way up and down are on the edge of simply refusing orders. 

•  

So I think we mentioned before that this sort of thing is an indication of stress and strain on the RA military system.  The question remains “how far and deep” does this go?

Militaries are funny things, big collective organisms.  And like any complex collective organism failures can be isolated or cascade into something bigger.  Two thoughts on this:

- Militaries are not symmetric.  We strive for uniformity but every unit is different, every echelon is different.  So we might have units refusing orders for different reasons.  The only thing they can agree on is that “this ain’t working”.  It is a serious thing to disobey orders, an offence under military law.  One can go to jail and in extremis face capital punishment.  So for this phenomenon to be seen widespread is a clear sign that something is not going well with the RA at a genetic level.  Further, the thing about systems is that they are also interdependent.  So we could have an entire battalion that is still raring to win the war but if the supply/transport company says “no way” the thing still falls apart.  So what we are not seeing are the cracks and fissures between RA sub-systems which erode trust and overall effectiveness.  At it worse entire militaries will simply mutiny but I am not sure we are there yet.

- Corporate learning turns into corporate culture.  Some very good lessons on this from Vietnam.  Basically old timers teach how to “dodge and avoid to survive” to newcomers, who then pass on when they become the old timers.  This sort of corporate culturalization is incredibly hard to root out as it tends to take root within informal leadership systems which do not show up on a chain of command diagram.  I suspect that after over a year and half of desperate and high loss warfare the RA has adopted aspect of a survival culture and this is an example of it.  One can fire generals all day once this ting sets in but it won’t make a bit of difference, troops will have elevated shirking and dodging to an art.  Usually the only thing to break this sort of thing is a massive win or loss.  A massive win tends to change the salinity of the social waters, while massive losses get everyone killed and you basically start from scratch - one hopes for that first one.

If verified, this report is way bigger news than that explody bridge.

[chuckdyke]

3 minutes ago, RandomCommenter said:

But as to whether they could join NATO without recapturing all their territory, if they came out and said (with societal consensus) that they no longer dispute those territories, then, yes, clearly they should be allowed join NATO.

If they stay technically at war they won't be able to join NATO. Something for the bureaucrats inside NATO to solve. 

[dan/california]

7 hours ago, Carolus said:

See, this is what worries me.

Russian commanders and troops refusing bad orders is bad for Ukraine.

The incompetence of the MoD is a big factor of why the war has been going like it has been going.

Dead Russians is the current measuring stick for deoccupation efforts. 

When Russian soldiers refuse meat assaults, but instead stay on the defense, this makes the Ukrainian job harder, not easier. 

When Russian soldiers abbandon soviet-style "obey the written letter" military planning, this makes the Ukrainian job harder, not easier.

This is not a 1917 situation, with disillusioned, hungry Russian soldiers wanting to get home.

It is disillusioned, hungry Russian soldiers beginning to refuse orders so that they can stay in Ukraine longer and kill Ukrainians better. 

Of course, disruptions of official chain of command is not a net positive for an army. But in this particular case of today's Russian Army, it might not be a net negative either.

The most dangerous formations on the Russian side are volunteers who modernise, teach, fundraise, build drones and act with initiative. With the authority of the MoD eroding, these volunteers will gain influence, not lose it. 

This is the difference between that one Russian throwing a jammed gun away while defending a trench and having a gun that works. And some guys with FPV drones that fly into the Ukrainian attack squad. Yes, most of the Russian platoon is still useless and cowers in the dugout. But it is nonetheless a possibility for accumulated small improvements.

To clarify, because that seems to have been the impression from my "paranoid post", I am not saying this will suddenly turn the Russian Army into a vastly improved fighting force and makes them suddenly win the war and parade through Kyiv in 2024.

I think this will draw the war out. It moves the needle more towards standstill. It costs more Ukrainian lives - even if the overall outcome down the line is not significantly changed.

 

7 hours ago, sburke said:

I think you are reacting in a very one sided way. An army that starts refusing orders undermines the authority of the state.  That army doesn't function independent of the state apparatus.  It doesn't mobilize troops, it doesn't make economic decisions, it doesn't drive the overall political process nor negotiate with the few allies Russia has. It undermines all that by making the state appear to not have control and therefore authority.  Think Xi wants to be in bed with a guy whose own army is in revolt?

Who decides who in the army gets resources?  Who decides that X artillery brigade supports which corps?  Who decides what aviation resources support which sector of the front? Chaos absolutely serves the interest of the UA.  With confusion as to who is in charge, the ability to respond to UA advances declines.  The RA isn't suddenly going to start fighting smarter, it is simply going to fight even less coordinated than it does now.

 

There is some theoretical clean take over of the Russian MOD that produces a competent, and motivated higher command that is acknowledged by everyone. The actual process of getting rid of Shoigu and Gerasimov by rebellion from below is likely to be a faction ridden mess that will have severe effects on Russian operations in Ukraine, and in the best case scenario basically wreck the Russian war effort. Doubly so as the first rounds of purges seems to be well underway. A competent command structure that takes a year to to actually regain unified control of the war effort, with or without Putin still theoretically in charge is simply going to get to negotiate Russia's terms of surrender in Ukraine. 

Putin can't just appoint someone truly competent that has the support of the army, because that persons first order would be to have  Putin shot.

[kevinkin]

6 minutes ago, RandomCommenter said:

But as to whether they could join NATO without recapturing all their territory, if they came out and said (with societal consensus) that they no longer dispute those territories, then, yes, clearly they should be allowed join NATO.

Those are good examples. Yet, I think tensions would have to cool off before NATO would accept a nation involved in a hot war. That might take years even if the UA reclaims everything. However, when an "opening" appears, NATO should grab it. 

[cesmonkey]

I don't know the credibility of the source, but this is being repeated by some Russian telegrammers:

 

[chrisl]

4 hours ago, Huba said:

Also the rail bridge in this section is much higher above the water than the road part, which almost hugs the surface, making it much harder to damage with the same quantity of explosives.

And easier to lift off the piers - rather than knocking a pier over, it seems that they've lifted a piece of one of the road decks up with the explosion and offset it a few feet.  

[Battlefront.com]

17 minutes ago, cesmonkey said:

I don't know the credibility of the source, but this is being repeated by some Russian telegrammers:

 

I buy this.  Evidence we have so far is Ukraine confirming they did the attack and it was naval in nature.  This should be believed.  We also know that Ukraine’s homegrown surface UVs do not have the sort of explosive power needed to cause this sort of damage.  We also have seen Russian counter measures against them being pretty effective.

The obvious conclusion is that Ukraine used a naval based UV that we have not yet seen employed.  We know this particular system, REMUS 600, exists and apparently could cause this sort fo damage.  We do know that NATO has supplied Ukraine with weapons that weren’t reported by official channels or even OSINT.  We know the British in particular have done this (Storm Shadow).  We also know there’s no logistical reason why a country would find it difficult to supply this sort of weapon nor would it be particullarly difficult to train Ukraine how to operate it.

Therefore, I think it is reasonable to think REMUS 600 is the likely cause for the bridge damage.

Steve

[Nastypastie]

13 minutes ago, cesmonkey said:

I don't know the credibility of the source, but this is being repeated by some Russian telegrammers:

That thing doesn't look close to the sort of yield needed to shift that span. Troll farm out in force in that comment section too.

[Battlefront.com]

8 hours ago, Carolus said:

See, this is what worries me.

Russian commanders and troops refusing bad orders is bad for Ukraine.

The incompetence of the MoD is a big factor of why the war has been going like it has been going.

Dead Russians is the current measuring stick for deoccupation efforts. 

When Russian soldiers refuse meat assaults, but instead stay on the defense, this makes the Ukrainian job harder, not easier. 

When Russian soldiers abbandon soviet-style "obey the written letter" military planning, this makes the Ukrainian job harder, not easier.

This is not a 1917 situation, with disillusioned, hungry Russian soldiers wanting to get home.

It is disillusioned, hungry Russian soldiers beginning to refuse orders so that they can stay in Ukraine longer and kill Ukrainians better. 

Of course, disruptions of official chain of command is not a net positive for an army. But in this particular case of today's Russian Army, it might not be a net negative either.

The most dangerous formations on the Russian side are volunteers who modernise, teach, fundraise, build drones and act with initiative. With the authority of the MoD eroding, these volunteers will gain influence, not lose it. 

This is the difference between that one Russian throwing a jammed gun away while defending a trench and having a gun that works. And some guys with FPV drones that fly into the Ukrainian attack squad. Yes, most of the Russian platoon is still useless and cowers in the dugout. But it is nonetheless a possibility for accumulated small improvements.

To clarify, because that seems to have been the impression from my "paranoid post", I am not saying this will suddenly turn the Russian Army into a vastly improved fighting force and makes them suddenly win the war and parade through Kyiv in 2024.

I think this will draw the war out. It moves the needle more towards standstill. It costs more Ukrainian lives - even if the overall outcome down the line is not significantly changed.

Sburke and The_Capt have already made very useful comments about your post, but I’d like to say something a little different.

What you’re worried about is valid in a sense, but unlikely to play out as you fear it might.  Aside from the other reasons stated, the most likely outcome of a large scale military revolt (coordinated or uncoordinated) is a breakdown in the entire system’s abiity to function.  This is what has already been pointed out, but carry this a bit further.

The military breaks down in large part because it doens’t see the war going well.  If there isn’t a wholesale leadership replacement, then it’s the sort of dysfunction that precludes unified action.  This would make the military situation even more favorable to Ukraine, not less.  Easy to conclude this as one of the big problems we’ve seen with the Russians since the start of this war is how disorganized they are compared to Ukraine.

If more pragmatic leadership takes over they will likely view the battlefield for what it is… an unmitigated mess that has no chance of being salvaged.  Maybe initially they might kid themselves that they can mount a more effective defense, maybe they don’t and try to sue for peace before things fall apart.

If they decide all that’s needed is a better defensive strategy, and don’t sue for peace, then what?  Russia’s larger problems with logistics, manpower, C2, shortages of decent equipment, etc. will persist because they are not easily solveable (some aspects are not even the result of incompetence).  The result is that the disgruntaled rank and file are tasked with staying in fixed positions waiting for Ukraine’s artillery to bash them and infantry to root them out.  Rotation won’t improve, counter battery fire won’t improve, shell availability won’t improve, etc.

So, think about it this way.  Private Pavel on up are dissatisfied with their chances of meaningfully serving the Motherland.  New leadership happens and the chances do not significantly improve other than meat assaults aren’t a thing any more (presuming they aren’t increased!).  Ammo is still short, food still comes inconsistently, and nobody comes to take over your positions while you take a break.  Logically they will be even more disallusioned than they were before because change happened at the top, but not for them.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

16 minutes ago, Nastypastie said:

That thing doesn't look close to the sort of yield needed to shift that span. Troll farm out in force in that comment section too.

Totally possible, of coruse.  Remember there were reports of two closely spaced explosions.  Two direct hits on the same pier by shaped explosive charges (theoretically reinforced with more explsoives) may be enough to cause the damage we see.  Unlike the truck bomb, there isn’t much apparent damage to the spans themselves except for some damage to light concrete and rebar (and we’ve seen the concerete’s quality being suspect already).

I know nothing about naval weaponry, so I have non strong opinion as to what specific system might have hit it other than it is something we’ve not seen before and it is not likely Ukrainian in origin.

Steve

[Carolus]

Thanks to Sburke, The_Capt, dan and Steve for tackling my negative views with your posts.

The kind of insight into the military as a structure and organism is not something I have. The interactions of its internal and external politics is truly complex. I think that everything was addressed that I was worrying about.

Edited July 17, 2023 by Carolus

[The_MonkeyKing]

46 minutes ago, cesmonkey said:

I don't know the credibility of the source, but this is being repeated by some Russian telegrammers:

 

That thing has a 240 kg payload. 

Last year bridge explosion had around 22 tons of explosives (this figure is from Russians)

This time the explosion seems to have been a bit smaller but still in the same ballpark as last time

[RandomCommenter]

1 hour ago, chuckdyke said:

If they stay technically at war they won't be able to join NATO. Something for the bureaucrats inside NATO to solve. 

What I am proposing is:

• Win the war, take the territory they want
• Renounce forever whatever territories they do not want or reclaim. There is no territorial dispute.
• Sign a peace treaty making peace on these terms

Then Ukraine is not at war. There is no territorial dispute. They join NATO and know they have a reliable peace now.

Of course, the problem with this is that it depends on Russia signing a peace treaty. So it gives Russia the power to say no, to keep lobbing in one cruise missile a month to continue the war and they can force Ukraine to stay outside of NATO.

So the Russians need to be defeated enough that they will accept to sign a peace treaty. Or we need to hold our noses and offer the Russians enough concessions that they determine that signing a treaty could be in their interests. These could be things like relaxing sanctions, increasing trade or even (I hate  to say it actually) forgoing some Russian war criminals facing justice for their crimes. Appeal to the self interest of the people on top.

In reality the best way to get there is still a crushing military defeat that collapses the Putin regime and then try to make peace with the next government. So in a certain sense these discussions are a distraction. All the effort now needs to focus on defeating Russia.

I thought that this article was interesting in teh FT (sorry, it is behind a paywall):

Western capitals must keep lines open to Moscow

What would a press secretary in a Russian embassy in the west be forwarding to the Kremlin these days? The question was posed to me by a German official early in Ukraine’s counteroffensive. I was reminded of this during the Nato summit last week — and even more so after the revelation of talks between former US officials and Russian diplomats. As Nato debated the future of Ukraine, the British media were so obsessed with a scandal involving a BBC presenter that the summit barely made a front page. So yes, happy times for Russian diplomats in London keen to relay to the Kremlin the message they know it wants to hear of a distracted, narcissistic UK. The German official was being playful but making an essential point: it is all too credible to picture Vladimir Putin still being fed self-reinforcing lines. What mileage is there for an aide to tell him the truth?

...

The west needs to let Moscow know how serious we are in our resolve. It also needs to work out who to talk to and who to trust, after long years in which the value of Russia expertise has been downgraded in western foreign ministries. In recent history, time and again autocrats have shown a stunning capacity for misreading their enemies’ intentions, and vice versa. Slobodan Milošević and Saddam Hussein spring to mind. Somehow the west has to pierce the self-delusion shrouding Putin’s court. I may of course be underestimating the spine of Russia’s press secretaries. But even if so, we need more not fewer back-channels.

https://on.ft.com/3Di0qef

 

[poesel]

1 hour ago, RandomCommenter said:

But as to whether they could join NATO without recapturing all their territory, if they came out and said (with societal consensus) that they no longer dispute those territories, then, yes, clearly they should be allowed join NATO.

There is a precedent with a country not being completely in NATO: Germany.
After the reunification, only the western parts were in NATO while the Soviets were still in the east. Only after they left, the Eastern Germany became part of NATO, too.

No war at that time, of course. But has been done technically.

[The_Capt]

3 hours ago, RandomCommenter said:

Of course, the problem with this is that it depends on Russia signing a peace treaty. So it gives Russia the power to say no, to keep lobbing in one cruise missile a month to continue the war and they can force Ukraine to stay outside of NATO.

So the Russians need to be defeated enough that they will accept to sign a peace treaty. Or we need to hold our noses and offer the Russians enough concessions that they determine that signing a treaty could be in their interests. These could be things like relaxing sanctions, increasing trade or even (I hate  to say it actually) forgoing some Russian war criminals facing justice for their crimes. Appeal to the self interest of the people on top

So this is the rub.  By saying "Ukraine, no NATO until war is over", we have basically incentivized Russia to drag this war out for as long as possible to achieve on of their key strategic aims - halt NATO encroachment into their Near Abroad.  Of course we are in a dilemma in that if we took Ukraine in now, and they immediately declared an Article 5, we either go to war or the whole freakin scheme falls apart.  So political leadership did what they always do...risk managed, push to the left and choose bad over worse. 

Ukraine could absolutely cut the occupied territories loose and we all redraw the lines of recognized "Ukraine" - they are lines on a map.  Further they could dump the occupied territories on the international community and say "Ok UN, now they are your problem to negotiate with Russia."  As has been mentioned more than once, there are not likely many actual Ukrainians in some of these areas and a whole lot of people who do not see themselves as Ukrainians which is a potential post-war issue.

The biggest reason to not push any of these buttons yet (and yes, this would be a form of diplomatic escalation that we do indeed control) is that we are not sure who is actually in charge in Russia right now.  So trying to assess agendas and calculus is extremely hard.  Maybe those behind the curtain actually know what is going on but sitting in the cheap seats it is become just bizarre.

[kimbosbread]

8 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

So this is the rub.  By saying "Ukraine, no NATO until war is over", we have basically incentivized Russia to drag this war out for as long as possible  

Exactly this.

[Letter from Prague]

If Russian army gets kicked out from Ukraine, and they try to extend the war indefinitely by firing missiles every so often, I think the Western leaders' answer to "can we hit Russian missile factory with ATACMS / Storm Shadow" would change from "nonono wait you can't" to "*shrug*" pretty quickly.

Especially if the alternative is long-range V1-clone spam. Even the Russians aren't dumb enough that if they get ejected, Ukraine won't need as much Western aid and can stop playing nice.

EDIT: but anyway - the Russian "leadership" is obviously willing to sacrifice every last mobik and every last tank and every last bmp to keep even one meter squared of Ukrainian land. By the time they are destroyed enough that they can be fully removed from Ukraine, the Free Russia Legion or whatever can probably take Moscow with ten Humvees.

I think Putin will be long dead before last Russian soldier is kicked out of Ukraine, because they are completely unwilling to retreat.

Edited July 17, 2023 by Letter from Prague

[Butschi]

53 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Of course we are in a dilemma in that if we took Ukraine in now, and they immediately declared an Article 5, we either go to war or the whole freakin scheme falls apart. 

I'm no lawyer but since article 5 is not really an automatism that says "if you attack one member we all declare war march all out armies against you", I guess in principle we could e.g. let Ukraine join and tell them that they can invoke article 5 on this conflict as much as they want but we will not ratify it, right?

Or we say, in this conflict we will interpret this part of article 5

Quote

they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

such that we deem it necessary to keep on imposing sanctions and delivering weapons and supplies - and nothing more.

But that would demystify article 5 and probably set a dangerous precedent.

[RandomCommenter]

4 minutes ago, Butschi said:

But that would demystify article 5 and probably set a dangerous precedent.

Exactly this. It would undermine the article 5 protections for all members.

[The_Capt]

3 hours ago, Butschi said:

I'm no lawyer but since article 5 is not really an automatism that says "if you attack one member we all declare war march all out armies against you", I guess in principle we could e.g. let Ukraine join and tell them that they can invoke article 5 on this conflict as much as they want but we will not ratify it, right?

Or we say, in this conflict we will interpret this part of article 5

such that we deem it necessary to keep on imposing sanctions and delivering weapons and supplies - and nothing more.

But that would demystify article 5 and probably set a dangerous precedent.

So sure NATO could play politics or lawyer with article 5 - "well technically, and so forth".  At which point how fast do you think NATO will evaporate?  "Oh welcome to NATO Ukraine but we are not really going to do anything about a NATO nation being hammered by an adversary illegally...oh look Russia is firing missiles at Latvia...well technically".   Deterrence only works if one can clearly demonstrate that you intend to follow through with either punishment or denial.

So "yes" basically if you illegally attack a member "we all declare war and march against you".  That or NATO stands for nothing really and then it all falls apart.  This reality is likely why we are avoiding an Article 5 about as hard as Russia is at any given moment.  They do not want it coming back at them as in their current state we are talking very rapid escalation, possibly out of control.  And we don't want it because it might fail and the Emperor's doodle is out.

[kimbosbread]

So given all this, how far along do we thing South Korea, Japan and Taiwan’s nuclear weapons programs are? I gotta imagine nuclear non-proliferation is basically dead as a result of this conflict.

[dan/california]

South Korea and Japan have extensive Nuclear power programs, Japan reprocesses fuel. Taiwan has a couple of reactors. I think in a truly crash program it would take Japan a month to get a fission weapon on a cruise missile in quantity if they were willing to deal with a clean up hassle. South Korea does not have active reprocessing, so they would have to do more work, and make a bigger mess to get the fuel together, my guess is six months. Based on publicly available information Taiwan would need a year or more. This of course assumes all three of them did not start large covert programs a year ago, and I think that is a lousy assumption. I mean they are arguably the three most technically sophisticated countries on the planet, so it is just a case of will and effort. the technology is just this side of trivial for all three. NOBODY wants to be the next Ukraine, and making people think that way is why we should have put two heavy brigades INTO Ukraine in January 2022 instead of pulling out everybody who was there. Water under the bridge at this point, but we will regret it for a very long time.

[kevinkin]

 

https://news.yahoo.com/crimea-bridge-key-russian-supply-050455702.html

Russia has extended the Black Sea deal three times in the past year, despite repeated threats to quit. It suspended participation after an attack on its fleet by seaborne Ukrainian drones in October, leading to a few days when Ukraine, Turkey and the United Nations kept exports going without Moscow.

Denys Marchuk, deputy head of the Ukrainian Agrarian Council, the main agribusiness organization in Ukraine, said seaborne exports might proceed again without Russian agreement.

"If there will be safety guarantees from our partners, then why not conduct the grain initiative without Russia's participation?" he told Reuters.

Any such resumption of shipments without Russia's blessing would probably depend on insurers. Industry sources told Reuters they were studying whether to freeze their coverage.

"The (key) question is whether Russia mines the area which would effectively cease any form of cover being offered," one insurance industry source said.

Mining would not be a step Putin (or whomever) would take. Would not be worth the PR or any reaction from NATO to save the starving. 

[NamEndedAllen]

#1 on Putin’s Playlist:

https://www.reuters.com/world/kremlin-says-putin-open-talks-us-stance-ukraine-makes-it-difficult-2022-12-02/