How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[dan/california]

32 minutes ago, NamEndedAllen said:

The endless speculations and inescapable, pulse-rate-rising “Are we there yet?!” flood at every report from the front permits the REAL plan to be revealed here,for the first time. The UA will keep ratcheting up the suspense with local actions across the board, announcements by the Allies of more NATO weapons delivered, more hints from the government…”it’s coming…”, UNTIL:

The old guys in Russian HQs and Moscow simply cannot take it any longer. Heart attacks now down leader after leader. Generals collapse. Putin allegedly seen on a stretcher with an oxygen mask. The country panics. Leadership everywhere is collapsing in fear, jumping out of windows, dropping cigarettes. The State Duma and the Federation Council lack quorums, and the ones who do show up are screaming at each other on Russian tv. And then…

The Russian troops at the front realize something wonderful, and say “Frack it. This sucks. let’s just go home.”

Zelensky starts hinting at delivering aid to the stricken Motherland…friendly annexation of interested Russian Republics - ancient beloved Kyiv as new Capitol of the Russian Federation. Kazakhstan, Armenia and Belorussia say, “Hmmm…let’s talk”. The CSTO countries announce a meeting, to be held in Kyiv if Zelensky would be willing to host. Biden announces USA sanctions could be phased out “If conditions are met”. 

The UA units remain alert, in position, but for the first time in years no deaths are reported along the front lines. Counter Offensive ends.

 

 

Sadly I think this is what happens AFTER the Russian army in Ukraine is smashed beyond recognition, not before.

[Kinophile]

2 hours ago, sburke said:

Even if it isn't and it is just some brigade level push to take advantage of Russian exhaustion, the effect it is having on the enemy is fascinating.  If UA does start pushing in multiple locations and present the RA with several problems to solve, the impact on RA morale is going to increase a lot as well as likely causing even more backstabbing within Russian leadership.

Very true,  although,  to be a nagging Nancy,  online sqwaking doesn't equal battlefield performance. 

[Artkin]

14 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

Hi, I am not doubting your assessment. But I would like to see a listing of this and how it is structured into maneuver elements. It would help me wrap my brain around the possible operations that can be expected this summer. Yes, it's May 12 now. No need to jump through hoops to get an OOB. Maybe others have something handy. 

Well if you own a copy of CMBS you can certainly download one of the MASTERTOE's I've created and take it out for a spin. Download it, open it in the editor and look at the units list. This file has both a Russian and a Ukrainian brigade attached. I made it a long time ago so I can't speak for the quality. I'll post a second link to  a fully fleshed out Russian motorized brigade. It's confusing if you don't know what you're looking at, but it's a 100% complete brigade down to the individual (To the best of my ability).

A typical motorized rifle brigade will have roughly 120-150 APC/IFV and 40 tanks. Organizations have probably changed by now though.

The Oryx website shows what equipment has been donated (At this point it's more like 10-15 brigades):

https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/04/answering-call-heavy-weaponry-supplied.html

 

 

https://www.dropbox.com/s/hikoc5zk4vqlfvw/MASTERTOE 93rd Mechanized %2B 200th Motor Brigades.btt?dl=0

https://www.dropbox.com/s/4tfql4td043k80u/MASTERTOE Russian MRB.btt?dl=0

 

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, sross112 said:

What I read from it is a lack of professional first line leadership (NCOs).

It's worse than that.  They have lost extraordinary percentage of their junior and mid level officers.  This is one reason why they have organized mobiks and prisoners as whole units.  According to what we've learned directly from them, they gather up platoon sized groups, they elect their own platoon leader based on whatever criteria the unit comes up with.  Obviously if the guy has some past military or law enforcement experience, they probably favor that, but otherwise its whomever.  As the old saying goes, there's always someone in charge.

The company level doesn't seem to be much better, but it is probable that the majority of that level are unqualified for the job even by prewar Russian standards.  It's probable a fair percentage of the battalion commanders are also likely technically unqualified.  The list of hundreds of dead junior and mid level officers clearly backs this up.

So, these mobik units are going to the front with no NCOs or officers.  But really, if they aren't trained and they're told if they retreat they die, they aren't really needed are they?

That said, some of the mobiks have been used as individual replacements for established units.  The leadership those units have is probably better, but I think still pretty thin due to 1.25 years of near suicidal employment.  In WW2 the US Army in NW Europe had something like a 300% turnover of 1st and 2nd LTs.  Anybody think that Russian units are doing better?  I for sure don't.

Steve

[Peregrine]

3 hours ago, Kinophile said:

And to y'all who thought us micks were an irrelevant afterthought on the *** end of Europe...well, Putin thinks we're important! 

Um Actually...not a good thing..... 

 

Keep an eye out for little green men. They may not be leprechauns. 

[kevinkin]

17 minutes ago, Artkin said:

The Oryx website shows what equipment has been donated (At this point it's more like 10-15 brigades):

Thanks. That's what I was looking for. Do you think the UA maneuvers entire brigades, or typically more at the company level? I think it's at the company level. Which means the task organizations they put together for upcoming offensives will be interesting to see. 

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, kevinkin said:

Hi, I am not doubting your assessment. But I would like to see a listing of this and how it is structured into maneuver elements. It would help me wrap my brain around the possible operations that can be expected this summer. Yes, it's May 12 now. No need to jump through hoops to get an OOB. Maybe others have something handy. 

Well here is one guys take. And he is a former Italian army officer with deep Ukrainian connections.

Edited May 12, 2023 by dan/california

[Kinophile]

5 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Well here is one guys take. And he is a former Italian army officer with deep Ukrainian connections.

160K?

Now THATS more like it.

[dan/california]

8 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

160K?

Now THATS more like it.

It might be there is a reason Ghrkin and Prigozhin are singing "We are about to die" in tune, together,  even as they hate each other with the heat of a thousand suns.

Edited May 12, 2023 by dan/california

[chrisl]

6 hours ago, Kinophile said:

Really gives you a good sense of just how big these things are. 

Theoretical range 

So nowhere in the AO is safe.  Strikes across the border are verboten. 

With that map, I'd be seriously tempted to make a really hard drive toward Crimea from Kherson, and maybe Zaporizhzhia at the same time, wait to see if RU sends reinforcements through Crimea, then take out both rail lanes and one road lane of the Kerch bridge. Then pause that attack once the outside lines are long and thin and start poking at wherever the Crimea reinforcements came from.  The time to take out the Kerch bridge is right as they're about to wrap it up, while the repair equipment is still vulnerable, too.

[kevinkin]

45 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Well here is one guys take

I am thinking that a major percentage will have to be held in combat ready reserve to provide for unknowable developments over the next several months. What is encouraging is that the build up will allow the UA to give it's forces real battlefield experience without throwing their new stuff to the wind. Recon pull is a effective way to do this. On the job training is the best I can up with given the stakes involved. However, I wonder how much NATO material support it aimed at the the negotiating table rather than the fight itself?  

Edited May 12, 2023 by kevinkin

[sburke]

36 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Well here is one guys take. And he is a former Italian army officer with deep Ukrainian connections.

That is an awfully good target.  I would be hesitant to put that many boots in that small a space.  It also makes for an enticing logistical tail target.  the RA may suck. but even they could do some damage there.

[dan/california]

4 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

I am thinking that a major percentage will have to be held in combat ready reserve to provide for unknowable developments over the next several months. What is encouraging is that the build up will allow the UA to give it's forces real battlefield experience without throwing their new stuff to the wind. Recon pull is a effective way to do this. On the job training is the best I can can up with given the stakes involved. However, I wonder how much NATO material support it aimed at the the negotiating table rather than the fight itself?  

Given the way Russia has smashed itself to measure gains in meters, in the few places it got any at all I think Ukraine can live with a relatively small reserve, at least while they are actively wrecking somewhere between a third and half of the Russian army. War is risk, it worth taking some to turn a successful offensive into a decisive one. Remember If Ukraine is truly successful and pushes Russia back to ~2/24 lines in the south it would shorten the front they have to hold considerably. That would free up a lot of forces to rest, refit, and train for the next step. Of course ideally the Russians would get a clue and quit, but who knows.

 

[Battlefront.com]

47 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Well here is one guys take. And he is a former Italian army officer with deep Ukrainian connections.

Heh... I was just doing a post about this.  I'll use his numbers as a reference because, IIRC, he's viewed positively by our group.  So, vetted in a way!

Looking through MilitaryLand's resources I have come up with the following list of currently uncommitted units:

Units formed in 2023 (18 Brigades + 2 Artillery)

5th Tank (March 2023 Reactivated)

13th Jager (February 10, 2023)

21st Mech (January 21, 2023)
22nd Mech (February 18, 2023)
31st Mech (February 18, 2023)
32nd Mech (February 9, 2023)
41st Mech (April 2, 2023)
42nd Mech (May 4, 2023 Expanded)
43rd Mech (May 4, 2023 Expanded)
88th Mech (February 15, 2023)
116th Mech (February 18, 2023)
117th Mech (February 2023)
118th Mech (February 18, 2023)
142nd Reserve Rifle Brigade (March? 2023)

78th Air Assault (May 4, 2023)
82nd Air Assault (2023)

37th Marine (February 2023)
36th Marine (February 2023)

48th Artillery (February 2023)
49th Artillery (March 15 Reactivated)

Possibly some or all of the following units are in reserve (5 Brigades)

46th Airmobile (2016)

33rd Mech (April 1, 2016)
47th Mech (April 26, 2022)
60th Mech (November 10, 2015)
63rd Mech (July 23, 2017)

 

This is 23 fighting and 2 artillery brigades, or about 50,000 personnel.  Subtracting out the 5 existing brigades possibly in reserve and that's 40,000 personnel.  Which is exactly what Reuters counted last month:

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-trains-40000-storm-brigade-troops-counter-offensive-2023-04-05/

Even if all of 5 possible reserve units are already committed, that's 18 fighting brigades.  That's a huge force.

Aside from this force keep in mind that Ukraine's current frontline is very stable and even, in places, able to counter attack.  That means this 40-50k force is in addition to whatever is in a particular sector already.  The sector I favor has about 8-10k forces already in the line.

Ukraine can do a lot of damage with this force, that's for sure.

Steve

[dan/california]

9 minutes ago, sburke said:

That is an awfully good target.  I would be hesitant to put that many boots in that small a space.  It also makes for an enticing logistical tail target.  the RA may suck. but even they could do some damage there.

He is sort of exaggerating about the five kilometer front. But that is an approximation of what they have available to shove through the hole once they make it. I rather suspect they will make more than one actually.

[Battlefront.com]

21 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

I am thinking that a major percentage will have to be held in combat ready reserve to provide for unknowable developments over the next several months. What is encouraging is that the build up will allow the UA to give it's forces real battlefield experience without throwing their new stuff to the wind. Recon pull is a effective way to do this. On the job training is the best I can up with given the stakes involved. However, I wonder how much NATO material support it aimed at the the negotiating table rather than the fight itself?  

If Ukraine decides to do a breakthrough/exploitation type attack, which is the one I favor, they will probably put 20k into the initial breakthrough (existing units plus new) and have the bulk of the remaining available units follow for exploitation.  Subtracting some for Donbas, that's probably another 30k available for exploitation.

I think this is entirely sufficient to take back half of the south provided they get down to Melitopol in good shape and attacks along the Dnepr from south and north obligate Russians to retreat.  If the latter doesn't happen, well, things will get very interesting.  Ukraine might not be able to take back as much territory, but will destroy some sizeable Russian forces.

Steve

[dan/california]

2 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I think this is entirely sufficient to take back half of the south provided they get down to Melitopol in good shape and attacks along the Dnepr from south and north obligate Russians to retreat. 

With longer range precision munitions finally available, which means things are going to blow up throughout Crimea. The Ukrainians might do even better than this. I really think an approximation of the 2/24 lines are a possibility. Not a certainty by any means, but certainly possible. Mobik morale isn't looking so good.

[Battlefront.com]

6 minutes ago, dan/california said:

With longer range precision munitions finally available, which means things are going to blow up throughout Crimea. The Ukrainians might do even better than this. I really think an approximation of the 2/24 lines are a possibility. Not a certainty by any means, but certainly possible. Mobik morale isn't looking so good.

There's only so much a Human can do before he has to take a break.  There's only so far a mechanized unit can go without maintenance.  Ammo, food, and fuel flow slower the longer the distances traveled from stockpiles.  Even if there's a general collapse in the south, there's a practical limitation on taking back territory.

Now, I think it is important to note that I am focused on the months of June-August.  If things go really well for this period then I believe more will be achieved in Sept-Nov before the weather ruins campaigning.  All 6 months combined, I think it is possible for Ukraine to retake all territory lost in the south in 2022.  I still do not think they are going to take back Crimea this year.

Steve

[kevinkin]

25 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Of course ideally the Russians would get a clue and quit, but who knows.

I am still thinking a whole bunch of the new material support is earmarked to operations beyond this campaign season. Perhaps setting up an armed camp similar but more vast than Israel has survived under. If I could get my hands on Putin I would ring his neck. Maybe my golf buddies in the NJ pizza trade could lend some "offer you can't refuse" with the cement truck whirling in the background. 

[dan/california]

26 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

There's only so much a Human can do before he has to take a break.  There's only so far a mechanized unit can go without maintenance.  Ammo, food, and fuel flow slower the longer the distances traveled from stockpiles.  Even if there's a general collapse in the south, there's a practical limitation on taking back territory.

Now, I think it is important to note that I am focused on the months of June-August.  If things go really well for this period then I believe more will be achieved in Sept-Nov before the weather ruins campaigning.  All 6 months combined, I think it is possible for Ukraine to retake all territory lost in the south in 2022.  I still do not think they are going to take back Crimea this year.

Steve

I suspect we will know soon enough. 

[Battlefront.com]

An important additional note to my list of Ukrainian units I forgot to include.

5 brigades on that list are not likely ready for combat just yet, so they are obvious candidates for later phases of exploitation and/or ops in the Fall.  Those units are:

41st Mech (April 2, 2023)
42nd Mech (May 4, 2023 Expanded)
43rd Mech (May 4, 2023 Expanded)
142nd Reserve Rifle Brigade (March? 2023)

78th Air Assault (May 4, 2023)

However, most of Ukraine's newly formed units were built around a cadre from an established unit.  This is something that Russia does not seem interested in doing with their new units (as much or not at all, not sure).  Given that Ukraine has a long history of splitting brigades into battalion components, sometimes widely separated form each other, it is possible that portions of these units might be in the fight sooner than others.

Steve

[kevinkin]

2 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Given that Ukraine has a long history of splitting brigades into battalion components, sometimes widely separated form each other, it is possible that portions of these units might be in the fight sooner than others.

That agility is really special. Plug and Play with a logistics trail hard to pin down. Defending on home ground helps. I would be interested in finding out how the UA is managing their rear areas with respect to ammo storage, R&R, and maintaining their stuff overall. 

[Battlefront.com]

Regarding Storm Shadow, I wanted to make a point about the wisdom of escalation:

Quote

However, the Storm Shadows have apparently been supplied with Kyiv’s assurance that they won’t be used against targets in the Russian Federation. Wallace said that the weapons would be used within Ukraine’s sovereign territory — although that would not rule out strikes against Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine, also including Crimea.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraines-storm-shadow-missiles-are-a-big-problem-for-russia

Russia is already whining and complaining about Storm Shadow, but they have limited practical responses.  In fact, the primary justification for sending Ukraine these missiles is because Russia insists on hitting Ukrainian civilians.  If Russia does anything else warcrimes related out of frustration, then guess what?  The West could allow Ukraine to target things within Russia. 

Putin has got to know this would be very, very bad because many more Russians will be asking "what air defenses doing?".  There's so many juicy targets in Russia and only so much effective air defenses to guard them all.  And if the West keeps the embargo on Russian territorial targets, there's still ATACMS and other systems that are currently being withheld that could show up and be in use within weeks.

This means the West escalated the threat to Russia while keeping other threats aside to limit what Russia is willing to do about it.  That is some good thinking on the part of the West, especially because it probably took the better part of the last 4-5 months to figure out and produce everything necessary to adapt them to Ukrainian airframes.

I look forward to seeing how Ukraine uses these and how successful Russian air defenses are in thwarting them.

Steve

[dan/california]

Interesting take from one of the most useful sources of the whole war.

[Der Zeitgeist]

22 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I look forward to seeing how Ukraine uses these and how successful Russian air defenses are in thwarting them.

I think their effect will mostly be psychological, considering the UK will (probably) not hand over a lot of these. But the Russians don't know that. Does Ukraine have a dozen, 50, 100? They can't tell, and they have to assume it's as many as Ukraine needs to turn every logistics node and ammo depot in the occupied territory into "cotton", as the Ukrainians say.

We will probably see a couple of highly visible attacks on a few important targets. Impressive mushroom clouds that look cool/scary on social media. The Russians will have to react to that by pulling back certain assets and dispersing depots and logistics. The Ukrainians will reap the benefits of reduced Russian supply on the frontline.

The overall effect will probably be similar to what HIMARS achieved, just on a deeper level.